No doubt as China increases its power, it could upgrade its military capacity. This combined economic and military might could help China acquire interests that it has long coveted and allow it to change in its favor security conditions in nearby areas.

However, the region’s political and security structure places China in a paradoxical position. If China takes action to fully protect its sovereign rights in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) or in adjoining seas, it will further threaten its relations with several neighboring countries in East Asia. A consequence is that it will push them to seek refuge with the US, resulting in China becoming further isolated in a more severe environment of containment. China will be thus limited to enforcement activities and diplomatic warnings in solving these issues. Meanwhile, with American diplomatic initiatives and its reaffirmation of support through alliances, countries who have sea sovereignty disputes with China will feel more confident in defending their interests.

It is therefore not in China’s best interests to use coercive power to solve or manage disputed sovereignty issues. The better options are patient negotiations, setting-up crisis management regimes, exploring economic benefit-sharing, maintaining high-level political engagement, expanding bilateral and multilateral economic cooperation and regular and limited jurisdiction administration over some disputed areas.

Through a series of diplomatic confrontations and power flexing tests between China and the U.S. in 2010, China has to admit one point: that Washington still commands a dominant position in East Asia and the west Pacific, and will continue to strategically invest in the area in order to counter and hedge China’s expanding influence. The U.S. also has to realize, however, that the time has passed when China would tolerate whatever the U.S. did at the expense of Chinese interests or dignity, even if precedential rules or models had been accepted or acquiesced to by Beijing in the past. It is no longer wise for the U.S. to hold onto all its inherited policy and terms of engagement in East Asia. It needs to gradually adapt to a transitioning geo-political and geo-economic structure, in which China is an ascending player.

However, China is currently dealing with complicated domestic challenges and conflicting ideologies about the path of internal reform, as well as growing friction with the U.S. and other developed countries. It also understands that the US-Western international system will not be fundamentally shaken over the long-run. Given these combined factors, Chinese leaders should continue adherence to the policy, set by late paramount leader Deng Xiaoping, of keeping a low profile and biding their time.

Westerners tend to interpret Deng’s policy as a short-run tactic, because the literal translation carries some misleading meanings: “Hide one's capabilities and bide the time,” is a euphemism for “hiding ambition” or “temporary retirement to bide one's time before going on the offensive.” This interpretation is too bookish; the relatively correct translation should be “hide one's light under a bushel, keep a low profile.” The implications of Deng Xiaoping’s admonition are the use of temporary tactics as well as a long-term strategic goal. This 28-Chinese character advisory was given in the context of the Soviet bloc disintegration when Western scholars predicted “The End of History.” According to Deng’s judgment, the capitalist economic model was an inevitable choice by humankind and China’s development and future destiny must be linked with it. In line with his advice, China therefore should always stay modest, never seek to become paramount, avoid confrontation with developed countries, and concentrate its energy on economic development (which contradicts the policy pursued by Mao Zedong in the Cultural Revolution, 1966-1976).

However, keeping a cool mind is not always easy. Especially when a country is developing fast and its social thoughts and information sources become diversified. Especially when it used to be treated unjustly in sensitive sovereignty issues and there are contradictions between the grand strategy of foreign policy and the assertive remarks of senior military officials.

Hence, when, for example, the Chinese government reaches agreement with a foreign country affecting Chinese interests or dignity, those affected will have strong reactions, voicing them to the government and expressing hostile sentiments against the related foreign party. The internet, Facebook, Twitter and the microblogging community will relay the opinions to every corner of the nation, putting pressure on senior leaders. This will push the government to adopt a high-profile attitude towards the incident, or firmly announce it will not make substantive concessions.

Although the strategic goal of “neither seeking confrontation, nor becoming hegemonic” still governs Chinese military doctrine, its force modernization will continue as planned, building an active defensive power. American military analysts believe China’s military is being developed in line with a strategy of “denial access power.” This is true in some sense, but not completely correct. China’s military wants to catch up with the American military’s technological standards, or rather narrow the gap and become a military power compatible with its status as a major economic power.

There are debates in China about whether we should become “a wealthy country with the rich people” or “a prosperous and powerful country with a strong military,” or both. But the view of developing the military at the same pace of economic growth is quite prevalent, and even the leaders fully support it. Developing some kind of offensive or long-distance weapons and becoming powerful militarily doesn’t mean to challenge the current system or the US’s position. Its purpose is to realize a long-cherished dream – China is a great country and this is a typical Chinese nationalistic pursuit. Of course, there are other advantages through commanding this power. China could deter other major power’s coercion and intimidation; it could daunt other countries from trying to seize disputed areas by force; it could protect Chinese overseas commercial interests.

Liu Ming is the deputy director of Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences
 

The atrophy has been alarming to many observers, not the least of which are Asian nations fearing they may be caught in the middle of a newly bipolarized region. Relations stabilized somewhat over the two months in the run-up to the summit, as both governments engaged in ministerial level exchanges aimed at producing a better atmosphere. But, immediately before President Hu arrived in Washington, the American side set the tone for the summit through a series of high profile speeches by Secretary of State Clinton, Secretary of Treasury Geithner, Secretary of Defense Gates, and Secretary of Commerce Locke—each of whom put down markers on expected Chinese behavior in a broad range of policy areas. They all implied that if the relationship is to develop positively and cooperatively into the future, it is primarily China’s responsibility to meet American expectations.

Thus, going into this summit, the American side played the role of proactive demandeur, putting China on the defensive.As Secretary of State Clinton noted twice in her recent speech, the Sino-American relationship has reached a “critical juncture.” For it to progress, Clinton said, “it is up to both of us to meet our respective global responsibilities and obligations.” While she explicitly rejected the concept of a “G-2” duumvirate and stated “we must avoid unrealistic expectations that can be disappointed,” the Secretary of State nonetheless once again extended America’s hand to China to become a cooperative global partner.

This is the same vision that President Obama offered during his state visit to Beijing in November 2009 and President George W. Bush’s administration also proposed with the concept of China becoming a “responsible international stakeholder.”  At the 2009 summit, the two sides even codified the vision in a visionary Joint Statement. Immediately thereafter, however, the vision was stillborn as the relationship deteriorated over a series of issues and disputes.

Thus, once again, the U.S. and China met against the backdrop of American expectations for China to step up and be the kind of actor Washington desires: upholding the postwar liberal order and institutions; putting pressure on North Korea and Iran to halt their nuclear programs; adhering fully to World Trade Organization requirements for an open economy; appreciating and making convertible the Chinese currency; eliminating intellectual property theft; combatting international terrorism, piracy, and proliferation of missiles and nuclear materiel; meeting international standards of military transparency; acting peacefully in the Asia-Pacific region; tackling greenhouse gas emissions; adhering to international (OECD) donor standards for aid to developing countries; and adhering to United Nations human rights obligations. These and other markers were identified by senior American officials in recent days in the run-up to the summit.

The summit itself went very well—better than many observers expected—from what could be discerned from the public events. The summit also resulted in another detailed (41 point) Joint Statement issued by the two sides. But will this new document immediately founder as did the 2009 one—or will the two sides be able to forge common purpose in the future? The bilateral relationship has definitely stabilized following the summit, but how long can the new stability endure?

Try as it may to encourage China to be a proactive global partner, Washington will likely again be disappointed by China’s reluctance to act on the world stage as the US side seeks. Beijing is simply not ready for “prime time” as a major world power. It still narrowly pursues its national interests globally (the acquisition of raw materials, energy supplies, trade and investment), but does not shoulder its diplomatic responsibilities commensurately. China is a global actor but not yet a global power. It remains a classic insular, defensive realist state. It has certainly benefitted from the global liberal order, but it does not seem assume a responsibility to enforce it.  It continues to prefer a policy of “free riding” and harbors profound ambivalence about the whole concept of “global governance”—viewing it as yet one more trap laid by Washington to retard China’s growth and subvert the CCP’s grip on political power.

Thus, it would seem that Washington may have, once again, set itself up for more disappointment from Beijing in the 2011 summit—but at least, this time, U.S. officials have thrown down the “opportunity gauntlet”: very clearly setting out the terms and expectations for a productive Sino-American relationship.  Perhaps the new and more positive tone in relations achieved at the summit will translate into limited and selective cooperation on global issues—limited cooperation is better than no cooperation. But Beijing needs to reexamine its global equities and engage in greater cooperation with Western and Asian nations, in order to contribute to the global “public goods” from which all nations (not the least of which is China) benefit.

Thus the test of the summit will be evident over the coming months. Hopefully, Beijing will turn a more cooperative face to Asia and the world in 2011 than it did in 2009-2010.

David Shambaugh is Professor and Director of the China Policy Program at George Washington University, and a nonresident Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution.