Competitiveness in artificial intelligence is no longer defined solely by breakthroughs in individual technologies. Instead, it increasingly stems from a self-reinforcing system in which technological innovation, industrial deployment and governance reinforce one another, creating durable systemic capabilities.

Britain may not become a third AI superpower alongside China and the United States, but it is well positioned to serve as an important bridge across different governance frameworks.

Competition in artificial intelligence is a contest across the entire industrial value chain. Only by advancing open innovation, ensuring security and trust, promoting inclusive development and strengthening global governance can AI contribute to shared global prosperity.

Artificial intelligence is becoming a new arms race, and to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past perhaps a drastic unification of competing models could prevent catastrophe.

China’s well-documented rise in prominence in the global supply chain has created an economic engine that now rivals the United States, but now facing stagnating growth, can China innovate into the 21st Century and drive into new territory?

Artificial intelligence (AI) is rapidly becoming an indispensable part of the military relationship between China and the United States, with both countries viewing it as a key factor in shaping the future balance of military power.

In recent years, Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) has re‑emerged as a central theme in artificial intelligence research and technology policy debates. In contrast to “narrow artificial intelligence” tailored for specific tasks or application scenarios, AGI is conventionally conceptualized as a general‑purpose intelligent system capable of cross‑domain learning, reasoning and adaptation. Its potential impacts are regarded as extending far beyond individual industries or technological spheres, and will profoundly reshape economic structures, social governance, and even international power configuration. For these reasons, AGI is no longer merely an engineering or academic problem, but has gradually evolved into a political‑economic issue of paramount strategic importance.

After years of observing U.S.-China dialogues on artificial intelligence, one pattern is hard to miss. The agenda has actually expanded over the past two years. From military AI to frontier model risks, from biosecurity to cybersecurity, the topics under discussion are not few. Disinformation, however, has barely entered the conversation, let alone become a subject of cooperation. In existing international discussions, it usually surfaces as accusation. I want to ask whether it can move from being a topic of accusation to being a problem the two countries handle together.

Despite intensifying U.S.-China competition in AI, both countries share a strong interest in cooperating on AI safety, as advanced and potentially misaligned AI systems could pose existential risks to humanity. Joint risk assessment, coordination against malicious AI actors, and expanded academic collaboration could help reduce these threats and improve global AI governance.

The startling breakthrough moment in artificial intelligence and the commensurate concentration of power into the hands of a few tech giants may lead to an intensification of geopolitical competition. China is positioned to play a major constructive role for the well-being of humanity.