Only by transcending the “winner-loser” mindset and exploring a binding solution that is fair, enduring and acceptable to all parties can countries finally rebuild a balanced, effective and sustainable European security framework based on the concept of community.
A multilateral meeting to discuss peace in Ukraine in the White House on August 18, 2025.
Driven by the need to honor campaign promises and build an image as the “president of peace,” Donald Trump is forcefully intervening in and attempting to dominate the process of a political resolution of the Ukraine crisis.
The Alaska meeting of leaders from the United States and Russia, as well as the Ukraine and European Union leaders’ group visit to the U.S. once offered a ray of hope for peace. But because the largest-scale and longest-lasting geopolitical and military conflict in Europe since the end of the Cold War has yielded hundreds of thousands of casualties, created millions of refugees and triggered broad disagreements over territory, Trump’s supposed “art of the deal” has not produced the desired outcome.
On the surface, none of the stakeholders oppose peace talks. Yet America’s ambition for an immediate cease-fire, Russia’s strategic goal of rebuilding the regional order, Ukraine’s core aspiration for security guarantees and Europe’s emphasis on a “just and lasting peace” have resulted in conspicuous cognitive gaps between the parties. The military and political impasse over the conditions for peace, the routes for getting there and the costs and guarantees of peace-keeping seem nowhere close to resolution.
As Carl von Clausewitz pointed out, “War is the continuation of politics by other means.” Yet politics must also serve as the endpoint of war. The Ukraine crisis is not only the product of a confrontation between countries but it reveals deep fissures in the European security order.
The battlefield contest between Russia and Ukraine has turned from total war to a war of attrition, and from a military rivalry to a contest for bargaining chips in pressing for negotiations. Even though all parties agree on the necessity of a cease-fire, the absence of the most basic trust and actionable supervision mechanisms means that simple agreements repeatedly degenerate into hard-to-execute political proclamations. How can an all-inclusive negotiation mechanism be developed for such subjects as a cease-fire, monitoring and verification, security guarantees and postwar arrangements? The answers are critical for the achievement of genuine peace.
In this process, no solution can get around the difficult issue of territorial sovereignty, a factor that will determine whether or not a cease-fire evolves into peace. The simplistic “land swap” logic doesn’t meet the two warring parties’ respective domestic political needs. They need to explore phased, non-military resolutions while adhering to the principles of the UN Charter.
For instance, distinguishing “de jure” and “de facto” recognition of territories, and adding so-called reservation clauses to agreements on territorial status, could clarify basic principles. Disputes should be resolved via political negotiations rather than military means in the future. Doing this doesn’t detract from sovereignty and territorial integrity but would provide room to seek pragmatic, executable, transitional arrangements.
Meanwhile, as the regional conflict that has lasted the longest, killed and wounded the most people and has had the widest impact on postwar Europe, the Ukraine crisis has posed unprecedented challenges for cease-fire oversight and peacekeeping missions. The traditional peacekeeping model featuring UN Security Council authorization and participation by major powers is not only unlikely to be fully accepted by the warring parties but the peacekeeping force necessary for a line of engagement that extends hundreds of miles will prove far beyond actual capabilities.
Therefore, it is necessary to explore innovative approaches beyond the direct deployment of peacekeeping forces. These might include satellite surveillance, as well as fixed and mobile unmanned equipment, to reduce new conflicts triggered by disputes involving peacekeeping itself. For China, such security approaches will also be more feasible.
With the endorsement of the stakeholders, clear mechanisms for emergency consultations and resolution also need to be built, and capable countries should be encouraged to play a role in the oversight framework.
Security guarantees lie at the core of any settlement of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. For Ukraine — which cannot join NATO in the short term — the key to preventing a new war is securing European NATO members’ substantive presence on its soil, along with binding security assurances and long-term aid plans. Russia, however, emphasizes strategic security space in the geopolitical sense, insisting that Ukraine cannot join NATO. It opposes long-term deployments in Ukraine by NATO members in the name of peacekeeping. It sees this as a continued erosion its strategic buffer zone. So, building a new paradigm of common security must take into account both Russia’s special understanding of “strategic security space”and security guarantees for Ukraine’s survival.
Therefore, it is necessary to encourage all parties to design a common security framework that includes security guarantees and assurances based on the principles of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security.
For Ukraine, it may be advisable to ask the European “coalition of the willing” to play the leading role in guiding its defense resilience in areas far from the line of engagement with non-combat personnel, making limited deployments and introducing defense-focused mid- and long-term aid programs. At the same time, the process of allowing Ukraine to join the EU should be accelerated, taking advantage of political and economic bonds as soft security guarantees.
For Russia, the parties may explore security guarantees about upgrading military mutual trust and transparency, conduct negotiations over such topics as building a demilitarized zone and strictly limit the deployment of offensive weapons in certain areas. In addition, efforts may be made on the basis of the draft agreement on security between Russia and the U.S./NATO to promote the restoration of negotiations on such matters as strategic stability and the INF Treaty, taking into consideration Russia’s special demand for strategic security space.
In the final analysis, a political resolution of the Ukraine crisis cannot depend solely on temporary cease-fire agreements or military deterrence. Nor can it be divested from the process of countries’ rebuilding of security as they see it. An ideal security framework for Europe should neither rely on changeable U.S. policies nor sink into a rearmament race. The EU should instead explore a new paradigm of common security that balances all stakeholders’ concerns and interests.
They parties may borrow from the core ideas of the Asian Security Initiative, Asian Security Model and the Global Security Initiative. They may maneuver an ideological transfer from “exclusive security” to “common security,” as well as a transition from the institutional arrangements for “absolute security” to those for “relative security.”
Only by transcending the “winner-loser” mindset and exploring a binding solution that is fair, enduring and acceptable to all parties can countries finally rebuild a balanced, effective and sustainable European security framework based on the concept of community.
AUTHOR’S NOTE: Core arguments of this article are drawn from the research report “Reframing Common Security: Toward a Paradigm Shift in Resolving the Ukraine Crisis,” released on Aug. 19, 2025, by the Institute for International Strategic and Security Studies at the SIIS. Full report available at https://www.siis.org.cn/SIISReport/17185.jhtml ）
