Britain's new prime minister, Andy Burnham, inherits a markedly different relationship with China than the "Golden Era" of a decade ago. To navigate growing U.S.-China rivalry while advancing British interests, the UK should pursue pragmatic engagement with China alongside stronger institutional coordination, economic resilience, and strategic diversification.
On July 20th, 2026, the UK welcomed its seventh Prime Minister in a decade – Makerfield MP Andy Burnham, who succeeded his predecessor, Sir Keir Starmer, in both the premiership and as the Leader of the Labour Party.
Whilst much ink has been spilled on the apparent instability in British politics and the challenges that lie ahead for Burnham’s domestic agenda, much less has been said on his foreign policy. Indeed, some voices have swiftly observed that Burnham has “little foreign policy background” whilst contending with “daunting global challenges”.
One such challenge would be straddling the complex and discombobulating rift between China and the U.S. The first call to a foreign leader Burnham placed as Prime Minister – ahead of his key ministerial appointments – was to Donald Trump: a tentative indication that he understands the importance of optics for the optics-obsessed White House incumbent.
When it comes to China – a country with which the “Golden Era” of bilateral relations has long lapsed – the UK also needs a coherent and practicable doctrine. To his credit, Burnham has had his fair share of exposure to Chinese renewable energy, electric buses, and advanced manufacturing, during his tenure as mayor of Manchester, the second-largest city-regional economy in the country. Earlier this year, he also met with the Chinese Consul General Tang Rui.
Yet his critics would observe that governing a city is innately different from governing a country.
It is perhaps with this in mind that Burnham appointed former Labour leader and – more recently – climate champion Ed Miliband as his Foreign Secretary, and re-appointed former Trade Secretary Jonathan Reynolds to his old post, with additional responsibilities for science and technology.
Behind the scenes, two seasoned veterans have been reportedly advising Burnham on security and foreign policy – Lord Jim O’Neill, who coined the term “BRICS” and has called upon the West to abandon the “colonial mindset” in order to engage with the emerging Global South, and Jonathan Powell, a peace-brokering diplomat previously appointed by Starmer to serve as National Security Adviser, who has been retained for institutional knowledge and policy continuity.
The Golden Era, Ten Years On
In 2026, the Sino-British relationship looks starkly different from the exuberant “Golden Era” during the latter half of David Cameron and the early years of Theresa May’s premiership. The bonhomie and excitement over China’s prospects as Britain’s leading economic, trade, and financial partner – especially in the immediate aftermath of Brexit – have been greatly tempered, whilst the shifting sands in domestic politics in Britain had given rise to heightened securitisation and wariness towards China amongst the British public.
Weeks before his departure from No. 10, Starmer’s decision to nationalise the Chinese-owned British Steel was endorsed by Parliament – with the purported rationale being that such nationalisation was in line with the country’s economic security. Undergirding the decision was the concern that the Chinese ownership could potentially weaponise the strategic asset in extracting key concessions from London, as well as the untenable optics of apparent “weakness” on China.
One may note that Trump’s return has significantly buoyed China’s reputation in the UK; indeed, the most recent edition of the Pew Research pollsuggested that 37% of UK respondents have confidence in Xi “to do the right thing regarding world affairs”, as compared with only 26% for Trump. Yet “concerns” pertaining to ideological divergences, the UK’s national security (and fears of suspected espionage), and Beijing’s growing might on the global stage have remained salient – no less due to, perhaps, the well-established consensus in the intelligence establishment on China. Throw in the ongoing Russian war in Ukraine and the Sino-Russian partnership, and we have here a prohibitive mixture of fault lines precluding closer Sino-British rapport.
The compartmentalisation between the military-security and the economic-trade-climate portfolios that enabled the Golden Era is no more. The question is: what comes next?
Staying the Course with A Pro-Region Twist
Amongst the various subtle “resets” Starmer brought into No. 10, one key development concerned his approach to the Sino-American rivalry. Out of a sense of economic pragmatism, but also the desire to signal optionality and versatility to Washington, Starmer initiated a multi-pronged rapprochement process with China, which saw several high-level ministerial visits and a Xi-Starmer meeting in January this year. Coming from the less ideologically entrenched space of local governance – especially in the post-industrial North – Burnham would likely seek continuity in Starmer’s re-engagement policy. Radical deviations – in favour of increased or reduced engagement – remain unlikely in the short run.
With that said, Burnham may press Beijing for more substantive investments into the North of England, as well as Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland – all key linchpins of a drive towards more distributed growth beyond the London-Oxbridge triangle. Select “red lines” concerning strategic industries would of course be drawn, though on the fronts of renewable energy, automated and non-labour-intensive manufacturing (via robotics), and even public health and biopharmaceutical research, Burnham could well be positioning the “Rest” as a magnet for Chinese talents and capital. This could go hand-in-hand with the deepening of higher education institution and city-to-city partnerships – a reflection of Burnham’s modus operandi of leveraging universities as key anchors to his innovation and technology agenda in Manchester.
Such efforts would inevitably come with caveats. For one, the many promised partnerships and signed agreements between China and the UK must deliver credibly for the average British citizen, so as to gain genuine traction. Whilst Burnham benefits from the uncanny unpopularity of his predecessor and a wholly divided opposition, he could ill afford to make any missteps that could incur the wrath of the Labour backbench or draw the ire from the financial elite and technocratic establishment in the country. A China policy castigated as too “soft” and too concessionary could prove politically costly, and Burnham is no stranger to the mercurial nature of Labour Party politics.
Building British Resilience in the Sino-British Relationship
If Burnham is to truly derive meaningful gains from the UK’s bilateral relationship with China, it is imperative that he builds up the country’s innate wherewithal, bargaining capital, and literacy vis-à-vis the second largest economy in the world. A couple of suggestions follow:
Firstly, Burnham must ensure that his cabinet speaks with one voice on China. Establishing a China House attached to the Prime Minister’s Office tasked with coordinating analysis, intelligence, risk/opportunity assessments, and state visits across ministries and government-affiliated entities, could go a long way in streamlining the country’s liaison and engagement with China.
The China House would not have the authority to override individual ministers’ briefs – instead, its function is to draw upon experts from a range of sectors and disciplines, including business, investments, energy, security, history, but also AI, public health, nuclear non-proliferation, in order to present comprehensive and tenable advice for sitting ministers and senior civil servants to consider when making decisions on China. The China House should include at least some individuals who have real on-the-ground experience in East Asia, who can speak to the complex and dynamic reality unfolding in the region. Pontification from afar is tempting and easy yet also induces unproductive and siloed groupthink.
Secondly, Burnham should accelerate the UK’s diversification efforts by branching out to countries beyond the Sino-US binary and the relative “comfort zone” of the European Union. ASEAN, with a population of almost 700 million and an immensely young population, should be a top priority. Emerging markets in the Indian subcontinent, Central Asia, Africa, and Latin America can go a long way in addressing some of the UK’s import bottlenecks and vulnerabilities, as well as unleashing new demand for British services and (to a lesser extent) goods. Such engagements would also bolster London’s ability to bargain competitively with both Washington and Beijing – pushing back against some of their less-than-politically-palatable demands.
Finally, on China, this Labour administration must embody openness without naivete. An increase in trade, investment, and economic partnerships should not imply doing away with security and safeguard mechanisms altogether. It does mean ensuring that non-security voices are taken just as seriously as their security counterparts, and that the public is kept informed of the likely benefits and drawbacks, upsides and risks, of said projects.
Will Burnham succeed where his predecessor struggled – namely, in carving out a substantive China policy that can deliver for the British people, without giving into excess pressures by China-skeptical or China-affirmative dogmatists? Can the Labour administration take the Sino-British relationship forward, whilst navigating byzantine British domestic politics? Only time will tell.
