Tensions between Donald Trump and Venezuela are rising against a backdrop of changes in the international order. Moving to rebuild the political biosphere of the Western Hemisphere, Trump is entering a complex and volatile new phase of geopolitics.
The USS Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group has been deployed to waters near Venezuela. While U.S. President Donald Trump said he hasn’t decided whether or not Venezuelan ground targets would be attacked, international media generally believe the likelihood is fairly high. The foundation for the prediction is Trump’s transactional thinking — that is, he never makes a losing deal. He bases everything on a cost-benefit analysis. The United States has sent massive force potential to Venezuela’s doorstep, with nuclear-powered submarines, B-52 bombers and guided missile destroyers all in the mix. Such large-scale, high-input deployment will absolutely not end with some minor strikes at sea and no other tangible achievements.
Such a high-profile move by Trump was undeniably motivated in great part by drug trafficking. The crackdown derived from his right-wing conservative beliefs.Whether on the campaign trail or in the White House, Trump has been resolute against drug crimes, and on multiple occasions has openly pledged to do whatever it takes to eradicate the sources of drugs that have found their way into the United States.
But his current move against Venezuela is not targeted only at drug-related crimes. In fact, Trump himself also believes the Drug Enforcement Administration’s judgment that Venezuela is not a principal source of drugs in the U.S., and he knows that the Nicolas Maduro government has also been cracking down on the Tren de Aragua drug cartel in recent years. Therefore, there must be deeper political motivations and economic goals behind the U.S. offensive against Venezuela.
Obviously, as many international analysts have observed, Trump’s political motivation is to orchestrate a regime change in the country, so as to finish what he left undone in his first term. An economic motivation is oil. Venezuela has the world’s largest proven oil reserves. The petroleum businesses of such U.S. companies as ExxonMobil and Chevron in Venezuela have suffered because of the nationalization policies of Maduro and his predecessor, Hugo Chavez.
Previously Latin America was not a key element of U.S. global strategy. Trump’s current obsession with the region has a lot to do with a significant change in the current administration’s global strategy and outlook on the international order. It is this change that has led to changes in the “backyard” policy of the United States. After returning to the White House, Trump set his eyes on global strategic contraction and withdrawal from the liberal world order. With the administration prioritizing geopolitical and geo-economic interests, the strategic status of the Western Hemisphere has risen.
Against this backdrop, Trump’s foreign policy has rolled back substantially to concentrate more on domestic and regional affairs. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, a core member of the Trump team, has identified Venezuela as the leading left-wing nearshore nation. It has thus become a prime target in U.S. geopolitical considerations, immigration, drug-trafficking, suppressing the left and assisting the right. These have become priorities in Trump’s policy agenda.
The U.S. approach to regime change in Venezuela mainly involves “triggering changes with pressure.” By deploying heavy military resources, carrying out attacks at sea and threatening attacks on ground targets, the Trump administration is trying to trigger a military coup in Venezuela by its own armed forces. In addition, the CIA has engaged in such clandestine activities as false flag operations, along with a color revolution — that is, striving to trigger changes inside Venezuela by simultaneously carrying out intelligence manipulation, media smearing, cyber attacks, cultivation of opposing forces and organization of street movements.
The likelihood of a targeted elimination of Maduro cannot be excluded. Recent media revelations about the CIA’s attempt to induce the defection of a mechanic for Maduro’s special plane is a case in point. The incident was not without precedent: With CIA support, a drone equipped with a bomb exploded near Maduro during a rally.
Trump does not acknowledge the Maduro government’s legitimacy and believes the Venezuelan election was won by fraud. He identifies Maduro as a terrorist who supports the Cartel de los Soles and has placed a $50 million bounty on him — the same as was offered for Osama bin Laden. Maduro has been a thorn in Trump’s side — an important target he would be more than happy to eliminate.
However, any U.S. attempt at regime change in Venezuela won’t be easy, because it faces five constraints:
First, regime change in Venezuela hinges on a divided military. For now, generals in the Venezuela military all claim allegiance to Maduro, and some high-ranking generals hold important positions in Venezuelan oil companies. This creates an interest alliance with Maduro. When one suffers, all suffer.
Second, today’s Venezuelan opposition is less powerful than it was during Trump’s first term, when he supported then-president Juan Guaido. Currently, the opposition’s capacity for organizing and mobilizing has weakened so much that it cannot continue to organize large-scale street demonstrations.
Third, Maduro has found conspicuous domestic support. The whole nation appears united against, and ready to fight, a common enemy. Over the years, Venezuela has seen economic conditions improve. There’s obvious momentum of economic recovery, lower inflation, slowing population outflows and even backflows.
Fourth is support from left-wing countries in the region. Brazil and Colombia oppose any U.S. violation of another nation’s sovereignty. Cuba, in particular, is strongly pro-Maduro and keenly aware that if the government of Venezuela collapses, Cuba will be the next target. If Venezuela suffers a significant attack, Cuba will likely do everything in its capacity to support the current government. The possibility that Cuba could sen armed forces (such as volunteer troops) directly to Venezuela should not be excluded.
Fifth, while Russia is bogged down in its conflict with Ukraine, it won’t easily abandon its oil business in Venezuela or its influence in Latin America. It certainly will offer Venezuela political support and aid in the form of weapons, funding, military guidance and even the possibility of the Wagner Group participating directly in the country’s military defense, which cannot be ruled out.
Even if the U.S. military attacks ground targets in Venezuela, the scale may be limited because there are some factors constraining U.S. expansion of such operations:
Venezuela is different from Grenada and Panama, which the U.S. invaded in the 1980s. Venezuela is a midsized country, with broad territory, treacherous terrain and considerable strategic depth.
Although the Venezuelan military can’t compare with that of the United States, it does have a more than 100,000 regular army troops and 1 million or so militia. It has an air defense system: Imported electronic detection and prevention equipment can identify drones, and its Russian-made missiles and shoulder-fired rockets are a lethal threat.
Once engaged in a large-scale war, the U.S. military will suffer a heavier toll than its previous invasion of Grenada and Panama, which Trump dreads, as it would be inconsistent with self-styled image as the “peace president.”
Then there is opposition at home. The Democratic Party and others will fiercely oppose a major offensive by Trump against a foreign country without congressional approval. The latest strikes on boats at sea have been criticized heavily as illegal. Many believe Trump has overdone it and think the U.S. Coast Guard is sufficient to interdict drug-traffickers. Many Americans think that killing people indiscriminately and without judicial due process is illicit. The commander of the U.S. Southern Command resigned because he opposed Trump’s military deployment and questionable strikes.
Finally, Trump has defined military operations against alleged drug boats as “non-international armed conflict,” indicating that the strikes don’t constitute a war between countries but are rather special military maneuvers against certain specific targets. He believes the likelihood of such strikes escalating into a large-scale war is low.
To sum up, the tensions between the U.S. and Venezuela reflect a restructuring of the Latin American regional order against a backdrop of significant changes in the international order. Trump intends to rebuild a backyard political biosphere that conforms to adjustments in U.S. domestic and foreign strategies.
The renewal of the U.S. Monroe Doctrine — only Trump style, in the form of bullying — coincides with rising aspirations among Latin American countries for strategic autonomy. The geopolitical wrangling between the U.S. and Latin America has thus entered a complex and volatile new phase.
