Both countries must put the common security threat ahead of developing their own cyberweapons — further strengthening cooperation on cyberthreat information sharing, giving full play to the technological advantages of each country’s enterprises in such collaboration to reduce mutual suspicion and misunderstanding.

As China’s new Cybersecurity Law is now irrevocably coming into force, the question is more what foreign businesses can do to adapt to or mitigate the law’s effects. China’s political project remains self-generation in all senses of the world, which nearly automatically means limited or controlled engagement with foreign commercial counterparts. Foreign businesses need to understand this in order to position their own potential contribution to that process of development as a path to growth.

Currently, there is no sufficient distinction in international law or norms to be made between simple system breaches and more malicious actions that damage or destroy systems, and that will almost certainly become necessary for the United States and China alike.

The question for Western diplomats dealing in global Internet governance must be how to effectively engage China so as to maintain peace, security and stability in cyberspace – goals to which China’s cooperation strategy commits explicitly. Will cold-shouldering China empower those voices in Beijing advocating a more hawkish and isolating approach to global internet norms? Meeting China halfway on some of its desiderata, for instance a more high-profile presence at flagship Chinese events, might not only lead to a broader basis for engagement and trust, but also enable support for those voices within the Chinese system whose objectives overlap more with that of outside countries.

A series of episodes in recent years – including Russia’s cyber interventions to skew the United States’ 2016 presidential election toward Donald Trump, the anonymous cyber-attacks that disrupted Ukraine’s electricity system in 2015, and the “Stuxnet” virus that destroyed a thousand Iranian centrifuges – has fueled growing concern about conflict in cyberspace.

Is a Geneva Convention the only response to the problem of government cyber-attacks against individuals? As global stakeholders of the internet, we must do more.

What will be President-elect Donald Trump’s policy on the use of offensive cyber weapons? First, he will likely adopt a more aggressive cyber position, with the subsequent risk of an accelerated cyber arms race. Second, he may loosen cyber alliances and abandon the quest for norms of state behavior in cyberspace. Both prospects could potentially make cyberspace more dangerous for the United States.

China’s Cybersecurity Law has elicited rather negative responses from foreign businesses, governments and NGOs. Perhaps ironically, the U.S. thus seems to have fallen victim to what Beijing has long feared would happen to them: ideological infiltration by a geostrategic adversary aimed at upsetting the political system.

Despite Donald Trump’s potentially passive attitude toward international governance and international cooperation, China and the US need collaboration in cyberspace. The threats and potential risks in cyberspace brook no footdragging, they are clear and present dangers. China-US cooperation in cyberspace not only helps all of humanity share Internet dividends, but it is also in both countries’ fundamental interest.

When one side is trying its best to make use of a dispute to exert pressure on the other side, it becomes very difficult for either side to see and appreciate common interests. Recent history offers many examples of how shared goals, such as curbing greenhouse gases and cyber crime, can point the way to fruitful cooperation instead of conflict.