Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute
Aug 28 , 2020
With China, Russia and the U.S. all developing major space programs, trilateral accords and communication will be key to avoiding misunderstandings – or war – between nations.
Jul 02 , 2020
One cost of the deteriorating Sino-American relationship is that it encourages North Korean intransigence regarding the inter-Korean peace process. If the U.S. and China want to avoid a repeat of the Korean War, it is up to both great powers to pursue policies which incentivize North Korean compliance.
Jun 06 , 2020
Conspiracy theories about the start and spread of COVID-19, such as those promoted by a few Chinese and American officials and commentators, threaten the cooperation and transparency needed to counter the pandemic.
Apr 17 , 2020
Although bilateral cooperation between China and the U.S. is sub-optimal at this moment, Beijing and Washington must not overlook other global challenges such as nuclear non-proliferation and arms control.
Nov 28 , 2019
A joint early-warning system throws a curveball at the United States and the global military order.
Sep 19 , 2019
President Trump’s interest in Greenland is sensible considering the strategic and economic importance of the Arctic — a region that also interests China, Russia, and other great powers, but the United States could be doing more to strengthen its ties to Denmark and its territory.
Jul 15 , 2019
China, Russia, and the United States are in an interlocking trilateral dispute over whether to extend bilateral strategic nuclear arms control treaties between Moscow and Washington to China as well.
Mar 15 , 2019
China should participate in official discussions regarding its nuclear employment and targeting doctrines and, like Russia and the United States, make public the number of China’s nuclear warheads and delivery systems.
Jan 09 , 2019
China and Russia are still North Korea’s best friends. How will they use this relationship?
Oct 05 , 2018
The U.S. effort to deny China access to advanced Russian weapons is understandable and, arguably, preferable to more direct attempts to decelerate China’s military modernization.