A window of opportunity is open to prevent slipping into a pattern of entrenched strategic competition — which is why the question matters now. Relations between China and Europe are moving from an era of sectoral competition to an era in which competition embraces the entire economic ecosystem.
During a series of workshops, forums and dialogues with European scholars in Stockholm and Brussels recently, I was struck by a strong sense of deja vu. Many of the discussions taking place within Europe’s strategic community today bear a remarkable resemblance to the debates that unfolded in Washington roughly a decade ago.
At that time, a growing consensus had emerged in the U.S. strategic community that decades of engagement with China had failed to achieve the intended objectives. The prevailing view shifted from engagement to competition, a transformation that ultimately became a major turning point in U.S. policy toward China.
Europe has not yet reached the same conclusion. Nevertheless, an increasing number of European policymakers and analysts are currently debating issues such as economic security, industrial resilience, strategic dependency, critical minerals, technological sovereignty and the so-called China shock. The focus of the discussion is no longer how to deepen cooperation with China but how to manage the risks associated with China.
This shift raises an important question: Are China-Europe relations approaching a tipping point of their own?
To be sure, Europe does not speak with a single voice on China. Different views coexist within the European policy community. Some emphasize economic security and strategic autonomy, arguing that security has become a precondition for openness. Others express growing concerns about China’s industrial policies, alleged overcapacity and the prospect of a new China shock, warning that Europe is facing mounting competitive pressures. Still others advocate moving beyond the narrative of systemic rivalry and call for a new framework of coexistence between China and Europe.
In other words, the debate in Europe these days is not about whether a particular China policy should be adjusted but rather how far such an adjustment should go.
At its core, Europe’s perception of China is undergoing three important changes:
First, China is increasingly viewed through a security lens. For a long time, China-Europe relations were primarily defined by economics. Even when disagreements arose, they largely revolved around trade, investment and market access. In recent years, however, Europe has increasingly approached China from a security mindset. Electric vehicles, artificial intelligence, critical minerals, data flows and digital infrastructure are all being framed in security terms.
This trend reflects a deeper dilemma within Europe. On one hand, European leaders continue to emphasize “de-risking” rather than decoupling, signaling that they do not seek a complete rupture with China. On the other hand, the expanding scope of economic security has drawn an ever-growing range of China-related issues into the realm of national security. As security considerations increasingly overshadow economic rationality and opportunities for cooperation, the risk is that de-risking could gradually evolve into broader economic disengagement if clear boundaries are not maintained.
Second, European concerns about China are shifting from individual industries to entire ecosystems. One of the most frequently mentioned words during my recent discussions in Europe was “systemic.” In the past, frictions were often concentrated in specific sectors, such as solar panels, electric vehicles or steel. Today, however, Europe is paying increasing attention to industrial ecosystems as a whole. Many European strategists no longer view supply chains, critical minerals, data governance, artificial intelligence and technology standards as isolated issues. Instead, they see them as interconnected components of a broader strategic system.
This evolution suggests that China-Europe relations are moving from an era of sectoral competition to an era of ecosystem competition. Europe is no longer viewing China merely as a competitor in particular industries. Increasingly, it sees China as a competitor across an integrated economic and technological ecosystem.
This shift is especially evident in the field of artificial intelligence. Europe is concerned about the market dominance of major U.S. technology companies, while also remaining cautious toward Chinese AI firms. Yet AI competition is fundamentally a kind of ecosystem competition, encompassing advanced chips, computing power, data, talent, capital, applications and governance frameworks. Although Europe possesses strengths in regulation and standard-setting, it lags significantly behind both China and the United States in areas such as foundation models, cloud services and capital markets.
This raises an important question: What exactly is the objective of Europe’s AI strategy? If Europe seeks to become a “third pole” in the global AI ecosystem while simultaneously maintaining strategic distance from both the United States and China, how can such an ambition realistically be achieved? That is the puzzle.
Third, Europe is redefining its international role. The conflict in Ukraine, Donald Trump’s return to the White House and intensifying global industrial competition have all pushed debates over European strategic autonomy into a new phase. Importantly, Trump’s impact on transatlantic relations extends far beyond his presidency. No matter who occupies the White House in the future, Europe is unlikely to return to the transatlantic relationship of a decade ago. Trends such as shifting burdens of security responsibility, the resurgence of industrial policy, intensifying technological competition and rising economic nationalism have all outgrown Trump. Together, they are reshaping Europe’s understanding of the United States and its own role within the wider world.
From a Chinese perspective, this means Europe is increasingly seeking to become a more independent strategic actor rather than simply a component of the broader Western bloc. This presents both opportunities and challenges. The opportunity lies in the possibility that a more autonomous Europe may enjoy greater flexibility in developing China-related policies that reflect European interests. The challenge is that a more autonomous Europe may also be more willing to defend its own economic and technological interests by adopting tougher positions on industrial policy, trade protection and technology regulation.
In other words, strategic autonomy does not automatically translate into a more China-friendly Europe. It does, however, mean that Europe’s choices and preferences are becoming increasingly important in shaping relations with China.
Does this mean that relations between China and Europe are destined to follow the same trajectory as relations between China and the United States? Not necessarily.
One of the most striking observations from these dialogues was that, despite growing concerns about China among many European scholars and policymakers, discussions about coexistence and cooperation remain very much alive. Whether through establishing crisis management mechanisms, promoting investment cooperation, strengthening coordination on AI governance or identifying areas of collaboration in climate change, energy transition, Middle East stability and Global South development, many participants were ultimately searching for a new framework for the stable coexistence of China and Europe. This stands in marked contrast to the consensus that gradually emerged in Washington a decade ago, where competition increasingly came to overshadow cooperation.
Most participants agreed that China and Europe have significant common interests. The real challenge is how to translate those interests into concrete action. To that end, several practical avenues deserve exploration. Rather than focusing on grand strategic visions, China and Europe could begin with specific projects, such as jointly supporting green energy and climate adaptation initiatives in developing countries. Rather than concentrating on the most politically sensitive issues, they could prioritize cooperation in less contentious areas, including AI safety governance, food security, public health and humanitarian assistance. Rather than waiting until crises emerge, they could establish more institutionalized working-level exchanges and crisis management mechanisms.
A decade ago, growing mistrust of each other’s strategic intentions gradually deepened between China and the United States. More and more economic issues were tied to security, while an increasing number of cooperative agendas became politicized. Over time, the logic of competition expanded and came to dominate the relationship. China-Europe relations have not reached that point. Yet some of the same warning signs are beginning to appear.
Rather than debating whether China-Europe relations have already entered an era of competition, a more important question is how to ensure that they do not follow the same path as China-U.S. relations. Europe is currently experiencing its own “China debate,” but it has not yet arrived at the conclusion that many in Washington reached a decade ago. That may well represent the greatest opportunity for China and Europe today. The issue is not whether differences exist between China and Europe. They clearly do. The more important question is whether both sides can strengthen communication mechanisms and build sufficient trust before crossing a tipping point, thereby keeping competition within manageable bounds.
If they fail in this, the current discussions about China shock, economic security and systemic rivalry may eventually harden into a new logic of strategic confrontation. But if they succeed, China-Europe relations may avoid slipping into a pattern of entrenched strategic competition. And that, ultimately, is why the question of whether China-Europe relations has reached a tipping point matters now.
(Li Jialin and Zhang Xueyu contributed to this article.)
