Troubled Waters in the South China Sea

Since 2009, several major developments have stirred controversy in the SCS and highlighted the difficulties of maintaining stability in the region. These include the Territorial Sea Baseline Bill passed by the Philippines Congress in mid-February 2009, laying claim to Scarborough Shoal (sovereignty claimed by China) and a number of islands in the SCS; a joint submission by Malaysia and Vietnam; and a separate submission by Vietnam to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the continental Shelf (CLCS). These extended continental shelf submissions underscore existing disputes that have added an extra dimension to the claims.

The tension in the SCS has continued to escalate this year with a series of events. In May, Vietnam and China accused each other over the “cable cutting” event. In June, Vietnam held live-fire exercises in the SCS amid high tensions with China over disputed waters. Standoffs have also taken place between Chinese and Philippine vessels. In March, two Chinese maritime surveillance ships reportedly ordered a Philippine survey ship away from an area called Reed Bank, followed by the Philippines sending military aircraft to the area. Starting from May, the Philippines Navy has removed foreign marker posts that were placed on reefs and banks, part of the much-disputed Spratly group of islands. The Philippines was renaming the South China Sea as the "West Philippine Sea" as tensions with Beijing mounted over the disputed area.

China’s "Core Interest" vs. US’s "National Interest"

Amid these tensions, the United States increased its presence in the region, resulting in a series of U.S.-Sino spats over the SCS dispute. In March 2010, as first reported by the Japanese and followed by U.S. media, Chinese officials told two visiting senior Obama administration officials that China would not tolerate any interference in the SCS, now part of China’s "core interest" of sovereignty. In July 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made a statement at the 10th ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) that disputes over the highly sensitive SCS were a "leading diplomatic priority" and "pivotal to regional security."

This backdrop contributed to increasing concern in Beijing where Clinton’s statement was seen as a signal that the United States had changed its neutral position on the SCS dispute to now back other claimant states, particularly Vietnam. In a Sino-U.S. workshop on the SCS in Hawaii 2010, some scholars from think tanks like RAND, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies and Center for Naval Analysis argued that Clinton’s remarks may be in response to what many U.S. media reported on China’s statement in March when Beijing defined the SCS as one of its "core interests."

At the same time, the concern of the international community is that the Chinese, for the first time, labelled the SCS a "core interest," on par with its interests in Taiwan and Tibet. Chinese scholars argue that China never publicly declared a "South China Sea = core interest" policy; it came first from Japanese media and was followed by U.S. journalists, serving as the subtext for the "U.S.-defends-freedom-of-navigation-in-the-South-China-Sea" story. Zhu Feng, a Chinese political scientist, clarified that Chinese officials did use the term "core interest," but the original text that "the peaceful resolution of the South China Sea is the core interest of Chinese government," was misinterpreted by the media.

Perception Gaps Continue to Widen

Many Chinese military officers and scholars have challenged Clinton’s call of "freedom of navigation in the sea" being a U.S. "national interest." A high-ranking Chinese military officer argued that freedom of navigation was never a problem in that region. Liu Jiangyong, an Asia-Pacific studies specialist at Beijing's Tsinghua University, said he did not see any sense in people worrying about, or interfering, in matters that did not concern them. Wang Hanling, a specialist in maritime law at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, said that China has never interfered in the normal activities of any ship crossing the SCS or any aircraft flying over it, especially for commercial use: "What the U.S. calls 'national interest' is not freedom of navigation but rather its presence in the Western Pacific, or military superiority and political influence, to be more specific." His comment stands for that of the majority of Chinese scholars.

The contesting U.S. and Chinese views on “freedom of navigation” have resulted in several incidents in the EEZs of the Asia-Pacific region. A confrontation between U.S. Navy survey vessel Bowditch and a Chinese frigate in China’s EEZ occurred in March 2001, followed by the April 2001 collision between a U.S. EP3 surveillance plane and a Chinese jet fighter over China’s EEZ, the most recent "Impeccable Incident." Disagreements between the United States and China, and between coastal states and user states in general, on interpretations of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea provisions generally relate to the exact presumed meaning of terms in the convention, as well as the meaning of specific articles. For example, there are specific differences with regard to the meaning of “freedom” of navigation and over flight in and above the EEZ, i.e., whether such freedoms can be limited by certain regulations — national, regional or international — or whether such freedoms are absolute.

Beijing expressed concern over the United States' increasing engagement in the SCS, adding that it opposes the internationalization of the maritime issue. China holds that the SCS issue is a dispute over sovereignty about territory and maritime rights between the relevant countries, and not an issue between China and the ASEAN, nor a regional or international issue. Some U.S. scholars argue that China's opposition to the "internationalisation" of the SCS issue is tantamount to an attempt to de-internationalise an international sea. They argue that once the South China Sea has been de-internationalised, China can bring its strength to bear on Southeast Asian countries and impose its own rules on these waters, rather than internationally accepted ones from international law.

In a workshop on U.S.-China relations on SCS issues in September 2010, some Chinese scholars tried to clarify the interpretation of the "bilateral approach" which China always insists on in solving conflict with relevant states. China clearly prefers to solve island sovereignty and maritime delimitation matters through direct negotiation with the countries involved. On non-traditional security issues, such as safety and security of sea lanes, anti-piracy, and marine environmental protection, China is more open to multilateral approaches of cooperation. One example is the DOC signed in 2002 and other regional agreements with ASEAN.

Gap bridged with Tension Easing

There are some signs that the SCS tension is starting to ease. In June, representatives of China and Vietnam met in Beijing and agreed to "peacefully" resolve their maritime territorial disputes. On July 21, China and ASEAN adopted the implementing guidelines of the DOC which is considered by China to be significant for China-ASEAN relations. The United States, also welcomed the agreement, praising China and ASEAN for defusing recent tensions.

Whether the guidelines will bridge the US-China gap still remains unclear. Despite the guidelines being applauded as laying a solid foundation for practical cooperation in the area and stepping further towards a code of conduct, there is still debate among the claimant states. The Philippines criticized the guidelines as lacking “teeth”. It seems China has yielded to agreeing to multilateral discussions on the SCS issue. However, under closer scrutiny, China hasn't stepped back from its position on dealing bilaterally with territorial disputes on the SCS－the sovereignty issue was not mentioned in the guidelines; instead they cover functional affairs about cooperation in SCS in areas like marine technological research, rescue, and anti-pirate efforts. While the guidelines will likely help reduce tensions in the region for the time being, the rules fail to address core conflicts between China and the Southeast Asian claimants. This is not what the United States would like to see given its recent gesture of offering to mediate among the claimant states. In addition, the major difference between China and the United States – whether military activities are legitimated – will still hamper their relationship and will no doubt eventually have a great impact on the Asia-Pacific security framework.

When Will China Clarify its Claim?

Among all these debates on "core interest", "freedom of navigation" and "internationalization", the "U-shape line" remains the most controversial and ambiguous issue between China and other claimant states. Beijing has not made any official declaration about the international and national legal values of the discontinuous dotted line. Before the Chinese government defined the U-shaped line’s legal status, Chinese scholars offered different or even contradictory explanations about the dotted line’s legal value at many international conferences. When China clarifies its claim is of great concern for not only other claimant states but for the whole international community. Indeed, it has become a nagging problem for Chinese foreign policy makers.

Though Washington proposes to mediate among the claimant states for resolution of the SCS dispute, Beijing opposes its internalization. It insists on a bilateral approach over sovereignty and maritime delimitation, and an open multilateral approach in some areas such as non-traditional security. The approach of ASEAN as a collective unit to negotiate with China does not apparently have consensus within ASEAN itself, given that apart from the four member states with overlapping claims with China, other ASEAN members may not risk ruining their relations with China. Above all, the most important and urgent agenda in this increasingly messy picture is when and how China will clarify its claim over the SCS.

Nong Hong is Postdoctoral Fellow with China Institute, University of Alberta and Deputy Director, Research Center for Oceans Law and Policy, National Institute for the South China Sea Studies

The situation in the South China Sea has become more intense in recent times. There have been incidents involving marine resources in the sea area between China and the Philippines, and between China and Vietnam, all directly related to resource discovery and development. They occurred as a result of unilateral exploration by the Philippines and Vietnam for oil and gas in the disputed sea area. Instead of infringing on the rights of other countries, China attempted to stop these activities by resorting to the rule of law. It showed restraint, tried to ease the tension and to retain the status quo in the specific sea areas.

The Philippines and Vietnam undertook their activity in the disputed areas in cooperation with foreign petroleum companies, regardless of China’s opposition. Their unilateral acts have a profound international and national background. The increased focus on the undeveloped oil and gas resource rich Nansha (Spratly) Sea area by transnational petroleum companies has been driven by a combination of the remarkable development of deep water oil and gas mining technology and sustained high levels of international oil prices. Further incentives for exploration can be found in the increasing domestic energy demands of the economically expanding Philippines and Vietnam.

Therefore, exploiting oil and gas resources in the Nansha (Spratly) Sea area becomes important in safeguarding their natural energy supplies. In the past five years, the Philippines has imported more than 10 million tons of gas and its needs are expected to double in the next decade; it’s oil demand is expected to grow 30%. Economic growth in Vietnam has been highly dependent on energy consumption. It has been among the top ASEAN countries for GDP growth in the past five years, averaging 7.1% annually. But the average increase in its domestic energy consumption is 10.3% which is 6.2% higher than that in other Asian countries in the same period. In terms of energy consumption, Vietnam is expected to turn from a pure-export nation into a pure-import one after 2013. So putting more effort into exploring oil and gas deposits in the South China Sea becomes a logical choice for both Vietnam and the Philippines.

In 2005, China, the Philippines and Vietnam officially signed “A Tripartite Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in the Agreement Area in the South China Sea”. It was a historic step toward realization of an idea that China had advocated for a long time, i.e. “Shelving Disputes and Seeking Joint Development.” Once the agreement expired in 2008, the three parties could have been expected to continue to maintain cooperation, enhance mutual trust and promote further cooperation. However, the Philippines secretly reached an agreement with UK Forum Energy PLC in February 2010 to explore oil and gas in Reed Bank (Liyue Tan) in the Nansha (Spratly) Sea area. It was an obvious attempt to unilaterally and commercially exploit the GSEC-101 block.

Meanwhile, Vietnam, together with Canada’s Talisman Energy oil company, started exploring the Vanguard Bank (Wan-an Tan) area. Vietnam claimed rights to the so-called 133 and 134 blocks which were, in fact, the ‘North Wan-an-21’ block that in 1994 CNOOC and the American Creston Energy Company tested with no viable result. This block is located entirely in China’s traditional maritime boundary line. Vietnam divided the block and called for bids, resulting in a de facto contract overlap which led to an international dispute. In addition, Block 119 around Vanguard Bank, which is being developed by the U.S Irving Oil Company and Vietnam, is within an area over which China enjoys sovereign rights. So the crux of recent tensions in the South China Sea is that the Philippines and Vietnam have totally ignored China’s position and turned a blind eye to its legitimate rights and claims. Also, they have solicited foreign oil companies to get involved in exploration of disputed areas and elevated the Nansha dispute to be more complicated and more international. It also shows that resource gain is much more important to the perpetrators than island acquisition.

The North Sea is a good example of how marine resources can be developed to the benefit of all parties. Through consultation in 1976, the United Kingdom and Norway reached a joint venture agreement across the maritime border, the first successful model of international cross-border oil and gas development. As a result, the venture was managed in such a way that all countries derived gains and the area became a Sea of Peace. It provides a useful model for resolution of the South China Sea dispute and demonstrates that what China is advocating – “Shelving Dispute and Seeking Joint Development” – is practical and feasible, and far from obsolete. The key point of ‘shelving dispute’ is to develop jointly.

Right now the problem is that countries like the Philippines and Vietnam are reluctant to conduct joint development with China in the Nansha Sea, leaving China with little option but to strengthen its efforts to safeguard its rights to resources. China can substantively contribute to joint development and turn the situation in the South China Sea to one in which all parties can benefit. But they all need to work together.

China is an influential power in Asia and the world, and it has both the responsibility and capacity to promote the region's prosperity and development. It is a reflection of such responsibility that China works to maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea. Since the Nansha dispute, involving sovereignty and sovereign rights, cannot be solved in the short term, “putting aside disputes and seeking joint development” should be regarded as a wise, win-win strategy for all parties. Even in the very long term it should remain as one of the best options. Joint development can generate mutual trust, expand consensus, and help to reinforce the regional security framework for the South China Sea. It can also be beneficial to the common interests and well-being of people living in countries adjacent to the South China Sea.

Deng Yingying and Liu Feng are research fellows of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies

Will armed conflict result from these recurring – and, it seems, escalating – disputes between the Philippines and Vietnam on one side, and China on the other? War, of course, is in no one’s interest. But the risk posed by these disputes is growing, because China’s relations with both the Philippines and Vietnam are at their lowest point in decades. Given these tensions, it is no surprise that the issue of disputed sovereignty in the South China Sea is almost certain to claim center stage at this month’s ASEAN Regional Forum, and at the East Asia summit in Bali that will follow it.

Last June, I gave the keynote speech at the celebrations marking the 36th anniversary of the establishment of Philippines-China diplomatic relations and the 10th anniversary of Philippines-China “Friendship Day” in the presence of 5,000 of my countrymen and a smattering of Chinese officials. Yet on that same day, the headlines in Chinese papers were blasting the Philippines for its historic claim to ownership of the Spratly Islands.
 

Fidel V. Ramos is a former President of the Philippines

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Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2011.

When a seemingly simple incident between Chinese fishermen and Vietnamese scientists elicits ominous threats from the senior leadership of the two nations (the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a statement that Vietnam was "gravely violating" China's sovereignty), it is a sign that both sides view the broader dispute as deeply material to their national interests. While the immediate conflict has appeared to have stabilized, as evidenced by China and Vietnam holding joint naval operations days later, the long-term dispute remains. Protests in Vietnam continue in front of the Chinese Embassy, and it is likely that similar conflicts over the area will continue to occur, given the vast amount of oil and gas reserves. We cannot have faith that they can be resolved at the 13th hour in such a peaceful fashion.

While the conflict in the South China Sea is not the only maritime conflict simmering at the moment, it is currently one of the most diplomatically urgent issues in the global maritime arena. Half of the world's merchant fleet by tonnage sails through South China Sea every year. America, as the world's most powerful naval force and leading global trading partner, has an important, yet controversial role to play in resolving such disputes.

There are no fewer than ten countries staking their territorial claims to this area of water in the pacific referred to as the South China Sea. China is the largest and most powerful of the countries, but it is joined by overlapping claims from Vietnam, Cambodia, the Philippines, and others.

America's involvement in the issue is politically sensitive. We have a lot riding on the issue both economically in seeing commerce flowfreely and politically in reasserting our diplomatic involvement in such global conflicts. But when Secretary Hilary Clinton spoke assertively last year on the issue at a major ASEAN conference, she was met by a cool response by China, who viewed her statements as siding against China and demanded that the US stay out of the issue.
The question facing American policy makers and the military community is whether America should flex its powerful naval muscles to resolve these disputes? Or should China, the region’s strongest power with anambitious naval expansion program, adopt a “might is right” strategy to get its way?

There is some historical precedence that deserves examining. In 1823, a rising power claimed its authority over regional territories when the US adopted the Monroe Doctrine, declaring the Americas off-limits to European powers. Despite not having a formidable Navy at the time, Great Britain had its own reasons to follow this policy and acted as a quiet backer of the Doctrine. As such, the remaining established powers did little to challenge the claim as America spent the next several decades building its own navy, and the Doctrine remained a de facto international law into the 20th century.

Today, one can argue that China is playing the role of America, a rising power staking its claim to an entire region even if it doesn’t yet have the naval power to enforce it. The takeaway from thecase of the Monroe Doctrine is that the support of an outside power, eitherexplicit or implicit, can make a big difference in the ability of a lesser power to get away with such a claim. If it is thus in the global interest for balanced agreements to the disputed claims in the South China Sea, America must make it clear that we will participate constructively protecting the best interests of the international community.

Yet a more recent example can further sharpen this lesson. The Russian government today tends to see American presence in the Black Sea, particularly in light of NATO’s participation in the European Missile Defense Shield system, as a national security threat.  Despite this, the U.S. is able to maintain a military presence as a result of sharing a fear of the destabilization of Afghanistan as a common national security threat with Russia.  As part of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), which provides equipment and supplies to troops throughout the country, the American military secures access to the Black Sea by virtue of their campaign in Afghanistan.  While it is certainly an uneasy compromise, Russia feelsthat an unstable Afghanistan is a greater security threat than a strategically placed, but preoccupied United States. In this instance, the lesson is that by emphasizing the importance of common threats and mutual interests, cooperation and open navigation can be achieved even when, on the surface, it appears to go against a country’s interests.

Looking at these conflicts, while they all have unique histories, the defining characteristic is that none has been able to function successfully and peacefully without free trade, unfettered openings, and international agreements on how to cooperate in these spaces.

That brings us back to the South China Sea. America needs to be involved, but I believe that we should be tactful and strategic about how to use our influence in the common interest of China and all other claimants. Interfering in ASEAN/multi-lateral negotiations is not essential, and in the past has often done more harm than good.

One idea worth considering is engaging a neutral arbitrator to help resolve the disputes. Indonesia is an interesting actor to consider in brokering agreements between China and other claimants. It is in the region, has minimal claims in the dispute, is the world’s largest Muslim democracy, and could play an important role as the current head of ASEAN. Regardless of who arbitrates any potential agreements, the U.S. must be willing to act as a quiet partner and guarantor to enforce the decisions. Tactful diplomacy must also be utilized that stresses the mutual interests furthered by ensuring free and open navigation for trade.

If successful, this could potentially serve as a model for a number of such seas in the midst of economically and politically significant disputes that can unpredictably heat up. These simmering disputes can have tremendous impact on global economies should they not be resolved. In particular, oceans north of the former Soviet Union have recently been opened due to global warming and glacier melting. These provide efficient passage to Europe, essentially creating a new trade route akin to the Suez Canal. These seas are critical to global commerce and cooperation, yet there are global disagreements over which country, if any, controls these waters.
 
There are several considerations in all of this which we should keep in mind as the US reacts appropriately to this issue:
-There are many more common interests to early and friendly resolution than most writers and politicians allow us to believe. These include first, the capture of the resources and the benefits that will bring to allinvolved, second the early common assurance that long-term free and open passage is assured through the region, and third the ability to get on to other very important issues affecting the region.

-The media and political journalists writing of these issues tend to sensationalize any statement or action, especially those by the US or China, no matter how insignificant the item might be.

-There tend to be many common statements and assurances by both China and the US.  These include assurances at the highest levels in China and the US that they both want to resolve all claims issues peacefully, that they want fair sharing of the many natural resources in the area, and that they want freedom of passage in the region.

The US must realize that the claims to the region have many historical elements.  We must keep a cool head, not overact to outsidepress and sometimes irresponsible political statements made by people on all sides, and in a spirit of quiet partnership with the countries of the region, and yes, China  play a constructive role in the ultimate and final resolution.
 
The US and the world must work to share these seas for peaceful use. Despite tremendous advances in technology and modes of transportation over the centuries, at the end of the day, global commerce still depends centrally on the high seas.

Bill Owens was an admiral in the United States Navy and later Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the second highest ranking member of the U.S. Armed Forces. He currently serves as a managing director of AEA Investors in Hong Kong.

In late February, a confrontation occurred between two Chinese vessels and an oil exploratory ship from the Philippines. On June 9, Chinese fishing boats were being chased away by armed Vietnamese ships. During the chase, the fishing net of one of the Chinese boats became tangled with the cables of a Vietnamese oil exploring vessel. The Vietnamese armed ship dragged the Chinese vessel for more than an hour before the net had to be cut.

In response to this incident, Vietnam conducted a live fire naval drill. On the same day, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung signed a bill clarifying eligibility for military conscription. At present Vietnam has 450,000 active military personnel. Conscription would call up five million additional troops.

The Philippine navy continues to actively remove China’s markers and buoys in disputed waters. In addition, the annual Philippine-US naval training has become sharply different from previous years. Rather than joint exercises between the Philippines and the United States, this year’s naval training involved all of coastal South East Asia. Brunei, Thailand, Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines all participated in exercises this year that simulated the defense of the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea against enemy ships.

The United States has demonstrated a rather one-sided view on the disputes in the South China Sea. Secretary Clinton has reiterated that “the United States honors our Mutual Defense Treaty and our strategic alliance with the Philippines.” Senator Jim Webb and Senator James Inhofe, both of the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on East Asia, introduced a bill that both condemns “the use of force by naval and maritime security vessels from China in the South China Sea” and supports the continued operations by United States forces to “assert and defend freedom of navigation rights in international waters and air space in the South China Sea”. The Webb/Inhofe resolution justified this condemnation of China by saying that “patrol boats from China attempted to ram one of its surveillance ships.” However, there was no attempted ramming.

The types of disputes and claims occurring between Asian countries in the South China Sea have been going on for centuries. Recent incidents can be quietly resolved by both sides directly working with each other. Final settlements might require decades of negotiation between affected parties. United States   involvement in this process will not help to resolve these disputes. Its intervention will only make the situation worse.

The Philippine government is now holding the United States to the Mutual Defense Treaty, the 1951 treaty between the United States and the Philippines, that states: “Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes.”

The question is will the United States want to have an armed conflict in the South China Sea if the Philippine government initiates a war? Can the United States afford another military conflict? Most American citizens will not support such military actions. Sometimes the mere United States statement alone can give false assurance to another country. If such a conflict happens today, it will be detrimental to the United States and the world. It would not only result in devastating damages and casualties, but would totally collapse the world economy. 

If China were the aggressor, why would China sign the Declaration on the Conduct of Parities in the South China Sea (Declaration) with all the member states of ASEAN in 2002? The reason is because China wants to work directly with each of its neighboring states to seek a peaceful way to settle border disputes. Earnest bilateral negotiation has proven to be the best way to resolve disputes. The results are clear: as of January 2009, China has settled land boundary disputes with 12 neighboring countries through diplomatic negotiations.

Since China signed the Declaration, it has abided by the terms. But countries like Vietnam have been ignoring the Declaration and drilling in the disputed territories without the consent of China and without sharing the revenue generated from the drilling. Today, there are over 1,000 oil rigs in the South China Sea, and not one of these belongs to China. Despite this, China still wants to maintain healthy relations with its neighboring states and continue to settle all disputes by peaceful means.

Following these incidents, Vietnam’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Ho Xuan Son visited China and met with China’s State Councillor Dai Bingguo in Beijing; Philippines President Benigno Aquino announced that he will proceed with plans to visit China this year despite heightened tensions over territorial claims in the South China Sea. Mr. Aquino further commented that he will use the visit to try and resolve disputes over the strategic waters.

So the options are clear for the United States, as China, Vietnam, the Philippines, and other countries are directly working out their differences; the United States should not take sides. For the United States,   the claim of national interest is really about the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, which was never denied in the last 60 years. But the territorial disputes are separate issues. Let the countries settle their disputes directly with each other. The best strategy is for the United States to stay out of the regional disputes. Keep regional disputes regional, and not international. These disputes will be resolved by the respective governments eventually.

Fred Teng is a senior media executive based in the United States. He is a regular speaker and writer on U.S. China policy issues, and actively working with a number of U.S. and China policy institutions on the bilateral relationship.

Barely a year after U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton shocked Beijing with her speech, delivered at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi, that declared the United States has an important national interest in the South China Sea, tensions are rising in the contested waters in the region.  In May and June, Chinese fishing vessels and patrol boats reportedly interfered with Vietnam’s oil exploration ships conducting seismic survey operations in areas claimed by both China and Vietnam.  Subsequently, the Vietnamese military conducted a rare live-fire naval exercise (thankfully not in the disputed areas).  Although Chinese reaction to the Vietnamese military exercise has been restrained, the risks of an accidental military conflict between the two claimants are real and significant.

How will the escalating territorial disputes in the South China Sea affect U.S.-China relations?

For the moment, Washington has maintained a studied neutrality on the disputes.  Its official policy, as repeatedly stated by senior U.S. officials (such as Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates) is quite clear.  The United States takes no side in the territorial disputes.  It wants to see the freedom of navigation respected by all sides and the disputes settled peacefully and according to international law.  As for the ongoing row between China and Vietnam, the U.S. has called for restraint.

Beneath such diplomatic wordings, however, the United States views the South China Sea disputes with enormous concerns, and any escalation of the disputes could negatively affect U.S.-China relations.

For the United States, how China handles its territorial disputes with its neighbors, especially its weaker neighbors such as Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia (which are among the claimants in the South China Sea disputes), is a marker of China’s conduct as a great power.  If China exercises restraint and seeks to resolve these disputes through patient diplomacy and legal means, the United States will be greatly reassured.   But if China opts for force and confrontation, the United States will be both alarmed and drawn into the dispute.  Of course, here we can envision a worst-case scenario.  Should the situation in the South China Sea get really ugly, we can expect that the United States will send its naval forces to the area, ostensibly to assert its right of free passage, but in reality to warn the contestants not to escalate the conflict.Obviously, such a development will gravely harm U.S.-China relations, which have been steadily improving since President Hu Jintao’s visit to Washington in January this year.  At the moment, the probability of such a scenario is quite low.  But both Beijing and Washington need to maintain open channels of communication with each to avoid a potentially confrontational situation.

In addition to the territorial disputes involving China’s neighbors in the South China Sea, this area is important for the U.S. in two other respects.  First, the South China Sea is East Asia’s most important waterway.  Much of the international commerce flowing to and from East Asia transits through the South China Sea.  These waterways are also critical transit routes for American naval forces.  So the United States, which sees itself as the guarantor of peace and stability in East Asia, does not want to see territorial disputes disrupt international shipping and navigation.  Second, the South China Sea has enormous untapped oil and gas reserves.   American oil giants, such as ExxonMobile and Chevron, have signed exploration agreements with some of the claimants.  For example, ExxonMobile is exploring for oil and gas in waters close to Vietnam.  The United States thus has a direct economic interest in this area.  A peaceful resolution of the disputes will allow American oil companies and others to conduct their operations with greatly reduced geopolitical risks.

With its multi-faced interests in the South China Sea, there is little wonder that America’s motives for asserting its interests in this contested area are suspect within China.  Rightly or wrongly, many Chinese analysts viewed Hillary Clinton’s statement in Hanoi in July 2010 with skepticism and suspicion.  They saw a more sinister ploy by the United States to throw its weight behind the other claimants and thwart China’s strategy to settle the disputes through bilateral, not multilateral, means.  (China has consistently opposed the so-called “internationalization” of the South China Sea disputes.)  Now that Vietnam is openly defying China, it is unavoidable that the same analysts would lean toward the view that Vietnam would not have dared to do so without subtle encouragement from the United States.

Such strategic distrust is a serious obstacle to U.S.-China cooperation in calming the waters in the South China Sea.  Both sides need to work hard to reassure each other.  For China, it must allay America’s fear that it will leverage its growing military and economic clout to impose its preferred solutions on its neighbors.  To do so, China must review its existing policy that rejects a multi-lateral solution to the South China Sea disputes.  Signing a stronger version of the code of conduct in the South China Sea, which is proposed by the ASEAN, will be a step in the right direction.  Complying with the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in marking its territorial waters in the disputed areas will be another.

For the United States, it also needs to be careful in how it responds to the rising tensions in the disputed areas.  It must, at all cost, avoid giving the impression that it favors certain parties.  To reduce strategic distrust, Washington and Beijing should maintain close contact with each other on this issue.  The South China Sea disputes may have temporarily roiled the diplomatic waters in the region, but they have also provided a rare opportunity for the United States and China to cooperate with each other in jointly maintaining peace and stability in East Asia.

Minxin Pei is a professor of government at Claremont McKenna College.

The reason is because some countries are always changing the current situation in South China Sea through economic, legal, and military means. They are willing to cite the declaration when criticizing others for destroying the current situation.

But I'm afraid that this situation won't last.

Those countries that once signed up to the declaration alongside China are planning to make a fresh start and even replace the original declaration with the new declaration on the conduct of the Association of Southeast Asian Countries in the South China Sea.

Undoubtedly, when DCPSCS was born, its goal were noble, and all the signatories agreed on a common purpose.

But today it is only China that follows its restraints while it is ignored by the other countries involved.
So it only encourages some countries to seize wealth that doesn't belong to them.

The South China Sea is not the only place triggering conflicts over sovereignty. But not all countries are scrambling for their interests and preparing for action, as some countries off the South China Sea are doing today.

As the most powerful country in this region, China should shoulder responsibilities for the lost ties of the DCPSCS. China didn't take measures to prevent others from playing dirty tricks or to lead to perform good deeds to preserve the solemnity of the declaration.

DCPSCS outlines countries' promises, but lacks enforcement mechanisms. This is rather similar to many laws in China, which rule on what is unlawful but don't have teeth to punish offenders.

Those countries raising objections over the issues in the South China Sea could hardly be aware of the Chinese government's seriousness.

Even faced with the intense situation in the South China Sea, China still sticks to expanding economic cooperation with those countries with which it is in conflict.

China even holds the idea of setting aside the conflict through economic and trade cooperation.

Thus we could not blame anyone for not taking China's declarations seriously.

No matter how firm the declaration made by China is, without effective sanctions, it won't be any deterrent against those violating the declaration.

Of course, if some countries intrude into China's territorial waters and show their military forces, China may consider taking responding actions.

Some other countries hide in their own territorial waters and show off their guns and artillery. As to these moves, China certainly has no way to punish them.

But under such circumstances, is it still necessary for China to strengthen its economic cooperation with other countries? Aren't we doing business with people who stole from us?

Vietnam is instigating anti-China sentiment domestically, but at the same time, it proposes expanding mutual trade with China to $30 billion every year and greatly increasing exports to China. For Vietnam, taking advantage of China's growth means it doesn't have to pay the price of high unemployment at home.

If the bilateral economic trade relations are damaged, it seems that China will pay a greater price, as it is the chief exporter.

However, the significance of bilateral trade to the two countries is totally different.

Even after losing the $20 billion, China will not suffer from recession. While for the other side, the situation is different.

This doesn't mean that economic weapons should be dragged into conflicts over territory.

But it is not reasonable that when a country buys our goods, it also criticizes us and covets what belongs to us at the same time.

Preserving our sovereignty by economic means is just one possible strategy. It doesn't mean that we exclude other strategies, including military force, to protect our sovereignty.

Ye Hailin is an expert with the Chinese Academy of Social Science.

Source: Global Times

All US administrations coming into office after World War II have attached great importance to the Middle East. After the September 11 Incident, the Bush administration listed the global war on terrorism as a top priority in the security strategy of the United States and launched two wars, one in Afghanistan and the other in Iraq, getting the United States deeply involved in the Middle East. The United State will never give up the Middle East, for any reason, although it may cut its input into this region. Like its predecessor, the Obama administration still attaches great importance to terrorism. But it has stopped using the phrase ‘war on terrorism’ and talking about the so-called Great Middle East Democracy Program.’ Moreover, it has already worked out plans on military pullout from Afghanistan and Iraq. For all its violence, the turbulence now sweeping across the Middle East will not lead to any change in the decision of the Obama administration on the eastward shift of its global strategy. It will surely contain, however, the actual execution of such a shift. To meet the need of the changed situation, the United States has already increased its political, diplomatic, military, economic and publicity input in the Middle East. As the turbulence in the Middle East gets more violent, the containment of the US move will become ever greater.

The United States had failed to foresee the turbulence in the Middle East. It has wasted no time, however, to get involved in it and tried every effort to pilot the turbulence, which has broken out due to complicated reasons and for widely different ends, toward the direction of democratic movements, hoping to use this opportunity for realizing the Middle East dream unfulfilled by the Bush administration by removing eyesore leaders such as Gaddafi and strengthening the leading role of the United States in this region. Once again, however, the Obama administration may fail to fully fulfill the dream, for two major reasons. First, the Arab public are firm in their stand against the United States and Israel, a stand hardened by the Middle East policies of the United States. They demand independence, and oppose foreign occupation, invasion or interference. Taking to the streets, the broad masses in Egypt and Tunisia have successfully dethroned their respective presidents. This is a demonstration of the power of the general public, and a warning that the aspirations and wishes of the general public must be taken into account when their governments make any decisions in the future. Secondly, any political turmoil in the Arab world will provide ground for Islamic forces to grow. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, for instance, has vowed to take 45-50 per cent of the seats in Egypt’s parliament in its coming election. It is still too early to say now whether their vow will become a reality. It is an undisputable fact, however, that this force is rapidly gaining strength. As it keeps growing stronger, it will surely exercise due influences on the decisions to be made by the Egyptian government. Already, such changes have taken place in Egypt’s diplomatic policies, such as its open declaration of resumption of diplomatic relations with Iran, opening of the Rafah crossing to Gaza Strip and promotion of conciliation between Fatah and Hamas, all acts not so welcome to the United States and Israel.

Obama came to power at a time just when the United States began its downhill journey from the peak of global supremacy, as evidenced by the weakening of the US role in the Middle East. The Obama administration has hoped to exploit the turbulence in this region for a turn of the situation. But it has been a dream not so easy to fulfill. Nevertheless, there is no denying to the fact that the United States remains the only superpower in the world and its leading role in the Middle East will not meet with any fundamental challenge in the foreseeable future.

In a down-to-earth way, President Obama has taken solution of the Palestinian issue as a starting effort to improve the relations between the United States and the Arabic and Islamic countries. Carrying forward the ‘two-state solution’ from his predecessor, he has made active efforts to seek resumption of peace talks between Palestine and Israel. Due to Israel’s unyielding stand, however, the peace talks have suffered setbacks one after another. This time, Obama has proposed to demarcate Palestine and Israel with a border safe and acceptable to both sides on the basis of the border marked in 1967 and through land exchanges agreed to by the two, only to be instantly rejected by Israeli prime minister Netanyahu. The later even went so far as to rebuke Obama face to face when he visited the United States, reiterating his unyielding stand. Netanyahu knows only too well that if Obama hopes to win in the general election next year, the US president would surely not displease the Jewish communities in the United States or inflict any real pressures on Israel. This is why Netanyahu has been set in his own ways without any misgivings or fears. In his speech, Obama has even explicitly expressed his objection to Palestine’s turn to the UN for support to its goal of creating an independent country. Since the Obama administration will never change its stand of favourism with Israel, the ‘two-state solution’ will be nothing more than an illusionary comfort to Palestine.

Obama is a president with aspirations and ambitions. Beset in an environment of uncontrollable factors, however, he cannot but lose one effort while making another. Such being his dilemma, the president will see many of his aspirations and ambitions end in empty talks.

An Huihou is a research scholar with Beijing-based China Foundation for International Studies, and China's former ambassador to Algeria, Tunisia, Lebanon and Egypt.

With the recent killing of Osama Bin Laden and the uncertainty of Pakistan’s role, some U.S. lawmakers are questioning the wisdom of continuing the multibillion dollar civilian and military aid program to Islamabad. Amidst a struggling economy, high unemployment and global commitments, should the United States cut its aid and let China fill the void?

This may seem counter to U.S. national interests, but the main objectives of Washington’s presence in South Asia are denying terrorists a safe haven in Afghanistan and preventing Pakistan’s nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of extremists. With Osama bin Laden dead and the withdrawal from Afghanistan in sight, Pakistan is bound to play a diminishing role in U.S. strategy; its importance for China is growing.

The U.S.-Pakistan relationship is fraught on virtually every level. Of the approximately $22 billion in American aid to Pakistan since 2001, most of it supported the domineering Pakistani military, which invested it (counter to U.S. demands) into military equipment aimed at deterring India. In an attempt to counter this, the Kerry-Lugar Act—a $7.5 billion aid package passed by the U.S. Congress in 2009—stipulated that the military must be subordinate to the civilian government. This infuriated the Pakistani public, seen as it was as an infringement on Pakistani sovereignty. The United States undermines its own efforts by focusing most of its diplomatic energies on Pakistan’s military and its Chief of Army Staff, Asfaq Kayani, rather than on the weak civilian Zardari government. As Manreet Singh, Indian MP and chief editor of the monthly Defense and Security Alert, states: “The major obstacle in the United States’ dealings with Pakistan is that it focuses on persons rather than institutions and by doing so is undermining the democratic institutions in Pakistan.”

On the strategic geopolitical level, the situation is even worse. After spending billions of dollars in aid, if the United States succeeds in stabilizing Pakistan and Afghanistan, it will play into China’s hand; for decades Beijing has quietly fostered a special partnership with Islamabad—an “all weather friend” in the words of Pakistan’s government.

China’s activity in Pakistan has increased noticeably in the last couple of years. In 2007, Chinese investment in Pakistan hovered around $4 billion. In December 2010, Pakistani Prime Minister Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao signed deals worth around $25 billion. China also provided millions of dollars in aid for the victims of the recent floods and for reconstruction projects. In July 2010, both countries held their third joint military exercises focused on counterterrorism. While the exercise was little more than a PR tactic, China is genuinely worried about the potential destabilizing influence of Pakistani militants on its own Muslim minority in Xinjiang.

China is also one of Pakistan’s main weapons suppliers—around 70 percent of Pakistan’s battle tanks are of Chinese origin. Back in 1990, the PRC allowed Pakistan to test its first nuclear device in Lop Nor. China even footed the bill for transporting the Nodong and Taepodong missiles purchased by Pakistan from North Korea after the United States refused to deliver F-16 fighter jets and the Pakistani Army had to seek other means of transporting its nuclear weapons.

All of this is in China’s self-interest. By geographically controlling the Western gateways of China, Pakistan could serve as an alternative route for its critical energy supply, which is bottlenecked in the Straits of Malacca (65 percent of Chinese energy imports—mostly crude oil—run through the strait). Beijing is heavily investing in a railroad from the port of Gwadar—constructed with Chinese money and strategically located on the Makran coast—to the Karakoram pass leading into the Chinese autonomous region of Xinjiang. This is part of what some US commentators have dubbed China’s “string-of-pearls” strategy, a strategy aimed at building strategic partnerships and securing ports and airfields from the South China Sea through the Strait of Malacca and across the Indian Ocean to the Arabian Gulf to protect its energy supply routes. The mouth of the Persian Gulf is only 350 km from the nearest Pakistani port. A permanently based Chinese naval squadron in the port of Gwadar increases China’s ability to project power into the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea.

The key question: If the United States decides to scale back spending on Pakistan, will China increase its aid correspondingly? Pakistan is confronting a major financial crisis. In the last two decades, it has twice come to the brink of financial collapse—once in 1990 and then again in 2008. It was saved only by massive infusions from the United States, Europe, Saudi Arabia, the IMF and China. Blatantly poor management by the Musharaf and Bhutto administrations has been compounded by the global financial downturn. There is insufficient electrical power to meet the country’s needs, and major cities experience periodic outages and blackouts. Food prices have escalated, as have the costs for the large amounts of oil that the country must import.

Chinese influence in the years to come, however, will in no way approach the level of U.S. involvement, and whether Beijing’s support will ever match that of Washington is questionable—at least in the short term. Chinese aid is in general quieter and more subtle with fewer conditions attached. While China is interested in combating terrorism and calming its Muslim minorities, the Chinese military traditionally has not played an important role in Chinese diplomacy. Deploying Chinese troops abroad is still a very alien subject to decision makers in Beijing, and the capabilities of the Chinese Armed Forces in counterinsurgency and police training have been largely untested and can in no way compare to those of the United States military. But this is all subject to change.

Most observers are certain that Chinese influence will increase in Pakistan in the near future. The shock of the Pressler Amendment—US sanctions imposed on Pakistan and quasi-abandonment of the country after the Soviet withdrawal in the 1990s—still sits deep in Pakistan’s consciousness. In response to the killing of Osama Bin Laden, General Kayani announced that Pakistan will reevaluate military and intelligence cooperation should Pakistan’s sovereignty be violated again. The future of US-Pakistan relations remains uncertain at best.

Prime Minister Attlee’s announcement in February 1947 to abandon the Greek nationalists and cede its Raj to India, amidst the worst British snowfall of the twentieth century, marked the beginning of the end of Britain’s postwar global power status and induced the birth of modern Pakistan. While the United States’ presence in Pakistan is in no way comparable to the British situation in India or Greece in 1947, U.S. policy makers should bear in mind that strategic disengagement is meant to preserve rather than diminish national power. In the case of Pakistan, China might be eager to fill the vacuum should the United States decide to trim down its efforts, something that would serve the U.S. national interest well in the long term.

Franz-Stefan Gady is a foreign policy analyst at the EastWest Institute.

Source: National Interest Online. Reprinted with permission.