Underneath the public press jabs that go on between East and West, the realm of resource competition is reshaping the relationships between Europe, China, and Russia as states move to secure immediate needs of oil and other resources.
Russian oil makes up around 8% of global supply. Gazprom’s Novy Port oil terminal in the Russian Arctic. (Photo: Gazprom)
U.S. President Donald Trump’s address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 23, 2025, crackled with familiar fire. He singled out China and India as the “primary funders” of Russia’s war in Ukraine, accusing them of hypocrisy in maintaining “neutrality” while snapping up discounted Russian crude. “China and India are the primary funders of the ongoing war by continuing to purchase Russian oil,” Trump thundered, his tone laced with scorn. The barbs extended to NATO allies, whom he chided for “funding the war against themselves” through persistent energy ties to Moscow – a swipe at Europe’s uneven sanctions enforcement that exposes the fragility of Western unity.
This was Trump at his rhetorical best: a heady brew of economic nationalism and moral hectoring. He decried the Asian duo for sustaining Russia’s war machine, much of it bankrolled by oil shipments dodging sanctions via shadowy tanker fleets. The numbers tell a stark story. China’s Russian crude imports averaged about 2 million barrels per day (bpd) in the first half of 2025. India notched a record 1.5 million barrels per day of Russian crude during the first 20 days of August 2025, fuelled by long-term pacts like Reliance Industries’ 500,000 bpd deal with Rosneft. These flows capture over 80 per cent of Russia’s seaborne exports after conflict escalation in Ukraine, channelling billions into Kremlin coffers and underscoring how “neutral” abstention in geopolitics may indirectly influence the course of conflicts.
Trump has furiously vowed tariffs on China and India unless they rein in buys, layering atop existing levies. He went further, warning that “if Russia is not ready to strike a peace deal, Washington is fully prepared to impose a very strong round of powerful tariffs to quickly halt the bloodshed,” while urging Europe to intensify the clampdown.
Nor is this idle talk. Trump’s administration has already brandished tariffs like a blunt instrument: threats of 100 per cent secondary duties loom over Chinese goods if Beijing – averaging those 2 million bpd from Russia – doesn’t slacken. Tariffs on Chinese imports have ratcheted to punishing levels across tech and dual-use sectors, partly for sanction evasion, eliciting China’s riposte of 125 per cent duties on U.S. exports. The escalation intensified U.S.-China trade tensions, but the two sides temporarily agreed to lower tariffs on select sectors and goods.
Even more intriguing is the India angle. As a linchpin in America’s Indo-Pacific pivot against Beijing, the main competitor of the U.S., New Delhi’s surge in Russian oil – now nearly 40 per cent of its total – prompted a July hike to 50 per cent U.S. tariffs on Indian goods. This risks fraying a partnership forged in Quad summits and defence deals, highlighting the contortions of U.S. strategy in a multipolar arena. Yet pragmatism prevailed; by early September, channels thawed with trade talks, Trump hinting at eased barriers while Modi evoked the “limitless potential” of ties – a deft sidestep averting escalation.
The hawkishness peaked in Trump’s sidebar huddle with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, where he branded Russia a “paper tiger” – an overextended force buckling under economic strain. “Ukraine, with the support of NATO, is in a position to fight and WIN all of Ukraine back in its original form,” – said Trump. Zelenskyy called it a “big shift,” crediting a frontline briefing for Trump’s recalibration from hasty ceasefires to outright victory bets. Coming amid stalled peace pushes, this signals a U.S. tilt towards arming Kyiv, potentially prolonging the conflict and ratcheting pressure on oil buyers. On September 28, U.S. Vice President JD Vance discussed the possibility of supplying Ukraine with long-range Tomahawk cruise missiles. These statements likely aim to pressure Moscow rather than really escalate. Transferring Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine – nuclear-capable strategic weapons – would risk a global conflict and give Russia justification to deploy more lethal arms. Though, Trump stated that the United States recently received a threat from Russia and, in response, deployed a nuclear submarine, adding that the American fleet is 25 years ahead of Russia and China in this domain. He emphasized that the submarine is "simply lurking" and expressed hope that it would not need to be employed, noting that American nuclear submarines are impossible to detect.
These salvos, set against Trump’s faltering mediation bids, etch a sharper fault line in energy geopolitics: a transatlantic bloc squeezing Moscow’s arteries, arrayed against an East wedded to realpolitik over moral postures. For China and India, these imports – China at 2 million bpd in 2024, India peaking at 1.8 million – are lifelines for growth, buffering volatility in a decarbonising world. Trump’s onslaught, though, could hasten a bifurcated order: Western chokepoints on shadow fleets and refineries, spurring Asian recourse to yuan trades (95 per cent of Sino-Russian deals last year) and BRICS payment rails. Russia’s 2024 fossil fuel haul topped U.S.$250 billion, but the real stakes lie in eroding U.S. primacy – Asian pushback might not just sustain Putin, but redraw alliance maps.
Amid these developments, gas prices for China will stay at least 27% below those charged to Turkey and other European buyers over the next three years, with the discount potentially stretching to 38% by the end of 2025. For this year, the average export price to China is pegged at around $249 per thousand cubic meters—significantly undercutting the $402 seen in Western markets. Looking ahead, shipments through the Power of Siberia pipeline are set to climb 20% by 2025, hitting the line's full design capacity of 38 billion cubic meters annually. A separate deal will ramp up volumes on the Far Eastern route to 12 billion cubic meters by 2027. The crown jewel remains Power of Siberia 2, which would pipe 50 billion cubic meters yearly through Mongolia for three decades, though details on pricing are still under wraps. By way of context, Gazprom shipped more than 21 billion cubic meters to Turkey in 2024, alongside nearly 16 billion to Europe through the TurkStream pipeline.
Enter Europe’s riposte. On September 24, amid UNGA’s diplomatic whirl, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen aligned with Trump in a margins meeting, pledging to zero out Russian gas and oil imports by end-2025 – fast-forwarding from 2027. “We agreed on the need to cut Russia’s revenues from fossil fuels, and fast,” she said, unveiling the 19th sanctions round from September 19: a blanket LNG ban, blacklisting 118 shadow vessels, and probes into third-country processors. “This is precisely what Europe is doing,” von der Leyen averred, casting the EU as a steadfast yet pragmatic fulcrum in the East-West schism.
Reality tempers the vow. Despite REPowerEU’s strides – pipeline gas down 90 per cent since 2022, oil bans hitting 90 per cent of pre-war volumes – dependencies linger. The EU shelled out €21.9 billion on Russian fossils in 2024, a scant 1 per cent dip year-on-year, with gas dominating 70 per cent of recent flows sans full LNG curbs. Exemptions for Hungary and Slovakia continue to sustain Russian oil flows through the Druzhba pipeline, ensuring steady revenues for Moscow that at times outweigh the scale of EU assistance to Ukraine.
Still, the UNGA tableau heralds a nascent bipolarity. The West, galvanised by Trump’s truculence and von der Leyen’s haste, cinches supply nooses – over 560 shadow ships shunned, ports jittery, insurers skittish. Coordinated Asia-routed oil tariffs could jolt prices 10-15 per cent if exports shed another million bpd, slamming global consumers. Asia counters with shrewd hedging: China’s yuan pivot circumvents SWIFT; India’s “business as usual” mantra indicts Western double standards on uranium hauls. Kazan’s BRICS conclaves advance de-dollarised swaps, blunting financial whips.
Perils abound. Harsher sanctions could lasso firms like Sinopec or Reliance in secondary snares, flaring trade skirmishes atop U.S.-China frictions in chips and EVs. Yet Beijing’s retort stays cool: China branded Trump’s words unconstructive, insisting it’s “neither creator of this crisis nor a party to it”. Deeds eclipse declamations – Gazprom eyes 38 billion cubic metres via Power of Siberia by late 2025, doubling from 2024, with Power of Siberia 2’s U.S.$55-70 billion Arctic artery inked to fortify Eurasian veins.
Trump's UNGA salvo may rally the West, but it risks alienating the very partners needed for a stable order. As the bipolar energy divide hardens – West squeezing, East hedging – the real casualty could be multilateralism itself. In a modern world, the fault line isn't just about oil; it's about who defines the rules of global power.
