Qian Liwei

Since Obama was reelected last November and Xi became Secretary-General of Chinese Communist Party the same month and was elected President this March, it has been a consensus among policy makers as well as experts in both countries that a face-to-face summit as soon as possible between the two leaders is necessary and expectable considering the smooth power transfer in both countries and its strategic implication to the Asian-Pacific region and the whole world. A precise calculation concluded that the first opportunity of a Xi-Obama talk would be on G-20 summit in Russia this September and the second opportunity a month later at APEC informal summit in Indonesia. But the reason for an earlier meeting is more convincing from the perspective of both governments, not only because Xi’s predecessor, former President Hu Jintao met Obama for 13 times in different occasions during Obama’s first term, a record rarely seen even between U.S. top leader and his counterpart of American closest allies, but also Obama and Xi have been maintaining a couple of formal exchanges of communication in the past seven months, so an earlier meeting is definitely a reasonable decision which will satisfy all parties related. 

Just prior to the summit, President Xi will pay a state visit to Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rico and Mexico which are all Latin American countries regarded geopolitically as the U.S. sphere of influence in. Xi’s incoming Latin American trip, an effort to extend Chinese economic and political presence in U.S. “backyard” will no doubt be closely watched by strategists and analysts, and may cause security concerns in the U.S. government. President Obama, recently trapped in political scandals, also has a very busy foreign journey plan, he’s expected to step on the African continent where Xi has just visited as his first diplomatic show in this March. 

With regard to the venue and the form of summit, both leaders will put protocol aside to focus on substance, as Washington Post noticed in its news report. Annenberg Retreat at Sunnylands, self-called “Camp David in the West”, is an ideal site for informal diplomacy. It has received seven U.S. Presidents in its history, and will largely facilitate a relaxed person-to-person communication, rather than a short greeting or corridor chat at an international conference.  It will also be instrumental to enhance mutual trust which is vital in case of emergency or contingency between the leaders of established power and rising power like U.S. and China as part of crisis management. A Xi-Obama relationship of mutual trust will gradually inject positive momentum to reduce the strategic trust deficit between the two countries. 

Although compared with the situation four decades ago when China and U.S. had hardly any official contacts, people-to-people exchanges have geometrically increased, high level diplomacy and summit of top leaders in particular, has been always at helm of bilateral relations.  Sino-U.S. ties are not managed from the bottom up, but instead from the top down, from the ice-breaking visit of President Nixon in 1972 to the settlement of bombing of Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia in 1999, and to the EP-3 incident in 2001. A smooth power transfer in leadership in both countries, and especially in U.S., is of great importance to the stability and development of the Sino-U.S. relationship. It’s natural conclusion that top leader diplomacy has been playing and still playing an irreplaceable role in bilateral relations. 

An earlier Xi-Obama summit is also highly expected by Asian-Pacific nations and the rest of the world. With so called “pivot to Asia” strategy implemented, the region is witnessing a set of new security challenges and potential tensions that regional countries are worrying about. Although China and U.S. have reached the consensus that the Pacific is large and deep enough to accommodate both countries, in the perspective of neighboring countries any big moves of “two elephants” has great impact on them, and a stable, sustainable and predictable Sino-U.S. relationship is highly appreciated. Furthermore, an arrangement of economic-security dual leadership system is beneficial to most of the regional countries which are eager to take a free ride in trade as well as in security. 

Xi and Obama is believed to touch the issues of great importance at bilateral, regional and global level, such as trade relations, cyber-security, climate change, situation in Northeast Asia, Iran nuclear ambition, macro-economic policy coordination, etc. President Xi will no doubt mention the new type of big country relationship which he first put forward when visiting U.S. as vice President on February 2012. This concept was reiterated when he received American high officials Secretary of Treasury Jacob Lew, Secretary of State John Kerry and Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey who came to Beijing in March and in April. New type of big country relationship has been also repeatedly echoed by Obama and his high officials, and will also be the new direction and goal which both sides are trying to reach. 

Tom Donilon, Obama’s national security advisor, will be on his way to Beijing on March 26 for the purpose of arrangement of summit right before President Xi leaves for his Latin America trip. Donilon is expected to meet the Chinese leadership including Xi, and nail down the details of the summit with his Chinese counterpart. 

Shortly after the summit, the fifth round of Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) is to be held in Washington, D.C. in early June, specifics of fruits of cooperation are highly expectable. Unproved information is being circulated that Obama will be invited to visit China late this year or early next year. A more positive, mature and predictable Sino-U.S. relations based on mutual respect, reciprocal benefit and win-win will pave the way for the new type of big country relationship. 

Qian Liwei is Associate Research Fellow with China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR)

The U.S. government has been largely dissatisfied with China’s North Korea policy throughout the Obama administration, best exemplified by President Obama’s admonition of China’s “willful blindness” after Beijing refused to condemn the North’s deadly attacks against South Korea in 2010. However, U.S.-China cooperation appeared to improve significantly during this latest round of North Korean provocations, reaching a high point with China’s cooperation on drafting sanctions and later the Bank of China’s decision to cut ties with the DPRK’s Foreign Trade Bank after the United States enacted unilateral sanctions in mid-March. Many pundits and former officials, notably Christopher Hill, Kurt Campbell and Jon Huntsman, pointed to China’s support for tougher sanctions in response to the North’s third nuclear test in February as a turning point in Chinese policy and a sign of increased willingness to work with the United States on the North Korea issue. Yet few considered what China was asking for in return. 

Beijing leverages its cooperation on North Korea as a bargaining chip in the overall U.S.-China relationship. China’s North Korea policy is encapsulated in the three no’s—no war, no instability and no nuclear weapons. China and North Korea’s mutual distrust and disdain does not change the fact that Beijing has convinced itself that the existence of a “pro-China” North Korean state is necessary to secure China’s interests in the region. Foremost among China’s interests is traditionally considered to be North Korea’s value as a strategic buffer against the U.S. military, but Peking University professor Jia Qingguo echoed the increasing debate when he said, “more and more people realize that North Korea is more like a security liability than a security asset to China.” China’s continued support for Pyongyang, despite the growing realization that North Korea no longer acts as a strategic buffer, suggests that North Korea’s value to China is changing to bargaining leverage in the U.S.-China relationship. 

China is able to wield North Korea as leverage because the Obama administration has outsourced its North Korea policy to Beijing. The administration’s policy of “strategic patience” has failed to accomplish its intended goal—to stop North Korea’s provocations by conditioning U.S.-DPRK contact on an end to such hostilities—leaving the United States to court Beijing for solutions. Yet the U.S. “rebalancing” to Asia has increased Chinese suspicions of U.S. intensions in the region and thereby reduced Chinese goodwill to cooperate on resolving the North Korea issue, leaving Beijing seeking compensation for cooperation. Fudan University professor Shen Dingli, shortly after calling for China to “cut North Korea loose,” laid out a strategy for Secretary of State Kerry’s visit to Beijing in April. Shen’s strategy reads like an instruction manual for bargaining with the Chinese leadership—“Kerry will likely urge China to rein in Pyongyang [but the United States] has to accord China’s interests more respect,” concluding that “Kerry should not seek cooperation without respecting China’s reasonable expectations.” Increased dialogue between the two capitals on the underlying motivations for the rebalancing will build mutual trust and reduce Chinese resistance to pressure North Korea, eliminating a driving factor in China’s use of North Korea as bargaining leverage. 

The question is whether the United States is willing to “pay” for China’s cooperation, and if so, how much? The U.S. government is unlikely to engage in outright bargaining but appears to be creating its own bargaining leverage for Chinese action on North Korea. The United States’ recent military actions in response to the growing threat of the North’s missile and nuclear programs sought to raise the costs of supporting the DPRK for Beijing. Although the U.S. government denied any connection to China’s policy, this imposed cost was highlighted by an increased emphasis on missile defense, which directly affects China’s own security by degrading Beijing’s second-strike capability. During his visit to Japan, Secretary Kerry hinted at this tactic, although he later backtracked; “if the threat disappears, i.e. North Korea denuclearizes, the same imperative does not exist at that point in time for us to have to have that kind of robust, forward leaning posture of defence.” 

However, China is likely no longer even interested in bargaining over North Korea. The recent release of the annual U.S. Department of Defense report on Chinese military capabilities for the first time explicitly stated that some cyberattacks on the United States were “attributable directly to the Chinese government and military.” In light of China’s bargaining strategy, the accusation is likely to end any Chinese willingness for significant further action on North Korea, including improved sanctions enforcement. This should be the final sign that Washington needs to reengage with North Korea directly, at an appropriate time, to get its DPRK policy back on track by reducing dependence on Beijing and removing China’s bargaining leverage. 

Despite any tentative signs of increased Chinese pressure on North Korea, Beijing’s fundamental policy of support for the Kim regime will remain unchanged going forwards, as another round of provocations is unlikely to significantly alter Beijing’s strategic calculus. With no significant changes on the horizon, the United States has to decide how to approach the North Korea issue in the larger context of U.S.-China relations. A good place to start would be to stop looking to Xi Jinping and instead talk to Kim Jong-un. 

Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga is a Research Assistant at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Obama’s “pivot” to — or “rebalancing” toward — Asia and the Pacific, in both words and deeds, has aroused a great deal of suspicion in China. These suspicions deepen when the United States gets itself entangled in China’s dispute with Japan over the Diaoyu Islands and in the debates over maritime issues in the South China Sea. Should this ill-thought-out policy of rebalancing continue and the security environment worsen, an arms race would be inevitable. China, despite its intention to pursue a strategy of peaceful development, might be forced to revisit some aspects of its policy for the region. That is something China abhors. We understand that a peaceful and prosperous world starts with your neighborhood — just as a stable and good Sino-U.S. relationship also starts in our two countries’ neighborhood, the Asia-Pacific region.

From the Chinese perspective, the United States is the only power capable of creating a negative external environment for China. This is why China carefully scrutinizes what the Obama administration does and tries to understand what it will do. But we also understand that it is in China’s long-term interest — as well as that of the entire region — to develop and maintain stable, healthy relations with the United States. And we think that there are many common interests that should serve as a basis for a cooperative relationship.

It is clear to all that the world’s balance of power is shifting in favor of China and other emerging countries, though the United States maintains its strength in the economic, science-and-technology, military, and cultural fields. However, this “one up, other down” trend that has been accelerating since the 2008 financial crisis has intensified U.S. strategic uncertainty about China. We believe this is why the United States has been increasing its strategic hedging by deploying more and more of its military assets to the Western Pacific and by strengthening its military alliances with Japan, Australia, South Korea, and others in the region.

Clearly, a huge deficit of strategic trust lies at the bottom of all problems between China and the United States. Some scholars have hinted that U.S.-China trust is at its lowest since U.S. President Richard Nixon’s historic 1972 visit to China. But history is a mirror. And from a historical perspective China and the United States, despite their differences, have many things in common, and there is no reason for them to distrust each other. Granted, China has achieved spectacular economic growth over the past several decades, which has made its military modernization possible. But isn’t this a product of the globalization espoused by the United States? Isn’t it a fact that China’s growth has contributed hugely to world peace and prosperity?

During World War II, China and the United States were allies, and together with others, they built the international system in which we now interact. A recent example is the joint efforts by China and the United States in tackling the international financial crisis within the framework of the G-20. We cannot claim that this cooperation between the two countries prevented the world economy from collapsing, but it would not be too off the mark to say that without such cooperation, the world today would be a totally different place.

Now, a new type of relationship between China and the United States requires changing the outdated view of a rivalry among great powers for spheres of influence and the inevitability of a confrontation between existing and aspiring powers. This relationship instead calls for dialogue and cooperation to expand common interests and reduce suspicions and vicious competition. China and the United States must try their utmost to avoid strategic quagmire and rivalry during this period of historic convergence and join hands in building a community of nations bent on peaceful development through cooperation and coordination.

The importance of such a relationship cannot be overemphasized, for both China and the United States. It is a road that has never before been traversed. To embark on such a road fully demonstrates that China has a historic vision and worldview and is working with other countries for peace and prosperity. It also demonstrates that China has full confidence in its peaceful development concept and has the moral integrity to maintain healthy, stable relations with other great powers. The United States has nothing to fear or worry about, and everything to gain, from a strong, peace-loving, and prosperous China.

True, there are structural differences between China and the United States with regard to geopolitics, political systems, and ideology. The debate on China in the United States is nonstop. But there is always something missing in this debate. Trust will not just fall from the sky; it needs to be built with real actions by both sides. As Obama enters his second term and China has completed its transition of power, we believe that hope has emerged and momentum is gaining traction.

Former U.S. national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski recently noted that the United States has accepted the rise of Chinese power. Chinese President Xi Jinping has noted on many occasions that the China-U.S. relationship is one of the world’s most important and vibrant relationships with the greatest potential and that there is enough space in the vast Pacific for both China and the United States.

On many issues, the United States cannot divorce itself from China’s helping hand. With regard to the North Korean and Iranian nuclear problems, the Syrian crisis, and other difficult issues, there is a need for China to play an important or even a key role. The United States also needs China’s help in tackling global challenges such as counterterrorism, nonproliferation, poverty reduction, climate change, and energy security. Faced with a continuing weak economy, Obama sets his priorities on job creation and economic growth, and here again, China can help. On the other hand, there are still neoconservative voices in the United States claiming that the peaceful rise of China is impossible. They even predict that the United States and China will engage in tense security competition and that as the aspiring power tries to surpass the existing superpower, war between the two is inevitable. These voices should not be dismissed lightly, and the two countries should be on guard against such erroneous thinking.

It is therefore of great urgency and necessity that the Asia-Pacific region become a test field for China and the United States to explore the possibility of building a new type of great-power relationship for the 21st century. The two countries need first of all to have their officials and academics concretize the concept — to put flesh on its bones. There is no room for procrastination. The cost of possible future conflict is simply too high to contemplate.

There need to be new perspectives and new thinking to address both old and new tough issues in China-U.S. relations. China-U.S. relations are well beyond the bilateral, if only for their sheer size. Whatever policy one takes vis-à-vis the other, the implications are multilateral and worldwide, for better or worse.

Consider, for example, climate change and world trade. The global challenge of climate change is a top priority in the cooperation between China and the United States. Clean coal technology and renewable energy are only a few areas where the two countries have been discussing and collaborating in the context of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. The global market potential for green energy, as U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry hassaid, could be in the range of $6 trillion. That is quite positive.

On the other hand, there are troubling signs that cooperation is not what it should be on trade and investment, where cooperation is even more important — bilateral annual trade already exceeds $500 billion, and more than 89 percent of U.S. businesses in China are reaping profits. Unfortunately, with the United States on one front pushing for the Trans-Pacific Partnership — now encompassing 12 countries, including Australia and Japan — and negotiating the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with the European Union on the other, it cannot but give China the impression that it is intentionally being left out. Or even worse, that it is being isolated in international trade and investment negotiations, not to speak of numerous instances of failure by Chinese companies trying to invest in the United States. Here I tend to agree with former U.S. Rep. David Dreier when he saidin an April commentary in the Wall Street Journal that “China and the U.S. are destined to be the two most important powers of the 21st century,” that “the Trans-Pacific Partnership shouldn’t be about hedging,” and that “[i]t is in the interests of the U.S. that China be part of this partnership.”

So how can we improve things? We believe both countries need to rise above our bilateral relationship, that China-U.S. relations probably need to be “de-China-U.S.-ified.” Instead, they should focus more on global issues and on making global governance work as the world enters a new era of reform and rejuvenation.

Cyberattacks are a prime example of a problem that should be treated as a global governance issue and not just a bilateral one (despite the recent bilateral exchanges between China and the United States on the contentious subject of who is to blame). The fact is: Cyberattacks take place everywhere every day, and it is a mounting challenge for all countries, including China and the United States. In other words, China and the United States are both victims, and there is no point in accusing each other.

What China and the United States should do is shelve the dispute, defuse the resulting tension, and turn it into an opportunity for collaboration to curb cyberattacks and protect the safety and security of this new common frontier. Bilateral discussions are necessary, and mechanisms should be established immediately for quick, efficient communication and problem-solving, with focuses on fighting cyberspace crimes in commerce, trade, finance, and counterterrorism. There is also an urgent need for the United States to overcome its suspicions and hesitations and join China, Russia, and others to negotiate and formulate an international “code of conduct for information security” in the context of the U.N. International Telecommunication Union.

Xi and Obama have agreed to continue promoting a cooperative China-U.S. partnership in the years to come, with an emphasis on building a new type of great-power relationship between China and the United States. We’re all for letting the policy debates continue, but what is needed right now are actionable policies on both sides — a road map to make them happen. The light at the end of the tunnel is visible already.

He Yafei is deputy director of the Chinese State Council’s Overseas Chinese Affairs Office and former vice minister at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 

© 2013. Foreign Policy

In recent years in Japan, an extreme nationalist ideological trend has taken shape and is quickly expanding its influence. The Shinzo Abe Cabinet and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) have started to adopt an assertive foreign policy, and Japan is fast becoming a trouble-maker in East Asia. Abe and his supporters openly call for negation of imperial Japanese aggression, claiming that the definition of “aggression” has not yet been “firmly determined”, and that the 1946-1948 Tokyo War Crimes tribunals were illegitimate, and that the killings by Imperial Japanese aggressor troops during the 1937 “Nanjing massacre” were exaggerated or fabricated. In April 2013, three ministers of the Abe cabinet and 168 Japanese parliamentarians visited the Yasukuni Shrine, which houses among others several individuals who were convicted as “Class A” war criminals after World War II. Further more, Abe stated that he would not re-affirm the apology for Japan’s war crimes by revising “the Murayama Statement” and “the 1993 Kono Statement” that apologized to the sex slaves and their families, and he is planning to make a more forward-looking official statement in 2015.  

Abe is a typical representative of the Japanese ultra-nationalist political groups. His rhetoric and plans for revising Japan’s pacifist constitution to allow for Japanese participation in collective self-defense have been his first steps toward strengthening military power and extending Japanese military operations all over the world without any domestic constitutional or legal restrictions. However, as Richard Nixon pointed out in Beyond Peace “For Japan to rearm or to acquire nuclear weapons is politically unacceptable at home and abroad.” In the face of Abe’s militant rhetoric and advocacy for more military muscle, there is growing fear in Asia that Japan might again become a major military power. The fact that Japan has decided and will continue to increase its military forces above the level necessary to defend its home islands will have serious consequences for the Asia-Pacific region. 

Japan has fully taken advantage of the U.S. strategy of rebalance toward Asia-Pacific to emphasize U.S.-Japan military alliance for its concealed goals. By catering to U.S. desires to strengthen alliances for its rebalance toward Asia-Pacific, Japan has taken a very high profile posture on improving its relations with the U.S. in order to win U.S. support for its military revival. So far for the short-term interests and because of the temporary budget difficulties, the U.S. has done a lot to foster Japanese military forces in the hope of gaining Japan’s greater contributions to its global strategy in terms of funds and military operations. The U.S. even went so far as to refrain from criticizing Abe’s ultra nationalist behavior and remain partial to Japan over the territorial disputes between China and Japan. The current tensions over the history issues and territorial disputes between Japan and its neighbors further demonstrate that Japan has embarked on a wrong and dangerous path. China and the U.S. have to recognize the seriousness of the situation and work together to help Japan realize its mistakes, ease the tensions in the region and avoid adding new irritants to Sino-U.S. relations. 

With no formal security mechanism in Asia, the U.S., China and Japan need to keep a delicate balance in order to maintain peace and stability., And in particular, as the only superpower in the world, the U.S. possesses sufficient leverage to play a constructive role in North East Asia while looking after its own interests there. For the U.S., it is highly necessary to abandon the Cold War mentality such as strengthening the military alliance with Japan for the sake of containing China’s rise. In the long run, such plans or strategies will never succeed, and they will do no good for the U.S., China or Japan. In the new century, it is worthwhile for China, the U.S. and Japan to try to work together as equal partners to create a totally new relationship by following the world’s general trend of peace, development and common prosperity. 

Wu Zurong, Research Fellow at the China Foundation for International Studies.

Dan Steinbock

The potential for fraud was reduced by biometric IC cards and a database, which eliminated 35 million bogus voters before the election. The number of voters amounted to 90 million, with 40 million first time voters. 

Saturday’s election was the first civilian transition of power in Pakistan’s history. While it did take place amidst horrific violence, increasing poverty, and pervasive corruption, it also held a promise of a very different future. 

In the coming years, Pakistan will seek to be more focused on economic development, which has significant implications over U.S. and Chinese interests in South Asia. 

America’s lost reputation 

In late 2011, Newsweek asked Khan whether China is a better political or military partner for Pakistan than the United States. “China is a neighbor,” he said. “China has a lot of experience pulling hundreds of millions of people out of poverty—and that’s what Pakistan needs, poverty alleviation—and we can learn from China’s experience in fighting corruption.” 

While the interview raised eye-brows in Washington, it reflected Islamabad’s decade-long disappointment with the White House, and a shifting orientation toward Beijing. 

According to Pew’s recent survey, the widespread discontent with Pakistan’s direction began to deepen toward General Pervez Musharraf’s rule. Instead of improvement, the reign of Asif Ali Zardari made things much worse. 

In 2005, three of five Pakistanis felt the country was on the right path. Today, more than nine out of ten believes Pakistan is moving toward a wrong direction. 

If President George W. Bush is unpopular in Pakistan, President Obama is even more so, thanks to his excessive use of drones to target extremists in Pakistan. 

Economic plunge 

Only half a century ago, Pakistan’s average economic growth rate exceeded that of the world economy. By the 1960s, the country was the model of economic development around the world. 

While fiscally imprudent economic policies contributed to rapid increase public debt and slower growth in subsequent decades, Pakistan has been hit by a series of adverse events in the past 15 years – from the Asian financial crisis and economic sanctions, to the massive influx of refugees, huge natural calamities and a threat of a nuclear conflict with India. 

Neither near- nor medium-term prospects are positive. Political uncertainty and security challenges have been compounded with large fiscal deficits accommodated by the central bank, which fosters high inflation, which limits growth and employment. 

Since the global recession in 2008, real GDP growth has averaged only 3 percent annually, which is insufficient to achieve substantial improvement in living standards and to absorb the rising labor force. If Pakistan fails to take advantage of the demographic dividend, it will soon have to cope with a regional ‘Arab Spring.’

As the Bhutto dynasty is fading into history, the PPP (the Pakistan Peoples Party) has lost the support of the nation. Meanwhile, the fiscally conservative PML (Pakistan Muslim League), led by former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, has led most polls, despite allegations of corruption. 

Since 2008, the PTI (Pakistan Movement for Justice), led by the charismatic Imran Khan, emerged as a popular counterweight to both PPP and PML. After General Musharraf’s endorsement, Khan was also seen as the candidate of the powerful army. 

The Triangle Drama 

After the Partition of 1947, the United States was among the first nations to establish relations with Pakistan, which Washington saw as a kind of South Asia’s Turkey. As an ally against the Soviet Union, Islamabad was seen integral to the Baghdad Pact (1955) in the Middle East and the Manila Pact (1955) in Southeast Asia. 

While bilateral relations soured in the 1970s with Zulfikar Bhutto’s left-leaning PPP, Soviet expansion in the 1980s led to close bilateral military cooperation. In the 1990s, relations turned cold again with the U.S. imposed economic embargo on Pakistan. While the War on Terror restored cooperation, it relied on the personal dynamic between President Bush and General Musharraf. 

Since 2011, diverging views on counter-terrorism, the killing of Osama bin Laden, along with other adverse incidents have severely impaired the bilateral relations between Washington and Islamabad. 

In turn, Pakistan and China found each other already in the 1950s, when Islamabad was among the first to recognize the People’s Republic of China. Following the 1962 Sino-Indian War, both countries began to nurture a close and supportive relationship. Military assistance began in 1966. A strategic alliance followed in 1972 and economic cooperation in 1979. 

Today, China is Pakistan’s largest supplier of arms and its third-largest trading partner. The two are cooperating in Pakistan’s civil nuclear power sector. Beijing has helped in building the Khushab reactor. 

In Islamabad, China is seen as a regional counterweight to Washington and NATO. China supports Pakistan’s position on Kashmir, while Pakistan supports China on the issues of Xinjiang, Tibet and Taiwan. Economic cooperation has accelerated with a free trade agreement and China’s assistance in the development of Pakistan’s infrastructure. 

China is the largest investor in Pakistan’s deep-water port at Gwadar, which is located at the month of the Strait of Hormuz. Some 60 percent of China’s oil comes from the Gulf by ships traveling over 16,000 kilometers in 2-3 months, but Gwadar will reduce the distance to 2,500 kilometers and serve round the year. 

Near-abroad in South Asia 

Today, more than nine of ten Pakistanis have an unfavorable view of the United States, President Obama, and U.S. economic assistance. However, most Pakistanis have a highly favorable view of China. 

Meanwhile, Islamabad’s economic consensus has shifted as a result of Khan’s platform, which combines a focus on economic development with moderation in foreign policy. The PTI is a major anti-status quo movement advocating for a modern and egalitarian model of Islamic and democratic welfare state – a version of Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s economic policies and Ahmet Davutoglu’s “zero conflict” policy in Turkey. 

Imran Khan is more popular than the president and the prime minister together. What bodes well for Pakistan’s future is that Khan’s rivals are embracing some of his core doctrines. 

In successful large emerging economies, land reform has been vital for increased agricultural productivity and effective democracy. In Pakistan, large landowners dominate political dynasties and democratic institutions, and pay few taxes. In turn, U.S. aid has served to slow down industrialization. Tens of billions of dollars in misdirected assistance to Pakistan has only alienated Islamabad from Washington.

As Pakistan’s impending shift strongly suggests, unipolar policies no longer work in the nascent multipolar world. 

Dr. Dan Steinbock is Research Director of International Business at India China and America Institute (USA) and Visiting Fellow at Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (China) and the EU Center (Singapore).

Liu Jiangyong

On April 30, 2013, Kenichiro Sasae, Japan’s ambassador to the United States, was quick to explain away Abe’s statements in a Letter to the Editor of the Washington Post, asserting that “The government of Japan has expressed its feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology, and it has expressed feelings of sincere mourning for all World War II victims, at home and abroad.” Nevertheless, what this Japanese ambassador to the US referred to as the “government of Japan” was probably the one under the previous cabinet of Tomiichi Murayama, not at all the one under the present leadership of Shinzo Abe. As Prime Minister Abe himself did not come forward to clarify his erroneous statement, then who can represent the present Japanese government? As I see it, it is still Prime Minister Abe. 

Given the worsening relations between Japan and its neighbors, why has Prime Minister Abe said, “The definition of what constitutes aggression has yet to be established …”? This is by no means accidental or a slip of the tongue. While anxious to worship the Yasukuni Shrine, Abe has not done so directly after being elected as Prime Minister. One reason for this is that Abe, as Prime Minister, had found it inadvisable to visit the Yasukuni Shrine following Tommichi Murayam’s statements in 1995. Abe’s remarks cover up his political stance denying Japanese aggression, showing he would stick to his erroneous outlook on history at the expense of Japan’s relationship with China, South Korea and other neighbors. Clearly, Prime Minister Abe is merely reciting the erroneous logic of his right-wing predecessors. Without constant reminders by the international community, Japanese militarism and the rightist outlook on history may lead Japan down an erroneous path. 

Shinzo Abe’s remarks are nothing but a sophistry lacking common sense. Putting aside the question of whether or not there is total consensus internationally on the definition of aggression, even according to the definition of aggression by Japan itself, there is ample proof that Japan’s war against China is downright aggression. 

In the wake of World War I, with the international community’s goal of preventing future wars, the League of Nations began deliberation on the definition of aggression in early 1920. But Japanese militarism, disregarding the censure of aggression by the international community, brazenly launched an all-out war against China and the Pacific. Committing a serious crime by destroying international peace and humanism, the war ended in Japan’s total defeat. 

Following World War II, the United Nations substantiated and expanded the definition of aggression. Article II of the United Nations Charter stipulates “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” This is consistent with the historical definition of aggression and covers a wider area. 

Regrettably however, Japan, anxious to become a permanent member of the UN, failed to adopt a Diet resolution admitting it’s launching of wars of aggression and offering its apology for its actions in World War II. In the absence of a national, unified will constraining relevant remarks by Japanese Prime Ministers and with the changing Japanese political landscape, new Japanese leaders would endeavor to revise the political position of their predecessors. One fundamental reason lies in the Japanese right-wing forces that have always tried to prevent the Diet from passing relevant resolutions. Now, right-wing conservative forces are in control of the majority seats of the Japanese House of Representatives in the election held at the end of 2012 and are expected to further gain control of the House of Councilors in the July 2013 elections. The right-wing conservative forces in Japanese politics face the danger of further pursuing the militant politics. 

It was against the above-mentioned background that Shinzo Abe’s recent remarks concerning the definition of aggression and the revision of Japan’s constitution were made. Given a lack of remorse, it appears history will repeat itself. The international community, especially regional countries in Asia, must call for continued vigilance and promote peaceful development for all countries and peoples of the world. 

Liu Jiangyong is the Vice President of the Research Institute of Contemporary International Relations at Qinghua University.

Wu Sike

Resolution of the Middle East question has been delayed for over half a century, exerting protracted influence on peace, stability and development in the region and the world at large. With massive political turbulence in some Arab countries in recent years, the Middle East peace process was marginalized. However, the Palestinian question remains a core concern of the Arab and Islamic world. Since the beginning of this year, the international community has given renewed attention to promoting the peace process. 

China has continuously supported Palestinian nation-building and made unswerving effort towards a just solution to the Palestinian question. Since taking office, the new leadership has set its eyes on the Middle East with peace through diplomacy on their minds. Chinese leaders believe that the world will not gain tranquility until the Middle East enjoys peace. Restoring peace through negotiation should be the strategic choice of both Palestine (and the Arab world) and Israel. With this in mind, China invited the two leaders to China and took the opportunity to advocate peace talks between them.

As this year marks the 20^th anniversary of the Oslo Accord, China put forth a four-point proposal. It expressed the hope that Palestine and Israel would commit themselves to peace through negotiation. The proposal lays out a plan for independent Palestinian statehood and peaceful coexistence with Israel. It endorses internationally recognized principles such as “land for peace” and respects the right to survival and security. The four-point proposal demonstrates a sincere desire for an early resumption of the peace process and comprehensive peace in that region. Both Palestine and Israel expressed appreciation for the Chinese efforts, welcomed a greater Chinese role and wished for an early resumption of peace talks. As to the timing and conditions of negotiation resumption, there is still difference between the two sides but both have shown certain flexibility. 

The question of whether China’s high-profile involvement in the Middle East peace process would challenge the dominant position of the US and cause concern, rests in a conventional zero-sum mindset and should not be of concern. It is the international community’s shared desire to push Palestine and Israel towards early resumption of negotiation and peace. While various parties are making efforts towards this end, the US indeed plays a more notable role. 

Shortly after taking office during his first term, President Obama visited the Middle East and announced his intention to improve relations with the Islamic world by helping resolve the Palestinian question. Since then, four years have passed with no progress and drastic changes have shook the Middle East. The first visit of Obama’s second term was to Israel and Palestine. Within two months in office, Secretary of State John Kerry visited three times, meeting with President Abbas five times and promising to produce a plan for peace in two months. All of these actions testify to the sense of urgency on the part of the US. However, the Middle East question is indeed too complicated for a single mediator, with intertwined disagreements and problems. Furthermore, as Israel’s strategic ally, the US faces many restraints in its regional policies and Palestinians do not feel assured to fully trust the US. As a result, despite the United States’ irreplaceable and dominant role, it cannot act alone. 

Chinese and American efforts can actually run parallel without conflict. Upon proposal by the US, the Middle East question was incorporated into the China-US strategic dialogue mechanism last year and has thus become an important aspect of their coordination and cooperation. During his visit to China, Secretary Kerry talked about the Middle East question with Chinese leaders and expressed hope for more communication and coordination with China. He particularly hoped that China would work on the Palestinian side, including by helping with economic development as a foundation for peace. Peace and stability is a shared wish of people in the Middle East and serves both world peace and development. It is also in the interest of China and the US to cooperate in this region, leading by example to promote peace. 

Wu Sike is a member on the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and member on the Foreign Policy Consulting Committee of the Ministry of Foreign Affair.

Li Shaoxian

US President Barack Obama visited Israel and Palestine at the outset of his second term and Secretary of State John Kerry went to the Middle East three times in two months, all aimed at restarting the long frozen peace process. At the end of April, the Arab League put forward a two-nation land swap proposal based on the 1967 borders, offering some chance for the resumption of peace talks. It is also the first time for China’s new administration to receive key Middle East leaders. For these reasons, the two visits have attracted extensive international attention. Discussions between the Palestinian and Israeli leaders with their Chinese counterparts are said to focus on their respective bilateral relationships and the Middle East peace process. 

On the first front, China maintains friendly relations and sound cooperation with both countries. Palestine has been a traditional friend of China; according to President Abbas, China is the only major country that has always supported the resumption of national rights for Palestinians. During the visit, China and Palestine signed agreements to enhance cooperation in the fields of economy, trade, culture and education, further elevating bilateral relations. 

For Israel, 21 years worth of diplomatic ties with China have led to the rapid growth of relations, friendship and cooperation. With bilateral trade reaching nearly $10 billion, China has become Israel’s largest trading partner in Asia and its third largest trading partner in the world. Additionally, a huge delegation of officials and entrepreneurs joined Prime Minister Netanyahu at joint economic and trade events. The two sides are expected to sign multiple intergovernmental cooperation documents and business agreements in many different sectors. 

With regard to the Middle East peace process, Chinese leaders are ready to seize the opportunity to push for peace talks. President Xi Jinping has put forward a four-point proposal. Although many ideas were already voiced by China on different occasions, it is the first time for them to be articulated in a systemic way and by the head of state. Palestine’s independent statehood and the peaceful co-existence of Palestine and Israel are the ultimate way out of their protracted conflicts. Peace talks are the only path to the above-mentioned objectives and have to follow the principle of “land for peace.” The process also requires concerted efforts by the international community. Other issues of respective Palestinian and Israeli concerns are also expected on the meeting agenda, but bilateral relations and peace process are the highlights. 

As is known to all, China has always supported the peace process. The first special envoy appointed in Chinese diplomatic history was to the Middle East. Since the appointment in 2002, the special envoy has had shuttle visits to the Middle East every year, sparing no effort to push for peace and facilitate peace talks. Such a position by China reflects a common desire of the international community and is a practical expression of China undertaking the responsibility of a major country. Needless to say, with increased national strength and closer links with Middle East countries, China’s interests in the region also expand as a stable Middle East serves Chinese interests. China is always of the view that the peace process lies at the heart of the Middle East question and that there will be no stability in the Middle East without peace between Palestine and Israel. In recent years, the international community has increasingly realized the significance of facilitating peace talks between Palestine and Israel. As a matter of fact, China and the US have important common interests in Middle East stability. Last year, upon request of the US, cooperation in the Middle East was added to the strategic dialogue agenda between China and the US. It is believed that the US and the rest of the world do wish to see a more active role played by China in the Middle East peace process. 

Nonetheless, greater efforts by China on the Middle East peace process does not mean that China is going to or has the ability to replace the US. Actually, China can only play a supporting role. The process depends on concerted efforts by the international community and especially on behalf of the US because only the US is able to exert substantive influence over Israel. The international community, the US included, needs to address two difficulties in the peace process: identifying the pre-1967 War border as the basis for negotiation and making sure that Israel stops building Jewish settlements. While it is extremely difficult to press ahead with the peace process, it is also a cause that well deserves unswerving effort. 

Li Shaoxian is the Vice President of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations.

Fu Mengzi

Kerry’s predecessor, Hillary Clinton, had passionately argued for the attention of the US to be focused on East Asia, often causing tension in the region. Now Kerry is trying to cloak this aggressive, realist style of diplomacy, with a mantle of idealism. The new diplomatic style has added a tint of “tenderness” to the Obama administration’s foreign policy and obviously represents the US’ ideals about its relations with the region. China should treat it with ease rather than with a mindset of confrontation. 

The “return to the Asia Pacific” strategy President Obama adopted in his first term of office often featured military exercises. A major consideration in the strategy was to counterbalance the influence of a rising China, causing major skepticism amongst China’s strategists. Since Obama was first elected, the US has become involved in the South China Sea disputes. This only intensified suspicions between China and the US about each other’s strategic intentions. Kerry’s “Pacific Dream” is a new way to state the US strategy of a greater focus on Asia. 

Under Kerry, the Asia Pacific strategy of the United States is already becoming more comprehensive and multidimensional. Although Kerry will continue promoting it, the “return to Asia Pacific” strategy will not solely rely on military means. Political, economic and diplomatic measures will also be adopted. This is exactly what Kerry meant when he said in his speech, “President Obama made a smart and strategic commitment to rebalance our interests and investments in Asia.” 

Furthermore, the US global diplomatic strategy is also being “rebalanced”. A major part of Obama’s readjustment of this strategy is to attach equal importance to Europe and the Middle East while “returning to Asia Pacific”. On the issue of anti-terrorism, the bombing at the finish line of the Boston marathon has put Americans on edge again although the issue was no longer an overwhelming issue on their agenda. With the spread of extremists and violent conflicts, especially after various terrorist organizations took the opportunity of al Qaeda’s near disintegration to extend their influence in North Africa and Central Asia, the Obama administration will shift part of its attention to these two areas instead of focusing on Middle East and South Asia exclusively. 

Additionally, economic issues now occupy the main position in the US diplomatic strategy. Kerry defined his “Pacific Dream” as striving for “strong growth, fair growth, smart growth and just growth”. Obviously the US hopes its diplomatic strategy will boost its economic recovery and help reinforce its status as the world’s sole superpower. 

Fourth, the US wants to rebalance its relationship with China. In a recent speech delivered at the Asia Society in New York, White House National Security Adviser Tom Donilon said China is one of three pillars of the US strategy that also includes regional alliances and economic interests. Obviously, the Obama administration is trying to tone down the rhetoric being used toward China. In his Tokyo speech, Kerry also said that the US welcomed “China’s strong statement of its commitment to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsular” and appreciated “China’s exploding investments into clean and alternative and renewable energies” over the past decade. He also said he had told Chinese leaders “the US and the world benefit from a stable and prosperous China that assumes the responsibilities of a great power.” He said China should play a key role in world affairs but should also play by the rules. He told his audience: “I’m pleased to tell you that we have had more high-level engagement and dialogue with China than ever before, and I believe it is constructive and productive.” He continued: “Even as we are clear-eyed about our differences – and we will be, and there are differences – we are committed to building a comprehensive and a co-operative partnership that allows us to work together in mutual respect.” 

Every nation has the right to pursue its dream. The Pacific Dream and China Dream should not be pitted against each other. Instead, they should be viewed highly complementary. In his recent visit to Africa, Chinese President Xi Jinping explained his ideals about the China Dream, the Africa Dream and the World Dream. With that said, it is important to note that China and the US are trying to establish an unprecedented new type of relationship between global powers. On this topic, Kerry also said, “Our Pacific Dream is to translate our strongest values into an unprecedented security, economic, and social co-operation.” In each of the efforts – growing strong, growing fair, growing smart and growing just, he said, “China is, of course, a critical partner.” 

Both China and the US are Pacific nations, who have become highly reliant on each other. There is certainly competition between the two, however there is also co-operation that carries greater weight in the bilateral relationship. In this problem-riddled Asia Pacific region, neither China nor the US has the veto power on many of the most pressing issues. The leadership of both countries have begun co-operation in dealing with regional conflicts and non-traditional security threats. In regards to Kerry’s Pacific Dream, we hope that constructive dialogue, rather than unilateral decisions, will chart its course. 

Fu Mengzi is the Vice President of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations.

Dr. Ruan Zongze

Thailand has friendly ties with China, Indonesia holds an important position in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Singapore is hailed as the brain behind ASEAN and Brunei currently holds the association’s rotating presidency.

China-ASEAN ties have made considerable progress, especially since the establishment of “China-ASEAN strategic partnership for peace and prosperity” in 2003, despite some twists and turns. Besides, the establishment of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area has improved the two sides’ ability to deal with the global financial crisis.

China supports and values ASEAN’s unity and development and would like to see the establishment of ASEAN Economic Community by 2015. It also wants to see ASEAN playing a greater role in international affairs and in maintaining regional stability and development.

The South China Sea disputes that flared up again in 2009, however, have soured relations between China and some ASEAN member states. The Philippines stirred up the HuangyanIsland crisis in 2012, and the Vietnamese National Assembly has passed the Law of the Sea to include China’s Xisha and Nansha islands in Vietnam’s territory.

For some time, some ASEAN member states have been trying to hijack the relationship between ASEAN and China for their selfish gains by stirring up trouble in the South China Sea. Vietnam and the Philippines occupy China’s maritime areas and islands and are trying to use extra-territorial forces to consolidate their illegal occupation. The South China Sea disputes have thus become an important factor in China-ASEAN relations.

Since the disputing sides find it difficult to perceive each other’s real intentions, some ASEAN states believe China is becoming increasingly assertive with its rising strength, while China thinks some ASEAN countries are trying to draw in external forces into the region to “balance” its rise.

The situation in the South China Sea is partly related to the “pivot to Asia” policy of the United States. And Japan, which has a dispute with China over the DiaoyuIslands, has joined the US’ game to fish in troubled waters.

Among the four countries Wang is visiting, Indonesia and Brunei claim part of the South China Sea, too, but are different from the Philippines and Vietnam, because they want the disputes to be settled through negotiations. Thailand and Singapore, which too share the waters of the South China Sea, don’t want the disputes to affect the overall China-ASEAN friendly and cooperative relations.

China will make its principled stance and bottom line clear when the time comes, and resolutely counter the disputing countries’ unilateral attempt to change the status quo in the South China Sea. With regard to China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, some neighboring countries’ actions are complicating or exacerbating the situation, which China has strongly opposed in its white paper on national defense.

Regional stability has played a very important role in the region’s rapid economic growth. So by fomenting trouble, these countries could undermine the stability of the region and jeopardize their development.

The Philippines, earlier this year, called for international arbitration in the South China Sea dispute, which has been opposed by China. In violation of the UN Charter and international law, the Philippines has illegally occupied some of China’s islands and reefs in the South China Sea since 1970s. Opposing the illegal occupation, China has been urging the Philippines to withdraw all its men and materials from China’s islands and reefs.

At the 22nd ASEAN Summit in Brunei last month, leaders of the member states issued a joint statement urging China to sign a legally binding “code of conduct” to avoid disputes. China is not afraid to talk about “codes of conduct” but first it has to be determined which country (or countries) is violating the spirit of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. Otherwise, no “code of conduct” will seem credible.

China attaches great importance to its relations with ASEAN member states not only because it needs a stable and prosperous ASEAN, but also because ASEAN needs a stable and prosperous China. Of course, the South China Sea disputes will not, and should not, dominate China-ASEAN relations.

China will continue to promote friendship and partnership, deepen mutually beneficial cooperation with its neighbors, and ensure that its development brings even greater benefits to them. But ASEAN has to make concerted efforts to stop some of its member states from stirring up trouble to keep China-ASEAN ties on a path of smooth development.

Ruan Zongze is deputy director of China Institute of International Studies. 

© 2013. China Daily