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Foreign Policy

The Return of Trump

Nov 18, 2024
  • Sun Chenghao

    Fellow, Center for International Security and Strategy of Tsinghua University; Visiting Scholar, Paul Tsai China Center of Yale Law School

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Donald Trump’s victory ushers in a new wave of turbulence for transatlantic relations. Under his “America first” agenda, U.S.-Europe ties are increasingly likely to display quasi-competitive characteristics, particularly in trade and foreign policy. This competition could further strain the traditional alliance, as Trump views the European Union as both an economic rival and a beneficiary of U.S. security support. With this outlook, Trump’s policy emphasizes a realignment of interests to ensure that the U.S. gains greater economic and security advantages.

Trump is expected to intensify U.S.-EU trade competition. During his campaign, he made clear that, if reelected, he would continue his aggressive trade stance, including imposing tariffs of 10 to 20 percent on all imports, and target China with tariffs as high as 60 percent. Such measures inject new uncertainty into U.S.-EU trade relations. Trump's hard-line approach could not only increase direct trade pressure on the EU but also embroil it in a global trade confrontation. The EU could respond with countermeasures, but these efforts might not be enough to alleviate the immediate pressures from a second Trump administration.

While U.S.-EU trade tensions may intensify, their economic ties remain robust, especially in the high-tech and financial sectors where the EU is still heavily reliant on the U.S. market. The strong connections in digital economies and transnational corporate partnerships reinforce this economic bond. As a result, the EU will likely respond cautiously to U.S. tariff policies, aiming to avoid a full-blown confrontation that could severely impact its foreign trade and economic growth.

Trump’s return to office, however, could heighten U.S.-EU competition within the global trade framework, particularly in areas such as global supply chains and market access. His tariff policies might significantly reduce the competitiveness of European companies in the U.S. market and could further weaken the EU’s global competitive standing. Traditionally, the EU has pursued free trade agreements and multilateral mechanisms to expand its influence in global markets, but Trump’s protectionist agenda will likely make this goal more challenging. Nevertheless, the EU will continue to seek collaboration with the U.S. in areas such as technology, innovation and global economic governance, providing some balance in the quasi-competitive nature of U.S.-EU relations.

In energy security, Trump’s return to office could place the EU in a more complex position. The U.S. has recently become a major energy exporter, particularly in liquefied natural gas, giving it significant leverage in the global energy market. Trump may use this as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the EU, intensifying trade and economic tensions.

While the EU has made strides in diversifying its energy sources, the U.S. remains a crucial partner in its energy security landscape. Trump’s re-election will mean that the EU not only faces pressure from traditional energy suppliers like Russia but may also need to make concessions to the U.S. on energy. For instance, Trump could demand that the EU increase its LNG imports from the U.S. or urge European countries to reduce their dependence on Russia and China in other sectors. Although the EU is wary of becoming overly reliant on U.S. energy supplies, reality may compel it to make certain compromises under U.S. pressure. Trump’s energy policies could push the EU to reassess its energy security strategy. 

Trump’s return will also add complexity to U.S.-EU relations in the realm of security. Trump has consistently emphasized that European NATO members should bear more of the military burden by increasing defense spending to lessen U.S. obligations — a demand that could become even more prominent in Trump’s second term. His re-election will likely require Europe to step up its defense investments. However, the EU’s defense capabilities remain limited, falling short of matching the U.S.’s global military reach and leaving it unable to independently address complex security challenges in the short term.

Under pressure from Trump, the EU might increase military cooperation and spending, but the U.S. will likely continue to dominate European and global security matters.

On the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Trump previously pledged to resolve the issue within 24 hours of taking office, though the feasibility of such a promise remains questionable. Nonetheless, U.S. support for Ukraine could weaken under his administration, which would have profound implications for transatlantic relations.

Europe’s response to Trump’s return can be expected to be marked by a complex blend of concern and urgency. On one hand, Trump’s stance on Ukraine has heightened European unease about its reliance on U.S. security, spurring countries like France and Germany to push for greater strategic autonomy. Following Trump’s victory, French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz quickly coordinated, seeking to display European unity. This security pressure has intensified calls for autonomous defense initiatives to avoid future dependence on U.S. decisions on critical issues. However, Central and Eastern European countries remain more reliant on the U.S. and NATO, complicating the EU’s ability to form a unified response and increasing transatlantic uncertainty.

While U.S.-EU competition may intensify, it differs from the U.S. strategic competition with China. The transatlantic relationship remains an alliance, making a full decoupling unlikely. In this quasi-competitive phase, Europe lacks equal standing with the U.S., especially in military and security matters, where it still relies on American protection. Trump’s re-election suggests Europe will have to make concessions on certain issues, particularly in its China policy, as Trump will likely demand a tougher stance. Despite some autonomy in EU-China relations, Europe may still align with U.S. positions under unilateral pressure from Trump to maintain the transatlantic alliance. Thus, while Europe might counter the U.S. in trade, it will struggle to shed U.S. influence in global strategic matters.

Trump’s return is likely to add a competitive edge to U.S.-EU relations, pushing Europe further toward exploring autonomy in security and defense. Europe may implement targeted measures in trade to secure a fairer economic environment, yet it will likely remain influenced by the U.S. on China policy and security issues. The future transatlantic relationship will be marked by contradictions. For Europe, this means a shift from “cooperative gains” to “interest-first” priorities, with Europe no longer at the center of U.S. foreign policy. Europe must face Trump’s tendency to de-prioritize allies in foreign policy to ensure it is no longer passive in this dynamic. The uncertainties brought by Trump’s return may, however, fuel Europe’s drive toward strategic autonomy.

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