Europe has not turned away from NATO; rather, it is using NATO as a foundation on which to weave an increasingly dense network of “minilateral” security arrangements. This network is both a product of the war in Ukraine and the reallocation of transatlantic responsibilities, and a continuation of Europe's longstanding tradition of security cooperation.
On October 2, defense ministers from the 10 member countries of the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) - the United Kingdom, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden - met at Keflavík Air Base in Iceland.
Viewed against the backdrop of Europe's evolving security landscape since the war in Ukraine began, the JEF is clearly focused on addressing hybrid threats on NATO's northern flank, with Russia as its primary security concern. It is fair to say that minilateralism is becoming an important means of strengthening security cooperation in Europe.
It is worth noting that the trend toward minilateralism in European security cooperation accelerated markedly after the 2014 Crimea crisis, with a growing focus on military defense, regional deterrence and rapid response.
During an academic visit to the United Kingdom in September 2026, I spoke with British security research institutions, government-affiliated analytical units and university scholars about the growing trend toward minilateralism in Europe's security architecture. In these discussions, British interlocutors repeatedly mentioned the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) and mission-specific multilateral arrangements such as the “Coalition of the Willing,” led by the United Kingdom and France. This suggests that Europe is turning to more flexible minilateral mechanisms to prepare for contingencies, both to address NATO's operational limitations in specific regions and on specific missions, and to fill gaps in foreign and security policy coordination between the United Kingdom and the European Union left by Brexit.
From Grand Coalitions to Smaller Groupings
In the interviews, some British scholars explicitly noted that European security cooperation is increasingly relying on minilateral and flexible multilateral arrangements. This shift is partly related to the EU's limitations in addressing high-intensity military and security issues. The EU can impose sanctions, establish funding mechanisms and support cooperation in the defense industry. But when it comes to more direct military and security matters, smaller groups of countries are often the ones able to act swiftly.
The advantage of minilateralism lies in the participating countries' broadly aligned threat perceptions, lower decision-making thresholds and greater operational flexibility, making it easier to organize a response quickly to a specific crisis. One scholar interviewed put it bluntly: if every action had to wait for all European countries to reach consensus, it would often be constrained by differences in domestic politics, fiscal pressures and policies toward Russia. By contrast, the Nordic and Baltic countries, together with the United Kingdom, can more readily cooperate in practical terms on deterrence, military assistance and regional defense, while building closer-knit networks of security cooperation.
NATO Has Not Been Weakened
Minilateral arrangements are not a substitute for NATO. On the contrary, several British interlocutors emphasized that NATO remains the central pillar of European security. The Joint Expeditionary Force is simply a flexible mechanism for cooperation. Its significance lies in enabling certain European countries, which have a stronger sense of security urgency and greater resources, to take the lead in developing a European-led capacity to respond to security challenges. Some British scholars also noted, however, that minilateral arrangements do not necessarily constitute fixed blocs; their membership may change with shifts in domestic politics and changes of government.
Another important factor behind the turn toward minilateralism is that the United States is redefining the division of security responsibilities between itself and Europe. The U.S. National Defense Strategy released in 2026 explicitly states that Europe should assume primary responsibility for its own conventional defense, while the United States provides “critical but more limited support.” This indicates that Washington's policy priority is not to withdraw from Europe, but to encourage Europe to shoulder greater responsibility for conventional defense in its own region while continuing to retain key strategic capabilities.
This rebalancing of responsibilities is also beginning to be reflected in reforms within NATO. Since 2026, NATO has adjusted its senior command appointments, with the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany and Poland taking on greater leadership responsibilities in the Joint Force Commands. All three four-star Joint Force Commands will be led by European allies. Meanwhile, the United States will retain the position of Supreme Allied Commander Europe, as well as key theater-level command roles for land, maritime and air forces.
A Shift in Europe's Thinking on Security Capabilities
European countries are paying increasing attention to their ability to sustain military operations, rather than simply the size of their defense budgets. British scholars point out that Europe's challenge is no longer just to increase military spending, to restore and expand arms production, particularly of ammunition, air defense systems and drones, as well as the industrial base needed to sustain a prolonged war.
NATO's latest policies reflect the same shift. In 2026, NATO made clear that increasing budgets alone was not enough; the key was to expand defense production capacity and ensure sustained supplies in peacetime, during crises and in conflict. At its Ankara summit, NATO announced more than $50 billion in new procurement, with a focus on long-range precision strike capabilities, air and missile defense, unmanned systems and intelligence capabilities.
Historically, minilateral arrangements are nothing new in European security. Since the emergence of the Westphalian system, European security has long been maintained through a balance of power, alliances and shifting combinations of states. The Congress of Vienna in 1815 and the subsequent Concert of Europe further established a tradition of a small number of major powers coordinating on key security issues. Today's minilateralism is certainly not a simple return to old-style balance-of-power politics, but its underlying logic has similarities: when faced with a common threat, countries with closely aligned interests and stronger capabilities often take the lead in forming cooperative arrangements.
In this sense, Europe has not turned away from NATO; rather, it is using NATO as a foundation on which to weave an increasingly dense network of minilateral security arrangements. This network is both a product of the war in Ukraine and the reallocation of transatlantic responsibilities, and a continuation of Europe's longstanding tradition of security cooperation. Its real significance is not that Europe intends to build a separate system from scratch, but that it is preparing for a security environment in which it can no longer count on the United States to underwrite its security.
