For nearly eight decades, American grand strategy in the Indo-Pacific has rested on a singular assumption: that the United States can project decisive military

The recent Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore offered a window into the evolving realities of power in the Indo-Pacific. U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth’s address struck a notably more measured tone than his previous interventions. Gone were the sharper edges of 2025 rhetoric. In their place emerged a focus on securing a “favourable but durable balance of power,” preventing any single hegemon — implicitly China — from dominating the region. Allies were urged to shoulder greater burdens, with familiar calls for increased defence spending. Conspicuously absent was any direct reference to Taiwan.

When it comes to the principle of multi-alignment – that is, the formation of non-binding yet effectual ties with a number of exogenous actors, including but not limited to great powers or regional blocs – ASEAN, the eleven-member bloc in Southeast Asia, is most definitely an astute exemplar.

India’s 2026 BRICS chairship unfolds amid a fragile but continuing thaw in Sino-Indian relations that, despite unresolved territorial disputes, is opening space for de-politicized economic cooperation, supply chain realignment, talent and people-to-people exchanges, with Hong Kong positioned as a practical bridge for sustained engagement between the two countries.

Unable to maintain its position of leadership, the United States is severely hindering the progress of other nations. It’s a self-isolating form of hegemony that poses real geopolitical dangers. By openly acknowledging and pursuing exclusive spheres of influence, America is effectively signaling a return to the law of the jungle.

Donald Trump’s protectionist policies and strained diplomacy have damaged U.S. relations with key allies, including India, which has responded by seeking closer ties with China. This emerging Sino-Indian rapprochement marks a potential shift toward a more multipolar global order led by Asian powers.

During the 12th Beijing Xiangshan Forum on Sept. 18-19 at the Beijing International Convention Center, Da Wei, Director of the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) and Professor of International Relations at Tsinghua University, was interviewed by China-US Focus Beijing editor Huang Zhijin. Da Wei believes that in the short term, China-U.S. relations will remain focused on maintaining stability; and as domestic political imperatives and broader global strategic considerations increasingly dominate the policy agenda, the Indo-Pacific strategy under Trump 2.0 appears to be losing substance.

Donald Trump prefers to treat the waters as a bargaining chip, so the United States may reduce high-profile provocations — such as close-in reconnaissance — and instead increase its “gray” tactics and low-intensity military exercises.

Amid the uncertainty of U.S. domestic affairs and the evolving international order, the transatlantic relationship — despite its apparent stability — is likely to experience undercurrents of discontent in the years ahead.

The future of the Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy remains fluid. However, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s two visits to the region, including his recent attendance and speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue, shed a little light.