Firstly, historic factors. In modern times, Northeast Asia has been a region full of turmoil and strife. Presently, issues such as territorial disputes between China and Japan, South Korea and Japan, the separation of the Korean Peninsula are all historical problems. Actually, the Japanese attitude towards historical issues has almost become one of the core variables that affects China-Japan and the South Korea-Japan relationship. Recently, members of Japan’s Cabinet paid a visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, which aroused strong dissatisfaction from China, South Korea and other Asian countries. From this point, historical factors have lead to important and obvious impacts on the current political landscape in Northeast Asia. 

Secondly, ideological factors. During the Cold War, the ideological struggle was one contested field for both the United States and the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War, however, does not mean the end of this ideological struggle. The current security situation in Northeast Asia is still plagued by a Cold War mentality, and the US alliance system in Asia is one typical external manifestation. To some degree, US behavior is an important reason for the increased security dilemma among the Northeast Asian countries. For example, one of the key issues in North Korea’s nuclear crisis is that North Korea has claimed that there is no guarantee for national security. For North Korea, a reliable nuclear deterrent is an effective practice to safeguard national security in a self-help system. Essentially, the core point of the North Korean nuclear issue is still the scarcity of safety and security. 

Thirdly, the factor of real interests. There are disputes in real interests among major Northeast Asia countries. Divided into types of interests, most of them are core interests related to territorial sovereignty, which leaves a narrower scope for coordination between the relevant countries. Additionally, the nationalist sentiment in those countries is generally higher, especially on sovereignty issues. As modern countries, heeding public opinion and considering people’s interests and aspirations have become an important source for the legitimacy of state power. For this reason, decision makers are heavily influenced by people’s emotion, which may lead to irrational policies. It should be noted that, given the impact of the international financial crisis, many countries in Northeast Asia have experienced hardship in economic development. In order to regain power, political forces have resorted to inciting nationalist sentiment against neighboring countries, which makes the countries’ relationship in the region more complex and worse. 

In view of this, to solve the security dilemma in Northeast Asia, we should at least do the following things: first, face up to history, and look into the future. All countries should calmly rethink lessons from history, especially for countries that have caused untold sufferings to the people of Asian countries. Based on and beyond that, these countries should turn their attention to the future, go forward and work together to build a long-term, stable security mechanism in Northeast Asia. To a larger extent, dealing with historical issues between the Northeast Asian countries, including the problems in the factual and psychological field is the first step toward a new security relationship among the Northeast Asian countries. 

Secondly, countries should discard the Cold War mentality and ensure mutual assured security. Whether it is in theory or in practice, the zero-sum game of the Cold War mentality has been proven to be outdated. The policies of power against power are not conducive to the regional stability and prosperity; while common security, cooperative security, collective security are based on mutual assured security thinking are the most useful means for safeguarding regional security and stability. Any country that wants to build up its own security based on another’s insecurity, pursue so-called absolute security is bound to get counterproductive results. 

Thirdly, countries should strengthen multi-level exchanges, and reduce the risk of miscalculation. At present, the academic community has formed a basic consensus, namely the lack of a Northeast Asia security mechanism, which is largely reflected in the lack of an effective, comprehensive, institutional exchange mechanism among Northeast Asian countries. As a result, the risk of strategic misjudgment increases, especially in times of crisis. Therefore, to build the Northeast Asia security mechanism needs to establish institutionalized communication channels first, which is not limited to the government level, but going to the non-governmental level. Mutual understanding and mutual trust between the public is to build the most reliable guarantee of harmonious relations between nations. 

Last but most important, we should strengthen Sino-US relations, and effectively increase cooperation. On the surface, Northeast Asia security involves many actors, but in essence, Sino-US relations are the core factor in the Northeast Asia security pattern. At this point, the state of security in Northeast Asia is highly subject to the state of Sino-US relations. From this perspective, the nature and form of Sino-US relations has become one of the critical variables for the Northeast Asian security situation. Actually, Northeast Asia security and Sino-US relations are interactive. In other words, the state of security in Northeast Asia will have counteractive effects on the state of Sino-US relations. Thus, to increase cooperation in Northeast Asia also provides the favorable opportunity and important platform to cultivate a new type of relations between China and the United States. 

Chen Jimin is Ph.D and Assistant Research Fellow for the Institute for International and Strategic Studies at the Party School of Central Committee of C.P.C

Is China Really a Dragon to be Defeated?

Compared with the US, Southeast Asian countries have a more balanced judgment on China’s role in the region. The most serious challenge for China’s relationship with Southeast Asian countries is the South China Sea issue. In fact, China is not the initiator of problems. It is the claimants, especially Vietnam and the Philippines, who changed the status quo.

For years, these countries have expressed their misgivings and concerns about China’s rapid development, especially the achievements in economic and military capacities. They believe “time is on China’s side” and they would be in a disadvantageous position dealing with China to end territorial disputes.

With this in mind, the Philippines and Vietnam obviously adopted more and more aggressive positions and approaches. In 2009, Philippine President Arroyo signed Republic Act No.9522, also known as the Philippine Archipelagic Baselines Law, which claimed the country exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Huangyan Island. Since then, the two countries have carried out a variety of actions that complicated the South China Sea issue. Various actions have been taken. In 2012, the harassment of Chinese fishermen by a Philippine naval ship triggered the Huangyan Island incident, which marked the most serious standoff in the related waters.

What is worse, the claimants are making the South China Sea issue a problem for the US and ASEAN. Vietnam and the Philippines have sought support from the US to counterbalance China. At the same time, they succeeded in fitting the South China Sea issue into the ASEAN agenda on various occasions.

The South China Sea issue has cast a shadow on China’s relationship with some Southeast Asian countries. However, most regional countries don’t believe China is aiming to become a regional hegemon.

Quite a few scholars and officials from regional countries admitted that China’s policies concerning the South China Sea issue are mostly responsive. China neither started a change of the status quo on purpose nor changed the position that the territorial disputes should be solved between related parties through peaceful approaches. ASEAN approved China’s signing of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and the follow-up efforts implementing the DOC.

Besides, China did not close the door for the potential signing of the Code of Conduct (COC). On the contrary, China has been working with related parties toward a jointly accepted outcome. China has also reaffirmed that the South China Sea issue is not a problem between China and ASEAN.

In addition, China has not and will not force Southeast Asian countries to choose between China and ASEAN. China values the unity of ASEAN and persists in respecting ASEAN’s leadership in regional cooperation and supporting the construction of the ASEAN community and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

On the whole, China has been trying to develop the relationship with neighboring countries and establish the image of a responsible player in the region. Even in the context of being challenged by some countries, China continues to persist in peaceful development and work on building a harmonious regional environment. China’s development and increasing regional influence is acceptable for most countries.

Is the US the Only Choice for Regional Countries?

Fundamentally, Southeast Asian countries value the opportunities for economic development, and at the same time, they pay attention to the developments in regional security. Their attitude toward the US rebalance is dependent on their judgment of US policy intentions and US influence on the regional economic development and security environment. Accordingly, it will be difficult for regional countries to sacrifice their own interests to assist the implementation of US policies.

Southeast Asian countries also attach importance to their relationship with China. The economic ties between China and ASEAN are strong and irreplaceable. China remains ASEAN’s largest trading partner. Meanwhile, ASEAN is China’s third largest trading partner. The trade volume between China and ASEAN exceeded $400 billion in 2012. In comparison, the economic relationship between the US and ASEAN cannot outweigh the one between China and ASEAN.

The regional countries realize that they will be in a favorable position if they balance between and benefit from both sides. They are reluctant to be forced to choose between China and the US, which forces the regional countries into an awkward predicament.

The US needs to understand that even though it shares some common goals with Southeast Asian countries, they are actually strange bedfellows.

Su Xiaohui, Deputy Director, Department of International and Strategic Studies, China Institute of International Studies

According to these authors, the U.S. has two “key and enduring” strategic objectives: “preventing the ‘domination of Asia by a hostile power or coalition,’ and ‘nurturing a prosperous, peaceful and free Asia.’”  

Asked what “two or three most important steps” the U.S. should take to achieve its goals, Blumenthal replied that the U.S. should “first, do what it can to ensure the strength of its allies and the durability of its alliances. Second, … continue to engage in intense diplomacy with China, particularly on clear mutual interests such as structural reform of both economies.”  

Last week, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace released what can be seen as an extended extrapolation of this U.S. strategy misleadingly titled China’s Military & The U.S.-Japan Alliance in 2030: A Strategic Net Assessment.    

The title is misleading because, as much as about the growth of Chinese military power, the massive 400-page study augurs a U.S. military layering on over the next 15 years strategic resources to maintain unchallengeable military “primacy” in the region. 

Looking at the scenarios it is hard not to be struck by the gap between America’s stated second “key and enduring” goal–essentially a harmonious Asia–and Carnegie’s “most likely” prospective future, which is a tense, economy-sapping arms race and intermittent low-level conflict carrying risks of sharp escalation. 

There is something very wrong with this picture. The defect, pointed out brilliantly by Australian National University professor Hugh White in his book The China Choice:  Why America Should Share Power, can be presented as a rhetorical question:  If it is reasonable and in the U.S.’s interest to prevent “domination of Asia by a [potentially] hostile power or coalition,” would this not be an even more vital objective for China?    

For the U.S., such a threat exists potentially in the future. For China, looking at U.S. military domination of the region, both on a stand-alone basis and through its alliances–most importantly, the U.S.-Japan alliance–it is today’s reality.  

 The U.S. wants better, constructive relations with China, and has launched many initiatives to “engage” Beijing, but continues to be disappointed with China’s reluctant response. White points out that the U.S. seems unable to comprehend that its terms for “engagement” are acceptance of a status quo that would be unacceptable to any country of China’s present position and power its home region and that certainly also would be unacceptable to the U.S. were the roles reversed.   

White’s prescription–congruent in many ways with the “new power relationship” concept being adumbrated in Beijing–is for the U.S. and China to construct a new regional security framework of shared power.  

How much more rational, positive, and “likely” is White’s prescription than the doleful and alarming scenarios in the Carnegie study. Extrapolating China’s response to today’s U.S.-dominated Asian security order, that study’s “two roughly equally likely scenarios” for the next 15 to 20 years are “eroding balance” and “limited conflict.” In the former, continued U.S.-orchestrated upgrading and augmenting of armaments ensures continued “allied superiority in most domains,” China would achieve absolute gains in all domains. The situation would be fraught with “greater likelihood of tensions and incidents, especially over territorial and resource issues—assuming, as would be likely, a continued absence of credible mutual security assurances or crisis management mechanisms.” 

In the “limited conflict” scenario “the security environment would likely witness intensifying patterns of military competition and rivalry as China’s capabilities increase relative to the alliance … involving a significant weakening of allied deterrence capabilities and the unnerving of other Asian nations.” 

We may be thankful that the Carnegie study authors allow that a more constructive future of “mitigated threat” for U.S.-China-Japan and regional relations is “possible,” but judge this scenario much less likely than the foregoing two. The main feature of this scenario “high levels of cooperative engagement between China and Japan and between China and the alliance … reinforced by deepening levels of Sino-Japanese economic interdependence and an emphasis by all sides on stability-inducing, positive-sum interactions in dealing with common problems.” 

Against its future scenarios, what, according to the study’s authors, should the U.S. and its allies do? For the “most likely” futures, they offer two responses:  “robust forward presence” and  “conditional offense/defence.” The first would aim “to retain unambiguous allied regional primacy through extensions of existing or new muscular operational doctrines such as Air-Sea Battle or Offshore Control, would signal a clear and convincing commitment to a continued strong—indeed, superior—U.S. military capability and close set of alliance relationships as the basis for security in the Western Pacific well into the future.” The second would stress “both deterrence and reassurance in a more equal manner, would seek to maintain a commitment to military primacy in key areas through the use of less offensive-oriented and (in some cases) preemptive operational concepts than would be seen in the robust forward presence approach.” 

Is this the tense, arms race future anyone in the region could desire? I think not. What is needed is a change in paradigm, which is to say concepts and attitudes, that recognizes the defects and dangers in the U.S. dominated post-WWII Asian security order.  

The study diffidently offers a response called “defensive balancing” to the less likely “mitigated threat” scenario. Defensive balancing “would involve a very significant change in current U.S. defense doctrine, force posture, and possibly political arrangements in the Western Pacific. It would entail a shift away from efforts to sustain existing military advantages and freedom of action throughout the first island chain via offense-oriented, forward-presence-based military strategies and alliance-centered political strategies. The emphasis would be on a more genuinely balanced regional power structure based on more defense-oriented, asymmetric strategies and greater efforts to defuse the likely sources of future crises through mutual accommodation and meaningful multilateral security structures.” 

Precisely, Carnegie is probably correct in saying that the “mitigated threat” scenario and this “balanced” response is considered unrealistic and unlikely in Washington. They are, however, exactly the scenario and response that should become strategic goals of U.S. policy. To achieve them and a new, stable Asian order, Washington is going to have to change. 

Stephen M. Harner, a former U.S. Foreign Service Officer and international banker in China and Japan, is a graduate of Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

Franz-Stefan Gady

While I do not want to accuse General Fang Fenghui of a plot to manipulate public perception and trigger a cyber hysteria, his remarks are symptomatic of the global uncertainty surrounding the results of a ‘major cyber attack.’ The simple truth is we do not know the likely consequences of such an attack as there has not been a full-scale cyber war to trigger major strategic cyber attacks. Even if total cyber war should break out, cyber weapons, while destructive, “appear to have nowhere near the ability to inflict catastrophic destruction along the lines of a major nuclear attack,” as Andrew F. Krepenevich stated in a report on cyber warfare. 

For example, US power grid systems (SCADA systems) are highly centralized, divided into three separate power grids—the Eastern Interconnection, the Western Interconnection, and the Electric Reliability Council of Texas Interconnection. Ninety percent of the Defense Department’s critical infrastructure is dependent upon power from these networks.  Military exercises have indicated that even a single cyber strike could disable any of the three grids not to mention the myriad consequences for civilian life. One expert spelled out the potential fallout in congressional testimony in April 2012:

•  When transformers fail, so too will water distribution, transportation, communications, and many emergency and government services. Given the 12-month lead time typically required to replace a damaged transformer with a new one, the local and regional economic and societal disruption caused by cyber attacks that that disable or destroy the mechanical functioning of key components of the power grid would be devastating. 

The possible consequences of such an event combined with cyber attacks on the financial and transportation sector have been mapped out in various scenarios demonstrating the crippling ripple effect of such an assault. But even the most extreme predictions do not approach the human catastrophe of a nuclear detonation in Manhattan and the instant incineration of a million or more people. Comparatively, a major cyber attack might be dramatized as the menacing threat of a Giant Squid, which would require all of the cinematic artifice of the mature Spielberg to effectively magnify the danger in a screen spectacle dubbed Tentacles. 

History provides us a vivid example about the impossibility of determining the impact of a new dimension of warfare on the outcome of a conflict. Contrary to some current thinking, the contemporary technological context of war does not so much resemble the 1950s as the 1930s and the evolution of air power and air power strategy. In 1921, Guilio Douhet argued in his The Command of the Air that air power was revolutionary because it operated in the third dimension setting of a decade long debate about the impact of airplanes on warfare. He argued that since aircrafts could fly over ground forces, they would relegate land soldiers to secondary importance. The vastness of the sky made defense almost impossible, so the essence of air power was the offensive. The only defense was a good offense (similar to the United States Cyber Command active defense doctrine). The psychological effect of German bombing on France and Great Britain during the First World War led to an exaggerated fear of the capabilities of air power in Western Europe. British Prime Minister Baldwin stated in 1932 that “the bomber would always get through,” and the fear of Germany’s “knockout blow” against Paris or Britain led to a frenzied search for solutions. 

The actual course of the war showed however that much of the fear of airpower was exaggerated. As a matter of fact, “the bombers did not always get through.”  The German air force lost the Battle of Britain and the air war over Germany and Japan—although important and lethal—was not decisive in the outcome of the war.  The British Royal Force, the German Luftwaffe and the United States Air Force did not achieve their strategic or operational objectives; air power supported, but could not replace, boots on the ground. 

The true strategic impact of cyber weapons also may fall below expectations in a future war. Any historical analogy has its limits however.  General Fang Fenghui’s rhetoric expresses the palpable fear in both China and the United States of the intrinsic vulnerability of their respective economies and critical information infrastructures to strategic cyber strikes. 

Some long-time students of Chinese military policy take Fang’s warning very seriously, although not at face value. Dr. Greg Austin, a Professorial Fellow at the EastWest Institute, reminds us that in 1996 Professor Joseph Nye and Admiral Bill Owens together warned that the advent of information weapons and infrastructure may affect strategic deterrence. Says Austin, “those who relegate information warfare to an artificial and compartmented construct similar to air power are ignoring how overarching strategies for information dominance, held both by China and the United States, have altered the calculus of risk for use of a nuclear missile strike.” The trouble with this view, credible as it maybe, is that we can’t see the physical evidence in the public domain. We need to be able to access some part of the substance of this new and evolving theater of cyber warfare before we can see more clearly what will land “on the beach” of our fears. 

Franz-Stefan Gady is a Senior Fellow at the EastWest Institute. 

Ted Galen Carpenter

Indeed, Washington’s military budget for 2013 (including funding for the war in Afghanistan) is more than six times Beijing’s official defense budget. Given that China is located in a region with multiple security concerns while America’s neighborhood is extremely stable and peaceful, it would seem that it is the US’ military spending that is excessive for its legitimate defense needs.

Such a bloated commitment of resources to the military is unhealthy both for America’s domestic health and minimizing international conflicts. It places an undue burden on US taxpayers while making other countries uneasy and suspicious.

A new infographic from the Cato Institute shows just how wildly out of proportion Washington’s military spending is to that of other countries. Perhaps the most striking statistic is that the US now accounts for 44 percent of all global military spending. Put another way, the US spends nearly as much on the military as the rest of the world combined.

The overemphasis on such outlays is evident in other ways. Twenty percent of the US federal budget is devoted to military spending, while the average for its NATO allies is a mere 3.6 percent and for Japan just 2.3 percent. Five percent of America’s GDP is allocated to the military, but for NATO countries, and Japan and China, it is well below 2 percent.

Washington’s exorbitant spending encourages friendly, allied countries to free ride and keep their own defense budgets lower than they might be otherwise, thereby freeing up financial resources for domestic priorities. However, for nations that have a more ambivalent or complicated relationship with the US, the effect is decidedly more negative. Major countries such as China, Russia and India have reason to wonder why US leaders give such high priority to military power when Washington already has a huge advantage in that area and the avowed adversaries it faces are small and weak.

It is indeed hard for the US to justify spending at such elevated levels given the superiority in its conventional forces and the existence of a large, sophisticated nuclear arsenal and delivery system.

Major powers that are not US allies could well suspect that Washington’s underlying motive for continuing its huge military outlays is an attempt to intimidate potential competitors. Smaller countries that are on bad terms with the US have even greater cause to worry. There is an ever-present concern that they may become targets of forcible regime change. Since Washington adopted that strategy with respect to countries such as Iraq and Libya, it is not an irrational fear.

Washington’s adversaries face a very unpleasant situation because there is no way that they can defend themselves successfully against a concerted campaign by the US military juggernaut. For them, the choice appears to be a stark one between capitulation to Washington’s demands or acquiring a nuclear deterrent.

The actions of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Iran indicate that at least some countries may opt for the latter. In a classic case of unintended consequences, Washington’s vast conventional military superiority (combined with a belligerent policy) appears to have created perverse incentives for nuclear weapons proliferation – the last thing in the world that US leaders wanted.

Greater restraint in US military spending would benefit both the American people and the prospects for better relations in the international community. Today, the amount Washington spends on its military each year is a whopping $2,300 per American. The comparable obligation for an average NATO country is $503 per capita. For China, it is less than $200 per capita.

That disparity imposes an enormous, needless financial burden on the American people. If US leaders did not insist on trying to micromanage the world’s security affairs, meddling in every manner of local or regional quarrel, and attempting to prevent other powers from playing more substantial roles, the US military budget could shrink dramatically. And it could do so without endangering America’s core security and economic interests.

Especially when the US government faces chronic, massive budget deficits and a growing debt problem, it is time American leaders established more prudent foreign policy priorities and pruned unwise or unnecessary commitments and objectives. A shrewder security strategy would provide the basis for much lower levels of military spending. The US ought to have a new, downsized military budget that is appropriate for the country’s legitimate defense needs.

Ted Galen Carpenter is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, and has nine books, including Smart Power: Toward a Prudent Foreign Policy for America, to his credit.

© 2013. China Daily

The story’s big in India, to be sure, but nobody’s paying the slightest attention elsewhere. The “intrusion,” the Indian media’s word for it, is relevant to Korea for one basic reason. It’s another sign of China’s yearning to spread its influence and power around its periphery.

However uneasy the Chinese may feel about the North’s rhetoric, its threats, its nuclear and missile programs, China sees North Korea as an extension of that power. The Chinese, pouring fuel and food into the North as usual, have to delight in the spectacle of the North defying the U.S. and South Korea, making sure China holds sway over both halves of the divided peninsula.

Can it really be, however, that China wants to flex its muscles against India in a repetition of the Sino-Indian border war of the fall of 1962 that resulted in at least 2,000 killed, two thirds of them Indian? Almost without anyone noticing what was going on, two dozen Chinese troops have moved about ten miles beyond the “Line of Actual Control” that’s viewed, at least in New Delhi, as India’s de facto northernmost border.

A few dozen Indian troops have set up camp several hundred meters from the Chinese in a confrontation that no one quite expects to burst into bloodshed. Should not loudspeaker demands to get out, and banners strung up bearing the same message, be enough to persuade the Chinese to decide, We’ve made our point and now we can leave. That’s how it’s been in hundreds of such “intrusions” over the decades since the two sides were actually shooting at one another in a contest in which the Chinese definitely proved their prowess.

This time, though, the Chinese are staying much longer than usual in a most inhospitable region covered with snow and ice at altitudes of several thousand meters. Much to the consternation of Indian policy-makers, the Chinese commander has refused to come to any agreement or understanding with the Indian commander. This time the Chinese seem determined to nip away at Indian lines — and Indian self-esteem.

The Chinese would seem to have already amply proved their military superiority by refusing to consider abandoning a virtually uninhabited region called Aksai Chin that the Chinese took over in 1962 and have held ever since. The region is so desolate, so difficult to defend and of so little immediate value that India virtually ceded it while still claiming it. The Line of Actual Control, as far as the Indians are concerned, is the border separating the territory the Indians still hold from Chinese-held territory.

There is a feeling in Delhi of, why won’t this latest hassle go away? That’s partly because China’s premier, Li Keqiang, is due to come to Delhi this month to meet India’s Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh. They should have a lot to talk about, including the problem of China diverting precious waters by damming the enormous rivers that flow out of China through northern India and neighboring Bangladesh.

Officially, India is playing a policy of containment of the Chinese. No, that’s not military containment. Rather, Indian policy-makers are trying to contain what could turn into a crisis, an “incident.” Prime Minister Singh prefers to view the Chinese presence as strictly a minor matter that should come to very little. “We do not want to accentuate the situation,” he told Indian journalists. “It is a localized problem.”

Fine, but the Chinese troops are still there. Moreover, Chinese officials in Beijing say Chinese troops never crossed the line at all. Although no one expects either side to open fire on the other, a solution does not appear in view.

Chinese and Indian leaders, moreover, have much more to worry about than the latest incursion. China is Pakistan’s biggest arms supplier. India imports arms from Russia, the U.S., Europe, even Israel, but not from China.  

From the South China Sea, which it claims as its own, to the East China Sea, where the Chinese face off against Japan over an island cluster known as the Senkakus to the Japanese, Daioyu to the Chinese, China is flexing its muscles. Looking northeast, China sees the Yellow Sea and the Korean peninsula as within its sphere of influence. Isn’t that why China keeps calling for “stability” above all else?

The image of Chinese troops way up on the roof of India symbolizes much larger problems for all Asia. On China’s outer fringes, a few dozen Chinese troops huddled in tents at an altitude of nearly 6,000 meters are the tip of the point of China’s expansionist aims throughout Asia.

Donald Kirk is a veteran journalist with decades of experience living and working in Asia. This article has been adapted from “China’s Thrust in the High Himalayas,” which originally appeared on Forbes.com

Chen Zhou

Besides traditional subjects, such as security situations and the building of China’s armed forces, it addresses many new concepts, including the policies and principles for diversified employment of armed forces, maintaining constant combat readiness, safeguarding maritime rights and interests, protecting overseas interests and safeguarding the security of international sea lines of communication. In a new step towards higher military transparency, the paper publishes for the first time the designations of all 18 combined corps of the PLA Army as well as the number of officers and men of the PLA Army mobile operational units, PLA Navy and PLA Air Force.

The white paper talks about a dialectical relationship between peaceful development and defense preparations. The country must in any situation pursue a defensive national defense policy rather than seeking hegemony or military expansion. Consolidated national defense and strong armed forces will guarantee the achievement of peaceful development. However, peace must be backed by force. Without solid national defense or a powerful army, peaceful development cannot be guaranteed and national rejuvenation will lose its basis.

Since the new millenium, situations in the world, in China and in the military have undergone profound changes. The white paper believes that the balance of international forces is shifting in favor of world peace and that peaceful development will remain the underlying trend of our times. Meanwhile, there are signs of increasing hegemonism, power politics and neo-interventionism. Local turmoil and hot-spot issues keep cropping up. Competition is intensifying in the international military field and the world is far from tranquil. While China’s modernization achievements have captured world attention, it still faces multiple complicated security threats.

Changes in the international strategic situation and national security environment place new requirements for the building and employment of armed forces. In recent years, the PLA has been proactively and steadily pushing forward reforms. It has intensified the strategic administration of the Central Military Commission and established the PLA Department of Strategic Planning. It endeavors to build new types of combat forces, further optimizing the structure and organization of troops. It works to improve the training mechanism, adjust human resources and logistics policies and rules, and develop new- and high-technology weaponry and equipment. A basic objective of revolution in military affairs in China is to speed up the formation of a lean, joint, multi-functional and efficient military force system.

The Chinese armed forces are to respond to the country’s core security needs and to maintain peace, contain crises and win wars. They place the protection of national sovereignty, security and interests of the Chinese people above all else. The white paper provides information about diversified military operations conducted in recent years, including combat readiness duties, exercises and drills, emergency rescue and disaster relief, international peacekeeping, naval escorts and joint exercises. The geographical scope has extended from Chinese territory to overseas where Chinese interests are at stake.

In recent years, the PLA has given strategic attention to routine combat readiness. The white paper has a special section on “maintaining constant combat readiness,” which describes the PLA’s state of combat readiness, with the Army strengthening combat readiness duty system, the Navy performing regular combat readiness patrols, the Air Force focusing on territorial air defense and the Second Artillery Force constructing a vigilant and efficient operational duty system. Scenario-based exercises and drills are considered key to changing military training and improving combat capabilities.

With a continental coastline of 18,000 kilometers and over 6,500 islands with an area of 500 square meters or more, China is a land and maritime country. The seas and oceans provide immense space and abundant resources for sustainable development and it is an essential national development strategy to build China into a maritime power. In the chapter on “safeguarding maritime rights and interests,” the armed forces claim that it is a fundamental task for them to ensure security of territory, internal waters, territorial seas territorial air and an important duty to safeguard maritime rights and interests. In combination with routine combat readiness activities, the Navy provides security support for China’s maritime law enforcement, fisheries, and oil and gas exploitation.

China’s gradual integration into the world economic system, has allowed overseas interests to become an integral component of China’s national interests. Security of overseas energy and resources, strategic sea lines of communication, and Chinese nationals and legal persons overseas are increasingly prominent. Vessel protection at sea, overseas evacuation and emergency rescue have become important ways for the PLA to safeguard national interests and fulfill China’s international obligations. By December 2012, the Chinese Navy had dispatched 34 warships in 13 task groups for escort operations.

The Constitution and the Law on National Defense mandate China’s armed forces safeguard world peace and oppose acts of aggression and expansion. The white paper gives an account of their operations in recent years. Since 1990, the PLA has dispatched 22,000 military personnel to 23 UN peacekeeping missions. China is now the biggest troop and police contributor among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. As China’s role in global affairs becomes more prominent, its security apparatus and national defense will increasingly play a pivotal role in international relations.

Chen Zhou, Director, National Defense Policy Research Center, Academy of Military Sciences

Dan Steinbock

“We strongly condemn such an act of terror targeted at innocent civilians,” said China’s new ambassador to the United States, Cui Tiankai, afterwards. “We are ready to further our cooperation with the United States in fighting terror.”

If Washington and Beijing could find a common ground in dealing with the global threat of terrorism, much more would follow. 

Legacy of terror

All major advanced economies share a recent history of terrorist escalation. Only hours after the Boston massacre, the annual simulation exercise by the special EU police units began across Europe. Meanwhile, the risks of extremism in the region are escalating, thanks to worsening economy, rising anti-immigration sentiment and failure to designate terrorist organizations.

In Japan, terrorism was seen as a Western dilemma until the hijacking of a Japan Airlines flight by a Japanese Red Army Faction and other terrorist attacks in the 1970s. The mid-1990s witnessed the Sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway. After two lost decades, both right- and left-wing extremism is increasing in Japan.

Further, the large emerging economies are in no way immune to terrorism.

Only two days after the Boston marathon bombings, 16 people were injured in the latest Bangalore blast right outside the office of the Bharatiya Janata Party, the leading Indian opposition party.  In the past two months, this blast has been preceded by a series of attacks in Srinagar, Hyberabad and Pune. In the multiethnic India, terrorism is recognized as a significant threat to the state. 

In Russia, the republic of Chechnya has waged two wars with Moscow’s security forces since the end of the Cold War. Meanwhile, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and a splinter group, the Islamic Jihad Union, continue to recruit zealots to fight against U.S. forces in Asia. In Russia, terrorism is considered a major threat to national security.

On April 24, a violent clash between authorities and assailants described as terrorists left 21 people dead outside the city of Kashgar in Xinjiang. In China, counter-terrorism often focuses on extremist violence in Xinjiang, which the authorities attribute to Uyghur activists.

As Brazil is preparing for the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic games, the country lacks specific anti-terrorism legislation. Meanwhile, leaked reports suggest that two dozen extremists connected to Al-Qae

da and other terrorist groups are already using Brazil as a base to hide, raise money or plan attacks.

In the United States, challenging divisions about ethnic, racial and religious differences, even about the nation itself, have witnessed terrorism, from political assassinations to external terrorist attacks, especially after the end of the Cold War.

Today, the concern over terrorism is the lowest common denominator uniting both major advanced economies and large emerging nations. 

From global terrorism to U.S.-Chinese counter-terrorist cooperation

Since the 1980s, global economic integration, boosted by Washington Consensus in the West and China’s economic reforms and opening-up in the East, accelerated growth prospects worldwide, until the great recession of 2008.

However, the same decades also saw a dramatic escalation of terrorism, which has been supported by the technology revolution that speeds up the diffusion of innovations globally. Typically, the kind of “pressure cookers” that were deployed in Boston were introduced in the 2010 feature “How to Make Bomb in Kitchen of Mom,” by the first issue of Al Qaeda’s English-language online magazine Inspire.

After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, many presumed that violence could be contained by the insulation of America, closed borders and “preemptive” wars. In reality, these policies alienated the United States from the international community.

Initially, 9/11 led to efforts of U.S.-Chinese counter-terrorist cooperation as the Bush White House sought Beijing’s cooperation in the anti-terrorism struggle against Al Qaeda and support for the U.S.-led “Operation Enduring Freedom.”

Meanwhile, Washington designated the “East Turkistan Islamic Movement” (ETIM) as a terrorist organization in August 2002. Reportedly, ETIM had committed over 200 acts of terrorism in the previous decade, resulting in over 160 deaths. Taking shelter under Taliban Afghanistan, ETIM leaders had met with Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda leaders, and other Islamic radicals to coordinate actions.

However, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) did not participate in the counter-terrorist coalition, and the initial U.S.-Chinese cooperation proved limited, even it contributed to a closer bilateral relationship.

Along with Washington’s unipolar security policies, U.S. war against Iraq, under the pretext of the threat of WMDs (Weapons of Mass Destruction), contributed to the erosion of counter-terrorism effort. 

Toward the next decade of multipolar counter-terrorism

While the past decade of nascent bilateral counter-terrorist cooperation did not go far enough, multipolar counter-terrorism initiatives could.

Neither Washington, with all of its military muscle and more than 40 percent of annual military expenditures worldwide, nor China, with its rising economic clout and military modernization, can contain globalized terrorism. But together, the two countries could rally the international community into effective counter-terrorism.

What is needed is effective action by leading advanced economies and large emerging nations, in which the cooperation of Washington and Beijing would have a great and even inspiring demonstration effect, through three vital initiatives.

•  Enlist the full support of advanced economies, via the G-7 nations, and the full support   of large emerging economies, via the BRICS.  

As the economic, political and military leaders of the advanced economies, the G-7 nations could rally the United States, Europe’s core economies, and Japan. Further, as the largest economic powers among the major emerging economies, the BRICS would represent the backing of India, Russia, Brazil, and South Africa, hopefully with the support of Indonesia, Mexico, and Turkey.

•  Develop a multipolar counter-terrorist platform. 

The strategic goal of these nations should not be overshadowed by old unipolar objectives or targeting of any one national, ethnic, racial or religious group (e.g., “Islamist” terrorism). Violent fundamentalism comes in all creeds.  The shared platform must be adequately broad to enlist all multipolar economies and sufficiently specific to be effective.

•  Develop an ongoing negotiating mechanism for shared disagreements.

Any united front is only as effective as its weakest link. Thus, it is important to identify the disagreements, agree to disagree, and to launch a continuing negotiating mechanism to build consensus approaches that truly serve multipolar counter-terrorist goals – not this-or-that nation’s unilateral interests.

After half a decade of stagnation in the U.S., recessions and downturns in Europe, two lost decades in Japan, as well as reduced growth prospects in the large emerging economies, the risk of destructive terrorism, its technological potential and global impact is greater than ever in history.

Within a decade, the odds are greater for than against a major ‘dirty bomb’ attack, biochemical horror or nuclear terrorism. We are running out of time. 

Dr. Dan Steinbock is Research Director of International Business at India China and America Institute (USA) and Visiting Fellow at Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (China) and the EU Center (Singapore).

During his visit, he toured an army aviation regiment; talked to senior officers at the National Defense University and delivered a speech at the Army Aviation Academy. He discussed with his counterpart General Fang Fenghui, Chief of General Staff for the PLA, and he was met by the Chinese President Xi Jinping, an honor that is only accorded to the most distinguished foreign military visitors. 

All this demonstrates the importance that the Chinese attach to General Dempsey, but also to the most important bilateral military relationship in the world.     

The Sino-American military relationship has not been short of twists and turns. Apart from the outstanding “three obstacles” in the relations – US arms sale to Taiwan, US reconnaissance in the exclusive economic zone of China and legal barriers on the US side  and limited exchanges between the US and the Chinese armed forces – recent years have also witnessed an enhanced sophistication in the relationship. This is due to the “rebalancing” of the US armed forces in the Asia-pacific and the somewhat contradictary American actions on such issues like the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands and the South China Sea.

The good news is that both sides have thus far agreed to disagree, and they concur to strengthen strategic mutual trust. Cooperation is top of the agenda. 

In the areas that have been identified by the two militaries for cooperation, i.e, counter-piracy, anti-terrorism, pandemic disease control, environmental protection, humanitarian aid and disaster relief; positive efforts have already been made. Last year, among frequent exchanges at the highest military level, the two Navys conducted a joint exercise in the Gulf of Aden, and the two armies conducted a table top exercise on humanitarian aid and disaster relief in Sichuan Province. During the US Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus’ visit to China in November 2012, he extended an olive branch by inviting the Chinese navy to attend RIMPAC 2014, a regularized multilateral exercise in the waters off Hawaii. His Chinese host accepted the invitation with pleasure. 

Perhaps one of the most important achievements is the visit itself. From time to time, the inter-military ties between China and the US were cut off as a result of grave incidents like the US-led bombing on the Chinese embassy in the former Yugoslavia, and the collision of the Chinese and US aircraft over China’s exclusive economic zone, and above all, the repeated US arm sales to Taiwan. All these incidents cost the military relationship dearly, to the extent that it takes at least one year for the two countries to resume dialogue. The fact that the two militaries can now visit and talk to each other on a regular basis is a positive signal to the world that the derailed relationship is back on track and is moving in the right direction. 

Let’s hope that this trend continues. 

Zhou Bo is with Center on China-America Defense Relations, Academy of Military Science

Ted Galen Carpenter

A less obvious, but increasing, possibility is that South Korea might dash hopes of keeping the Peninsula non-nuclear.  Two opinion polls taken in South Korea, including one by Gallup Korea, after the North’s February nuclear test found that more than 64 percent of respondents favored Seoul developing its own nuclear deterrent.  It was not an entirely unprecedented result.  Following the North Korean attack on Yeonpyeong Island in 2010, polls also showed a surge in public support for an independent deterrent.           

It’s pertinent to recall that South Korea had an active nuclear program during the 1970s under strongman Park Chung-hee.  Only massive pressure from Washington induced Seoul to terminate that program.  But nervousness in South Korea has been building steadily since the United States and the other participants in the Six-Party talks have been unable to get Pyongyang to relinquish its nuclear objectives.  

A pro-nuclear attitude seems to be slowly spreading within South Korea’s political class as well as among the general public.  Although President Park Geun-hye (ironically, the daughter of the man who originally flirted with building an independent deterrent) has rejected any nuclear ambitions for her country, there has been a noticeable increase in statements from major political figures and opinion shapers in recent months taking a very different position.  

The most outspoken politician thus far on the nuclear issue is Chung Mong-joon, and Chung is not some inconsequential, fringe player.  Not only is he a member of the South Korean parliament, but he’s the son of the founder of the powerful Hyundai industrial conglomerate and one-time leader of the governing party.  

During a visit to Washington in early April, Chung stated that South Korea should withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and, if the North continued its nuclear program, match that move with the development of its own nuclear weapons.  A few weeks earlier, he was quoted in the New York Times explaining his reasons.  “The Americans don’t feel the North Korean nuclear weapons as a direct threat,” he said.  “At a time of crisis, we are not 100 percent sure whether the Americans will cover us with its (sic) nuclear umbrella.” 

Chung’s comment highlights a long-standing problem faced by allies or security clients of a great power like the United States.  Primary or direct deterrence—deterring an attack on one’s own county—is a straightforward process with high credibility.  North Korea or any other aggressor knows that attacking the United States would be suicidal, since Washington would respond with a devastating retaliatory strike.  But an ally or client cannot have similar confidence that its patron would take the same action to respond to an assault confined to that client.  Such uncertainty is especially great when the aggressor has the ability to attack the homeland of the protecting power. 

That’s why the credibility of extended deterrence—the willingness to incur possible devastation merely to defend an ally—has always been lower than the credibility of primary deterrence.  During the Cold War, Washington’s NATO allies were perpetually uneasy about whether the United States would actually defend them in a showdown with the Soviet Union.  And as Henry Kissinger once noted, the allies constantly pressed the United States to reiterate and strengthen its assurances (including by stationing forward-deployed military units as a tripwire to ensure U.S. involvement if war erupted in Europe). 

South Korea and other U.S. allies in East Asia experience a similar sense of uncertainty as evidence mounts that Pyongyang intends to retain and strengthen its nuclear capability.  Although North Korea cannot presently strike the U.S. homeland, it may soon be able to attack Guam and other U.S. possessions in the western Pacific.  And probably within a decade it will be able to reach targets in North America. 

South Koreans have ample reason to wonder whether U.S. leaders would really risk the safety of their own country just to respond to a North Korean attack confined to South Korea.  The Obama administration is trying to reassure its ally that the security commitment, including the nuclear deterrent, remains firm.  The flyover by B-2 nuclear-capable bombers during the March joint military exercises with South Korea was a manifestation of that attempt to reassure—as was the subsequent dispatch of F-22s. 

The credibility of Washington’s security guarantee to Seoul is fading, though, no matter how often U.S. officials may profess the continued seriousness of that commitment.  As much as Washington and Beijing insist that their goal is a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, unless they can induce North Korea to give up its nuclear program, there is a growing possibility that South Korea will not sit idly by and depend solely on the United States to deter threats from a nuclear-armed, hostile neighbor.  South Korean political leaders can resist a pro-nuclear majority in public opinion for only so long.  

The issue of nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula is a key test for the Sino-U.S. relationship and its ability to manage security problems.  Beijing’s patience with Pyongyang certainly appears to be wearing thin.  Chinese President Xi Jinping’s comment that “no one should be allowed to throw the region, even the whole world, into chaos for selfish gains” was widely seen as a rebuke to North Korea.  But if Beijing wants the Korean Peninsula to be free of nuclear weapons, the time is overdue to put stronger pressure on Kim Jong-un’s government—despite the risk that such pressure might cause the North Korean state to collapse, removing the strategic buffer between China and U.S- led East Asia. 

If China needs to get tougher with Pyongyang, the United States needs to become less wedded to a strategy based on ever tightening sanctions and the goal of increasing North Korea’s economic and diplomatic isolation.  Instead, the Obama administration ought to take Beijing’s long-standing advice and explore ways to try to establish a more normal bilateral relationship with Pyongyang—as difficult as that task might be. 

The bottom line is that unless both China and the United States change their strategies, the goal of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula will slip away.  Moreover, Washington and Beijing may ultimately have to deal with not one but two nuclear-armed Korean states. 

Ted Galen Carpenter, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, is the author of nine books on international affairs, including (with Doug Bandow) The Korean Conundrum: Washington’s Troubled Relations with North and South Korea (Palgrave Macmillan).