Is China Really a Dragon to be Defeated?

Compared with the US, Southeast Asian countries have a more balanced judgment on China’s role in the region. The most serious challenge for China’s relationship with Southeast Asian countries is the South China Sea issue. In fact, China is not the initiator of problems. It is the claimants, especially Vietnam and the Philippines, who changed the status quo.

For years, these countries have expressed their misgivings and concerns about China’s rapid development, especially the achievements in economic and military capacities. They believe “time is on China’s side” and they would be in a disadvantageous position dealing with China to end territorial disputes.

With this in mind, the Philippines and Vietnam obviously adopted more and more aggressive positions and approaches. In 2009, Philippine President Arroyo signed Republic Act No.9522, also known as the Philippine Archipelagic Baselines Law, which claimed the country exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Huangyan Island. Since then, the two countries have carried out a variety of actions that complicated the South China Sea issue. Various actions have been taken. In 2012, the harassment of Chinese fishermen by a Philippine naval ship triggered the Huangyan Island incident, which marked the most serious standoff in the related waters.

What is worse, the claimants are making the South China Sea issue a problem for the US and ASEAN. Vietnam and the Philippines have sought support from the US to counterbalance China. At the same time, they succeeded in fitting the South China Sea issue into the ASEAN agenda on various occasions.

The South China Sea issue has cast a shadow on China’s relationship with some Southeast Asian countries. However, most regional countries don’t believe China is aiming to become a regional hegemon.

Quite a few scholars and officials from regional countries admitted that China’s policies concerning the South China Sea issue are mostly responsive. China neither started a change of the status quo on purpose nor changed the position that the territorial disputes should be solved between related parties through peaceful approaches. ASEAN approved China’s signing of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and the follow-up efforts implementing the DOC.

Besides, China did not close the door for the potential signing of the Code of Conduct (COC). On the contrary, China has been working with related parties toward a jointly accepted outcome. China has also reaffirmed that the South China Sea issue is not a problem between China and ASEAN.

In addition, China has not and will not force Southeast Asian countries to choose between China and ASEAN. China values the unity of ASEAN and persists in respecting ASEAN’s leadership in regional cooperation and supporting the construction of the ASEAN community and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

On the whole, China has been trying to develop the relationship with neighboring countries and establish the image of a responsible player in the region. Even in the context of being challenged by some countries, China continues to persist in peaceful development and work on building a harmonious regional environment. China’s development and increasing regional influence is acceptable for most countries.

Is the US the Only Choice for Regional Countries?

Fundamentally, Southeast Asian countries value the opportunities for economic development, and at the same time, they pay attention to the developments in regional security. Their attitude toward the US rebalance is dependent on their judgment of US policy intentions and US influence on the regional economic development and security environment. Accordingly, it will be difficult for regional countries to sacrifice their own interests to assist the implementation of US policies.

Southeast Asian countries also attach importance to their relationship with China. The economic ties between China and ASEAN are strong and irreplaceable. China remains ASEAN’s largest trading partner. Meanwhile, ASEAN is China’s third largest trading partner. The trade volume between China and ASEAN exceeded $400 billion in 2012. In comparison, the economic relationship between the US and ASEAN cannot outweigh the one between China and ASEAN.

The regional countries realize that they will be in a favorable position if they balance between and benefit from both sides. They are reluctant to be forced to choose between China and the US, which forces the regional countries into an awkward predicament.

The US needs to understand that even though it shares some common goals with Southeast Asian countries, they are actually strange bedfellows.

Su Xiaohui, Deputy Director, Department of International and Strategic Studies, China Institute of International Studies

Dr. Ruan Zongze

Thailand has friendly ties with China, Indonesia holds an important position in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Singapore is hailed as the brain behind ASEAN and Brunei currently holds the association’s rotating presidency.

China-ASEAN ties have made considerable progress, especially since the establishment of “China-ASEAN strategic partnership for peace and prosperity” in 2003, despite some twists and turns. Besides, the establishment of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area has improved the two sides’ ability to deal with the global financial crisis.

China supports and values ASEAN’s unity and development and would like to see the establishment of ASEAN Economic Community by 2015. It also wants to see ASEAN playing a greater role in international affairs and in maintaining regional stability and development.

The South China Sea disputes that flared up again in 2009, however, have soured relations between China and some ASEAN member states. The Philippines stirred up the HuangyanIsland crisis in 2012, and the Vietnamese National Assembly has passed the Law of the Sea to include China’s Xisha and Nansha islands in Vietnam’s territory.

For some time, some ASEAN member states have been trying to hijack the relationship between ASEAN and China for their selfish gains by stirring up trouble in the South China Sea. Vietnam and the Philippines occupy China’s maritime areas and islands and are trying to use extra-territorial forces to consolidate their illegal occupation. The South China Sea disputes have thus become an important factor in China-ASEAN relations.

Since the disputing sides find it difficult to perceive each other’s real intentions, some ASEAN states believe China is becoming increasingly assertive with its rising strength, while China thinks some ASEAN countries are trying to draw in external forces into the region to “balance” its rise.

The situation in the South China Sea is partly related to the “pivot to Asia” policy of the United States. And Japan, which has a dispute with China over the DiaoyuIslands, has joined the US’ game to fish in troubled waters.

Among the four countries Wang is visiting, Indonesia and Brunei claim part of the South China Sea, too, but are different from the Philippines and Vietnam, because they want the disputes to be settled through negotiations. Thailand and Singapore, which too share the waters of the South China Sea, don’t want the disputes to affect the overall China-ASEAN friendly and cooperative relations.

China will make its principled stance and bottom line clear when the time comes, and resolutely counter the disputing countries’ unilateral attempt to change the status quo in the South China Sea. With regard to China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, some neighboring countries’ actions are complicating or exacerbating the situation, which China has strongly opposed in its white paper on national defense.

Regional stability has played a very important role in the region’s rapid economic growth. So by fomenting trouble, these countries could undermine the stability of the region and jeopardize their development.

The Philippines, earlier this year, called for international arbitration in the South China Sea dispute, which has been opposed by China. In violation of the UN Charter and international law, the Philippines has illegally occupied some of China’s islands and reefs in the South China Sea since 1970s. Opposing the illegal occupation, China has been urging the Philippines to withdraw all its men and materials from China’s islands and reefs.

At the 22nd ASEAN Summit in Brunei last month, leaders of the member states issued a joint statement urging China to sign a legally binding “code of conduct” to avoid disputes. China is not afraid to talk about “codes of conduct” but first it has to be determined which country (or countries) is violating the spirit of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. Otherwise, no “code of conduct” will seem credible.

China attaches great importance to its relations with ASEAN member states not only because it needs a stable and prosperous ASEAN, but also because ASEAN needs a stable and prosperous China. Of course, the South China Sea disputes will not, and should not, dominate China-ASEAN relations.

China will continue to promote friendship and partnership, deepen mutually beneficial cooperation with its neighbors, and ensure that its development brings even greater benefits to them. But ASEAN has to make concerted efforts to stop some of its member states from stirring up trouble to keep China-ASEAN ties on a path of smooth development.

Ruan Zongze is deputy director of China Institute of International Studies. 

© 2013. China Daily

Talks at the expert-level were initiated in October 1992; up until late 1995 the talks focused mainly on the land border and the Gulf of Tonkin. Talks at the government-level began in August 1993, and the thirteenth round of talks was held in January 2007. In addition, meetings and talks that have not been included in the official rounds were included. The first achievement was the signing of an agreement on the principles of handling the land border and the Gulf of Tonkin disputes in October 1993. Joint working groups at the expert-level were set up to deal with the two issues. The joint working group on the land border held sixteen rounds of talks from 1994 to 1999. The joint working group on the Gulf of Tonkin met seventeen times from 1994 to 2000. The negotiation process has led to the signing of the Land Border Treaty in 1999 and the first maritime delimitation agreement in the Gulf of Tonkin in 2000. Thus, the deadline for resolving the land border and the Gulf of Tonkin issues were met.

Less progress has been achieved with regard to the disputes in the South China Sea. Talks at the expert-level were initiated in November 1995 and the eleventh round of talks was held in July 2006. However, both parties have yet to agree on which disputes should be included on the agenda. Vietnam pushes for the inclusion of the Paracels as an issue alongside that of the Spratlys, whereas China only wants to discuss the latter issue. To further complicate matters, China seems to view the disputes over water and continental shelf areas as part of the Spratly conflict, whereas Vietnam seems to view them as separate. It seems as though Vietnam does not want to initiate talks relating to such water and continental shelf, as it would be interpreted as giving legitimacy to China’s claims on those areas. Thus, of the above three South China Sea issues to be addressed by the two countries, only one was put on the agenda, namely the Spratly archipelago, which involves other claimants as well.

Post 2009 developments and responses

In early May 2009 Vietnam submitted to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf a “Partial Submission” relating to Vietnam’s extended continental shelf in the “North Area” of the South China Sea, as well as a “Joint Submission” with Malaysia relating to the “southern part” of the South China Sea. Both submissions prompted China to protest and to reiterate its claims in the South China Sea. On a more positive note, the Government-level delegations dealing with territorial issues met in 2009 on two occasions. Vietnam also protested against the Chinese arrest of Vietnamese fishermen on several occasions in 2009, and also in 2010. Furthermore, Chinese fishing bans led to Vietnamese protest in 2009 and 2010. In response to the heightened tension, the Prime Ministers of the two countries held talks in Hanoi in October 2010 and decided to “seek satisfactory solutions to existing issues relating to” the South China Sea.

Open differences relating to activities in the South China Sea continued during the first half of 2011. Two more serious incidents on 26 May and 9 June were related to Vietnamese oil exploration activities in areas of overlapping maritime claims. Vietnam accused China of cutting the cables of the explorations ships operated by Vietnam, while China accused Vietnam of illegal activities within an area under its jurisdiction. In connection with the incidents Vietnam explicitly rejected China’s claim within the “nine-dashed lines” in the South China Sea.

After this public display of differences and tension, the two countries took action to reduce the level of tension. Two significant developments took place in October 2011: an “Agreement on basic principles guiding the settlement of sea-related issues” was signed in Beijing on 11 October; and the first high-level summit since 2008 took place on 11-15 October when Vietnam’s Party Secretary-General Nguyen Phu Tong visited China.

The Agreement on basic principles states that the government-level delegations of both countries “agree that the satisfactory settlement of sea-related issues between Vietnam and China is suitable for the basic interests and common aspirations of the two countries’ people and helpful for regional peace, stability, co-operation and development.” They also agreed on the six-point principles for resolving sea-related issues.

A Joint Statement was issued in connection with the high-level summit. Considerable attention was devoted to maritime issues. The two countries stressed their political will and determination to settle disputes through friendly negotiation and talks to maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea. They agreed to speed up negotiations on the sea issues and to seek basic and long-term solutions acceptable to both sides. Regarding negotiation on areas beyond the mouth of the Gulf of Tonkin, both delimitation and “co-operation for mutual development” are emphasized.

In February 2012, Vietnam and China’s Deputy Foreign Ministers held talks in Beijing. They agreed to establish working groups at the department level to negotiate on the mouth of the Gulf of Tonkin. They also agreed to set up working groups to co-operate in “less sensitive sea domains.” Finally, they agreed to launch a hotline between the two foreign ministries. The hotline was opened on 2 March. Two rounds of talks at the department level were held to negotiate on areas outside the mouth of the Gulf of Tonkin. Two rounds of talks were also held in 2012 to discuss “co-operation in less sensitive fields at sea.”

Despite these positive developments, differences relating to the South China Sea have prevailed. This can be seen from official Vietnamese complaints in response to China’s fishing ban, to the arrest of Vietnamese fishermen, to the opening up of blocks for oil concessions in the South China Sea, to Chinese activities relating to the establishment of the city of Sansha, and to an incident in late November in which Vietnam claimed that Chinese fishing boats had “blocked” and “severed” the cable of a Vietnamese seismic survey vessel in its continental shelf and EEZ. China’s main complaint was in response to Vietnam’s adoption of its Law of the Sea.

Observations

The most evident feature relating to China-Vietnam relations and their management of the territorial disputes is that there are established forms of dialogues and talks from high-level down to expert-level to address differences and tensions. The structure of talks has been continuously developed since the early 1990s, and the two sides have agreed on mechanisms and principles to better handle and manage their differences.

China and Vietnam’s response to the deep tension in 2011 was to reach an Agreement on basic principles, and both sides took steps to implement the Agreement in 2012. In addition, the two countries held the first post-2008 high-level summit in October 2011 and the South China Sea issues were directly addressed at the summit.

However, continued efforts are needed. The successful completion of the negotiations on the delimitation of areas outside the mouth of the Gulf of Tonkin is important. An interim approach could be a bilateral joint development arrangement. The continued implementation of the fishery agreement is essential. The collaboration relating to the maintenance of order in the Gulf of Tonkin through joint-patrols needs to be expanded. In the South China Sea, it is essential to avoid future confrontation, not only for bilateral relations but also for the stability in the region. It is also necessary to move both bilateral and regional conflict management process forward.

At the bilateral level, the 2011 Agreement on basic principles has enhanced the mechanisms for the management of sea-related issues through a de facto bilateral ‘code of conduct.’ The High-level Summit of October 2011 signaled a renewed high-level push for better management of such issues. The combination of these two factors has created more conducive conditions to manage disputes and to reduce tension between China and Vietnam in the South China Sea.

One issue that remains to be addressed is the lack of mutual agreement on the scope of talks on the South China Sea. Only the Spratlys is on the agenda. If China and Vietnam could agree on the scope and the issues that are disputed it would be an important step forward, as this would create a realistic agenda for expert-level talks. This should not be interpreted as an argument that either side should abandon their sovereignty claims, but rather that they should recognize that they have overlapping claims that needs to be addressed.

At the regional level, both countries are parties to the DOC. They can positively contribute to the successful implementation of the DOC and also contribute to the process of further developing the conflict management mechanisms needed to maintain stability and avoid tension and confrontation in the South China Sea. A possible future regional “code of conduct” applicable to the South China Sea within the framework of the ASEAN-China dialogue could contribute to such a development.

Ramses Amer is PhD and Associate Professor in Peace and Conflict Research, Visiting Senior Fellow, Public Policy and Global Affairs Programme, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

Li Jianwei is Director and Research Fellow at Research Division III, National Institute for the South China Sea Studies, Haikou, Hainan, China and Visiting Fellow of S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

Feng Zhaokui

An important reason for Ishihara’s confidence in Japan winning a war with China came from an analysis by American experts saying that “the Japan Self-Defense Forces are superior to the PLA in terms of air and sea combat effectiveness and hence Japan will win if a conventional war is fought.” 

The article revealed that Ishihara’s purchase was in no way a whim but rather a planned and strategically implemented plot. In November 2012, Takashi Okada, staff reporter of Kyodo News, published a new book, Question of the Senkaku Islands: Magic of Territorial Nationalism. In it, he argues that the row over Diaoyu Islands has been a plot by Shintaro Ishihara to seek a stage for adversarial nationalism, and that the ultimate political objective is to overthrow the post-World War II order established by the US and the UN after the Tokyo Trial and to overthrow Japan’s peace constitution. With that objective in mind and the realization that directly targeting the US would be self-destructive, Ishihara has been very smart in his plan. The first step is to challenge China by including Daiyu Islands in the scope of defense assistance identified by the Security Treaty between the US and Japan. When China responds with actions over the Diaoyu Islands, Japan will revise its constitution and re-arm itself on the ground of national calamity. Then, if war over Diaoyu Islands continues, the US will definitely be involved. The war will be a lose-lose situation for China and the US, and an opportunity for Japan to free itself from the US and reinvigorate the Great Japanese Empire. 

Ishihara has long been called the “anti-three man” (anti-US, anti-China and anti-government) and the standard bearer of the “gangs from pre- and during WWII.” The latter term refers to the remaining Japanese militarists who invaded Asian countries and launched the Pacific War by attacking Pearl Harbor in 1941. It is thus natural for Ishihara to have sinister motives to set a trap for not only China, but also the US. There are also personal reasons for Ishihara to hate the US. His father worked for a Japanese shipping company. Under harsh US attacks almost all the Japanese ships, both military and civilian, sank. Gone were the happy days of his family. Ishihara once hoped that Japan would win WWII and the whole Pacific would be Japanese inland sea. His dream was now broken. Now, however, Ishihara has designed an indirect approach to save the empire: not to hit the US directly but to guide China and the US to confrontation so that the weakening of both will be an opportunity for Japan’s military rise again. Nonetheless, people have reason not to believe neither China nor the US will give Japan this opportunity or rush into Ishihara’s trap. 

Even in Japan, voices of reason over Sino-Japanese relations and the Diaoyu Islands are now increasing, and with good momentum. For example, former Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama visited China and brought back the Chinese hope for a “peaceful resolution” of the islands dispute. Famous scholars such as Susumu Yabuki and Tadayoshi Murata published articles to restore the historical truth of the Diaoyu Islands question. Not long ago, an editorial of the Tokyo Shimbun made it clear that “the proposition that territorial dispute does not exist is not convincing internationally” and that Japan should “admit the existence of diplomatic disputes”. 

The above-mentioned article in Nikkei provided a detailed description of Ishihara’s purchase plot, and specifically mentioned his clamors for war, obviously sending a reminder that kind-hearted people should be on guard for provocative acts by Ishihara, and prevent the dispute from slipping into war. In both countries, more and more people of vision believe that the existence of disputes should be the very reason for enhanced people-to-people and even official exchanges. It is the view of this author that more exchanges will be a powerful means to reveal the motives of the vandals of the Sino-Japanese relationship. 

This year marks the 35^th anniversary of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between China and Japan. We should make good use of this opportunity to make up for the compromised celebrations of the 40^th anniversary of resuming diplomatic relations last year. As is known to all, China has all along insisted to peacefully resolve the question of Diaoyu Islands through negotiation. Ishihara’s dream of war will never come true.

Feng Zhaokui is an honorary academician of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

Michael Swaine

Aside from the Taiwan issue, maritime sovereignty and resource disputes center on (a) the Sino-Japanese imbroglio concerning both overlapping claims and sovereign control over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands northeast of Taiwan, and (b) the complex web of disputes between Beijing and several Southeast Asian entities over many islands in the South China Sea. A second set of disputes centers on the activities of naval military operations within China’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and “near seas” (jinhai). 

On the broadest level, a third set of concerns (they have not yet risen to the level of an active dispute, constituting instead an intensifying competition) is more strategic in nature, affecting the entire area of the so-called “first island chain.” They derive from the contradiction between a long-standing American assumption of the need to maintain military supremacy across the Western Pacific and the recently emerging Chinese capability to challenge certain elements of that supremacy through the deployment of increasingly capable “counter-intervention” or anti-access, area-denial (A2/AD)-type weapons systems along China’s maritime periphery. 

The increasing capabilities and resolve that Beijing is displaying in its disputes with the U.S. and other nations are viewed as an indirect challenge to the overall maritime status quo as defined largely by Washington. Taken as a whole, these maritime issues are vitally important because they constitute the single most likely source of instability, and even military conflict with China. Moreover, such dangers are particularly acute as a result of the involvement of strong (and apparently rising) nationalist emotions on all sides, and the overall zero-sum nature of the sovereignty issues, which inclines claimants to adopt absolutist stances and in many instances over-react to perceived challenges to one’s position. 

In order to contribute to the effective management of these disputes, and of China’s role in particular, it is vitally important for Washington to clearly understand their origins and drivers, especially in the case of China, as well as the limits, strengths, and dangers of various types of possible future U.S. responses. 

Dispute Origins and Drivers 

Many factors are acting to intensify the maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas. While some of these are directly associated with China, others are not. The most China-centric drivers include: Beijing’s overall increasing regional power and influence on one hand; and arguably intensifying levels of Chinese nationalism and the related impact of social media among the Chinese populace on the other hand. 

In recent years, Beijing has significantly increased its capacity to operate both military and non-military (or para-military) naval and air assets along its littoral, thereby enhancing its ability to assert its long-standing and largely unchanged claims, through a greater overall maritime presence and an increased ability to police disputed areas and respond to the actions of others. Although other claimants are striving to increase their capacities in a similar manner, Beijing has thus far been the most successful, in large part due to its size and growing economic capacity. 

The latter driver of Chinese behavior (i.e., social media) has served to intensify and expand the public’s awareness, in real time, of apparent challenges to Chinese sovereignty claims, thereby placing greater pressure on the Chinese leadership to respond quickly and resolutely. Chinese citizens hear about sovereignty-related incidents soon after they occur, exchange responses in very rapid fashion with one another through social media, and at time make excessive and ridiculous demands of the government. Although Beijing is by no means a passive recipient of such pressures, it is arguably fearful of appearing weak or inactive in the face of strong public sentiment. 

The intensity of the Chinese response to sovereignty-related challenges or issues is reinforced by the emotional association of those issues with the violations of China’s sovereignty that occurred during the mid-19^th and early 20^th centuries, and the fact that China’s collective leadership is more concerned with image and public pressures than in the past. Add to this the increasing level of strategic distrust between Washington and Beijing, and the result is a tendency toward over-reaction on the part of Chinese leaders and public alike. 

Limits, Strengths and Dangers of  U.S. Responses 

Future prospects are not good. The combination of absolutist stances on sovereignty, intense nationalism, high public awareness, potentially major economic incentives, increasing civilian and military capabilities among the claimants, strategic calculations, and the absence of either clear and binding legal procedures or a supra-national authority to arbitrate or enforce disputes combine to prevent any significant movement toward any “resolution.” That said, it is conceivably possible to establish a more stable basis for mediating and hence controlling disputes among the claimants. All of the actors involved have an incentive to prevent an intense arms race or escalating pattern of conflict over disputed maritime territories. In the case of China, such outcomes would threaten its overall “peace and development” strategy and reinforce the notion that it is unwilling to develop or utilize legal procedures or norms to resolve differences with its neighbors. 

Speculation abounds concerning the impact of Xi Jinping and the new leadership on the above dynamic. According to some analysts, Xi personally approved a step-by-step plan to intensify pressure on Japan, thereby rejecting a more moderate approach advocated by some in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Others point to Xi’s past experience with the PLA, his espousal of the “China Dream” concept that allegedly envisions a strong nation with a strong military, and his high-profile visits to military facilities to support the notion that the new leadership will employ a far more muscular, military-oriented foreign policy, especially toward maritime and other sovereignty disputes. At present, however, this general conclusion is largely speculative. 

There is no quick fix for resolving these complex and long-standing maritime disputes. Many members of the media and outside analysts view each American or Chinese action with regard to the disputes as an indicator of alleged U.S. containment of China, Beijing’s presumed search for regional preeminence, or an effort to create exclusionary spheres of influence. While the manner in which both Washington and Beijing address the disputes can certainly have an effect on their larger strategic relationship, each maritime incident or action should not be regarded as a measure of the larger strategic issues. Ultimately, these disputes are about Asian nationalism and historical memories, not geostrategy, which should instill considerable caution among U.S. policymakers. 

Dr. Michael D. Swaine is Senior Associate in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The agenda is full.  Particularly important are territorial disputes in East Asia which could turn violent.  Relations between the People’s Republic of China and its neighbors have deteriorated, naval confrontations have increased, and Washington has been dragged into the mess. 

Doug Bandow

The issues are many.  China makes contested claims to the Diaoyu/Senkaku, Nansha/Spratly, and Xisha/Paracel Islands, as well as Huangyan Island/Scarborough Reef.  (I will use the more familiar names in the West.)  On the other side are Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, and Vietnam.  

Despite its physical distance, the U.S. remains entangled in these disputes.  Perceived Chinese aggressiveness has spurred the so-called “pivot” to Asia, including the augmentation of military forces and strengthening of military alliances.

Conflict between China and other states easily could drag in America, which has formal defense treaties with Japan and the Philippines.  Washington and China have had their own contentious disagreement over the U.S. Navy’s legal right to conduct intelligence gathering within China’s 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone.

The PRC obviously has important interests at stake.  It wants international acceptance of control over its territory.  Beneath the disputed waters are potentially significant energy deposits.  As a great trading nation China is concerned about secure ocean transit.  Good relations with its neighbors would ease its rise to regional primacy and global leadership.

Most fundamental may be the issue of peace.  The PRC has suffered much over the last two centuries.  Although policy reform was necessary for China’s economic transformation, so was the absence of war.  The latter allowed Beijing to concentrate on economic growth, which has allowed an ever larger share of the population to escape immiserating poverty.  The PRC is wealthier today, but remains a relatively poor nation with great income disparities.  China still needs peace.

America’s interests may be fewer but are no less profound.  The U.S. would benefit from greater resource development.  Washington also is concerned about global norms, especially the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes.  The U.S. is committed to its traditional alliances, seeks secure sea lanes for its trade, and desires stability and peace in a region with which it has abundant political, economic, and cultural ties.

The status quo is extremely dangerous.  No one wants war.  However, China and Vietnam fought over the Paracels a number of years ago.  Passions are aflame throughout the region recognizing popular anger in China, Japan, and the Philippines makes it harder for any nation to climb down from confrontation.

China’s President Xi Jinping has just taken over in the midst of internal political challenges and may feel pressure from nationalist elements.  Abe’s Liberal Democrats won the recent Japanese election while promising to be tough on China.  The Philippines is eternally in crisis and its weakness may encourage it to overplay its hand.  Anti-China sentiments were evident (though for other reasons) even in America¹s recent presidential election.

Fear of Beijing also has prompted countries in the region, including one-time enemy Vietnam, to move closer to the U.S.  Both India and Japan are being encouraged to play a greater role.  Tokyo and Manila have pressed the U.S. for express guarantees of disputed islands. 

It won’t be easy to resolve the many disputes.  All parties should admit uncertainty and act with humility.  Ownership of these islands is contested because it is uncertain.  Territorial claims are based on a complicated mix of international law and treaty, control and occupation, and historical connection.  No doubt the PRC’s case looks better in Beijing than elsewhere, but it is not a slamdunk even under the best of circumstances.

China should recognize that its claims are not indisputable and therefore require a negotiated or adjudicated resolution.  Any attempt at coercion will result in hostility, retaliation, and resistance.  Indeed, Beijing’s plan to stop and search ships considered to be illegally operating in its territorial waters in the South China Sea, if enforced, almost guarantees naval incidents.  Yet negotiations work:  of 23 border disputes since 1949 the PRC settled 17 peacefully.  In return for restraint, Beijing could rightly insist that its interests not be compromised until the dispute is resolved. 

Washington should acknowledge that its concern is indirect and it does not know the correct outcome.  American officials should press allied states, which occupy or seek to control disputed lands, to demonstrate restraint and negotiate.  After winning the Japanese election Prime Minister Shinzo Abe declared that the Senkakus are Japan’s inherent territory so there is no room for negotiation at this point. That is a prescription for conflict.

The U.S. should not bias the outcome by promising to defend contested territorial claims.  Former Undersecretary of Defense Michele Flournoy acknowledged the risk of the Philippines mistaking U.S. support for an opportunity to be much more assertive in staking their claims.  America’s objective should not be to ‘defeat’ Beijing, but to promote an outcome which leaves the entire region more peaceful and stable.

In some cases bilateral negotiation, perhaps with outside mediation, could resolve the issue.  But in the case of the Spratlys, with multiple claimants, a multilateral dialogue or forum, which China so far has resisted, might be more effective.  Disputes also could be brought before an international tribunal, whether formal (such as the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea) or ad hoc.

Moreover, interim measures could evolve into long-term solutions.  The parties should consider a code of conduct to prevent escalation of minor incidents; bilateral or regional resource development and maritime policing until ownership issues are decided; separation of resources and navigation from sovereignty, ensuring widespread access to the benefits irrespective of formal legal control; and shared sovereignty, where two or more nations have legal rights to the territory.  As Wu Shicun of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies observed, countries should “seek common ground while reserving differences.”

What matters most is that the resulting process be seen as fair and legitimate.  China, the U.S., and nations throughout the region overwhelming benefit from today’s stable and peaceful order.  All interested parties should work to ensure its continuation. 

Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and a former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan.  He is author of several books, including Foreign Follies:  America’s New Global Empires (Xulon).

The Obama administration has accepted China’s rise as, if not inevitable, then at least as beyond the ability of the United States to prevent. Administration officials believe that any effort to contain the PRC would fail and prove counterproductive. Indeed, they see the United States as having an interest in China’s becoming a peaceful and prosperous country, giving Beijing more resources to strengthen international security and the global economy in partnership with Washington.

In light of these constraints, the Obama administration’s strategy has been to induce Beijing to accept U.S. security and economic goals for the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. U.S. officials describe their objective as to “reinforce the system of rules, responsibilities, and norms that underlies regional peace, stability, and prosperity.” The vision is of mutually shared peace, stability, and prosperity, which can be achieved if China becomes a global stakeholder and accepts international law, multilateral responsibilities, and international norms such as ensuring “a fair and level playing field for foreign investors, protecting intellectual property, and maintaining maritime security.

Although such lofty results might not be possible, administration officials deny that a Sino-American conflict is inevitable or that the two parties are engaged in a zero-sum game in which an advantage for one party invariably harms the other. U.S. officials have however tried to discourage China from pursuing certain disruptive paths by laying down a series of military and diplomatic markers affirming U.S. support for the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes, freedom of maritime navigation, military transparency, fair commercial practices, and other rules of behavior. Chinese officials have formally declined to endorse these rules for good behavior but also thus far have refrained from overtly challenging them.

Administration officials have adopted a high-profile interventions in China’s other sovereignty disputes in the East and South China Seas. They have termed Beijing’s approach to these sovereignty disputes an important test of China’s rise, of whether Beijing will employ its growing capabilities in peaceful or disruptive ways.

The administration’s new approach was evident at the July 2010 meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum. At that session, while reaffirming that the United States takes no side on the substance of China’s territorial disputes with its neighbors, Secretary Clinton broke with diplomatic precedent and offered to help launch multilateral talks on disputed South China Sea territories within the ASEAN framework. She insisted that all these disputes must be resolved through peaceful means that take into account the interests of all parties, including the United States.

The intent of these interventions is to discourage assertive stances toward these sovereignty issues by underscoring U.S. concern. U.S. officials have their own reasons to contest Beijing’s maritime claims. According to one calculation, one-third of all the world’s commercial shipping traverses these contested waters near China.

In terms of tactics, the Obama administration has relied heavily on making declarations of benign intent, taking actions to strengthen international norms and institutions, raising the U.S. profile in Asia through enhanced diplomacy and military engagement efforts, and increasing engagement with PRC civilian and military agencies.

U.S. officials have sought to employ alliances, partnerships, and international institutions as key tools to help manage China’s rise. Perhaps the most original Obama administration tactic is attempting to build a more dense and comprehensive multilateral regional economic and security architecture, consisting of diverse bilateral alignments, international organizations, formal rules, and informal norms that constrain Chinese behavior according to U.S. preferences.

U.S. officials note that, if successful, this constraining architecture could potentially reduce the need for active U.S. management and compensate for the anticipated further decline of U.S. resources relative to those of China in coming years.

It would be simplistic to describe these recent U.S. initiatives as aimed exclusively to contain China. While some State and Defense Department officials have such intent, President Obama and his White House national security staff believe that increasing Chinese regional strength and influence is inevitable given the PRC’s continued preeminent economic growth. U.S. officials also recognize that few Asian countries would join an overtly anti-Beijing coalition given that China is the main economic partner, and that the United States lacks the means to counter China’s rise unilaterally.

Most importantly, the Obama administration sees the U.S. and Chinese economies so interdependent that any effort to hurt China’s economy would invariably adversely affect the United States. In this sense, the two countries are in a “mutual assured depression” relationship. Unlike with our Cold War-era “mutual assured destruction” relationship with the Soviet Union, Americans cannot treat China as if it were another USSR since we need China’s help to deal with global challenges.

Richard Weitz is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute. His current research includes regional security developments relating to Europe, Eurasia, and East Asia as well as U.S. foreign, defense, homeland security, and WMD nonproliferation policies.

The People’s Republic of China long has been a convenient political target.  Despite the obvious benefits of a bilateral relationship which is both peaceful and profitable, for years US presidential candidates have sought to win political points by criticizing Beijing.  Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama all ran for president as sharp critics of the PRC.

However, once the election was past administrations usually shifted to a more pragmatic policy approach.  Irrespective of party affiliation, the new presidents realized that the bilateral relationship was too important to sacrifice.  Their willingness to work with Beijing triggered the cycle anew, with the next set of candidates engaging in a new round of China-bashing.

So the cycle continues today.

Candidate Barack Obama termed President George W. Bush “a patsy” in dealing with China and promised to go “to the mat” with China over its trade practices.  The Obama administration began by emphasizing economics and trade.  For instance, Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner charged China with “manipulating” its currency. 

However, administration claims seemed to grow less shrill as Washington issued more debt.  Moreover, perhaps in part in reaction against the use of democracy by George W. Bush and the neoconservatives to justify promiscuous war-making, the Obama administration played down human rights issues.  Explained Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, “We have to continue to press them.  But our pressing on those issues can’t interfere” with cooperation on other matters. 

Controversies in the South China Sea led to greater discord.  Despite Chinese protests, the administration addressed complicated territorial disputes and enunciated a so-called pivot toward Asia.  The PRC’s state-run media charged that Secretary Clinton was “a person who deeply reinforces US-China mutual suspicion” who “has brought new and extremely profound mutual distrust between the mainstream societies of the two countries.”    

Washington and Beijing also disagreed over the best approach to Syria.  The PRC rebuffed Washington’s attempt to place greater pressure on Damascus, leading Secretary Clinton to denounce Beijing’s actions as “just despicable.”

Nevertheless, the administration maintained a solid working relationship with China.  On her way to the PRC in early September, Secretary Clinton observed:  “Even when we disagree—believe me we can talk very frankly now—we can explore the toughest issues without imperiling the whole relationship.”  The administration also left the disagreements out of the campaign.  The president treated them as policy rather than political issues.

However, Mitt Romney began attacking the PRC during the primaries (as did several other Republican candidates).  He decried Beijing for engaging “in behavior that undermines international security” and promised to adopt policies to check its “harmful ambitions” and encourage “the evolution of China toward a more politically open and democratic order.”  He also warned of the risk of a “Chinese century,” criticized Secretary Clinton for relegating “the future of freedom to second or third place,” denounced the Obama administration for being a “near supplicant to Beijing,” and claimed that administration “weakness” had “only encouraged Chinese assertiveness.” 

Romney ostentatiously targeted trade with China.  He claimed that Beijing was a “cheater” and promised to label it as a “currency manipulator” on day one.  He decried America’s “trade surrender.”  After wrapping up the nomination he ran ads promising to “make China play by the rules.”  Romney attacked the administration for not being tough enough on China’s alleged unfair trade practices, especially the failure to cite Beijing as being a currency “manipulator.”  He called the president the “outsourcer-in-chief” who had reneged on his promise to cut back borrowing from “the bank of China.”

The administration returned fire.  Treasury Secretary Geithner rejected the idea that “you can solve problems in the world, a very complicated world we live in, by calling people names.”  The president criticized Romney’s stewardship of Bain Capital, and especially its investment in Chinese firms and outsourcing of jobs to China.

The administration also claimed to be filing cases before the World Trade Organization at a higher rate than the Bush administration.  In fact, the administration initiated two new WTO cases against Beijing since July.  Most recently Washington attacked Chinese subsidies for its auto and auto parts industries.  The administration also indicated that it would renew tire tariffs set to expire at the end of September.

China did not ignore these mutual barrages.  In September it filed its second WTO case against America within a month, contending that antidumping and countervailing duties imposed by the administration violated international trade rules.  As for Romney, declared the official Chinese news service Xinhua:  “It is rather ironic that a considerable portion of this China-battering politician’s wealth was actually obtained by doing business with Chinese companies before he entered politics.”  China Daily wrote:  “By any standard, the US Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney’s China policy, as outlined on his official campaign website, is an outdated manifestation of a Cold War mentality.”

Worse could come.  Bonnie Glaser of the Center for Strategic and International Studies warned of a potential shift in Chinese foreign policy:  “The US Asia pivot has triggered an outpouring of anti-American sentiment in China that will increase pressure on China’s incoming leadership to stand up to the United States.  Nationalistic voices are calling for military countermeasures to the bolstering of America’s military posture in the region and the new US defense strategic guidelines.”

However, while the two leading presidential candidates play to America’s worst political demons, the US public supports a more measured approach.  A new Pew Research Center poll found that 58 percent favor being “tough” on China on trade, but respondents did not see the PRC as a security threat, ranking it behind Islamic extremism, Iran, North Korea, financial instability, and drug violence in Mexico.  The poll also found that 55 percent supported a “strong relationship” between the US and China; nearly two-thirds believed that the relationship was sound.

Much obviously is at stake as the two governments attempt to work through sometimes contentious differences.  Even though the next administration is likely to adopt pragmatic engagement toward China, years of hostile rhetoric risk pushing policy in both nations to the extreme. 

The task before Washington and Beijing is to peacefully accommodate each other’s security requirements, economic interests, and geopolitical ambitions.  On her recent trip to China, Secretary Clinton summarized the challenge:  “Our two nations are trying to do something that has never been done in history. Which is to write a new answer to the question of what happens when an established power and a rising power meet.”  For the sake of their respective peoples—and many others around the world—that answer must be peaceful cooperation. 

Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute.  A former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is the author of Foreign Follies:  America’s New Global Empire (Xulon Press) and co-author of The Korean Conundrum:  America’s Troubled Relations with North and South Korea(Palgrave/Macmillan).

And that thinking is deeply troubling.

In two massively confrontational proposals, the GOP platform for its national convention signaled an exceptionally hard-line towards Beijing. Should such thinking find its way into policy, the future course of the world’s most important bilateral relationship will be set in a dangerous direction – especially as the Chinese leadership transition proceeds.

First, despite unprecedented stability between Taipei and the mainland in recent years, the GOP platform asserts that if China were to attack Taiwan, “the U.S., in accord with the Taiwan Relations Act, will help Taiwan defend itself.”  This is a puzzling position given that the Taiwan Relations Act commits the U.S. to no such thing. In fact, the law makes no reference to American obligations in the event of Chinese aggression whatsoever.

Moreover, making it the official position of the United States to help defend Taiwan from Chinese attack would jettison the long-standing American practice of strategic ambiguity. According to that practice, Washington has not committed itself to any course of action in the event of cross-strait hostilities. This has allowed the U.S. to balance the benefits of achieving deterrence in the Taiwan Strait while treading lightly on one of Beijing’s most sensitive security issues.

Second, the GOP platform takes another hard-line when it “condemn[s]” Beijing’s “destabilizing claims in the South China Sea.” This too would be a major reversal of longstanding American policy. Regarding maritime and territorial claims in the region, historically “the United States does not take a position on competing territorial claims,” as Secretary Clinton recently reiterated in a meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Yang.

Instead, the central U.S. position has been on the conduct of the disputes, urging all parties remain peaceful. In that spirit, the United States has voiced strong support for Chinese participation in the proposed Code of Conduct, which enjoys broad regional support, and would implement stronger measures designed to prevent the disputes from escalating. To the extent Washington has been involved in the claims themselves, it has advocated multilateral negotiations between relevant parties.

The GOP position of condemning Chinese claims outright would all but guarantee that the Code of Conduct – currently the best hope for mitigating tensions – is rejected by Beijing. It would likewise torpedo any chance of convincing the Chinese to enter multilateral negotiations to settle the disputes amicably. Further, such a strong move against Beijing’s claims would destroy America’s ability to act as a moderating presence in future flare ups, hurting rather than helping the situation. 

Disturbingly, the Republican platform gives no indication it is aware of the risks of pursuing such confrontational policies. And those risks are severe given that China considers Taiwan and, increasingly, its claims in the South China Sea as among its coveted “core interests”

The most immediate risk of hard-line positions on Taiwan and the South China Sea is stoking Chinese nationalism against the United States. The ferocity of Chinese nationalism was recently on display when protests erupted against Japan in connection with territorial disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Some signs reportedly read “even if China is covered with graves, we must kill all Japanese!” The result of stoking Chinese nationalism would be greater domestic pressure on Beijing to use a firmer hand in its disputes, including with the United States. In this respect, nationalistic sentiment has the ability to undermine the rational basis of Sino-U.S. relations in a real sense.

Further, the GOP’s hard-line on Chinese core interests would have significant military consequences. The buildup of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been guided by developing the capability to prevail in contingencies involving Taiwan and, increasingly, in the near seas where China’s maritime and territorial disputes are located. Moreover, on an operational level, this buildup has been intended to achieve “counter-intervention” capabilities against powerful militaries that may oppose Chinese interests in these areas, namely the United States. Thus, by threatening stronger political and possible military intervention in these precise issues, the GOP would actively encourage a more robust PLA buildup. 

But the military risks are worse then they first appear for two reasons. First, the Chinese Communist Party may already be increasingly turning to the PLA for foreign policy solutions, as evidenced by the recent establishment of a PLA garrison on the disputed Sansha Island in the South China Sea. Second, the PLA has already unofficially voiced concern that US policy in the Pacific is designed to “contain China,” as Maj. Gen. Luo Yuan has commented prominently. Should this point of view become generalized – a risk that the GOP platform would dramatically increase – an empowered PLA may become a stronger advocate for confrontation.

Not only is the GOP platform blind to these risks, but it denies the possibility of their existence. The platform goes so far as to deny that any rational calculus whatsoever motivates Chinese military modernization, “condemn[ing]…China’s pursuit of advanced military capabilities without any apparent need.”

As the American elections and Chinese leadership transitions proceed, ignoring the risks of confrontation are too severe to ignore.  Regardless of how or if the GOP platform finds its way into policy, its thinking should be recognized as dangerous. Moreover, Chinese strategic planners understand they must be prepared to deal with a United States in the future that may have policies very different from those today. In making those preparations, the suggestions of the GOP can hardly escape notice. In this sense, some damage may be done already.

Bill French is a policy analyst at the National Security Network.

Unfortunately wise statecraft should never be assumed.  Even if political leaders wish to tamp down frictions, they must contend with the fact that nationalist fervor is running high in the region.  It is easier to malign the intentions of others than it is to consider a dispute from multiple vantage points.  While the vandal who ripped off the flag of the Japanese ambassador’s car in China did not precipitate a crisis, his misdeed is the kind of mindless action that could set in motion dangerous dynamics in the future.  Reining in distrust is necessary to calm the roiled waters of the South China Sea. 

Nautical navigational rules offer insight into the diplomatic path ahead.  Vessels at sea have no presumed right of way.  All ships share the responsibility to avoid a collision.  Likewise, all states have an obligation to avoid hostilities.  The two largest powers, China and the United States, have a special duty to secure peace.

A good beginning would be to acknowledge that the South China Sea is part global good, part sovereign territory.  Different national interpretations are inevitable, and being realistic about this fact is an essential beginning point for easing tensions. 

Current trends strongly suggest that the Indo-Pacific region will provide the economic and political engine of the twenty-first century.  Economic prosperity requires open commerce, the vast majority of which flows over the world’s oceans.  The South China Sea joins the Indian and Pacific Oceans.  Half of all global shipping tonnage passes through the Sea’s narrow southwestern chokepoint of the Strait of Malacca.  In short, the South China Sea is a vital part of the global commons.

But the South China Sea is also the sovereign home to adjacent states.  Because of the vagaries and complexities of history and international law, the precise ownership of territorial waters, specific land features, and underwater and seabed resources defies easy adjudication.  No single state or institution can impose a resolution.  There must be shared solutions. 

Too many commentators appear to expect states to move from problem to grand bargain, for instance, through an almost magical binding code of conduct.  Had a binding code of conduct been acceptable to all, it would have been fashioned far earlier in the process that is currently in its second decade, between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China.  Even if the parties could agree to the basic tenets of such a code in the near future, enforcing it would pose a whole other set of problems.

Meanwhile, tensions have outpaced cooperation.  Over the past couple of years escalatory moves have created anxieties throughout the region.  The recent standoff over Scarborough Shoal/Huangyan Island witnessed prolonged tit-for-tat actions and statements, developments that were punctuated with the largely unsuccessful ASEAN summit meeting in Cambodia. 

China’s growing tensions with the Philippines, as well as with Vietnam, have been pitted against a more deeply engaged United States committed to rebalancing its influence to Southeast Asia in general and the South China Sea in particular.

Just as China may not want its claims to be ignored, China’s smaller neighbors are equally adamant about their claims.  The Philippines, which is attempting to build a minimal naval capability to patrol its waters, is no threat to China.  At worst, politicians in Manila can be accused of raising the profile of disputed claims to such a high level, that it appeared overly confrontational to Chinese leaders, who in turn decided that a stern response was necessary.  While the United States stands for a peaceful resolution of these complex disputes, there is little doubt that Washington would assist Manila in a crisis.

Vietnam also wants a fair deal with respect to its claims, including its exclusive economic zone (EEZ).  It does not want China selling oil-exploration rights in disputed waters within Vietnam’s EEZ.  Nor does Vietnam want to accept Chinese claims to the Paracel Islands, which China occupied during Vietnam’s fragile, post-unification period in the 1970s.  Once again, while the United States wants these disputes to be settled diplomatically, coercive measures would compel all actors in the region to recalibrate their security requirements.  Regional polarization and a naval arms race could well be catalyzed.

Geostrategic and globalization interests will both persist, forcing an uncomfortable mixture of competition and cooperation.

Cooperative schemes have foundered on distrust, and can be viewed cynically as seeking to freeze an advantageous position.  For instance, China’s failure to move beyond the expansive and ambiguous 9-dashed line covering 80 percent of the South China Sea, has the diplomatic effect of putting the whole area in dispute and thus, by the terms of the Declaration of Conduct, off limits to national occupation. 

Because of distrust, some Chinese assume the United States is ‘rebalancing’ simply to hold onto power rather than to support a rules-based system.  Meanwhile, the United States and other countries in the region are skeptical of the intentions of a rising China.  Let’s admit that we cannot eradicate this distrust; but we can contain it. 

What is needed moving forward is a mixture of realism, confidence-building measures, transparency, and restraint.

We should expect the United States to continue to place a general priority—in its diplomacy, trade, and military operations—on the increasingly powerful Indo-Pacific region.  But the essence of US strategy is economic interests—maintaining freedom of the seas, and freedom throughout the global commons—and that calls for further China-US cooperation.  The United States needs to treat China with respect and do more to foster cooperation.  Areas most ripe for such cooperation include in the areas of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, science and technology (especially, involving the resources of the South China Sea), and practical energy cooperation.  As a model production-sharing accord between Brunei and Malaysia demonstrates, the resources of the South China Sea will only be harnessed when there is such cooperation. 

China, for its part, can expect the United States to respect sovereign disputes, rather than to impose an arbitrary solution.  But China should not expect the United States to stay aloof.  The United States will ‘take sides’ when it comes to insisting on peacefully resolving disputes, whether with a treaty ally like the Philippines or a growing trading partner like Vietnam.  And Chinese officials would be prudent not to test the commitment of the United States.  For instance, early next year, shortly after the US election, American officials might either over or under respond to a test of its resolve; over-responding would not be advantageous, but even a weak response might subsequently produce a harsh backlash.  Restraint and measured steps are called for, even as both China and the United States expand their relations with countries in the region and with ASEAN as a whole. 

A related but separate challenge, that transcends the South China Sea, deals with China’s rejection of America’s legal right of innocent naval passage within the 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone of China.  China seeks to end this practice and is building a capacity to repel or deny access to outside naval forces, most notably those of the United States, which seeks to safeguard the public good of freedom of navigation, both for global commerce but also to maintain openness with respect to security.  China’s military modernization remains shrouded in far more secrecy than its neighbors think would be consistent with friendly intentions.  

The United States one day will no doubt learn to live with PLA Navy ships passing off America’s coasts.  But for the foreseeable future, issues such as innocent naval passage through exclusive economic zones and territorial disputes in the South China Sea, must be managed rather than settled.  Through greater dialogue, trust-building and transparency, informal rules of the sea can accommodate both a rising China and a strong America.

Dr. Patrick M. Cronin is Senior Advisor and Senior Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security in Washington, D.C.  He is also the editor and co-author of Cooperation from Strength: The United States, China and the South China Sea, which is available at http://www.cnas.org/southchinasea.