In his first visit to China after taking office, Kerry met with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang and had talks with State Councilor Yang Jiechi and Foreign Minister Wang Yi.

What was achieved in the visit?

Tao Wenzhao

First, both sides reaffirmed their commitment to a co-operative partnership, and promised to continue working for the establishment of a new type of big power relationship that is based on equality, mutual trust, co-operation, and win-win solutions. This commitment created a favorable condition for a steady development of the bilateral relationship. The two sides said they would keep strategic dialogues on the top level and make full use of the current communication mechanism. Presently there are more than 90 communication platforms between the two countries.

Second, both sides agreed to continuously enrich bilateral relations and achieve new breakthroughs in the depth and quality of their cooperation, which will inject force into the effort to build a new type of great power relationship. Sino-US economic and trade relations are the most powerful proof of the win-win and interdependent nature of bilateral relations. The Chinese side emphasized the importance of the continued development of these relations for the two countries’ common interests. But there are also obstacles to this development. Some people in the US always want to politicize the trade relationship, and Washington has maintained restrictions on high-tech exports to China.

China has complained about the problems. The United States has promised change but has not gone into action. Now that President Barack Obama has begun his second term and vowed to expand exports, it is high time Washington eased its restrictions on high-tech exports to China.

The two sides also agreed to issue a joint statement on climate change and announced that the two countries will set up a climate change workforce under the framework of the China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue. As the two countries are the world’s top energy consumers and greenhouse gas emitters, this decision will have great significance for the creation of a new international mechanism to address climate change.

Third, both sides emphasized that they need to strengthen their interactions in the Asia-Pacific region, where their interests and differences converge. In its first term of office, the Obama administration adopted the strategy of rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region. The strategy brought complexities to the region and caused widespread concern among relevant countries, including China. There has been a tendency toward integration in the region. As the integration process touched upon the interests of all countries in the region, it has been on the agenda of talks between Chinese and US leaders over the past few years.

There are two modes of integration going on in the region at the moment. One is the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), or Ten-plus-Six as is commonly known, of which China is a member. But the US is not included. The other is the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) involving 12 countries. China is not in it but Japan has said it would like to join the group. Some foreign commentators have said the two groups represent competition between China and the US in the regional integration process. In fact, there are far more economic co-operative mechanisms than these two. They may overlap with one another in membership but should not be mutually exclusive. During Kerry’s visit, Chinese leaders told him that both countries should adopt an open and inclusive approach to the region’s economic integration. As this writer sees it, not one single country can dominate the regional integration. There can be different groups competing with each other on the basis of co-existence. The competition should be aimed at promoting regional and global economic development rather than excluding certain countries from the integration process.

Currently, the nuclear and missile issue on the Korean peninsular is causing great concern in the international community, especially among Northeast Asian countries. This was naturally a major topic in Kerry’s talks with the Chinese side. When visiting the Republic of Korea, Kerry made it clear that the US would not accept the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) as a nuclear country, and would want the nuclear issue be settled in a peaceful way, including the Six-Party Talks and a bilateral talk between the US and the DPRK. Kerry said the DPRK must prove its sincerity in denuclearization. China reiterated its stand on the issue that consistent efforts should be made to maintain peace, stability and denuclearization on the Korean peninsular, and to settle the issue through dialogue. Major progress was achieved in the Six-Party Talks, including the Joint Declaration issued on 19 September, 2006 and the disablement of nuclear facilities in Yongbyon.

In recent years, however, there were twists to make the issue more complex. Pyongyang’s pitch of war rhetoric has been rising in a series of announcements，including an announcement of a state of war on the peninsula and an imminent trial shot of mid-range missiles. The US, on its part, intensified its joint military exercises with its allies and strengthened its military presence in the region by deploying F-22 stealth fighters, B2 stealth bombers and a B-52 strategic bomber. Both parties’ moves are detrimental to the region’s stability. After the Kerry visit, both the US and China should acquire a clearer understanding of each other’s positions and intentions, and work together to defuse tensions on the Korean peninsular. The Six-Party Talks should be resumed as soon as possible with concerted efforts from all relevant parties. To free this region from conflict and war, two procedures are essential: one is the process of denuclearization and the other is to make the DPRK integrate into the regional community.

Kerry’s latest visit and other visits by Obama administration’s high-ranking civilian and military officials prior to it indicated that the bilateral relationship between the US and China has safely passed the transition period and will gain greater momentum in its development.

Tao Wenzhao, Researcher, Institute of American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

At the same time, China is blamed for implying in the White Paper that the US is a factor that sabotages regional stability. The US is seeking to assure China that its rebalance to Asia is not to contain China, and that China’s concern is groundless. It portrays China as acting out a monodrama with the US as a simulated enemy.

Containment Cannot Be Revived

Containment is not the appropriate word to describe US policy towards China. On one hand, China is not qualified for US containment. Even though China is already the No. 2 economy in the world, neither the hard nor soft power of China and the US is “diamond cut diamond. The countries facing China’s development feel pressure rather than a concrete threat. The US will probably define China as a major competitor in the world, not necessarily a major enemy.

On the other hand, it is difficult for the US to reproduce its containment of the Soviet Union during the Cold War period. Currently, the US is burdened by its domestic issues, the global economic crisis, and its overseas military activities, all of which have confined the US capacity from playing a more active role in the Asia-Pacific. The US tends to make its regional allies shoulder more responsibility and provide more support for its regional designs.

China understands the realities. However, it is neither helpful for the US to misinterpret China’s positions, nor exaggerate the influence of the Chinese conspiracy theory.

The US Rebalance in Disguise

Even though the rebalance is not containment, it is difficult for the US to embellish its strategy in a China-friendly disguise.

As early as July 2009, the US publicly announced a strategy to shift its pivot to Asia. In October 2010, then Secretary of State Hilary Clinton comprehensively explained the goals and approaches of the strategy in her speech. In the year 2011 and 2012, the strategy was extensively implemented.

Up until now, the strategy has been developed in three areas. The first and most prominent perspective is the military perspective. The US achieved a de facto permanent military presence in Australia, sought to establish the US-Japan-South Korea trilateral military alliance, and accessed strategic sites such as Subic Bay, Cam Ranh Bay and Changi. The country also put forth the plan to expand its anti-missile system to Asia. In 2012, the drills headed by the US in the Asia Pacific reached an unprecedented level, whether in scale or frequency.

US officials and scholars have tried to explain to China the reasons for the above actions. They emphasize that the US may need to deal with potential risks and emergencies in the Asia-Pacific, and provide necessary support and guarantee for its alliance. However, it is impossible for China to turn a blind eye to the US increasing its military presence in the region, which means more uncertainties for China.

The second perspective of the rebalance concerns the economy. Initially, this perspective was rather dim compared with the remarkable progress in military arrangements. With the implementation of the strategy, the US began to sense the questioning and concern from China. In 2012, the US used the term “rebalance” to replace “pivot” to Asia, in order to reduce the military implication of the strategy. At the same time, the US emphasized that the strategy is comprehensive and not specifically focused on the military.

However, China finds it hard to be truly involved in the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPP) talks, which are enthusiastically promoted by the US, even though the US claims that the framework is inclusive.

As for the third perspective on US foreign relations; while the US has drawn closer to its traditional allies such as Japan, South Korea and Philippines, it is paying more attention to countries like India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam and Mongolia. The small countries in the South Pacific are also included in the US blueprint.

China does not say that all of Washington’s strengthening relationships with its allies and regional countries is meant to challenge Beijing, however China is concerned about the increasing US influence and somewhat biased stand in regional affairs. Japan and the Philippines’ seeking of support from the US to counterbalance China in their territorial disputes may be good cases in point.

On the whole, no matter how the US adjusts its rebalance, its key intention is to reshape the order of the Asia-Pacific and gain a long-term strategic advantage and leadership in the region. In this process, the US will inevitably seek to “shape” or “regulate” China’s behavior.

Critics may not be effective in dealing with China. The US at least needs to work with China to find an acceptable way for both sides to co-exist in the region.

Su Xiaohui, Deputy Director, Department of International and Strategic Studies, China Institute of International Studies

According to the US Census Bureau, annual Sino-US trade surpassed $500 billion in 2012 – a significant increase over previous years. This figure, albeit unprecedented, conceals new fissures opening up between the two nations. The United States has erected trade barriers to curb the inflows of high tech products like solar cells and low tech goods like stainless steel sinks. US trade officials contend that some Chinese products are being sold at high dumping margins that warrant a protectionist stance. The new barriers have not been without effect, either. China’s solar export earnings fell a reported 40 percent between 2011 and 2012 after the US imposed tariffs of up to 249.96 percent on the industry. Experts predict that the United States will push more anti-subsidy investigations, protests regarding intellectual property theft and the blocking of foreign investment capital throughout 2013. But even as Washington snubs China, US policymakers are seeking new commitments to trade liberalization elsewhere.

As if to send a clear message that China is not America’s preeminent trading partner, President Obama announced his proposal for a US-EU free trade agreement during February’s State of the Union Address. The agreement would encompass almost 45 percent of the world’s GDP and over a third of global trade. Since existing tariffs are relatively low, negotiations would focus on increasing the volume of trade by setting common standards for products like automobiles and GMOs. 

While these measures will be difficult to implement, support for closer trade relations is stronger than ever on both sides of the Atlantic. The United States and the European Union have often been rivals when it comes to making trade policy, but reluctance from both parties to broker a partnership has softened. EU leaders’ enthusiasm stems primarily from a desire to shore up the region’s economy as the Euro Crisis continues. Washington is looking to promote job growth by boosting exports – the EU imports more than twice as much from the United States annually than China does.

In the meantime, the president is making headway in discussions regarding the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPP). At a meeting between President Obama and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the two leaders conferred on Japan’s participation in the agreement, which could be confirmed as early as March. As Japan would be by far the most important US trading partner to join TPP, securing Japanese ascension is one of Washington’s top priorities. Although previous administrations led by the Democratic Party of Japan and heavy resistance from the agricultural sector cast doubt on the future of the deal, a plurality of Mr. Abe’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party supports participation. With polls showing that a majority of the Japanese public now favors TPP, the LDP will likely throw their weight behind the agreement to rally support in advance of July’s House of Councillors election.

Popular support for TPP in Japan can be attributed to a number of issues, from the most obvious economic incentives to matters of national security. Some in the Japanese media have read the swell of public support as demonstrating favor of closer ties with the United States, as tensions run high from North Korea’s recent nuclear test and the mounting territorial dispute between Japan and China. Energy will also be a major factor in Japan’s decision; natural gas from the United States will be vital in maintaining Japanese industrial competitiveness as the future of the nation’s nuclear reactors is debated.

Should the US-EU FTA and TPP both succeed, the flow of global trade would be almost irrevocably altered. American exporters will see the scope of their markets rapidly expanding as decreasing tariffs and international industry standards facilitate the movement of goods and services across both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. The prospect of developing nations being given preferential treatment and inroads to the US market is of even greater concern to China. Vietnam has already been successful in eroding much of China’s competitive advantage in the textile industry; its participation in TPP is expected to expedite that shift.

Beijing must position itself to take full advantage of the rising tide of trade liberalization. Talks regarding a trilateral FTA between China, South Korea and Japan are scheduled to begin in early April, and Chinese officials remain optimistic about the ASEAN-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The successful negotiation of these agreements is central to China’s economic future but the trilateral deal has already been dogged by diplomatic issues, the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute in particular. It is essential that Beijing come to the negotiating table with an open mind, rather than allowing a diplomatic row with Japan to sour the deal. Demanding a pound of flesh from Tokyo during the discussion of terms will be self-defeating if the accord founders.

Given the timing of the United States’ new approach to global trade, it seems to be a measured response to recent developments in the Sino-US relationship. Trade friction remains a key concern between China and the United States, and cyber-attacks have risen to the fore as the most complex and divisive issue plaguing the bilateral relationship. President Obama’s segue from cyber-attack defense strategy review into his proposal of the Transatlantic FTA during the State of the Union Address spoke volumes; the juxtaposition of the two issues suggests that they are clearly related.

Although the president’s bold trade initiatives may appear retaliatory vis-à-vis China, they are ultimately good faith accords being negotiated with third-party nations, which leaves Beijing with little hope of hindering their progress. The United States should remain receptive to overtures of trade liberalization from the Chinese, since bilateral trade reform would almost certainly be of mutual benefit. It will be up to Beijing to make the first offer of favorable terms – Washington is already awash with tantalizing alternatives.

Colin Moreshead is a freelance writer living and working in Tokyo. His research focuses primarily on East Asian trade relations and exchange rate policy.

Wu Zhenglong

First, the hybrid of bilateral and plurilateral negotiations on market access, tabled by the United States, complicates the negotiating process. According to the hybrid principle, the existing bilateral free trade agreements between the US and other TPP member countries will remain valid and the US will only open up negotiations with those members who do not have FTAs with US. However, most members prefer a uniform tariff reduction among all the members so that the TPP will replace all the existing bilateral FTAs as a “comprehensive high-quality” FTA. The US hybrid approach makes market access negotiations more complex and lengthy. The U.S purpose is to maintain the vested interests in sensitive products and protect its domestic market. Take Australia as an example, it cannot expect to get U.S market access for its sugar through the TPP negotiations as it was carved out of the Australia-United States FTA. Similarly, it is not economically feasible for Vietnam to make garments with the US yarn or cloth and then export to the latter, as the US insists on the yarn-forward rules of origin. Vietnam will not be able to get U.S preferential tariffs and quota for its textile through Vietnam-US market access negotiations.

Second, the seemingly “high standards” are actually favor the U.S. interests. Touting the high standards, the U.S. aims to maximize its interests through its advanced high technology and market advantages. A case in point is the intellectual property rights (IPR) protection. The U.S. demands far exceed the TRIPS of the WTO. The pharmaceutical patent protection package proposed by the U.S. will raise the prices of generic medicines by a big margin, thus jeopardizing the normal operation of the health systems of such countries as Australia and New Zealand. Other TPP members also disagree with the U.S patent protection packages, maintaining that the excessive IPR protection will constitute an obstacle to scientific and technological innovation and the economic growth of the developing countries. As the biggest patent exporter in the world, the U.S. will acquire more wealth through enhanced IPR protection. Another example in this aspect is the mechanism for investment dispute settlement. The U.S. insists on the “Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement” (ISDS) mechanism instead of the WTO arbitration system, when a foreign investor finds itself in dispute with the host state. As the ISDS empowers enterprises to sue a state, it remains highly controversial. Australia explicitly indicates that it will deny any foreign investors the right to bring legal action against Australia. Apparently, the ISDS favors the U.S., the biggest capital exporter in the world.  

Third, the one-size-fitting-all approach is applied to differentiated concerns of the various countries. The current eleven TPP members are composed of developed and developing countries. They take different positions more often than not on an identical issue. When it comes to competition policy, for instance, the U.S. has set out a lot of new requirements for the state-owned enterprises(SOEs) to eliminate such preferential arrangements as subsidies, special funding for the SOEs overseas investment, and tilted government procurement, etc. For most developing countries, these requirements go far beyond their capacity. E-commerce presents another example. The U.S. has put forth a list of free e-commerce measures, including no tariffs or levies on digital products, non-discriminative treatment to digital products and their authors, developers, producers and performers, freedom of commercial cheating for consumers to participate in e-commerce, and free flow of trans-border digital information. These potential clauses of the TPP will pose severe challenges to the developing members. Furthermore, in the area of financial investment liberalization, the U.S. proposal to lift the ban on capital flow can hardly be accepted by some developing members who once suffered from the Asia Financial Crisis.  

Fourth, the TPP negotiations are subject to the U.S. internal politics. At the very inception of the negotiations, the U.S. drove home that it would not accept a TPP without strong provisions on labor and environment requirements. Obviously, the U.S. proposals on labor and environment will reduce the comparative advantage of developing countries and they will likely create more job opportunities for the U.S.

Finally, the TPP is being negotiated as a single undertaking. The single-undertaking principle makes the negotiations harder.  It dictates that the whole negotiations will be taken “hostage”, if a single issue is yet to be settled. Moreover, with more countries to join the TPP, the difficulty in consensus-building will be amplified accordingly.

TPP is supposed to be a “21^st Century, high-standard, comprehensive FTA”. But with so many “exclusions” and “carve-outs” on the traditional 20^th Century trade issues, it appears neither comprehensive nor high standard, at most a limited liberalization. On the 21^st Century behind-the-border issues, nevertheless, the U.S. is very radical. In fact, the high-standards turn out to be the American standards, which are out of touch with the realities in most of the developing members. The cause for this dual-structure is that the U.S. pursues maximization of it own interest at the expense of others. This zero-sum gaming policy has led TPP negotiations to flounder.

The coming nine months are critical for the TPP negotiations. If the U.S. fails to show flexibility to craft  compromises and conclude the negotiations by October this year, the TPP negotiations will risk a prolonged stalemate.

Wu Zhenglong is a research fellow at the China Foundation for International Studies.

Liu Junhong

To answer these two questions, it is necessary for us to look back at the cooperation between the East Asian nations over the last 15 years. Only through such a review can we come to pinpoint the contradictions. In 1997 when the ASEAN leaders met in a summit to identify risk control and prevention measures through regional cooperation, leaders from China, Japan and South Korea were invited to attend as nonvoting delegates. This laid the foundation for the rudimentary ‘ASEAN plus China, Japan and South Korea’ mechanism that later evolved into the ‘ASEAN Plus Three’ framework and finally has grown into the ‘dominating channel of regional cooperation’ firmly supported by China. Basically, the ASEAN Plus Three framework works through two mechanisms: the currency swap arrangement fixed in the Chiang Mai Initiative, and the ASEAN Free Trade Area centered around ASEAN Plus One. Both have seen positive developments thus far. At its meeting in Vientiane near the end of 2004, the ASEAN Plus Three decided on two major issues: creation of the East Asia Community as its general objective, and inauguration of the East Asia Summit, both decisions that immediately aroused the alarm of the United States that had always ‘benignly overlooked’ moves by this regional body. Some economists such as Fred Bergsten decried the moves for splitting the TPP, while some US congressmen and politicians cited them as contradicting the Asia-pacific alliance system of the United States, arguing that incorporation of the first island chain lying in the front of the Asia-pacific alliance system into the East Asia Community would totally change the security map of this region. This is why the United States came to point out in 2005 that the proposed East Asia Community is ‘deficient in democracy.’ The Japanese Foreign Ministry responded with a new draft – the so-called Ten Plus Six proposal, hoping to inject some democratic elements into the body by bringing Australia, Singapore and India. Obviously, this proposal was a negation of the popular belief that the United States stands for democracy. In reaction, the United States declared during the following APEC meeting that it would develop a package partnership with the ASEAN within 10 years. In early 2006, the Japanese government under Junichiro Koizumi unveiled the strategy of ‘quick action on the ASEAN, containment of China, the United States and South Korea, and creation of the de facto East Asia Community.’ It also completed economic partnership agreements with ASEAN nations five years ahead of schedule to seize marine fortresses of strategic importance. During the 2006 APEC meeting, the Bush administration brought to conclusion a number of bilateral free trade area agreements between any two parties within the APEC framework, but refused the Japan-US free trade area proposed by Japan. In 2007, Bush came up with the concept of a Pacific-rim free trade area bridging Chile, New Zealand, Singapore and Brunei, or the Pacific Four or P4 as came to be known later. The TPP concept raised by Obama is nothing new, but rather a development and extension of Bush’s conception.

So far as its coverage is concerned, the RCEP we are talking about today is identical to the Ten Plus Six scheme advocated by Japan. The Japanese have always kept to the terms of their own creation, although they have now added to it the suffix ‘FTA in broad sense.’ The key here is the Japanese interpretation of the terms Ten Plus Six and ASEAN Plus Three: the ‘Ten’ in Ten Plus Six refers to 10 countries not bound up together as in the case of the 10 ASEAN members, an understanding that has been continued in the RCEP. In order to complete the framework as soon as possible, the three latecomers have also been counted as exceptions, further reinforcing the Japanese interpretation.

What calls for notice here is that Indonesia came up with the RCEP concept last year, right when the EPA agreement between Japan and India took effect. As a result, the RCEP framework would work, in terms of structure, on the principal axle formed by Japan, the ASEAN and India, while all other countries concerned would only serve in the ASEAN Plus One sub-axles. For its part, will the ASEAN continue to believe in its leading role after the start of FTA talks between China, Japan and South Korea? It seems unnecessary to give answers to the two questions raised earlier in this article. What truly calls for our brainstorming is how to facilitate trans-Pacific regional cooperation under a system covering 18 East Asian countries and how to coordinate it with cooperation within the APEC framework. Positive results from such brainstorming will provide, perhaps, the basic conditions for keeping the economic vitality of the Asia-Pacific region during its course of opening-up to the rest of the world and harmonization with the pace of globalization.

Liu Junhong, researcher at Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Relations

The idea of a RCEP is not new. It was at first mooted at the 19^th ASEAN Summit in November 2011. The goal is to remove trade barriers within the group. Once built up, the RCEP will likely cover half of the world’s population, and the economic aggregate is expected to approach US$ 20 trillion. This means it will be the largest free trade area.

Although various frameworks for economic cooperation with diversified goals and designs have been proposed for the Asia Pacific region, the RCEP is still irreplaceable. The ASEAN and China are key supporting forces. The ASEAN seeks to maintain its leadership in the regional cooperation, while China will persist in its position of respecting and strengthening the leading role of the ASEAN in the regional cooperation.

The RCEP Is Irreplaceable in the Current Regional Cooperation

At the East Asia Summit (EAS) this year, US President Obama promoted free trade between Asian nations and the US, in which the discussion of the TPP was included. The TPP involves some countries in the region including Vietnam, Malaysia and Singapore.

While Japan is enthusiastic in participating in the TPP, the country is also active in promoting the East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA) and the Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia (CEPEA). At the same time, the talks for a free trade agreement among China, Japan and South Korea are under way, even in the context that these three countries are embroiled in territorial disputes.

Many analysts are concerned of the “Spaghetti bowl” phenomenon, in which the regional cooperation will be bothered by complicated and overlapped regimes. In this situation, the role and function of the RCEP will be weakened. However, the fact is that the RCEP has its own prominent advantages and will not be easily overtaken or replaced by other alternatives. Its advantage is obviously reflected in its flexibility. It allows for decisions to be made through any agreed modality and enabling special and differential treatment of ASEAN members, which enables a more generous consideration of each nation’s interests and needs. In contrast with the high threshold of the TPP, the RCEP will be more attractive for the ASEAN countries, since quite a few ASEAN countries are not members of the rich country club.

The ASEAN and China Are Important Supporting Parties for the RCEP

Since the ASEAN is trying to maintain and strengthen its leadership in the regional economic cooperation under competition, calling for the construction of the RCEF is an effective approach. The removal of trade barriers within the RCEP is expected to be achieved by 2015.

Except for a variety of alternative cooperation regimes mentioned above, the US rebalancing strategy also has an impact on the centrality of the ASEAN in regional cooperation. In 2012, the US extensively implemented its rebalancing strategy in Asia-Pacific. After being re-elected, Barak Obama has confirmed that the rebalancing will not be replaced and Asia will remain a policy focus of the US. Actually, the US has succeeded in strengthening the ties with some ASEAN members. Recently, the US has made it clear that more attention will be paid to the economic field. Under the situation, the ASEAN is in urgency to form a framework of cooperation, in which the ASEAN plays the leading role.

China is an important driving force for achieving the RCEP. China always respects and supports the leading role of ASEAN in the regional cooperation. At the same time, China is concerned about the TPP that excludes China. Up to know, the nature of the TPP is still ambiguous and it is presumed to be part of the US program to contain China. Therefore, it is natural for China to support RCEP in reaction to the potential risks. Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao reaffirmed in the EAS in November this year that China would fully supports efforts of the ASEAN nations to push forward the building of the RCEP.

The prospect of the RCEP will be greatly influenced by the progress of the economic integration of the ASEAN. Therefore, the construction of the economic integration is among the priority tasks of the ASEAN in coming years. At the same time, support from other countries, including China will be also helpful for setting up the RCEP.

The future of the regional cooperation is still faced with uncertainties. The factor that matters is the increasingly serious competition between different interest groups and cooperation mechanisms. However, another possible solution is that various frameworks including the TPP and the RCEP will co-exist. With appropriate communication and cooperation, these mechanisms will be able to avoid vicious competition.

Su Xiaohui, Research Fellow, Department of International Strategic Studies, China Institute of International Studies.