Political meritocracy has been largely eclipsed from political theorizing in the modern world, but there are three important reasons for reviving and reinterpreting this political ideal, particularly in a Chinese context. First, political meritocracy has been, and continues to be, central to Chinese political culture. Second, democracy is a flawed political system and meritocracy can help to remedy some of its flaws. Third, the Chinese Communist Party itself has become a more meritocratic organization over the last three decades or so.

Political meritocracy is a key theme in the history of Chinese political culture. For Confucius, political meritocracy starts from the assumption that everybody should be educated. However, not everybody will emerge from this process with an equal ability to make morally informed political judgments. Hence, an important task of the political system is to select leaders with an above average ability to make morally informed political judgments, as well as to encourage as many people of talent as possible to participate in politics. Such rulers, in Confucius’s view, would gain the trust of the people.

In its early days, Communist China under Mao explicitly rejected Confucian-inspired ideas of political meritocracy. Understandably, perhaps, the main task was rewarding revolutionary energy and securing military strength for the state to put an end to abuse and bullying by foreign powers. But now, the establishment of a relatively secure and strong Chinese state under the leadership of the CCP means that China has less to worry about survival qua political community. Hence, the emphasis has shifted to the task of good governance led by able and virtuous political leaders, and the selection and promotion mechanisms of the CCP have become more meritocratic.

In the 1980s, talented students at leading Chinese universities often did not seek to join the CCP. Today, it’s a different story. At elite schools like Tsinghua University, 28 percent of all undergrads, 43 percent of graduating seniors and up to 55 percent of grad students were CCP members in 2010. The CCP is also targeting the “new social stratum “of young professionals in urban areas, including business people and managers in private firms, lawyers, and accountants.

The advantages of “actually-existing” meritocracy in the CCP are clear. Cadres are put through a grueling process of talent selection, and only those with an excellent record of past performance are likely to make it to the highest levels of government. The training process includes the cultivation of virtues such as compassion for the disadvantaged by such means as limited periods of work in poor rural areas. Moreover, this kind of meritocratic selection process is only likely to work in the context of a one-party state. In a multi-party state, there is no assurance that performance at lower levels of government will be rewarded at higher levels, and there is no strong incentive to train cadres so that they have experience at higher levels, because the key personnel can change with a government led by different party. So even talented leaders, like US President Obama, can make many “beginner’s mistakes” once they assume rule because they haven’t been properly trained to assume command at the highest levels of government.

Leaders in China are not likely to make such mistakes because of their experience and training. The fact that decision-making at the highest-levels is by committee—the seven-member Standing Committee of the Politburo—also ensures that no one person with outlandish and uninformed views can decide upon wrong-headed policies.

Once Chinese leaders reach positions of political power, they can make decisions that consider the interests of all relevant stakeholders, including future generations and people living outside the state. In multi-party democracies with leaders chosen on the basis of competitive elections, by contrast, leaders need to worry about the next election and they are more likely to make decisions influenced by short-term political considerations that bear on their chances of getting reelected. The interests of non-voters affected by policies, such as future generations, are not likely to be taken seriously if they conflict with the interests of voters.

Moreover, the fact that the real power holders in Western-style democracies are supposed to be those chosen by the people in elections often means that “bureaucrats” are not considered to be as important; hence, less talent goes to the bureaucracy. This flaw may be particularly clear in the American political system

This is not to imply that the US and other countries should strive to emulate Chinese-style meritocracy. For one thing, political meritocracy is more likely to be workable and stable in a certain type of political culture: as noted above, political surveys show that people in East Asian countries with a Confucian heritage tend to value political meritocracy, but the same may not be true in other cultures.

Nor do I mean to imply that “actually-existing meritocracy” in China cannot be improved. The success of meritocracy in China is obvious: China’s rulers have presided over the single most impressive poverty alleviation achievement in history, with several hundred million people being lifted out of poverty. Equally obvious, however, some problems in China—corruption, gap between rich and poor, environmental degradation, abuses of power by political officials, overly powerful state-run enterprises that skew the economic system in their favor, harsh measures for dealing with political dissent, repression of religious expression in Tibet and Xinjiang—seem to have worsened during the same period the political system has become meritocratic. Part of the problem is that China lacks democracy at various levels of government that could help to check abuses of power and provide more opportunities for political expression by marginalized groups. But part of the problem is also that political meritocracy has been insufficiently developed in China. The system has become meritocratic over the last three decades or so, but it can and should become more meritocratic in the future.

Perhaps the most significant improvement within the Chinese Communist Party over the last three of decades has been more emphasis on the selection and promotion of officials with above average intellectual ability, especially at the higher levels of government. However, the system is not as meritocratic as it could be, even in this respect. Consider the “anti-meritocratic” effects of constraints on freedom of political speech. The best political decisions, of course, need to be based on complete information, but fear of negative consequences may inhibit stakeholders from expressing their viewpoints.

Another area of concern is that the rigorous, multi-year talent selection process may discourage risk-taking. In other words, relatively creative and original minds may be weeded out early because they have offended people or challenged the “normal way of doing things

There may also be a need for more international exposure in the selection process. The main task of the Chinese Communist Party is of course to serve the Chinese people. But China is now a great global power, and what it does also affects the interests of people living outside of China, and it needs to be as humane as possible in its dealings with other countries. It is a good sign that the children of government leaders are often educated abroad because they can serve as informal advisors, but nothing takes the place of personal exposure to foreign ways of doing things.

Equally important, there may be a need for more representation by members of minority groups at the highest levels of government, even if they didn’t rise through the political system. Only sincere adherents of a religion can really know what’s best for their religion and meritocratic decision-making would involve more representation by members of religious communities.

Of course, meritocratic-decision making is not just a matter of having the ability and knowledge to make political decisions. Immoral decision-makers with high-level analytical skills and local knowledge can do more damage than not-so-competent political leaders who may not be able to figure out the best means to realize immoral ends.

Term and age limits for Chinese leaders are helpful. But there is a need for other mechanisms to reduce corruption—a relatively independent anti-corruption agency (similar to Hong Kong and Singapore), more transparency, more freedom for media to report on cases of corruption, financial audits for leaders and their family members, higher salaries for leaders, and harsh punishments for corruption. More rigorous emphasis on ethical education for political leaders is also necessary.

Of course, a political decision maker should do more than refrain from corruption. He or she much also be motivated by humanity and compassion for people, animals, and the natural world. But is it difficult to reconcile this desideratum with the extreme under-representation of females in the political decision-making bodies, especially at the highest levels. The current leadership selection process is biased against females: the process is so time-consuming that it seems hard reconcile with ordinary family life. Perhaps half of the government positions at the highest levels of government should be reserved for females. I have no doubt that a government composed of more female leaders is more likely to rule in a compassionate and humane way.

Obviously, the process of “meritocratization” is a long term transformation for which there is no clear end-point (unlike, say, “democratization,” which usually means free and fair competitive elections for a country’s top political leaders). But one clear way forward would be for the Chinese Communist Party to change its name so that it better corresponds to the institutional reality of the organization, as well as to what it aspires to be. Most obviously, the organization is no longer Communist and few Chinese, including members of the CCP, believe that the party is leading the march to higher communism. A more accurate name might be the Chinese Meritocratic Union.

Let me end with one point that will be intensely controversial in countries with a democratic heritage. China can learn much from the political virtues typically associated with democratic regimes: political participation, freedom, transparency, and toleration. But the country can and should build upon the actual and potential advantages of political meritocracy: the decades long training of political officials entrusted with the top political decision making powers, the ability to make decisions that take account of the interests of future generations, the rest of the world, and the natural world, even when they conflict with the interests of the majority of citizens, and decision-making by committee rather than vesting ultimate decision-making powers in one individual (such as the US President). These advantages of meritocracy are compatible with more freedom, transparency, toleration, political participation at sub-national levels of government, and a certain degree of political competition at the top. But meritocracy is incompatible with multi-party competition at the top and one-person one vote for the selection of top decision makers. Hence, the task in China is to improve meritocracy and learn from parts of democracy, but not from what many democrats today would consider to be its core element.

Daniel A. Bell is professor of political theory at Tsinghua University (Beijing) and Jiatong University (Shanghai). His latest book is the coedited volume, A Confucian Constitutional Order.

China-US trade grew steadily during the first term of Obama’s presidency. According to China Customs statistics, China-US trade reached $ 396.09 bn, 9.1% up from over a year ago, 2.8 percent higher than China’s global trade growth rate. China’s exports to the US reached $289.32 bn, 9.5% up from over a year ago, 1.7 percentage points higher than its global export growth of 7.8%. US exports to China also grew by 8.0% during the same period, to $106.76 bn, 3.4 percentage points higher than China’s total import growth of 4.6%. According to the US Department of Commerce, US-China trade hit $2731.20 billion during the first 8 months of 2012, 6.7% up from over a year ago, 1.7 percentage points higher than its total global trade growth rate. US exports to China during this period reached $70.00 bn, 5.9% up; and imports from China grew by 6.9%, to $203.12bn. 0.3 and 2.2 percentage points higher than the US’ global export and import respectively. 

This set of simple data shows that both China and the US have gained a share of each other’s markets in the difficult world economic environment since the beginning of this year. If this trend persists, President Obama will most likely realize his goal of doubling exports by 2014 in the Chinese market.

Cross-border investment has also witnessed significant growth, especially China’s investment in the US. According to a report by the New-York based Rodium Group, China’s investment in the US hit $6.3 bn in the first 9 months of 2012, almost doubling that of a year ago. US actual investment in China reached $2.30 bn during the first 10 months of 2012, 0.63% down from a year ago, according to China’s MOFCOM data. However, it performed better than China’s total FDI inflows (down 3.76%) and especially better than that from the EU (down 6.78%).

All the political and economic frictions, including all the attacks from both Barack Obama and Mitt Romney have failed to change this trend. It is the economic complimentary fundamentals, not Washington politicians’ remarks that lie behind this momentum.

The next four years will be hard for the world economy, with the Euro Debt crisis evolving further before finally retreating. The US economy will most likely continue its current slow recovery, with the jobless rate dropping to 6% in 2015. China, at the same time, will fundamentally restructure its economy in the last 3 years of the 12^th five-year plan period. Both countries will need more access to each other’s market. In sectors such as alternate energy, shale gas, smart grid, IT and electronics, automotives, environment, tourism, logistics and finance, further growth in two-way trade and cross-border investment can be expected. Total two way trade volume will probably exceed $700 bn by 2016. US direct investment will stay at around $4-5 billion per annum in the next 4 years, while China’s direct investment will maintain a robust growth, hitting $15 billion in the year of 2016.

 New Protectionism, Strategic Distrust and System Disaccord will Continue

A distinct feature of Obama’s trade policy has been new protectionism. He approved a special duty on tires from China during his first year in office. In the election year of 2012, the Obama administration stepped up anti-dumping and counter-veiling frictions against China considerably, covering solar cells, auto parts among other sectors. Unlike trade remedy cases in the past when remedies came after two consecutive years of an import quantity surge and price falls from China, the actions came merely because of a surge in the quantity imports.

For instance, US imports of auto parts from China increased by 131.7% from 2005-2011, or from $3.77 bn to $8.77 bn, a net increase of $5.0 bn. However, the US exports of auto parts to China increased by 556.4%, or from $1.01 to $6.63 – a net increase of $5.6 bn. And the US auto parts jobs in the US increased from 721,700 in July, 2011 to 789,500 in July, 2012. Nonetheless, China was still accused because of the high jobless rate in the auto sector. It can be expected that, as long as the high jobless rate in the manufacturing sector persists, which looks very likely for at least the next 2 years, the quantitative protection against China will continue. With Chinese high-end industries growing during the next four years, there might be more cases of head-on conflicts with the American computers and Electronics, telecom equipment, flexible manufacturing sectors during the second term of Obama.

President Obama issued an executive order in late September, blocking Chinese Sany’s wind farm acquisition in Oregon for national security reasons, although the Navy had already given a green light and there were German and Danish wind farms around. It was the first time that a US president blocked a foreign acquisition in 20 years.  Ten days later, the House Intelligence Committee issued a report blocking Huawei and ZTE’s access to the US market, also for national security reasons. Contrarily, Softbank of Japan acquired Sprint almost at the same time without meeting a single word of opposition in the US. Those two cases vividly highlight the profound US strategic distrust towards China, regarding the latter as a real or potential adversary.

Obama trade policy with China has also advanced from individual cases to an overall strategic position, regarding China as pursuing “ state capitalism,” “skirting the trade rules” and thus “challenging the world trade system”. The US blames China for government control and SOE monopoly, and various subsidies on their own industries, thus creating an unfair competitive advantage against the US companies either in the US and the world markets. It can be easily envisaged that this trend will only gain momentum during Obama’s second term.

Manufacturing Returns to America: conflict or complimentary?

Increasing evidence has shown a slight return of manufacturing back to the US during the first Obama term, especially in the past two years.  Obama’s second term will only see this trend continue. China, on the other hand, has shown repeated cases of moving out. While the vigorous growth of shale oil production and energy cost keeps going down, and the cost in China keeps rising, investments based primarily on cost considerations may partially shift from China back to the US. However, those based on market considerations will follow a different path. Ford Motors, for example, announced earlier this year a shift back of its auto parts plant from China to the US, creating 2,000 jobs. Meanwhile, it also announced a master plan to build 2 assembling plants in China, with a goal of doubling its China capacity by the year of 2017. On China’s part, the return of manufacturing has offered good chances for direct investment in the US, creating jobs locally, and global expansion of the parent company.

For the next four years, Obama will step up his efforts of repatriating US manufacturing which will result in various conflicts with China on the one hand, and create numerous chances for China on the other.

Teamwork for a Win-Win Situation

It will not be in the interests of China nor of the US, if the two-way trade and investment falls simply due to business frictions. A more practical approach is a careful, sector-by-sector study of complimentary factors for both nations, to find out workable action plans for win-win projects in both trade and cross-border investment.

The American Chamber of Commerce in China white paper 2012 showed that 68% of their member companies surveyed had a profitability in China higher or equal to that in the rest of the world, and 84% of the respondents put their primary goal in investment in China as selling to the Chinese local markets, or importing from the US, or selling to China’s neighbor markets, as compared to 77% in 2011. It shows that the US companies need expanding business in the enormous and fast growing China market, and the US economic recovery needs Chinese investments. For China, the huge innovation sources and cutting edge technologies from the US fit her industrial restructuring and advance well. These complimentary fundamentals constitute the solid foundation of the two-way trade and investment, and will ultimately set the general scenario of China-US business relations during Obama’s second term.

He Weiwen is co-director, China-US/EU Study Center, China Association of International Trade.

No matter who wins the election in November, the China-US relationship will be faced with challenges. However, the two countries will become more interdependent, and will have to engage in more cooperation in the future. A new type of relationship between the two major countries is likely to be established in certain forms.

Issues concerning China have been discussed extensively during the campaigns and China has been a focus of the two candidates. The “rise of China and tomorrow's world”was among the five topics in the third and final presidential debate.

Although the Democrats and the Republicans have realized that the China-US relationship is characterized by both cooperation and competition, they tend to emphasize and even exaggerate what they deem to be the downsides of the bilateral relationship.

With China's rapid development and expanding influence in international affairs, the US has to acknowledge the fact that China is a rising power. In previous US presidential elections, China was similarly used as a political card, but was usually described as a country to be shaped by the US. As a contrast, in the current campaign, both political parties have paid more attention to a rising China and hoped to see China become cooperative.

The problem is that the US is still concerned that China's rise will mean uncertainties. Unsurprisingly, the China card has again been played in the election. Obama and Romney are both prone to emphasize the potential of increasing competition with China in the future.

Both candidates are blunt about China, especially on economic issues. Recently, while Mitt Romney accused Obama of being soft on China, President Obama took measures to block Chinese investments in the US market citing so-called “national security risks.” Obama issued a presidential order to prevent Ralls Corp., which is owned by two executives of Sany Group, from owning four wind farms in Boardman, Oregon. The US House of Representatives Intelligence Committee released a report, recommending that regulators block Huawei and ZTE from buying US companies, adding that government computer systems should not include components made by them.

Beside security concerns, the US often blames China for Americans' own domestic problems such as unemployment. Obama stated that the tariffs he imposed on Chinese tires in 2009 protected thousands of American jobs, while his competitor called Chinese manufacturing enterprises“cheaters”who were stealing American jobs.

In the geopolitical and military areas, both candidates have emphasized containing China. Obama stated that with his policy initiative, the U.S. is rebalancing towards Asia and has strengthened ties with regional allies. He said that he is planning to deal with China's rise with smart power. From Romney's perspective, Obama's efforts were not enough, and in addition to smart power, hard power is also needed and must be strengthened. Therefore, Romney is against cutting down military expenses and suggests maintaining powerful forces in order to deal with China's accelerating military build-up and prevent China from any“provocation”or“threat”against its neighboring countries.

No matter who becomes the president, the economic and trade relationship between China and the US will experience some turbulence. A friction in this field is inevitable.

However, the other side of the coin is that whoever becomes the president needs to cultivate the China-US relationship. There have been sober voices in the US calling for comprehensive and unbiased judgment on China. Some analysts and officials have realized that if all the countermeasures proposed by the candidates are actually implemented after the election, the US interests will be undermined.

China has become the second-largest economy and will maintain rapid development in a relatively long period of time. China is also an important player in the international community and will gain more clout in the future. As the No.1 economy and the only superpower in the world, the US will probably define China as a major competitor in the world, not necessarily a major enemy or threat. The most likely situation will be that the two countries will become more interdependent and their crucial interests more intertwined. A new type of relationship between the US and China is likely to be shaped, and the potential for cooperation is remarkable.

Su Xiaohui, Research Fellow, Department of International Strategic Studies, China Institute of International Studies

The next president must ask if America can afford to continue to be the police officer of the world.  We are withdrawing from one war in Iraq and in a mess in Afghanistan. Both have drained our treasury and with questionable benefit.

The next president may wish to take a page from ancient Chinese war strategist Sun Tsu.  Sun Tsu’s philosophy is to make fighting a war unnecessary, to instead accomplish the most with minimal risk — in essence, to win without fighting.

China, while spending significantly less than the US on their military they have been in an expansion mode. The build-up may ultimately swamp America, but perhaps not in the way some expect. The threat to America may come from within.

According to Pentagon officials, China is not yet capable of competing militarily with the U.S. and is at least a generation or more behind the United States in military technology.

Perhaps the real threat is what President Dwight D. Eisenhower, a WW II hero and Army general, warned about in his farewell presidential speech.

A little over 50 years ago Eisenhower warned the nation to beware of the “Military Industrial Complex” — an “iron triangle” of intertwined relationships between government, the Armed Forces and the industrial sector that manufactures arms and profits from them.

Americans must be careful that we do not allow China saber rattling, an expansion of their military prowess, evidenced by a testing of their first stealth jet, the construction of their first aircraft carrier and tussles over small islands in the East China Sea to draw us into an extended arms race that we can ill afford.

Should America protect our national interests? Absolutely! However, the policy question moving forward will be: At what cost? And do we win the battle only to lose the war?

Our military budget, like all aspects of U.S. spending, has recently come under fire in this new era of budget austerity.

China has used its evolving economic strength to gain enormous strategic geopolitical advantage in a number of areas; spending the better part of its stellar economic rise to build its country: Roads, bridges, air and seaports, bullet trains, schools, and universities. All have benefited the Chinese people and kept the Communist Party in power.

All the while, the U.S. has disinvested in our people and domestic priorities, allowed our infrastructure to decay and building up our military only to police the world, spending trillions overseas. It shows, too, as we struggle economically — we are also crumbling, literally, from within.

Clearly, China is also spending militarily as well as on domestic needs. If we try to keep pace with an arms race with China could we, like the USSR, go broke? Or will the American people become fed up with high unemployment, declining wages, aging infrastructure and a concentration of wealth in the hands of a few to demand changes in spending priorities?

The Soviet Union spent its focus and economy on an arms race with the West (primarily the U.S.). Economically, communism was part of the problem but the spending on arms ultimately bought down the former USSR.

Watch out for the Military Industrial Complex and it trilogy of political hardliners, U.S. military, and defense contractors bringing America down — without a shot being fired.

As China grows militarily, there will be a continued cry from our military and congressional and defense contractors to reverse the beginning of reductions or at least slowing the increases in military expenditures here at home. Just as the old USSR bankrupted themselves in an escalating arms race, China could do the same to us.

The future will belong to the nation that invests in its people. Investing in research and development, innovation, knowledge, creativity with a can-do spirit will propel us forward.

The question remains, will our expenditures on items that will make us strong both around the world and here at home match our rhetoric?

Can America afford both “bread and arms” when we have a deficit in excess of $16 trillion, borrowing 40 cent for every dollar spent and owing China over $900 billion? When it comes to the U.S. spending wishbone, domestic vs. military spending going forward, who will be the ultimate winner?

The next president needs to watch this building storm, protect our national interests, and be careful that our own preparation for the coming waves does not become our undoing.

Sun Tzu, reminds us: “The victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory.”

As we continue this journey with a rising China, we will need leaders of great wisdom to make sure China’s rise does not come at our demise.

Tom Watkins serves on the University of Michigan’s Confucius Institute, and the Detroit Chinese Business Association advisory board and is honorary professor and educational consultant to K-12 schools and a university in China. He served as Michigan’s state superintendent of schools, 2001-05, and president and CEO of the economic council of Palm Beach County, Fla. 

The just concluded election of delegates to the 18^th CPC Congress has typically exemplified China’s socialist democratic politics with native characteristics in that it has been a campaign conducted under the guiding principle of democratic centralism and through ‘three integrations,’ namely, the integration of independent nomination by Party members and selection by Party organizations, the integration of determination by majority vote and solicitation of public opinion by Party organizations, and the integration of review by Party committees and comment by the general public.

A key test telling the degree of democracy inside the Communist Party of China involves initial nomination in the election of delegates to its congresses and other types of elections: is it a privilege enjoyed by Party organizations exclusively or a right shared by all Party members? Obviously, appointment of candidates by Party organizations rules out democracy, a practice not seen during the election of delegates to the coming Party congress. Instead, the whole process started with free nomination of candidates by members in grassroots Party branches, with only those winning the majority vote being forwarded by the branches for the next round of campaigning. This is a time when democracy in inner-Party election is best practiced, and when all Party members can take a part and have a say. In other words, the right to initial nomination is enjoyed by all, and the winner is determined by vote. The positive side of this practice is its full expression of the will of all Party members, while the negative facet is its high degree of decentralization, a situation that calls for the Party committee of the electoral unit concerned to confirm the initial candidates from among the numerous nominees recommended by the branches. The bottom line for such confirmation is the majority vote received by a nominee in his or her Party branch.

However, no mechanism of democracy is free of defects. The mechanism of determination by vote, for instance, is defective in two senses. First, those enjoying comparatively greater popularity or holding leading posts will get a bigger chance to be nominated; and secondly, the minority may not be duly heard. To address this problem, the election process is extended to the second step: review by Party organizations. This is an important point, at which opinion is solicited from the general public and comments are heard from all circles to make up the deficiency of the mechanism of majority-vote determination. This review is usually conducted by the Party committees of the nominees’ work units, and the purpose is to hear the opinion and comments from the Party organs, Party member representatives, staff members, and Party discipline inspection departments in these units.

Following these two steps, the first running upward from the bottom and the second downward from the top, is the third round, namely, publicity of the name-list of the nominees by the Party committee of the work unit in due forms including internal notice, TV broadcast or multimedia messaging service for public review, comments and supervision.

If no objection is raised to any of the nominees during this period of public review and comment, the electoral process would move on to the fourth step, namely, call of a full session of the Party committee to finalize the name-list of candidates by way of marginal election. In case of such name-list finalization by a Party organ at the provincial level, all non-ruling parties, federations of industry and commerce, and non-party personages concerned should be informed beforehand for opinion and comment.  

On the basis of the work done so far, provincial Party congresses or meetings of representatives will be called to elect, by vote, the delegates to the national congress. The candidates to be voted should be 15 percent more than the delegated elected. A total of 2,270 delegates are elected this way, and then publicized in the media for public knowledge. Finally, these delegates are subject to qualification examination by the Credentials Committee of the congress prior to its official start.

Is the process mentioned above a demonstration of democracy? An answer to this question may be worked out by making reference to several factors that will include, as this author believes, at least the following:

·         The right over initial nomination: is it monopolized by the minority or shared by the majority?

·         The rules of game: are they fair and open?

·         The campaigning: is it conducted in a realistic way?

·         The representation: is it extensive enough?

·         The sense of individuality and satisfaction: does it prevail among all the Party members?

So far, as the recently concluded campaign to elect delegates to the coming congress of the Communist Party of China is concerned, it started with initial nomination at Party branches, the lowest-level Party organs, during which the basic rights of individual Party members were respected. The electoral standards, or the electoral mechanism as a whole, were also kept fair and impartial. As individuals, the Party members differ from each other in terms of their social identities or posts inside the Party, a fact leading to de facto injustice and inequality. They all share the same right, however, to vote and stand for election under the electoral mechanism, as evidenced by their participation in initial nomination and final election of the delegates in provincial-level meetings of representatives. This marked a substantial step toward inner-Party democracy, indeed. When it comes to confirmation at the Party committee level, public will is taken as the basis. In other words, ‘centralization’ at the Party committee should be kept within the boundary of majority vote.

Another feature of the election process is publicity of candidate namelists for review and comment by the colleagues of these candidates and the society as a whole. Subjecting candidates to scrutiny by Party members, non-Party personages, Party and non-Party organs, as well as the general public, this practice is most typical of China’s democratic politics. There have been cases whereas some candidates failed to pass such scrutiny and were moved out of the list. The current delegate election mechanism also encourages competition on a broader scale. Ever since the 1980s when China inaugurated its reform and opening-up initiative, the CPC has counted on marginal election as a key step toward perpetual democracy of its governance and rule. During the recent election of delegates to its coming congress, for instance, it was required that the candidates should outnumber the actual number of delegates by no less than 15 percent so as to extend the range of competitive selection. Finally, the delegates must be representative of all regions, all trades and all social circles. The delegates that have been officially named to attend the coming congress, for instance, have been elected by more than 80 million Party members in over 4 million Party branches, a result earning a satisfaction ratio of 97 percent from all party members.     

The recent election of delegates to the coming Party congress is an orderly political process. First of all, strict conditions and criteria were put up to qualify the delegates, which covered both their political performance as Party members and the social and public reaction to their election. Secondly, the Party organs at all levels played their role as key coordinators in candidate nomination, competitive election of delegates, and organizational and guidance services. At the final step of the process, Party discipline inspection departments and the general public were brought in for scrutiny and comment. In summary, the election was a process conducted under democratic centralism from beginning to end. 

Through the above discussion of the recent election of delegates to the coming Party congress and its procedural features, we can see that inner-Party democracy has become a key feature exemplifying both the development of the Communist Party of China and the advancement of democratic politics in China as a whole.

Gao Xinmin is a professor and doctoral tutor at the Party School of the CPC Central Committee.

The Obama doctrine largely suggested a new US strategy to strengthen its long-term role in the Asia-Pacific almost in all dimensions: security, political, diplomatic, and economic.  But of all these efforts, the most striking is the US military rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific.

According to a US strategist, the military aspect of the US strategic rebalancing is to include two interconnected efforts: geographical rebalancing and capability rebalancing.Agreements are being made with countries like Japan, Australia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam to host the maximum US presence allowable without aggravating local sensitivities about basing.    

With regard to capability rebalancing, the US is trying to rebalance its investments in military technologies and force structure to best address Asia-Pacific military realities.  This essentially calls for a shifting from its current counterinsurgency focus on land in Afghanistan to seaborne crisis response in the Pacific.  To this end, the US is said to deploy 60% of its naval assets in the Asia-Pacific.  Efforts will also be made to create a set of new military capabilities in the nuclear, conventional (air and sea power), missile defense, and cyberspace fields.  Meanwhile, the Pentagon has produced the so-called Air-Sea Battle combat concept as a new operational doctrine in its preparation to fight a war with a regional power specifically like China.

The purpose of this strategic balancing is clearly to reestablish US dominance in the Asia-Pacific.  To achieve this goal, Washington seems to need a target, which is China, to justify the legitimacy of its increased involvement in East Asia.  “Watch out for China” has become a catch phrase, a central them of the US new strategy.  Thus, the process of the implementation of this new strategy in the past two years has been noticeably linked up with the US’frenzied efforts to demonize China, sowing discords between China and its neighbors, inflaming China’s territorial and maritime disputes with these countries, and encouraging the disputant countries to take a unified and more defiant stance against China.  All this seems meant to issue a signal to the region that the US is here to stay as an eventual security guarantor, and is ready to support any country that may happen to be “bullied”by China.  

Rebalancing seems to help strengthen the US position in the Asia-Pacific.  The reality, however, has given full testimony to the adverse ramifications of the US' new strategy.  The rising tensions have now become a hallmark in the otherwise peaceful and stable situation in Each Asia.  Territorial and maritime disputes have flared up beyond the control of the national governments.  Regional multilateral cooperation, which used to witness dynamics development, has experienced serious setbacks.  The region has also seen a spiraling arms race, which may force many states to scramble for more sophisticated weapons and equipment, and to be prepared to fight each other although all of them are fully aware that any military conflicts between them would only bring disastrous lose-lose results. 

All these tensions may just be what Washington wants.    In Obama's case, only when the Asian-Pacific is plagued by persistent political tensions, lingering historical grievances, rising territorial disputes, and strong strategic suspicion and mistrust among East Asian states, would Washington find chances to get in.

In the long run however, there may be several uncertainties concerning the fate of the new US strategy.            

First, rebalancing is expensive. At a time when the US is determined to dramatically cut back its military budget, and reduce its worldwide security commitments, the actual commitment Washington could really afford to the Asia-Pacific is anybody's guess despite its reassurance that the Asia-Pacific remains the only region where the US would increase rather than decrease its military investment.  The US cannot neglect its interests in the other parts of the world. For all the continuing supremacy in strength, the US’fatal vulnerability is the fact that its capability is now falling far short of its ambition.

Second, stirring up tensions, and inflaming territorial disputes in the Asia-Pacific is playing with fire.  Recent developments have already shown that Washington seems to be aware that it might have overplayed the game.  By instigating countries like Japan and the Philippines to take more provocative stances towards China, precipitating their territorial disputes to the brink of a military conflict, the US seems to be running a risk of being dragged into an armed conflict or even a war in the region it never wants.  On the part of its East Asian allies and partners, some are disappointed that Washington talks big, but fails to act to back up their confrontation with China.  More have come to realize that relying on China economically while depending on the US for security cannot be a sustainable option, and that getting too close to the US would not be conducive to their best interests.  They fear that strengthening military and security ties with Washington may also come at the expense of their much-cherished independence as a US ally, and the leverage of maneuvering among major powers in their policy.  There are already signs that despite the bellicose rhetoric of several disputant countries in the maritime disputes with China, they have recently also offered reconciliatory gestures, expressing a wish to work together with China to seek a cooperative approach to the disputes.  At the end of the day, Washington may find out that its efforts to knock together a de-factor containing-China coalition may just be a dream that can never be fulfilled. 

Third, the US rebalancing has left unanswered a critical question; that is, what kind of role China should play in the US calculated security structure in the Asia-Pacific in the future.  For all the seeming necessity of containing China, the US is also keenly aware that China has become an indispensible partner to its own economic prosperity and sustained security.  This schizoid, ambivalent mindset towards China on the part of Washington may continue to make its China policy inconsistent, unstable, and irrational.  As a consequence, the US rebalancing would most probably remain an incoherent and confused strategy. 

Last but not least, rebalancing built on the military muscle will eventually prove the wrong recipe for the US desire to maintain its leadership in the Asia-Pacific.  Issues abound in this region.  Most of them are of economic and political nature.  What really matters to them is the economic health, the dynamics of economic cooperation, and to that end, a peaceful and stable environment. 

To conclude, the US rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific can hardly be taken as a positive development, but may just be a passing episode of an ongoing process of the power restructuring in the region.  China should be concerned but not alarmed over its ramifications in the short term.  China should certainly take due steps to respond to the adverse consequences of the new US strategy, but not overreact.  The thrust of China's policy should continue to count on the positive aspects of the situation in the region, including, among others, a common wish of all the regional states to work together to maintain the economy momentum, and peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific.  For all the tensions and frictions among the East Asian states today, the common ground between them remains, which is so powerful that no outside power could fundamentally split.

MG. Pan Zhenqiang is currently senior adviser to the China Reform Forum, a think-tank in Beijing.  He is the former director of the Institute of Strategic Studies, National Defense University, PLA, China.  The paper is an adapted version of a presentation at the J-Global Forum 2012 at Seoul, on September 10, 2012

China’s Exploration of the “New Type of Relations between Major Countries”

Since the beginning of the 21^st century, Chinese leaders have been exploring the way towards a better and more stable China-US relationship. Their exploration is based on the understanding of the importance of the bilateral relationship. The China-US relationship is a bilateral relationship of great importance, vitality and potentiality in the world, and is also highly representative of a rising power and an existing dominant power. The past history of China-US relations has showed us that China and the US both gain from peaceful coexistence, and will lose from confrontations, that the mutual interest serves as the bedrock of cooperation, and that China-US cooperation is conducive to stability in the Asia-Pacific region as well as peace and development in the world.

The Chinese leaders’ exploration is also based on the understanding of the characteristics of this age and the developing trend of the world. They have realized that peace, development and cooperation are irreversible trends of the times. With the development of multilateralization, globalization and informatization, all the countries share a more common destiny with mutual dependency and intertwined interests.

China’s mission is for peaceful development towards a harmonious world. This cannot be accomplished without healthy and stable relations between major countries, especially between China and the US.

Hopefully, this Chinese exploration has met with largely positive responses from the US, and this concept of a “new type of relations” has been accepted by some American leaders, at least orally. As the then US President Bush said to Chinese Premier Wen, during his stay in Beijing for the Olympics, the U.S.-China relationship is not one in which “I win you lose” or “you win I lose.” Gains for China do not mean losses for the United States, and vice versa. The United States can benefit from China's prosperity and development and the two countries can prosper together.

The Content and the Policy Implications of the New Type of Relations between Major Powers

The “new type of relations” discussed here should be the relationship characterized by win-win cooperation, mutual trust and favorable interaction. The concept is a new way of thinking about international relations. It gets rid of the traditional idea of a “zero-sum game” and the mentality of a cold war and hot war, which has resulted in confrontation and even wars from time to time in history.  It is a new concept for pursuing a common destiny, under which all parties cooperate for mutual benefits and join hands in conquering difficulties.

This new concept should include the following elements:

The first is mutual respect and mutual trust. Both sides should respect each other’s sovereignty, core interests, choice of social system and approach of development. The world is big enough to accommodate the interests and development of all the countries. The US should approve a more powerful and successful China that can play a more important role in international affairs. Therefore, the US should not seek to contain China or irritate turbulence in China. Meanwhile, China persists in peaceful development and has no intention to challenge the US. China is looking forward to a constructive US role in the Asia-Pacific.

The second is coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit and win-win results. Both countries need to further strengthen practical cooperation for common interests, enforce coordination in regional and global issues, address regional and global issues brought about by globalization, and jointly make contributions to world peace and development.

The third is seeking common interests while properly addressing the differences. China and the US should maintain and emphasize the positive aspects of the bilateral relationship and try to maximize the common interests. At the same time, both sides should deal with differences with respect and understanding of each other’s interests and concerns. The two countries should improve the understanding through dialogue and communication so as to positively address and resolve the existing disputes. The unsolved problems might be put aside temporarily, in order to avoid disrupting the main stream for cooperation.

The fourth is sharing responsibilities and facing the challenges together. China and the US should cooperate in dealing with the increasing regional and global problems and various challenges to the sustainable development of the world.

The fifth is building up solid friendships and favorable public opinion. The two sides should promote people to people exchanges at all levels.so that a more understanding atmosphere will be created for better relations.

Obviously, it is no easy task to establish such a new type of relationship between China and the US. What is more urgent and important right now is to respect each other’s core interests and concerns, to assess each other’s strategic intentions in an objective and reasoning way, to manage and control the disputes and conflicts, to avoid strategic misconception, and to prevent provocation and vicious competition. The rising power will not challenge the existing power, while the latter should learn to co-exist with the former.

This new concept can be implemented only by efforts from both sides. The good news is that President Obama has shown his willingness to explore with China the building of this new relationship between major powers, which will definitely be in the interest of both countries.

Dr. Chen Xulong, Director and Associate Research Fellow, Department of International and Strategic Studies, China Institute of International Studies

Almost all countries in East Asia, big or small, have become involved in territorial disputes, such as those between Japan and Russia, between Japan and South Korea, between South and North Korea, between China and Japan, between the countries washed by the South China Sea, between Thailand and Cambodia, and between Malaysia and Singapore. What is more, none of these disputes are easy to settle. Since what is at issue is their sovereignty and national sentiment and dignity, none of the disputing parties will make easy concessions or readily come to accommodations. As a result, how to handle territorial disputes has long remained a stern challenge to all countries in East Asia.

However, history shows these countries can successfully work together. In 1972 and 1978, for instance, the then Chinese and Japanese leaders agreed to leave their disputes over the Diaoyu Islands for settlement in the future, a decision that has kept Northeast Asia in stability for 40 years. Today, however, Japan has unilaterally breached this agreement, triggering hostility between the two countries and plunging Northeast Asia into great turbulence.

As a solution to the South China Sea issue, China worked out the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) with the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in 2002, setting the right direction for settling their disputes in the South China Sea. The DOC stresses that all territorial and jurisdictional disputes in the South China Sea shall be settled through peaceful means, and that pending the settlement of a dispute, the parties concerned shall exercise self-restraint, shelve the dispute, and seek common development of the disputed area. Ever since the conclusion of the DOC, China has faithfully exercised self-restrain, neither sinking a single well nor building a single airport in any of the disputed areas. Some other parties to the DOC, however, have made big inroads into the South China Sea, with Vietnam being the most noticeable example. In 2004 and 2005, it built airports on Spratly Island and Truong Sa Lon Island respectively, and has ever since carried a large number of personnel, equipment, and ammunition into the Nansha Islands. Since 1978, it has also concluded prospecting and development contracts with scores of oil companies from Japan, Russia, the United States, France, Britain, India and others, offering more than 120 blocks across Chinese territorial waters around the Nansha and the Xisha Islands for tenders and turning oil and gas exploitation into a pillar of its economy. Other countries like Malaysia and the Philippines have also made inroads. As a matter of fact, the South China Sea has become an arena for the bullying of the big by the small over the past decade, with China falling the victim.

The US’ eastward shift of its strategic focus has tremendously changed the political ecology of East Asia and stirred up one wave after another on the East Asian seas that have remained comparatively quiet before. The territorial disputes between East Asian countries, in particular, have been exploited by the United States as a major tool to tighten ties with its allies and weave a network of military partnership for containing China. For all its declarations of neutrality, the US’ actual stand of preference is only too clear for the world eye.

Firstly, the United States has been self-contradictory in its stand. Routinely, it has claimed not to take a stand regarding the sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands. At the same time, it has reiterated the applicability of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan concerning the Senkaku Islands. In other words, the US would still regard the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan as applicable to the Diaoyu Islands, even if it questions the actual sovereignty of these islands. Obviously, the United States is trying to bolster and support the Japanese right-wingers and the Noda administration in their farcical purchase of the Diaoyu Islands.

Secondly, the United States has taken actual actions to support Japan, the Philippines and some other claimants. Since the fallout between China and Japan over territorial issues, the United States has not only tilted toward Japan in words, but also stepped up its ‘security cooperation’ maneuvers and show of force in the East China Sea. Its Marine Corps, for instance, has joined the Japanese Self-Defense Force in a joint month-long exercise of island-targeted operations in the East China Sea, a first in their joint exercises. At a time when Japan repeatedly commits provocative acts over the Diaoyu Islands to intensify Sino-Japanese frictions over territorial issues, it is obvious to all whom the US is targeting by joining forces with Japan to conduct large-scale military exercises..

Another example is the US’ attitude toward China’s disputes with the Philippines over some islets and reefs in the South China Sea. Superficially, it has refused to take a stand. Recently, however, it has noticeably stepped up cooperation with the Philippines in joint military exercises designed to ‘react against marine threats.’ With support from the United States, the Philippines has been going all out to strengthen its naval reconnaissance and maritime law enforcement abilities, with its spearhead directing at the waters around the Huangyan Islet in the South China Sea.

Lastly, the United States has reacted differently at developments of a similar character. When the Vietnamese parliament passed the Maritime Law of Vietnam in June this year to bring China’s Xishan and Nansha islands under its jurisdiction, China reacted by announcing the establishment of Sansha City to strengthen its control, development and protection of its islands, reefs and territorial waters in the South China Sea. The United States harshly denounced China for the normal action, but did not breathe a single word about the Vietnamese act, fully revealing its preference.

Needless to say, the US factor has fueled the current intensification of territorial disputes in East Asia. Apart from taking sides with Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam and others, the United States has also provided these countries with advanced armament or joined forces with them to conduct military exercises targeting China, claiming neutral in words but adding fuel to the flames in deeds. It is precisely against such an overall background that some countries have tried to inflame their national sentiment or take extreme steps to constantly intensify the already tense situation, with some emboldening themselves with external forces to provoke against China time and again and some stepping up arms expansion and war preparation for territorial expansion under the strategy of inch-by-inch encroachment, only to constantly exacerbate the tension in East Asia originating from territorial disputes.

With close ties and extensive interests in East Asian countries, the United States is highly dependent on this region, a situation that can well be turned into an opportunity for cooperation and a driving force for development. China respects the justified presence and interest of the United States in this region, and welcomes all construction contributions from it.

What is constructive contribution, then? So far as territorial disputes are concerned, "The United States at this point probably should not be in the lead, but it should voice strong support for this sort of process, offer technical support, and return to the principle of evenhandedness," as Douglas Paal has pointed out.

Paal has been absolutely right. When US Secretary of State Hillary visited Indonesia, however, she brazenly tried to fix a timetable for the finalization of the Codes of Conduct in the South China Sea, saying that she hoped to see some substantial progress from China and the ASEA before the East Asian summit in November. She was trying to order the East Asian nations about as their supreme commander. But she was totally wrong.

When it comes to the territorial disputes in East Asia, the United States has two options: strict adherence to the principle of neutrality and impartiality and top precaution in both words and deeds, as it did during the row between Japan and South Korea over the Dok Island (Takeshima Island as known in Japan) – low profile and impartiality; or taking sides, adding fuel to the fire, or saying one thing and doing another. Different options will lead to different results, of course, with the first option to bring about lasting peace and prosperity in East Asia and the second one to intensify and perpetuate tension in this region. Which one, then? It is now high time for the US to ponder and decide.

Wu Zhenglong, Research Fellow of China Foundation For International Studies.

China as a Major Value Provider for Domestic Progress

Modern transnational values can be reduced in a very broad and reductionist way into four basic categories: “economic growth”, “liberty”, “social justice”, and “environment protection”. The primary national achievement that China has made since the initiation of reform and opening-up falls into the category of “economic growth”. But this transnational value itself is definitely not out of her creation. And now from the government to the public opinion, the sense is more and more acute that this achievement has been at the expense of “social justice” and “environment protection”. Since the beginning of reform Chinese society has been economically liberated. The provision of economic rights to 1.3 billion people is indeed a great extension of liberty in the history of the world. However, this value itself is also not an innovation from China, and economic liberty in too many cases in China now is virtually laissez-faire with its huge cost to social justice and environment health, not to mention that there is still a very long way to go before China fully realizes some other basic liberties of her people.

Thus, looking at the development of China and its impact on the world, one can say that we Chinese more and more have firm confidence in the growth of national strength. But (this is a greatest “but”) it is still difficult now to foretell what major contribution the contemporary China will make on transnational values of the world.  

It should be emphasized that in one major aspect China has already contributed an innovative historic value, which was created by Mao Zedong in the later 1920s to early 1950s, and adapted brilliantly by Deng Xiaoping for contemporary China. The principle is that what is best for Washington or Moscow or elsewhere is not necessarily best for China, just as what is best for China is not necessarily best for any of the others. People are fully entitled to travel on their own roads respectively according to their own practice, experience, and decisions. This “local” Chinese experience, vindicated by successful revolution, reform, and growth, could have a great global significance.

China as a Strategic Great Power, and Prospects for China-U.S. Relations

With the assumption that China’s peaceful rise continues, the United States will probably consider China with increasing seriousness or even eventually adopt certain peaceful “final settlement”. That will differentiate the balances of strength and influence in different functional and geographical areas through adopting the rationale of “selective preponderances” (instead of “comprehensive superiority”) or “advantage distribution”.

This will not only entail accepting the leading position China might obtain in terms of GDP, foreign trade volume, and diplomatic/economic influences in Asia, but also accepting the mutual strategic deterrence between China and the United States The U.S. will also need to accept China’s military parity or even a marginal superiority to the U.S. in the former’s offshore area (with Taiwan’s east coastline as the approximate “demarcation line”) and a generally peaceful reunification of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. This means that the U.S. must accept China as a legitimate strategic great power. Meanwhile, the United States, with China’s acceptance, will retain her over-all military superiority in the world in general and in the Central and Western Pacific in particular, as well as her predominance in diplomatic influence in some other major regions. All the above assumes a sharing between China and the United States, and the latter’s final acceptance of China’s peaceful rise as a world power.

But indeed, on the other hand, the great “structural rivalry” in power between China and the United States is becoming broader and more profound than in the past, perhaps like a gathering storm over the distant horizon. What is particularly important is that China’s lasting and escalating military build-up will surely become (or even already begin to become) the most prominent problem in the minds of American strategists and neo-conservatives. Since Ronald Reagan the U.S. has always been determined to maintain its military superiority, perceiving it the most important and prominent strategic asset, while China has made up its mind to realize essential military modernization for her vital national interests and self-respect: this contradiction is surely not absent the possibility of paralyzing the future of China-U.S. relations.

China as a Major Bearer of International Responsibility  

Especially in China’s relations with the United States, European Union, and other western powers, as well as in the increasingly prominent wide issue of global governance, there are newly emerged major problems with relative long-term significance, which may become even more prominent in the near future. These are the international responsibilities a rising China should bear and, especially in the eyes of the western powers, have not yet been borne sufficiently. What is increasingly necessary is China’s assurance, by words as well as deeds, of her “responsible rise” alongside her peaceful rise.

There should be no doubt in China that she must greatly increase her bearing of international responsibility, as long as such bearing (1) will not violate her vital interests and surpass her fundamental capability, while remaining somewhat compatible with increasing her international influence; (2) results from the equal consultation between her and the external world, rather than from any “dictation” or coercion by the latter; and (3) largely matches the increase of her reasonable international rights and privileges. “International responsibility” is rapidly becoming a key word in the issue of China’s grand strategy and foreign policy, and a major challenge that China has to meet positively. It should not be forgotten that China occupies about one fifth of the world’s population, therefore her contribution to the world in terms of international responsibility bearing will in return benefit her own people.

It is right for China to refuse and resist unreasonable demands and pressure from the West. At the same time, it is also right for her to substantially increase the commitment and bearing of international responsibility to address the global challenges. These two things are not at all mutually exclusive. Especially in reducing her huge foreign trade surplus, dedicating herself more to environmental protection, and engaging in international non-proliferation and regional security cooperation, an increase in commitment and responsibility are closely bound to China’s healthy development within and strategic security without. 

China as a Restrainer of Abusive or Excessive Power in the World

China ought to play this role in both the short and long term, as it is so closely connected with a fundamental issue: What might be rising China’s future foreign policy position?

The peaceful rise will and should continue to be a major element in China’s future foreign policy orientation, but far from its basic totality. The rise of peaceful China has been her “traditional” orientation in foreign policy since the launch of reform and opening-up by Deng Xiaoping. Through her peaceful rise, including the strategic prudence and diplomatic accommodation characterized so often by diplomatic compromises, China shall ultimately become an independent World Power, both politically and mentally. Deng Xiaoping himself emphasized this, with his personal language and discourse, as “China…. will be one polar” in the overall “multi-polar” power structure the world will have and ought to have in the long future.         

For this, China is required to check American power as gently as possible with moderation. This means, among other things, that China should have a sort of comprehensive and balanced diplomacy, paying sufficient attention to her relations with the United States and striving for a better selective partnership, while placing firmly its “gravity” of diplomatic attention and strategic operation upon Asia. China therefore should deal with her Asian neighbors in a holistic strategic framework in the above sense. As long as it would not severely damage China’s vital interests and her fundamental national honor, the Chinese government must do its utmost to keep old friends and win new ones along China’s geographical periphery, mitigating the old lasting resentments, avoiding new national antagonism and, over many decades, creating strategic partners or even allies. In the same way, China also should pay sufficient attention to her relations with other powers on other Continents.

Moreover, this sort of foreign policy orientation requires the Chinese state and society to be healthier through domestic reform, and to reduce the excessive interdependence on the United States in terms of political economy. At the same time with almost the same importance, the Chinese government has to guide the related public opinion in China, a substantial part of which has become in recent years less patient, more easily angry, and often underestimating China’s Asian neighbors.

However, there has been a school of thought regarding the contemporary traditional foreign policy orientation mentioned above. “G-2 the Chinese version,” a concept raised in China in 2008, means that the United States must be given a preponderant position in the Chinese foreign policy agenda and national attention for external affairs. This also means that China’s interdependence with the U.S. in the political economy should increase even further. People holding this belief seem to have convinced themselves that this approach can reduce troubles from the United States as China’s greatest troublemaker through some “extra-accommodation,” while enabling China to treat almost all the other troublemakers more forcefully or less attentively. And, they believe or hope, it also can make China obtain the U.S. recognition of, and even assistance to, her “No.2” status and position in the world in the same way. They obviously have more illusions, less strategic sense, and less real great power aspiration than many others in China.

Shi Yinhong is Professor of International Relations at the Renmin University of China.

It is easy to see why some might argue the filing was reckless. After all, it led China on the very same day to file the WTO's 449^th dispute, the title of which is United States—Countervailing and Antidumping Measures on Certain Products from China. In this view, Obama, who was trying to look tougher on China than his opponent, Mitt Romney, ended up triggering Chinese retaliation. The stakes include not only a long list of US trade remedies, but the methodologies that produced them. Still, this isn’t just tit-for-tat litigation; China's complaint was going to be filed in one form or another regardless of whether the US sued over auto subsidies. September 17 may have been a busy day in Geneva, but the coincidental filings should not blind us to China's wider aims, nor to the US's narrower ones.

Since joining the multilateral trade regime in 2001, China has been the complainant in 10 WTO disputes, nine of which concern trade remedies. Against the US, China has recently prosecuted two cases that bear on key definitions and methodologies pertaining to antidumping and countervailing duty determinations, in particular. Beijing's latest filing builds on these two cases and, like the second, takes another cut at the first. If the timing of this case caught some by surprise, little else about it should have. Far from being an ad hoc gesture of retaliation, this case is a part of a larger offensive against US (and other) trade remedies practices. Expect more.   

The US filing did not materialize overnight either. Various constituents, along with their representatives in Congress, have been calling for the auto subsidies case for months. And while Obama's announcement met with applause in Columbus, the filing is not as encompassing as those in the crowd might have hoped. In particular, the US is targeting subsidies that are contingent upon export, and the lack of transparency surrounding Chinese subsidies in general. This is not provocative stuff; the WTO says these kinds of subsidies are mala in se, and the charge that China doesn't notify its programs is nothing new. Forced tech transfer isn't mentioned, nor is anything about local content. Claims of this sort, advocated for by proponents of the filing, fall within WTO disciplines and could have been raised. This case could easily have been provocative.

The US also seems to be hoping to build a coalition of countries in this case. The request for consultations falls under a provision that invites others to join, and in a dispute over export subsidies, never mind one against China, there are sure to be takers. This doesn't bode well for reaching a negotiated solution, but it will help sell the case as reflecting wider concerns, not just US ones.   

Domestic politics is a funny thing. Obama told the Cleveland Plain Dealer that “when we push [the Chinese] very hard but we don't go out of our way to embarrass them, we get results.” Romney's reaction was that the filing “may sound good on the stump, but it is too little, too late….” No one said it was reckless. For its part, Beijing denied that there was anything retaliatory about the WTO's 449^th dispute. Business was more muted. The Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association, for one, said only that it would look into how the filing would impact its members. As in the solar industry, another source of US-China trade tension, global supply chains are complicating the domestic political payoff to filings like this. Auto vendors are invested in China, and they worry about how the case will affect these investments. It is getting harder to pander.

The most interesting thing about China's WTO litigation is not the number of complaints it has filed or defended against, but its appearances as a third party. The number is 91. This is Beijing's learning by watching strategy. The global economy is better off with a more vigilant China, a China that has greater confidence in the rule of law because it has the capacity to use it. It is costly to be reckless in filing against China, even on the campaign trail in Ohio, but that's not what happened. The US case is principled and modest in the expectation that China will be principled and modest too. This isn't just mutual deterrence in the back alley of the global economy. It is an outcome owing to the fact that the content of the requests exchanged on September 17 matters. The WTO helps filter good cases from bad, and the mutual deterrence is attributable to both side's capacity to advocate sufficiently well to prevent bad cases. It's a long road from Ohio to Geneva, but its good that the US and China know the way.

Marc L. Busch is the Karl F. Landegger Professor of International Business Diplomacy at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University