The durability of any China-UK rapprochement will depend not on diplomatic symbolism but on whether London is prepared to pursue pragmatic cooperation based on its own national interests.
British Prime Minister Keir Starmer's visit, from Jan 28 to 31, marks the first visit to China by a British prime minister since 2018.
After Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney visited Beijing a few weeks ago, Prime Minister Keir Starmer of the United Kingdom arrived in China— he first visit by a British prime minister since 2018. Against the backdrop of strained transatlantic relations and mounting domestic economic pressures, a key question arises: Is this visit merely a tactical one-off move or does it signal a longer-term recalibration of Britain’s China policy?
If one adopts an optimistic reading—given that Starmer stressed to the accompanying CEOs the need for a “comprehensive, consistent, stable, and strategic approach to China”—the obstacles facing the Starmer administration still deserve careful scrutiny. Foremost among them is the enduring constraint of the UK-US alliance. As a sobering reminder, U.S. President Donald Trump has already issued blunt warnings to Carney and escalated the rhetoric by threatening sweeping tariffs should Canada proceed with major trade arrangements with China.
Yet external pressure is only part of the challenge. Domestically, Starmer confronts entrenched political narratives that portray engagement with China as inherently risky. Some politicians have even claimed that approving China’s plan to build a large embassy complex in London would amount to allowing a “spy hub” to operate in the heart of the city, allegedly extending its reach across Europe. Such rhetoric reflects not only security anxieties, but also deeply rooted suspicions that complicate any attempt at pragmatic diplomacy.
At a more fundamental level, the real test for Starmer lies in whether Britain can reassess long-standing, often stereotyped perceptions of China—many of which stem from disinformation and politicized narratives or from alignment with U.S. strategic pressure. Without such a cognitive and policy recalibration, even well-intentioned diplomatic gestures risk becoming symbolic rather than transformative.
Looking back at the trajectory of China-UK relations, it is difficult to ignore how certain allegations have shaped British perceptions, particularly on so-called human rights issues. These include Britain’s endorsement of U.S. claims of “genocide” in Xinjiang and its repeated criticism of Hong Kong’s National Security Law.
On Xinjiang, the contrast in moral standards is striking. While Britain has shown notable restraint in addressing Israel’s actions in Gaza, it nevertheless passed parliamentary motions saying Xinjiang was in a site of genocide—despite the absence of independent, conclusive evidence. This disparity has fueled perceptions in China that human rights concerns are being selectively invoked for geopolitical purposes.
As for Hong Kong, predictions that the National Security Law would plunge the city into repression and decline have not materialized. Instead, public order in Hong Kong has been largely restored after years of unrest and the special administrative region continues to function as a major international financial center. The city has recorded a steady economic recovery, strong foreign investment inflows and consistently high rankings in global business and competitiveness indices. These developments invite reflection on whether some Western criticisms are driven less by concern for local well-being than by discomfort with Hong Kong’s continued success under Chinese sovereignty.
Technology policy presents another major stumbling block. In July 2020, the UK abruptly reversed its earlier position and banned telecom operators from purchasing new Huawei 5G equipment. It required the complete removal of existing equipment by 2027. This sudden policy U-turn severely undermined Chinese confidence in Britain’s market openness and regulatory stability—a clear turning point from the so-called Golden Era to a period of strategic chill. The broader crackdown on Chinese technology companies—often justified in the name of national security but without publicly available conclusive evidence—has reinforced perceptions of a political double standard.
These actions have raised doubts in Beijing about whether the UK can maintain a genuinely independent and predictable China policy. Notably, senior British figures themselves have acknowledged the external drivers behind these decisions. Former business secretary Vince Cable stated openly that the Huawei ban “had nothing to do with national security” but resulted from pressure from the United States. He added that British intelligence agencies had repeatedly told him there was no security risk.
A spokesperson for the prime minister, Boris Johnson also admitted that U.S. sanctions were the decisive factor behind the policy shift. Such admissions underscore the extent to which alliance politics, rather than domestic risk assessment, shaped Britain’s choices.
This brings us to the core strategic dilemma. Was the UK’s previous China policy shift a sovereign decision or an act of alignment within intensifying great-power competition? And if pressure from Washington resurfaces—especially under a Trump administration willing to weaponize tariffs—can Starmer realistically sustain a more balanced approach?
If Britain proves unable to adjust entrenched perceptions of China, and equally unable to withstand renewed external pressure, then this week’s visit may struggle to evolve into a durable policy reset. In that case, it would be seen less as the beginning of long-term engagement and more as a short-term response to economic necessity.
Against this backdrop, I maintain cautious optimism regarding the UK’s stated efforts to stabilize and improve China-UK relations. Ultimately, however, the Starmer government should be judged by its words and its deeds. Several indicators will be particularly telling: whether the approval for China’s new embassy in London can withstand judicial review; whether the economic and trade understandings reached during Starmer’s visit to China will be translated into concrete implementation; and whether the UK can maintain policy autonomy in the face of sustained pressure from the United States.
Ultimately, the durability of any China-UK rapprochement will depend not on diplomatic symbolism but on whether London is prepared to pursue pragmatic cooperation based on its own national interests—even when such choices require political courage at home and strategic autonomy abroad.
