Ted Galen Carpenter

A less obvious, but increasing, possibility is that South Korea might dash hopes of keeping the Peninsula non-nuclear.  Two opinion polls taken in South Korea, including one by Gallup Korea, after the North’s February nuclear test found that more than 64 percent of respondents favored Seoul developing its own nuclear deterrent.  It was not an entirely unprecedented result.  Following the North Korean attack on Yeonpyeong Island in 2010, polls also showed a surge in public support for an independent deterrent.           

It’s pertinent to recall that South Korea had an active nuclear program during the 1970s under strongman Park Chung-hee.  Only massive pressure from Washington induced Seoul to terminate that program.  But nervousness in South Korea has been building steadily since the United States and the other participants in the Six-Party talks have been unable to get Pyongyang to relinquish its nuclear objectives.  

A pro-nuclear attitude seems to be slowly spreading within South Korea’s political class as well as among the general public.  Although President Park Geun-hye (ironically, the daughter of the man who originally flirted with building an independent deterrent) has rejected any nuclear ambitions for her country, there has been a noticeable increase in statements from major political figures and opinion shapers in recent months taking a very different position.  

The most outspoken politician thus far on the nuclear issue is Chung Mong-joon, and Chung is not some inconsequential, fringe player.  Not only is he a member of the South Korean parliament, but he’s the son of the founder of the powerful Hyundai industrial conglomerate and one-time leader of the governing party.  

During a visit to Washington in early April, Chung stated that South Korea should withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and, if the North continued its nuclear program, match that move with the development of its own nuclear weapons.  A few weeks earlier, he was quoted in the New York Times explaining his reasons.  “The Americans don’t feel the North Korean nuclear weapons as a direct threat,” he said.  “At a time of crisis, we are not 100 percent sure whether the Americans will cover us with its (sic) nuclear umbrella.” 

Chung’s comment highlights a long-standing problem faced by allies or security clients of a great power like the United States.  Primary or direct deterrence—deterring an attack on one’s own county—is a straightforward process with high credibility.  North Korea or any other aggressor knows that attacking the United States would be suicidal, since Washington would respond with a devastating retaliatory strike.  But an ally or client cannot have similar confidence that its patron would take the same action to respond to an assault confined to that client.  Such uncertainty is especially great when the aggressor has the ability to attack the homeland of the protecting power. 

That’s why the credibility of extended deterrence—the willingness to incur possible devastation merely to defend an ally—has always been lower than the credibility of primary deterrence.  During the Cold War, Washington’s NATO allies were perpetually uneasy about whether the United States would actually defend them in a showdown with the Soviet Union.  And as Henry Kissinger once noted, the allies constantly pressed the United States to reiterate and strengthen its assurances (including by stationing forward-deployed military units as a tripwire to ensure U.S. involvement if war erupted in Europe). 

South Korea and other U.S. allies in East Asia experience a similar sense of uncertainty as evidence mounts that Pyongyang intends to retain and strengthen its nuclear capability.  Although North Korea cannot presently strike the U.S. homeland, it may soon be able to attack Guam and other U.S. possessions in the western Pacific.  And probably within a decade it will be able to reach targets in North America. 

South Koreans have ample reason to wonder whether U.S. leaders would really risk the safety of their own country just to respond to a North Korean attack confined to South Korea.  The Obama administration is trying to reassure its ally that the security commitment, including the nuclear deterrent, remains firm.  The flyover by B-2 nuclear-capable bombers during the March joint military exercises with South Korea was a manifestation of that attempt to reassure—as was the subsequent dispatch of F-22s. 

The credibility of Washington’s security guarantee to Seoul is fading, though, no matter how often U.S. officials may profess the continued seriousness of that commitment.  As much as Washington and Beijing insist that their goal is a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, unless they can induce North Korea to give up its nuclear program, there is a growing possibility that South Korea will not sit idly by and depend solely on the United States to deter threats from a nuclear-armed, hostile neighbor.  South Korean political leaders can resist a pro-nuclear majority in public opinion for only so long.  

The issue of nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula is a key test for the Sino-U.S. relationship and its ability to manage security problems.  Beijing’s patience with Pyongyang certainly appears to be wearing thin.  Chinese President Xi Jinping’s comment that “no one should be allowed to throw the region, even the whole world, into chaos for selfish gains” was widely seen as a rebuke to North Korea.  But if Beijing wants the Korean Peninsula to be free of nuclear weapons, the time is overdue to put stronger pressure on Kim Jong-un’s government—despite the risk that such pressure might cause the North Korean state to collapse, removing the strategic buffer between China and U.S- led East Asia. 

If China needs to get tougher with Pyongyang, the United States needs to become less wedded to a strategy based on ever tightening sanctions and the goal of increasing North Korea’s economic and diplomatic isolation.  Instead, the Obama administration ought to take Beijing’s long-standing advice and explore ways to try to establish a more normal bilateral relationship with Pyongyang—as difficult as that task might be. 

The bottom line is that unless both China and the United States change their strategies, the goal of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula will slip away.  Moreover, Washington and Beijing may ultimately have to deal with not one but two nuclear-armed Korean states. 

Ted Galen Carpenter, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, is the author of nine books on international affairs, including (with Doug Bandow) The Korean Conundrum: Washington’s Troubled Relations with North and South Korea (Palgrave Macmillan). 

Troy Stangarone

However, since upgrading their relationship to a strategic cooperative partnership in 2008, relations between Seoul and Beijing have begun to deteriorate. They have found themselves at odds over regional priorities such as North Korea and the nature of the U.S.-Korea alliance, as Beijing watched Seoul expand its economic ties with the United States and European Union.

While North Korea has consumed much of the attention in the early days of Park Geun-hye’s presidency, the new administration has indicated that it places a priority on improving relations with China. Improving ties with China is something Park may be well placed to achieve. She is viewed favorably in China and has the advantage of being able to speak Mandarin. She also appears to have a willing partner in Xi Jinping.

However, improving relations with China will require her administration to build off of the already strong economic relationship between South Korea and China, while addressing the tensions that have developed in the relationship in recent years.

Since formalizing relations, China and South Korea have built a dynamic economic relationship that has seen two-way trade rise from a mere $6.3 billion in 1992 to $215.1 billion last year. In little more than a decade China surpassed the United States as South Korea’s largest trading partner, while two-way trade today outstrips South Korea’s combined trade with the United States and Japan.

Economic ties should only continue to grow in the years ahead as China shifts its economy towards greater levels of domestic consumption. Currently, much of South Korea’s trade with China is processing trade. As China shifts towards more domestic consumption additional opportunities for South Korean producers to sell into China’s domestic market will develop.

South Korea and China are also in the process of negotiating a series of free trade agreements (FTA). Last year, Seoul and Beijing launched talks on a bilateral FTA and recently held the first round of discussions with Japan on a trilateral FTA. The trilateral talks should help to lay the groundwork for a common set of rules and standards for the region to deepen economic integration. At the same time, both South Korea and China are taking part in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership which would bring together the ASEAN + 6 nations under a common FTA.

While the Park administration will be able to continue to strengthen South Korea’s economic ties with China through its FTA negotiations, developing a deeper strategic partnership may prove more challenging. In recent years, a series of disputes and challenges related to North Korea, the United States, territorial concerns, and values and perceptions have hindered moves to develop a deeper strategic relationship.

These disputes have led to a declining public perception of China among South Koreans. According to recent polling by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, only 49.8 percent of South Koreans view relations with China as cooperative in nature, with a nearly equal percentage viewing them as competitive. In contrast, 80.2 percent of South Korean’s view Seoul’s relationship with Washington as cooperative. Additional polling by the Asan Institute has shown that 61 percent of South Korean’s view China as a threat post-unification, as opposed to only 26 percent for Japan and 9 percent for the United States. As a whole, South Koreans tend to view China’s military and economic rise as a threat.

However, the most difficult challenge for improving relations is North Korea. While Seoul and Beijing work together to maintain stability on the peninsula and discourage provocations or nuclear tests by North Korea, there has been a growing dissatisfaction with each side’s approach to dealing with Pyongyang more broadly. 

Despite an economic relationship with China that is nearly 35 times larger than North Korea’s, South Korea still finds that Beijing values the stability of the Kim regime in Pyongyang over its economic relationship with Seoul. For Beijing, concerns about instability impacting the development of its own northeastern provinces, refugees from a potential collapse, and the prospect of a U.S. ally on its border still guide its policy.

However, China’s approach has created tensions with Seoul in the past. In 2010, North Korea sank the Cheonan and later shelled Yeonpyeong Island; leaving South Koreans surprised that China would seemingly side with North Korea despite its aggression against the South.

Beijing’s handling of refugees from North Korea has also been a sore point in the relationship. China views North Koreans who have illegally crossed its boarder as economic migrants and repatriates them to North Korea rather than aiding in their transit to the South.

At the same time, China began to grow frustrated with South Korea’s move away from a policy of engagement with North Korea under the Lee Myung-bak administration.  From the Chinese perspective, the best way to handle the challenge of North Korea is through engagement and to address the regime’s insecurities. However, China’s own economic engagement, at a time when Seoul has cut off almost all economic ties with North Korea beyond the Kaesong Industrial Complex, has created concerns about China’s long term economic influence on the North.

Park’s approach to North Korea may help to mitigate these tensions with China. Generally referred to as “trustpolitik,” Park has proposed greater engagement with North Korea through a process of mutual trust building. While premised on the concept of starting small and building to larger forms of engagement, it could, in time, put Seoul’s approach to North Korea more in line with Beijing’s preferred policy. At the same time, China has also indicated a willingness to take steps to improve inter-Korean relations.

Of all of the relationships in Northeast Asia, the one between South Korea and China may be the most complex. While the United States remains South Korea’s primary security partner, South Korea’s economic growth has become increasingly tied to China’s own economic fortunes. Similarly, real progress on North Korea requires the cooperative involvement of China. If Park’s approach is able to improve relations with China while maintaining strong ties with the United States, she will not only have achieved what her recent predecessors have not, but also have improved South Korea’s economic and security prospects.

Troy Stangarone recently completed a Council on Foreign Relations Fellowship in South Korea at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies. He is currently the Senior Director for Congressional Affairs and Trade at the Korea Economic Institute of America. The views expressed here are his own.

The agenda is full.  Particularly important are territorial disputes in East Asia which could turn violent.  Relations between the People’s Republic of China and its neighbors have deteriorated, naval confrontations have increased, and Washington has been dragged into the mess. 

Doug Bandow

The issues are many.  China makes contested claims to the Diaoyu/Senkaku, Nansha/Spratly, and Xisha/Paracel Islands, as well as Huangyan Island/Scarborough Reef.  (I will use the more familiar names in the West.)  On the other side are Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, and Vietnam.  

Despite its physical distance, the U.S. remains entangled in these disputes.  Perceived Chinese aggressiveness has spurred the so-called “pivot” to Asia, including the augmentation of military forces and strengthening of military alliances.

Conflict between China and other states easily could drag in America, which has formal defense treaties with Japan and the Philippines.  Washington and China have had their own contentious disagreement over the U.S. Navy’s legal right to conduct intelligence gathering within China’s 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone.

The PRC obviously has important interests at stake.  It wants international acceptance of control over its territory.  Beneath the disputed waters are potentially significant energy deposits.  As a great trading nation China is concerned about secure ocean transit.  Good relations with its neighbors would ease its rise to regional primacy and global leadership.

Most fundamental may be the issue of peace.  The PRC has suffered much over the last two centuries.  Although policy reform was necessary for China’s economic transformation, so was the absence of war.  The latter allowed Beijing to concentrate on economic growth, which has allowed an ever larger share of the population to escape immiserating poverty.  The PRC is wealthier today, but remains a relatively poor nation with great income disparities.  China still needs peace.

America’s interests may be fewer but are no less profound.  The U.S. would benefit from greater resource development.  Washington also is concerned about global norms, especially the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes.  The U.S. is committed to its traditional alliances, seeks secure sea lanes for its trade, and desires stability and peace in a region with which it has abundant political, economic, and cultural ties.

The status quo is extremely dangerous.  No one wants war.  However, China and Vietnam fought over the Paracels a number of years ago.  Passions are aflame throughout the region recognizing popular anger in China, Japan, and the Philippines makes it harder for any nation to climb down from confrontation.

China’s President Xi Jinping has just taken over in the midst of internal political challenges and may feel pressure from nationalist elements.  Abe’s Liberal Democrats won the recent Japanese election while promising to be tough on China.  The Philippines is eternally in crisis and its weakness may encourage it to overplay its hand.  Anti-China sentiments were evident (though for other reasons) even in America¹s recent presidential election.

Fear of Beijing also has prompted countries in the region, including one-time enemy Vietnam, to move closer to the U.S.  Both India and Japan are being encouraged to play a greater role.  Tokyo and Manila have pressed the U.S. for express guarantees of disputed islands. 

It won’t be easy to resolve the many disputes.  All parties should admit uncertainty and act with humility.  Ownership of these islands is contested because it is uncertain.  Territorial claims are based on a complicated mix of international law and treaty, control and occupation, and historical connection.  No doubt the PRC’s case looks better in Beijing than elsewhere, but it is not a slamdunk even under the best of circumstances.

China should recognize that its claims are not indisputable and therefore require a negotiated or adjudicated resolution.  Any attempt at coercion will result in hostility, retaliation, and resistance.  Indeed, Beijing’s plan to stop and search ships considered to be illegally operating in its territorial waters in the South China Sea, if enforced, almost guarantees naval incidents.  Yet negotiations work:  of 23 border disputes since 1949 the PRC settled 17 peacefully.  In return for restraint, Beijing could rightly insist that its interests not be compromised until the dispute is resolved. 

Washington should acknowledge that its concern is indirect and it does not know the correct outcome.  American officials should press allied states, which occupy or seek to control disputed lands, to demonstrate restraint and negotiate.  After winning the Japanese election Prime Minister Shinzo Abe declared that the Senkakus are Japan’s inherent territory so there is no room for negotiation at this point. That is a prescription for conflict.

The U.S. should not bias the outcome by promising to defend contested territorial claims.  Former Undersecretary of Defense Michele Flournoy acknowledged the risk of the Philippines mistaking U.S. support for an opportunity to be much more assertive in staking their claims.  America’s objective should not be to ‘defeat’ Beijing, but to promote an outcome which leaves the entire region more peaceful and stable.

In some cases bilateral negotiation, perhaps with outside mediation, could resolve the issue.  But in the case of the Spratlys, with multiple claimants, a multilateral dialogue or forum, which China so far has resisted, might be more effective.  Disputes also could be brought before an international tribunal, whether formal (such as the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea) or ad hoc.

Moreover, interim measures could evolve into long-term solutions.  The parties should consider a code of conduct to prevent escalation of minor incidents; bilateral or regional resource development and maritime policing until ownership issues are decided; separation of resources and navigation from sovereignty, ensuring widespread access to the benefits irrespective of formal legal control; and shared sovereignty, where two or more nations have legal rights to the territory.  As Wu Shicun of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies observed, countries should “seek common ground while reserving differences.”

What matters most is that the resulting process be seen as fair and legitimate.  China, the U.S., and nations throughout the region overwhelming benefit from today’s stable and peaceful order.  All interested parties should work to ensure its continuation. 

Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and a former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan.  He is author of several books, including Foreign Follies:  America’s New Global Empires (Xulon).

Justin Logan

At the same time those articles were being written, we were also being told that Japan was actually cutting defense spending, that demographic and ideological constraints were preventing Japan from taking on a larger role, that Japan’s nationalism is a sign of weakness, and that Japan’s response to China’s rise was primarily focused on hugging America closer. Now the Council on Foreign Relations is running a symposium asking whether Japan is in decline.

So what’s really going on here? Is a confident, nationalistic Japan stepping forward to take a larger role in East Asian security, or is a once-great power locked in stagnation and slowly fading away?

In part, partisans of these two points of view are talking past one another. Compared to its defense posture and politics in the past, Japan is growing increasingly nationalistic and militarized. But looking at its economic and technological power, it still punches far below its weight. Talking about a Japan that is more heavily-armed and nationalistic than at any time in the recent past doesn’t say much about how well-equipped Japan is to deal with today’s national security challenges, unless you factor in how militarized Japan has been in the recent past. The answer, of course, is “not very,” which makes looking at comparative Japanese militarization less useful.

It’s true that Japan is rebalancing its defense budget toward naval platforms that would be useful in deterring or defeating the most likely security problem the country faces, Chinese naval encroachment. Still, unless China’s economy collapses, its growth, and commensurate growth in China’s defense spending is going to present serious challenges for Japan—whether or not Tokyo can count on the United States to pay for a significant portion of Japan’s defense.

The important question for Americans is whether Japan is poised to play a leading role on security issues in Asia more independently of the United States. Since the end of World War II, Japan has been one of the “spokes” in Washington’s hub-and-spokes system of alliances throughout Asia, relying largely on Washington for its defense needs.

In Japan’s defense, its free riding was, and to some extent still is, encouraged by the United States. As Victor Cha has demonstrated, Washington’s system of alliances in Asia was designed with what he terms a “powerplay” rationale, in which the United States created asymmetric, bilateral al­liances in order, in each case, to “exert maxi­mum control over [its] smaller ally’s actions.” Further, Cha writes, Washington sought to “amplify U.S. control and minimize any collu­sion among its alliance partners.”

Whatever sense this made in the 1950s and 60s, it has grown to be a particularly bad deal for Americans. Japan’s security is important to Americans, but it is more important to Japanese. Therefore, it doesn’t make sense that Japan spends roughly 1 percent of its GDP on defense when Americans—who face a much less dire threat environment—spend 4 percent. As the U.S. fiscal shortfalls and the political difficulty in fixing them both become clearer, it is irresponsible not to insist allies do more for their own security.

The time has come to urge Japan to take a much more prominent role in East Asian security issues. There are several reasons to start this process immediately.

First is the Damoclean sword of demographics. Japan is likely to have roughly 40 percent fewer citi­zens under 15 and undergo a 30 percent drop in working age population by 2040, placing increasing stress on its economy and its pension and health systems. It will also mean fewer Japanese workers to produce defense articles and serve in the Self-Defense Forces. This makes the need for Japan to do more urgent today.

Also, although over the medium term things appear almost certain to get worse in Japan, its present prowess in defense technologies—specifically naval and anti-submarine warfare platforms—can be parlayed to produce dividends in the future. Investments today yield benefits downstream, and already Japan is contemplating arming and training its neighbors’ navies and coast guards. Immediately enhancing and expanding this program, and considering more systematic arms sales could help stabilize the balance of power.

Historically, the U.S. foreign-policy establishment’s response to suggestions that Japan should develop a more robust and independent defense policy has been to stoke fears of Japanese imperialism. As former policy planning director Anne-Marie Slaughter opaquely put it, Japan is “neither psychologically ready nor suitable for historical reasons” to play a larger role in providing for its own security. The concern is that Japan’s remilitarization would produce dangerous arms racing with China, poisoning Japan-China relations and possibly Japan-US relations.

These fears are overblown. Whatever importance one ascribes to Japanese ideology or the visits of Japanese officials to the Yasukuni shrine, the fact remains that Japan does not (and will not) have the ability to project power on land. This is the upside of Japan’s demographic problem. Even if Tokyo were to re-arm, no one should fear a replay of the 1930s, because Japan simply doesn’t have the fighting age population to project power without wrecking its economy. On the other hand, Japan’s existing naval prowess requires relatively less labor than would ground forces, and does not directly threaten Japan’s neighbors. To suggest an analogy with the invasion of Manchuria is to overlook the material constraints Japan faces.

If Japan does not adjust rapidly and take on a more significant role on security issues in Asia, its demographic profile and resulting fiscal woes could marginalize Japan, making it into a wasting asset in the eyes of Americans. With elections poised to return the Liberal Democratic Party to power, Americans and all those hoping for greater burden sharing in Asia should hope Japan steps up. If it doesn’t do so soon, it may never get another chance.

Justin Logan is Director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, and the author of the forthcoming policy analysis, “China, America, and the Pivot to Asia.”

Short version: Japan seized control of the islands following a war with China in 1895. The United States administered them from 1945 to the early 1970s. Japan regained control in 1972, when ownership was reacquired by a private family. Nobody lives there.

Earlier this year, the right-wing mayor of Tokyo said the city government was going to buy the islands to ensure that they remained in Japanese hands. (Had he gone ahead and done so, they would have become the most distant metropolitan suburb in the history of the world). To forestall this step, the Japanese national government bought the islands instead, a step that has provoked some ugly demonstrations in China and raised the possibility of a military confrontation.

This issue is a tricky problem for the United States, because we'll be expected to support our Japanese ally if the dispute escalates. The U.S. position on the whole issue isn't clear, however, and is further complicated by the fact that Taiwan agrees with the PRC and regards the islands (the largest of which is only some 4 square kilometers and is home to moles, birds, and sheep), as part of its territory too.

This whole business got me thinking. In a bygone era, sovereigns used to sell each other territory when it was in their interest to do so, normally when one of them needed cash. Remember the Louisiana Purchase, or the acquisition of Alaska from Russia? If the Japanese government can pay roughly $2 billion to buy the islands from a private family, why can't China pay the same amount (or whatever the market will bear) to obtain them from Japan? After all, the PRC is pretty flush with cash these days, and Japan could use some extra money (although ~$2 billion isn't really that much). Still, why not just view this as a simple matter of business?

The main obstacle to this obvious solution is nationalism. China regards the islands as Chinese territory, so why should they pay Japan in order to get something they think is rightfully theirs? Similarly, some Japanese might regard selling the islands as an affront to their own national pride, or something like that, even though nobody in Japan is likely to live there or even get anywhere near the remote little rocks.

Nonetheless, it would be smart move for Tokyo to offer to sell the islands at roughly the same price they just paid. Think of it this way: Suppose you and a wealthy neighbor disagreed over the boundary line between your property, and suppose further that the municipal records where you lived weren't clear. Both parties think the other's position is unfair, but you might be willing to forego your claim if your wealthy neighbor offered you enough. And he might be willing to do that even if he believed he was purchasing something he already owned, if doing so would be cheaper than litigation and if he wanted to avoid having a nasty relationship with you in perpetuity. Buying out your claim would be smart move on his part, and you might even take the money and invite him over for a beer to celebrate the deal.

Tokyo should offer to sell for another reason. If China refused, it would look like Beijing was spoiling for a fight, and unwilling to solve the matter in a reasonable way. That outcome would be a victory for Japan, because it is in their interest to be seen as the reasonable party in this dispute. Why? Because if China's power continues to rise, a key feature of East Asian diplomacy will be how different actors inside and outside the region perceive the intentions of the various players. China will want to portray the United States and its various regional allies as the main source of confrontation or instability, because that will make other states less likely to join with the United States in balancing China. By contrast, the more that Beijing is perceived as bellicose, ambitious, and prone to throwing its weight around, the easier it will be for the United States to maintain its Asian partnerships and the more that other states in East and Southeast Asia will be inclined to cooperate with each other despite their economic ties to China and their various disputes with each other. The spat over the Senkakus provides both Japan and China with an opportunity to show how reasonable they can be. And by doing so, they give the other side a chance to blow it by being recalcitrant or greedy.

By the way, I'm betting that none of these things will happen: Japan won't offer to sell and if it does, China will refuse to buy. Which is one of the many reasons why I believe security competition in East Asia will continue to increase.

UPDATE:  A well-informed commenter called me yesterday and said I had missed a key element in this dispute: China doesn't care about the islands per se; it is more interested in the resources that may exist in their vicinity (oil, gas, fish, etc.) and wants possession in order to extend its "exclusive economic zone."  This is a good point, but it is not a barrier to a financial solution to the dispute.  If there are valuable resources and China wants them, Japan can just raise the price, or agree to sell in exchange for some cash up front and a percentage of future revenues (say, for the next fifty years or so).  In other words, there's in principle no reason this couldn't be handled through a process of bargaining and side payments.  But as I said, I still don't think it will get resolved this way.

Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.

© 2012. Foreign Policy.

Da Wei is Professor of Institute of American Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations.