During the 12th Beijing Xiangshan Forum at the Beijing International Convention Center, Da Wei, Director of the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) and Professor of International Relations at Tsinghua University, was interviewed by China-US Focus Beijing editor Huang Zhijin on Sept. 18, 2025 . Da Wei believes that in the short term, China-U.S. relations will remain focused on maintaining stability; and as domestic political imperatives and broader global strategic considerations increasingly dominate the policy agenda, the Indo-Pacific strategy under Trump 2.0 appears to be losing substance.
The transcript below is a consolidation and has been edited for clarity.
Huang Zhijin: President Trump has been in office for more than 240 days. Have there been any changes in his personal views on China over these months? What trends are emerging, and how do things differ from Trump 1.0?
Da Wei: The policy logic behind Trump’s first and second terms is fundamentally the same but manifest in significantly different ways. Trump 2.0’s China policy is part of a broader adjustment in U.S. foreign and domestic strategies. The Trump 2.0 administration aims to redefine America’s relationship with the external world, particularly in economic and security terms. This “external world” includes not only China but also Europe and other regions.
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has developed a pattern of relations with Europe, China and other countries with a backdrop of unipolar hegemony and neoliberal globalization. This includes the interdependent relationship between the U.S. and China. Now, as the U.S. realizes that this old pattern is unsustainable and ineffective in fixing domestic challenges such as growing wealth inequality and others, it is adjusting this old pattern, domestically and also in external dimensions. This means that U.S. foreign relations, including ties with China, Europe and Southeast Asia, need to be recalibrated. The so-called Liberation Day tariffs on April 2 are a typical example, reflecting a posture of “America against the world,” not just targeting China.
Thus, a comparison of Trump 1.0 and 2.0 reveals distinct approaches to China. The former was characterized by a “U.S. vs. China” dynamic, with the U.S. singularly focused on pressuring and containing China. In contrast, the Biden administration pursued a “the West vs. China” strategy, attempting to rally allies to collectively counter China.
Trump 2.0 has pivoted to a “U.S. vs. the rest of the world” posture, positioning the U.S. in opposition to the global community as it recalibrates its relationships worldwide. That said, not only China but the majority of the world has concerns over the current U.S. policy trajectory. In this broader geopolitical landscape, the current U.S.-China relationship is but one dimension. During Trump 1.0’s one-on-one confrontation with China, China policy was at the center of U.S. foreign affairs. Today, while still significant, China policy no longer occupies the preeminent or most urgent position on the agenda.
Another notable shift in Trump 2.0’s China policy was evident in the early days of his second term. Initially, buoyed by a decisive victory, Trump believed that the mere imposition of tariffs could coerce other countries into submission. However, after a series of engagements with multiple countries, particularly China, he has come to recognize the limits of all the perceived leverage.
I believe that starting around May and June of this year, the Trump administration’s China policy, while not fundamentally altered, has undergone tactical adjustments. The U.S. has begun seeking negotiations with China. Bilateral relations have gradually stabilized because Trump realized that China couldn’t be taken down by brute force and that he needed to negotiate with patience. Therefore, his overall China policy has become relatively more stable. Compared with his policies toward other countries, even though Trump’s current China policy can’t be said to be as friendly, it is less aggressive and more inclined toward consultation. His earlier condescending posture has been somewhat set back by China’s firm counter-measures.
Huang Zhijin: Over the past 200-plus days, changes in Trump’s strategy have partly been driven by China’s countermeasures. For example, China’s restrictions on rare earth exports caught Trump and his team off guard. Besides these countermeasures and Trump’s own capricious personality, what other internal factors within his team have led to the shift in strategy?
Da Wei: U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent may have been crucial. He is an experienced, steady hand with common sense. When he realized that high reciprocal tariffs wouldn’t work, he quietly and adeptly persuaded Trump. After April 2, Trump singled out China and postponed tariffs on other countries. We of course oppose this approach, but tactically speaking, it makes some sense. The U.S. can’t afford to make enemies on all fronts and had to focus on China. This was widely believed to be Bessent’s idea.
All in all, Trump 2.0 team is more of a club of loyalists than a cohesive unit, unlike the 1.0 team that housed some strong-minded and veteran bureaucrats. So, the current team of loyal followers is unlikely to offer substantive advice. Of course, people like Bessent may have Trump’s ear, and influence Trump’s decision-making.
Another factor is the lackluster U.S. economy. The recent interest rate cut by the Fed reflects Trump’s anxiety about the economy. On the foreign policy front, there are self-inflicted challenges galore. He spent more than half a year trying to resolve the Russia-Ukraine conflict without much progress. In the Middle East, the U.S. airstrike on Iran’s nuclear facilities and Israel’s attack on Qatar have also consumed a lot of Trump’s political capital. As a result, China is indeed not the foremost or most urgent item on the agenda.
Huang Zhijin: How do you assess Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s performance? He seems preoccupied with illegal immigration and cross-border crime. Apart from his meeting with Foreign Minister Wang Yi and joint statements with Japan and the Philippines that indirectly involved China, he is muted on China-U.S. relations. As a traditional conservative, will Rubio nudge Trump toward a more confrontational approach?
Da Wei: Hard to say in the long run, but for now, Rubio is very much in line with Trump, toeing the line of whatever he says. There might be some political maneuvering on Rubio’s part. For whatever reason, he has yet to publicly challenge any of Trump’s policies. A case in point was the falling out of Trump and [Ukrainian President] Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the White House. Rubio’s statements clearly convey that he is unwilling to cross Trump, partly to secure his own political future.
Also, as a Cuban American and ex-senator from Florida, Rubio was given the Western Hemisphere portfolio by Trump 2.0, a good fit for his background. He is well-versed, as well as interested, in these issues. But on China and Russia policies, Trump hasn’t involved Rubio much. Trump has appointed special envoys to handle foreign affairs. For example, on the Russia-Ukraine issue, Rubio’s role is probably less significant than that of the Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff. On China policy, Rubio has not yet played any prominent role.
Huang Zhijin: However, Rubio also serves as the national security adviser, making him the first diplomat to hold two positions since Kissinger.
Da Wei: Both the secretary of state and National Security Council have seen their powers significantly diminished. Trump has tasked Rubio primarily with Latin American affairs. But Trump is taking the lead on other foreign policies himself, including China policy. Of course, on economic and trade policies, Bessent is the most trusted, and Peter Navarro still exerts influence. Beyond that, the overall arrangements for China affairs, such as whether and when to visit China, are decided by Trump himself.
Huang Zhijin: As you just mentioned, the Trump 1.0 team was a strong bureaucratic group. So, what is your view of the MAGA faction, the “restraint faction” and the “priority faction” within the Trump 2.0 team? What impact do they have on U.S. foreign policy and China policy?
Da Wei: First of all, it’s true that there are different voices and factions within the U.S. government, and the factions you mentioned do exist. However, I don’t think they are all playing equally important roles. Rather, Trump dominates. Others mostly keep silent, occasionally speaking out on specific issues to make an opinion, but it is confusing as to whether or not they represent the official policy of the United States. For example, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said during a video call with Defense Minister Dong Jun that the U.S. does not seek conflict with China, nor does it seek regime change. In fact, the Biden administration said similar things. We don’t need to read too much into it.
Huang Zhijin: At the Beijing Xiangshan Forum, former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Chad Sbragia cited Secretary Hegseth’s remarks, noting their peculiarity, as never before has a U.S. defense secretary spoken in that tenor.
Da Wei: While unprecedented in public discourse for a defense secretary, I was not surprised. Consider the converse: Hegseth’s speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue, where he robustly espoused the “China threat” narrative and attempted to rally regional countries to counter China. Whether that speech truly reflected Trump’s stance remains uncertain. For instance, one might hear the MAGA faction emphasize nativism and advocating a pivot to the Western Hemisphere. Yet others argue that the U.S. remains engaged in the Indo-Pacific and needs to cooperate with regional nations. Amid these contradictory voices, it becomes exceedingly difficult to discern who genuinely speaks for Trump or to fathom his true intentions. Ultimately, such noise and conflicting messages exert limited influence on Trump’s decision-making.
Huang Zhijin: According to a recent Politico article, a newly released U.S. National Defense Strategy will relegate issues like China and Russia to a secondary tier, prioritizing the Western Hemisphere and homeland security. If accurate, does this signify a shift away from the containment strategies employed during the Biden and Trump 1.0 eras?
Da Wei: The strategy has yet to be officially unveiled. The prevailing sentiment suggests that Politico’s report may overstate the case. One plausible explanation is that the MAGA faction, in an effort to align with Trump’s preferences, drafted content that reflects what they perceive as his inclinations. However, even if the final strategy is framed in such terms, its implementation is far from guaranteed. There is invariably a chasm between strategy formulation and execution. In reality, any U.S. national security or defense strategy will invariably prioritize the homeland and the Western Hemisphere. This is a standard approach for any nation’s strategy, guided by a defense logic that prioritizes in proximity order. Should we examine the full draft, it would undoubtedly feature phrases such as “U.S. security begins at home.” Thus, Politico’s account may be an exaggeration.
Huang Zhijin: How do you evaluate Trump 2.0’s Indo-Pacific strategy? It seems that momentum has diminished, as Trump remains preoccupied with trade wars. So, where will the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy be heading in the future? What changes will its main components undergo, such as security cooperation between Japan and South Korea, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and the AUKUS agreement? For example, will the Quad continue to exist?
Da Wei: First, the Quad may continue to exist, but its relevance in regional security affairs will likely wane. The Quad is more conceptual in nature, which sets it apart from AUKUS, which involves concrete military technology cooperation, such as nuclear submarines. The Quad is primarily a political gesture. I believe Trump does not place much importance on allies and is not particularly interested in either AUKUS or the Quad.
Second, Trump is averse to military confrontation. He views these arrangements as costly and requiring cooperation with allies, which essentially means spending money on them, so he is not interested.
Third, the very existence of the Indo-Pacific Strategy is in question. AUKUS may continue to exist and engage in cooperation, but if it is only AUKUS, the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy will ring hollow. Although the Biden administration had promoted the Quad, the current U.S.-India relationship is strained, and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework has stalled. The Trump administration has a fraught relationship with Southeast Asian countries and faces challenges in its relationship with India. How can the U.S. advance the Indo-Pacific Strategy? This strategy may exist in name only, as it has been largely hollowed out in substance.
Huang Zhijin: In the Indo-Pacific region, Japan and South Korea are strategic pivots for the United States. Trump once attempted to normalize U.S.-DPRK relations, and Kim Jong-un’s recent visit to China may signal that he is poised to restart a DPRK-U.S. dialogue. Will Trump meet with him again? If so, what will they discuss? The meetings during Trump 1.0 all fell through. What will the future of U.S.-DPRK relations be like?
Da Wei: A meeting could happen. The DPRK is still taking a tough line with the U.S., but normalizing ties is something that would benefit the DPRK in the long run. Right now, they’re not talking about giving up their nuclear program, but they are open to discussing things like disarmament and other issues. It’s highly unlikely that the U.S. or other countries will formally recognize the DPRK as a nuclear state. There’s clearly a big gap between the two sides, but it’s possible for the U.S. and the DPRK to start talking again without acknowledging DPRK as a nuclear power. It’s possible that we’ll see some progress in U.S.-DPRK relations over the next three years.
Huang Zhijin: What do you think about the idea of resetting China-U.S. relations, which some American scholars brought up during the Xiangshan Forum?
Da Wei: China-U.S. relations need a reset, but we’re not quite there yet. The timing isn’t right and the conditions aren’t in place. When people talk about a reset, it sounds like we’re trying to shed the baggage of the recent past and go back to a better place in our relationship, and then build from there. But that’s not what we need right now. What we need is to move China-U.S. relations onto an entirely new foundation, not just try to patch up the old one.
Nixon’s visit to China set our relationship on a Cold War footing, and since the 1990s globalization has been the bedrock of our ties. But now, that foundation of globalization has crumbled, and our relationship has taken a hit. So, a “reset” isn’t about rebuilding the old foundation — it’s about creating a new one. We need to put China-U.S. relations on a new platform and start fresh. That’s what a real reset should be like, but getting there is going to take some time.
Huang Zhijin: Trump is hoping to meet with the Chinese side during the APEC summit in South Korea. What do you think might come out of that meeting?
Da Wei: We haven’t heard anything official yet, so we’ll have to wait for the leaders of both countries to make an announcement. Generally, it’s possible for the two leaders to meet at the APEC summit, but it would probably be a pretty short session. Trump mentioned on social media that he might visit China next year. Either way, there’s a good chance we’ll see more high-level interactions between the two countries in the future. In that process, I think China and the U.S. need to find some common ground on tariffs. If we can get tariffs down and stabilize them, that would be great news. Personally, I don’t think U.S. tariffs on China are going to drop a lot, but if we can reach an agreement, at least we’ll have more predictability. Also, we need to set up a more frequent high-level dialogue mechanism. That’s a deliverable the two leaders could agree on.
Huang Zhijin: Currently, U.S. academic circles are quite concerned about the so-called Taiwan Strait crisis. Foreign Affairs magazine carried such discussions. Trump does not wish to go to war. As you mentioned earlier, China-U.S. relations are determined solely by Trump, and his unpredictable personality adds to the uncertainty. Is it possible that he might reach a new consensus with China on the Taiwan question, or achieve a new breakthrough? At the very least, could he revert to the past U.S. stance of supporting a peaceful solution to cross-strait differences, or make an exception by stating opposition to Taiwan independence?
Da Wei: It is unlikely that Trump would explicitly state opposition to Taiwan independence. What he might do is to reiterate established U.S. positions, including affirming that the “One China” policy remains unchanged and that the U.S. does not support Taiwan independence. None of these statements would be novel, and they involve numerous details, but he may restate them in principle.
Huang Zhijin: Given the ongoing communications, how do you assess Trump’s approach to China policy as the 2026 U.S. midterm elections approach? Based on current sustained dialogue and engagement, what trajectory might bilateral relations take over the next 18 months to two years? Could we see continued improvement, perhaps with some breakthroughs?
Da Wei: The overall trend suggests that stability is achievable and could even last past the midterms. But I want to emphasize that while stability is possible, achieving meaningful improvement remains exceptionally challenging.
