China-ASEAN relations are shaped by deep economic integration but also by territorial disputes, competitive pressures and persistent public unease toward Beijing. Building a more durable relationship will require greater strategic empathy from China, including more locally responsive economic engagement, a deeper understanding of ASEAN societies and more restrained diplomacy in managing regional tensions.
There is a tendency to reduce into simple caricatures the geopolitical leanings of ASEAN states. Indeed, the impression the average commentator forms of the region’s distribution of power inevitably reveals one’s undergirding presumptions about the Sino-American relationship, and how ASEAN is purportedly positioned between the two powers.
Those who are more concerned by China’s growing geopolitical heft would reference the South China Sea dispute, in positing that the region needs counterbalancing forces to check against the emerging powerhouse – be they the U.S., the EU, or the vestiges of multilateral institutions in an era where unilateralism evidently is on the rise. Those who have long been wary of Washington’s mercurial, mercenary tendencies would in turn point to the capriciousness of the Trump administration and posit that the region should pursue warmer ties with Beijing – to avail itself of the economic and investment opportunities that abound.
The trouble with such views is not so much that they are unequivocally false. It is that they comprise the exaggerated extrapolations from fragments of the bigger picture – one in which the interests of ASEAN states are not reducible to the whims of external powers, and where internal heterogeneity renders the region both more complex and autonomous than observers would often grant. In particular, in examining the China-ASEAN relationship, observers in Beijing would benefit from not taking the region’s apparent receptiveness towards Chinese presence for granted.
Dazzling Numbers
On surface, the numbers appear sanguinely impressive. ASEAN has been China’s trading partner since 2020, whilst China has been ASEAN’s top trading partner since 2009. Sino-ASEAN trade comprises around one-sixth of China’s total foreign trade value, surpassing USD 1 trillion in 2025. By the number of announced transactions, ASEAN became the top destination for Chinese manufacturing FDI in 2025, with a significant surge in capital flows routed through Singapore, Hong Kong, or directly into their end destinations.
In the 2026 State of Southeast Asia Survey by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Beijing (52%) pulled ahead of Washington (48%) – with the two oscillating over the past few years – to emerge narrowly as a relative “favourite” amongst the respondents, should they be asked to choose between the two countries. More potent backing for China appeared in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore, amongst a demographic comprising primary policy and intellectual elite. Independent of favourability, China was widely viewed as the most influential economic power (55.9%) and political-strategic power (40.0%) in the region.
Simmering Undercurrents
Yet such statistics must be read in conjunction with the underlying dynamics at play.
The foremost elephant in the room remains the territorial disputes that have sparked potent, emotive reactions from both the Chinese and select ASEAN populations. As observed by Kevin Li, my learned friend at the Asia Society Policy Institute, public opinion towards China varies across the board in the region, with populations in states locked in a “frontline” confrontation with Beijing over the South China Sea exhibiting more reserved attitudes than their counterparts that have managed to build stabilising architecture. Indeed, across both Vietnam and the Philippines, dubbed “Maritime Frontline States” in the South China Sea, China’s favourability declined across the board in the two decades between 2004 and 2024, particularly following the Huangyan Island/Scarborough Shoal standoff in 2012 and the 2014 China-Vietnam oil rig crisis respectively.
One can contest the conclusions apparently exhibited by such data through a multitude of lenses – positing that a more compressed timeframe (since 2012) ought to be used, which could show, in Vietnam’s case, a clear rebound; disputing the comprehensiveness of the “survey coverage” or arguing that factors other than the 2012 standoff and 2014 incident, such as domestic political shifts, contributed towards the cooling of attitudes towards China. Yet such questions do not detract from the broader picture – namely, concerns over a possible clash and overlapping territorial claims with China have prevented substantive improvements in perceptions of China, even despite the immense shared interests in trade and supply chain integration between Beijing, Hanoi, and Manila.
Elsewhere, select ASEAN producers are increasingly grappling with both the upsides and challenges posed by China’s technological and economic prowess. A prominent Indonesian businessman put it to me bluntly on my visit to Jakarta last year, “Your country’s goods are both high-quality and cheap. Our local producers are struggling to catch up – and losing out on market share.” Whilst consumers and secondary manufacturers leaning heavily into made-in-Chinese products have stood to gain from the intense “involution” in what McKinsey China Chairman Joe Ngai terms “the world’s toughest gym”, domestic firms are reeling from the vigorous and multi-dimensional competition posed by their Chinese counterparts.
A More Calibrated and Constructive Path Forward
There is a tendency to attribute intentionality and strategic acumen to China’s approach to ASEAN. The adoption of ambivalent positions vis-à-vis conflicting parties, such as Thailand and Cambodia, is portrayed to be its presenting itself as a “natural partner to both sides”. Other strategists dub Beijing as seeking to “divide and conquer” the various territorial claimants to the South China Sea, whilst perhaps overlooking the extent to which the Chinese government perceives itself to be – and is in fact – reactive, as opposed to proactive, to particular clashes and ruptures in the region. The ascription of power often comes with the presumption of intentionality, which – in my view – is overstated.
If anything, amongst Chinese policymakers, there is an overconcentration of intentionality across select domains where the potential upsides (or downsides) are most visceral – for instance, the offshoring and relocation of supply chains, via “chuhai”, from China to ASEAN, or the vocalisation of criticisms of what Beijing views to be infringements upon its territorial interests. On the flipside, the discontents amongst frustrated domestic producers, aspiring local enterprises eager to benefit from the technologies developed by their Chinese counterparts, or denizens wary of the displacement of local brands and goods by Chinese newcomers, are construed as secondary – or peripheral – to the China-ASEAN relationship.
This asymmetry in intentionality is regrettable. Indeed, a core part of the antidote to China and ASEAN’s tensions rests with the cultivation of strategic empathy. Here, China should and can take the lead.
Firstly, across the board, Chinese enterprises must come to grips and terms with the concerns of the wider populations at large. In lieu of completely outflanking and trouncing their peers – be it that it may that they do so fair-and-square – they should think carefully about how their “spoils” can be shared with the broader ecosystem. Granting majority shareholder-ship to local partners, acknowledging and embracing cultural customs and rituals, and scrutinising carefully the middlemen employed on the ground, would be useful heuristics. To shore up their reputation for the long haul, they must empower their local workers and provide meaningful channels for feedback collection and engagement. To see to such reforms, Beijing should explicitly empower the Ministry of Commerce with the mandate and powers to oversee – and discipline – businesses transgressing norms of decency, particularly in areas beyond the remit of well-formulated legislation.
Secondly, just as ASEAN leaders would benefit from understanding China’s intricate internal dynamics and political economy – with the 15th Five-Year Plan being a ripe starting-point – the Chinese state must cultivate a more nuanced understanding of the domestic, sub-national, and local politics of each of these ASEAN states. Such understanding should come through the deepening of academic, think-tank, and people-to-people exchanges, in a manner that does not trigger sensitivities concerning foreign interference – the key lies with respecting the diversity of thought of, and the right to disagree amongst, ASEAN populations. The recent controversy surrounding the movie “Dear You” – which I found a powerful, moving watch – epitomised not only the wariness of regional policy elite concerning the purported influence of Chinese “propaganda”, but also the need for the Chinese state to understand and treat better the root causes of such anxiety – even if it finds the underlying logic unagreeable.
Thirdly, the territorial clashes in the South China Sea are by no means intractable. The relatively pragmatic note sounded by Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Manila in late July, amidst a series of high-level meetings with his counterparts from ASEAN, India, and the U.S., spoke to Beijing’s attempt to prevent further escalation and spillovers arising from the Sino-Philippine clashes in the South China Sea. The Philippines president Bongbong Marcos’ recent remarks – on prospective joint development of the oilfields in the region – also embody his attempt to recalibrate relations amidst a persisting energy crisis triggered by Trump’s foolhardiness in the Middle East, and to set a floor to bilateral relations despite the bellicose exchanges between his Defense Minister and Beijing in recent months.
The path forward for more robust China-ASEAN relations is clear. We should not feel discouraged by the impediments discussed above. As a frequent traveler to ASEAN, I see much room for hope, in the strengthening ties between Chinese and ASEAN youth, the growing interest with regards to studying in each other’s universities, and the mutual recognition of the heterogeneity of both China and ASEAN alike.
So long as genuine respect is earned – as opposed to extracted – in the long run, it can and will outlive short-term transactions.
