The recent G7 and NATO summits suggest that Europe is seeking not only to retain the initiative in shaping regional security but also to play a more active role in building an improved international order. In doing so, it has absorbed elements of Donald Trump’s transactional diplomacy.

When a small state assumes the protection of a bigger ally under any circumstance, conflicts erupt. Will the U.S. and China learn from history?

Back-to-back China-Russia coordination is a response to the growing turbulence in the international system. While their strategic collaboration enhances bilateral strategic predictability, it also signifies that major-country competition is becoming more protracted and complex.

Middle powers on the continent have a real motivation to cooperate. Constrained by structural factors such as their defense systems, however, the so-called transatlantic shared heritage and the scale of the U.S. market, their cooperation is seen mostly in policy coordination and diplomatic statements.

Even as the United States attempts to nudge its allies toward taking a tougher line on China, Washington is increasingly seen as an unreliable partner. Its pressure no longer brings automatic alignment. Other Western nations are choosing their own course.

Whether assessing the prospects of the war in Ukraine or predicting the trajectory of relations between the United States and Russia, U.S. policy discussions have generally revealed a cautious, realistic tone: The war is unlikely to end quickly, and the rupture in the international order is widening.

Germany’s renewed engagement with China reflects deep shifts in the international system. As alliance cohesion weakens and multipolar trends advances, Berlin is exploring interest-based cooperation beyond traditional Western frameworks, signaling a broader transition from ideology-driven alliances toward pragmatic international partnerships.

Growing instability in the global order and rising uncertainty in relations with major powers are driving countries such as India, Canada, Brazil, and European states to deepen cooperation with one another. These middle powers are increasingly pursuing strategic partnerships, trade agreements, and supply-chain coordination to preserve autonomy and stability amid great-power rivalry.

Reaffirming legal limits is not an act of idealism. It is one of prudence. Strategic stability is not self-sustaining. It must be actively maintained. And in the nuclear age, maintenance begins not only with capability but with responsibility.

The durability of any China-UK rapprochement will depend not on diplomatic symbolism but on whether London is prepared to pursue pragmatic cooperation based on its own national interests.