The EU’s pursuit of becoming an autonomous and influential global power, while balancing relationships with the U.S. and China, was jolted by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The EU aims to collaborate and compete as an equal with both powers, while improving its domestic strength, ensuring reciprocity, and linking trade to geopolitics, foreign policy, and security. And the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, executing the EU strategy in Asia and the Indo-Pacific, and establishing a collective defense structure with operational objectives, are three projects that could help achieve these goals.

The Russia-Ukraine war has shaken Europe’s energy security, triggering major adjustments in supply chains, consumption and renewable energy development. The conflict and its spillover effects suggest that a new economic cold war may already be underway.

Europe’s trade relationship with the Indo-Pacific region is the highest valued of any in existence, and yet its leaders are moving surprisingly slow when it comes to their announced ambitions in the region. This is partially due to geopolitical concerns as tensions mount between China and the U.S.

America’s professed commitment to the WTO is suspect: What it really wants is to reshape the organization in its own image. By rejecting the WTO ruling against it, the U.S. is putting the teetering trade body at risk.

Alienating Russia will not increase stability for Europe, nor will Russia disappear as a result of the Ukraine war. But Russia’s old power model — needlessly using force to punish countries for switching sides — needs to change.

The G7 Summit, which just concluded at the French seaside resort of Biarritz, showed that Europe and the United States diverge with and even increasingly confront each other on trade issues. Considering its fading influence, the continued value of the G7 has been thrown into doubt, even by European academia.

Many countries, not just the United States, are disadvantaged by China’s unfair trade practices. Rather than confront the challenge alone, the United States should work to address the problem as a team sport. Doing so would be more effective and less costly than hoping U.S.-China tit-for-tat tariffs do not do significant harm to American workers, but do lead to a change in China’s economic policies.

Behind all the hype surrounding China’s changing global role in general, and the One Belt One Road concept and the BRI in particular, lie important and unanswered questions about America’s longer-term strategy for reshaping its relations with China and Asia more broadly.

After two decades of on-and-off talks, Washington and Brussels hope to conclude their trade and investment partnership. However, it is not a marriage, but a triangle drama. Emerging Asia is the third party.