The 12th Beijing Xiangshan Forum was held at the Beijing International Convention Center Sept. 18-19, 2025. Professor Wu Xinbo, dean of the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University, spoke with China-US Focus editor Huang Zhijin and assessed the trajectory of Trump 2.0’s China policy. The transcript below has been edited for clarity.
Huang Zhijin: At the 12th Xiangshan Forum, you remarked that since President Trump’s return to office, China-U.S. relations have passed through three distinct stages: from January to May, a period of “fight and fight” marked by tariff battles; from May to late August, a phase of “fight and talk”; and at present, a stage characterized as “talks and understanding.” In view of the upcoming U.S. midterm elections, what understandings do you anticipate the two sides might be able to reach? What principal obstacles are they likely to face? Compared with earlier modes of cooperation or consensus, in what respects might such views diverge or constitute a breakthrough?
Wu Xinbo: By “understanding” I primarily mean that China and the United States require a general framework and shared awareness. In its earlier phases, the Trump administration’s approach was largely transactional and issue-driven, addressing matters such as fentanyl, TikTok and trade but lacking an overarching framework. Yet the sound management of bilateral relations requires not only the resolution of specific issues but also a guiding framework. A future leaders summit could provide the opportunity for both sides to reach a general understanding of the trajectory of relations, thereby enabling them to address issues such as trade, Taiwan and the South China Sea in a more purposeful manner, without becoming hostage to any single agenda item.
Such an understanding, however, would not be immutable. Its durability would be contingent upon multiple factors, particularly U.S. domestic politics. With the 2026 midterm elections approaching, Trump will need to determine how to address the China factor, while the Republican Party must decide how to play the China card — whether to emphasize cooperation or to intensify confrontation as a display of toughness. These considerations will directly affect the stability of any understanding.
Huang Zhijin: During the Xiangshan Forum, some American scholars advanced the proposal of a “reset” in China-U.S. relations. This recalls the Obama administration’s early efforts to reset relations with Russia, which ultimately failed. Why has the notion of resetting China-U.S. relations resurfaced at this juncture? If such a reset were to be attempted, what would be its essential elements, and how feasible would it be?
Wu Xinbo: A meaningful reset would require at least two dimensions. The first is a redefinition of the nature of China-U.S. relations. Since Trump’s first term, Washington has regarded China as its foremost strategic competitor, shaping policy on the basis of rivalry and relying on pressure, containment and deterrence. Without a change in this perception, bilateral relations will be unable to improve. The second dimension concerns the bilateral agenda. At present, under the unilateral framing of the United States, the agenda is dominated by negative issues — confrontation, friction and conflict — rather than cooperation, stabilization and improvement.
To have a reset, the United States must revise its strategic designation of China and recognize the relationship as one of “partner and competitor,” with partnership accorded priority. We have consistently conveyed to the United States that China is willing to be a friend and partner, not an adversary. The prevailing framing must be adjusted accordingly.
On this basis, the bilateral agenda should be reconstructed. Rather than focusing narrowly on competition, containment and confrontation, Washington should place priority on expanding areas of cooperation — economic and trade relations, diplomacy, security, cultural and people-to-people exchanges, science and technology — while continuing to manage differences, as in the past. Only by elevating cooperation to the forefront of the bilateral agenda can a reset of Chin-U.S. relations acquire substantive significance.
Huang Zhijin: Within such a cooperative agenda, what concrete areas of engagement might be pursued?
Wu Xinbo: The potential domains of cooperation are extensive. Drawing on the trajectory of bilateral relations over the past several decades, I would stress several key areas. Economically, both sides should seek to enlarge the overall pie, refrain from restrictive trade practices, avoid tariff wars, reject decoupling or so-called de-risking, encourage reciprocal investment and foster technological collaboration, including in financial services. On issues of regional stability and security, cooperation should be strengthened in managing pressing challenges, such as stability on the Korean Peninsula. In the domain of global governance, the two countries should work together to address public health challenges, drawing lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic. This is an area of particular importance.
Moreover, there is considerable scope for collaboration in responding to climate change, advancing artificial intelligence and developing clean-energy technologies, including partnerships between Chinese provincial-level administrative areas and U.S. states. In emerging fields such as AI, where both countries occupy positions of global leadership, China and the United States share a responsibility to jointly manage attendant security risks.
Huang Zhijin: You mentioned both technological cooperation and competition. Recently, President Trump has eased certain restrictions on the export of AI-related software and hardware and expanded cooperation with Chinese enterprises. Yet such measures seem to be the exception, given that technological competition is widely regarded as a long-term trend. How do you interpret the Trump 2.0 approach to technological competition with China?
Wu Xinbo: The Trump 2.0 administration’s approach to constraining China’s technological development may diverge in some respects from that of the Biden administration. The Biden team acted on the assumption that it could “outcompete” China, whereas the Trump team has begun to recognize that suppressing or obstructing China’s technological progress is ultimately futile. In particular, following the launch of China’s DeepSeek large-scale AI model, Washington has reexamined the effectiveness of its restrictive policies.
At the same time, the Trump administration views technological rivalry not solely as a contest for innovation leadership, but as a struggle for market dominance — both within China and globally. Only by securing markets can U.S. standards and products prevail, yielding profits that can be reinvested in research and development to maintain technological primacy and create a virtuous cycle. On this basis, Trump 2.0 may adjust some restrictive measures, though any adjustments will likely be limited. Internal divisions within the administration mean that a consensus has yet to emerge.
Huang Zhijin: According to Politico, the Pentagon’s forthcoming National Defense Strategy will prioritize the Western Hemisphere and the U.S. homeland, relegating challenges from China and Russia to a secondary tier. This would differ from the first Trump administration’s strategy, which placed “containing China” at the forefront. If accurate, what would this imply for America’s Indo-Pacific strategy and U.S. containment policy toward China?
Wu Xinbo: If the Trump 2.0 administration were to reorient its strategic focus toward the Western Hemisphere and the homeland, that would imply retrenchment not only from Europe and the Middle East but also, to some degree, from the Indo-Pacific. The Indo-Pacific Strategy, launched during Trump’s first term and sustained under Biden, consistently identified China as the principal strategic rival. Even before the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the Biden administration was concentrating resources on advancing this strategy.
Should the Pentagon indeed adjust its orientation, the Indo-Pacific Strategy may persist in name but would no longer target China with the same intensity. Nor would it concentrate comparable resources — including those of U.S. allies — on containment and deterrence. Such an adjustment would be conducive to improving China-U.S. relations and would carry positive implications for stability across the Asia–Pacific region.
Huang Zhijin: Within the Indo-Pacific, the situation across the Taiwan Strait remains the central concern. In view of current security risks, do you believe a second Trump administration might establish a new understanding with China on the Taiwan question, thereby stabilizing both bilateral relations and regional dynamics? For example, in recent years the United States has refrained from expressions such as “supporting the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait differences.” Should a new consensus emerge, what rhetorical or discursive innovations might be expected?
Wu Xinbo: In recent years, President Xi Jinping has consistently articulated China’s position on the Taiwan question to the Biden administration, emphasizing that the United States should support China’s peaceful reunification and cease selling arms to Taiwan. This remains China’s position toward any Trump administration as well: the United States should end arms sales to Taiwan and explicitly endorse China’s peaceful reunification. As I have indicated, this constitutes the new understanding that must be reached between China and the United States. The decisive factor is whether Trump is willing and able to commit to this course of action, which ultimately depends on his personal political resolve.
In terms of governing style, Trump has demonstrated an unconventional approach: Once he makes a decision, he is capable of transcending established constraints and undertaking major initiatives. This contrasts with Biden, who lacked the determination to implement bold measures. The key question is whether Trump can summon such resolve.
Huang Zhijin: Would Trump’s capacity to act also be conditioned by the influence of his advisers? How do you assess the internal factions within Trump 2.0, such as the MAGA-oriented “restrainers” and the China-focused “prioritizers”? For instance, on the Taiwan question, traditional conservatives like Secretary of State Marco Rubio might attempt to dissuade Trump. How do you evaluate the degree of resistance within his administration?
Wu Xinbo: The principal difference between Trump’s first and second terms lies in the presence of so-called “deep state” figures in the earlier period. These individuals constrained Trump and obstructed his agenda — John Bolton, for example, impeded progress in U.S.-North Korea relations, limiting Trump’s achievements. In his second term, however, Trump has shown that he learned from this experience, so loyalty and political obedience will be the primary criteria for appointments.
Rubio, in fact, belongs to the establishment — the “deep state” — rather than the anti-establishment camp. But for reasons of political ambition he would likely adjust and fulfill the tasks Trump assigns him. Whether in U.S.-Russia or U.S.-China policy, he will be required to act in accordance with Trump’s directives. While differences of opinion will inevitably persist within the administration, once Trump issues instructions the resistance will not be decisive.
In broader terms, U.S. policy toward China during the second Trump administration will be directed primarily by Trump himself. Nevertheless, in secondary domains, subordinates may act in accordance with their own policy preferences. For instance, during Trump’s first term, barriers to Sino-U.S. cultural and people-to-people exchanges were largely promoted by Mike Pompeo without Trump’s direct involvement. Similarly, at the outset of the second term, the removal from the State Department’s website of the statement “the United States does not support Taiwan independence” was almost certainly carried out without Trump’s knowledge. It’s one example of subordinate-level maneuvering. Such episodes are unavoidable, but in strategic terms Trump will remain the ultimate decision-maker.
Huang Zhijin: How do you evaluate other members of Trump’s current team, such as Vice President JD Vance, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, with respect to their roles in shaping U.S.-China relations? Should they be characterized as moderates, pragmatists or prioritizers? The conventional label of “hawks” appears increasingly anachronistic. Based on your observations over the past six months, how would you assess them?
Wu Xinbo: Vice President Vance belongs to the MAGA camp. He advocates an “America first” orientation, emphasizing the concentration of resources on domestic priorities. The TikTok issue, for example, was an area where Vance assumed a leading role within the Trump administration, seeking solutions consistent with Trump’s preferences. As a prioritizer, he does not advocate allocating disproportionate resources to confrontation with China, which contradicts the MAGA framework. By contrast, Rubio has argued for retrenchment away from the Middle East and Europe precisely to concentrate resources in the Indo-Pacific to counterbalance China.
Bessent currently directs U.S. economic and trade negotiations with China, and his approach differs markedly from that of Robert Lighthizer, who oversaw negotiations during Trump’s first term. First, whereas Lighthizer sought to advance a strategy of strategic decoupling from China, Bessent does not view this objective as either attainable or advantageous for the United States. Second, Lighthizer approached negotiations with a strong ideological bias against China’s economic system. He aimed to compel “structural reforms” that would fundamentally alter it. Bessent, by contrast, is less driven by systemic prejudice. He acknowledges that problems exist in bilateral economic relations but places greater emphasis on pragmatic dialogue and problem-solving. Third, Lighthizer viewed U.S.-China economic relations through a narrowly competitive lens, attempting to obstruct China’s progress in advanced manufacturing and technology to forestall its potential to surpass the United States.
Bessent, however, adopts a broader perspective: While addressing Washington’s specific trade concerns, he also recognizes the potential for cooperation in areas such as finance and the stabilization of the international financial system. These differences highlight a substantive divergence in orientation between the two negotiators.
U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer also participates in negotiations, though his role is secondary. Unlike Trump’s first term, when Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin was largely marginalized, the treasury secretary now occupies the leading position in economic and trade negotiations with China.
Huang Zhijin: Bessent has met with us four times in the past six months, exceeding the frequency of several of his predecessors. Would you categorize him as a moderate or a pragmatist? How does he differ from Commerce Secretary Lutnick, who frequently voices positions on technology controls against China?
Wu Xinbo: I would describe Bessent as a pragmatist in U.S.-China relations. Lutnick, by contrast, is best understood as a political loyalist to Trump. His primary concern lies in aligning with the president’s preferences, often tailoring his stance to accommodate Trump’s views. This differs from Peter Navarro, Trump’s longtime trade adviser, who remains an extreme hawk. Navarro consistently emphasized trade protectionism, economic nationalism and tariff wars. The so-called reciprocal tariffs were largely his design, which ultimately proved ineffective and compelled Trump to assign Bessent the task of repairing the situation.
From the outset, Bessent had not endorsed the reciprocal tariff strategy, being skeptical of its effectiveness. Navarro has not been entirely marginalized, however. While less visible in negotiations and public statements, he continues to serve as a potential instrument should Trump seek to adopt a more confrontational trade stance toward China or other countries.
Huang Zhijin: China and the United States are currently discussing the possibility of a leaders meeting during the forthcoming APEC Summit in South Korea. What substantive outcomes might result from such an encounter?
Wu Xinbo: I hope that in the economic domain, the tariff issue will be brought to an end through a phased resolution. The United States has been wrangling over the tariff issue for more than half a year, and extending the suspension announced in May by another 90 days is out of the question. The meeting must clarify the extent of tariff reductions — for instance, whether the 20 percent tariff on fentanyl-related products will be removed. At present, combined tariffs — including those imposed during Trump’s first term — stand at nearly 50 percent. If the United States seeks agreement, it must commit to lowering tariffs.
From China’s perspective, such unilateral tariffs lack reason and legitimacy and should be abolished. Yet Washington will not relinquish this bargaining tool easily; it will seek concessions. Nonetheless, tariff reductions, including on fentanyl-related products, appear unavoidable.
Beyond tariffs, other critical Chinese concerns must be addressed, particularly U.S. technology restrictions and the inclusion of more than 2,000 Chinese enterprises on the Entity List. These issues demand resolution. China cannot accept a situation in which U.S. concerns, such as TikTok, are prioritized while China’s are disregarded. Thus, meaningful progress must occur in easing U.S. technology sanctions and restrictions on Chinese investment.
On this basis, negotiations could also extend to U.S. demands, including increased Chinese imports of American soybeans, agricultural goods and Boeing aircraft, as well as increased openness in China’s service sector.
A leaders’ meeting would not be confined to economic issues alone, of course. It would address diplomacy, security, cultural and people-to-people exchanges and law enforcement cooperation. This includes whether new mechanisms for dialogue and consultation are established during Trump’s second term — restoring former arrangements or creating new ones. Consequently, the agenda is extensive, and the potential for consensus and mutual understanding is considerable, including, as previously noted, the Taiwan question.
