Shrill forebodings of a return to ‘currency wars’ and irremediable U.S.-China trade quarrels are overblown – although the prognosis on this front is somewhat mixed. A small step backwards (the yuan devaluation on August 11th) might yet come to reflect the biggest leap forward in Asian economic, trade and financial regionalism in the years and decade ahead.

The 1.8% devaluation of the yuan has started a debate in China-watching circles about whether or not the People’s Bank of China is trying to make the RMB more market-determined, or trying to make boost its exports. Most likely, Beijing is allowing the RMB to find its feet before the IMF review in November.

Although the degree of depreciation could be determined by how the Chinese government weighs the advantages and disadvantages of RMB exchange-rate movement, market forces play a more important role, and investors must pay close attention to this.

The tremendous volatility of China’s markets has led to direct and indirect government involvement, which is ultimately a short-term fix. Beijing must re-commit to the opening of its financial markets and to a deepening of capital market reforms.

China has become one of the world’s most important investors and capital exporters, stepping into a new phrase of “GNP” from “GDP” and reversing the mechanism of capital-free flow. So it is imperative to speed up the opening of its capital account.

SDR inclusion will mean an endorsement of the renminbi as an international reserve currency, and at the same time, the Chinese government will have the power and capacity to steer and manage the renminbi exchange rate.

The recent initiative provides the possibility for RMB internationalization to grow deep roots, but that global outreach could be a “double-edged sword.” Exchange-rate fluctuations will mean greater exchange risks for enterprises, but the RMB cross-border settlements could also help enterprises to hedge exchange-rate risks.

China’s main goals are to give consideration to market supply and the exchange rates of basket currencies, to guide market expectations and to maintain a stable RMB exchange rate -- not to jump on the bandwagon of the “global currency war”. That bodes well for the inclusion of the RMB into the Special Drawing Rights currency basket of the IMF before the end of 2015.

The Chinese economy is simply too big to remain tied to the once useful monetary anchor of the renminbi–U.S. dollar peg. It is time to let it go. In the short term, it would help deliver a warranted Chinese monetary easing by helping to stabilise the effective exchange rate and to facilitate an orderly unwinding of the Chinese corporate carry trade.

The controversial issue of “currency manipulation” has resurfaced. However, Washington and Beijing have very different perceptions about the identity of the “currency manipulator.” The net effect is currency friction that is likely to prevail until the 2020s.