President Trump’s efforts to maintain stable U.S.-China relations face resistance from anti-China hawks within his own party. Despite positive developments from recent bilateral summits, disagreements over Taiwan, nuclear weapons, and China’s growing global influence raise questions about whether Trump can sustain his cooperative approach to Beijing.
President Trump seems committed to maintaining a stable, reasonably cooperative U.S. relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The cordial atmosphere during his September 2026 summit with PRC president Xi Jinping in Washington confirmed that intention. Indeed, this session appeared to be even more positive and less contentious than their May 2026 meeting in Beijing. At the May summit Xi admonished Trump not to let Washington’s support for Taiwan reach the point of causing serious disruption in the bilateral U.S.-PRC relationship.
Trump was able to de-fuse the incident, but Xi’s warning, hawkish voices in the United States contended, was ominous and confirmed the PRC’s ambition to be Washington’s principal geostrategic adversary. The Wall Street Journal’s editorial board and some of the Journal’s favorite China-bashing columnists did their best to create and hype an image of Xi attempting to intimidate Trump regarding Taiwan. Those analysts and other hawks especially criticized the U.S. president for his subsequent comment warning Taiwanese leaders not to pursue formal independence for the island.
Their efforts to foment bilateral tensions are faltering. At the September discussions, no pointed disagreements about Taiwan arose. Indeed, even during the prelude to the latest summit, evidence of deepening bilateral cooperation was pervasive with respect to Taiwan and other crucial issues.
However, hawks in the Republican Party, along with the GOP’s political and news media allies, are doing their utmost to sabotage the president’s policy of détente and foment a confrontation with Beijing. Indeed, some conservatives appeared resentful even about the pomp and ceremony that Trump displayed for his Chinese guest while hosting the September summit in Washington. Their substantive complaints about both meetings were far more caustic.
Several knowledgeable observers from across the political spectrum noted that, especially from a symbolic standpoint, the May summit had been a solid success for Xi. They concluded that China had established itself as a fully equal great power to the United States. That observation was certainly true, at least in terms of Beijing’s prestige and influence, if not quite yet in terms of military capabilities and the other core features of “hard power.” The September summit further consolidated American and global perceptions of China’s heightened status and position.
Those developments have utterly alarmed anti-PRC figures in the Republican Party and the conservative movement in general. Outspoken anti-China hawks in the United States especially fret that Trump is not sufficiently committed to a U.S. defense of Taiwan. John Bolton, who served as a U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations under President George W. Bush and was Trump’s National Security Advisor during his first term, has been especially vocal about that worry. In a September 24, 2025, op-ed in The Hill, Bolton made his concerns quite explicit. Pointing to a delay in the administration’s latest arms sale to Taipei, he asserted that “Taiwan has long feared Trump might trade away its interests in pursuing mega-trade arrangements with the Chinese communists. There is already ample evidence, beyond arms-supply issues, that he is going out of his way to placate Beijing.”
Other conservative hawks have weighed in with similar messages since then. Two authors of a March 25, 2026, Wall Street Journal column contended that the president’s “ambivalence on Taiwan” creates a “historic opportunity for China.” They also reported that Xi hoped “to lay the groundwork to realign U.S. policy on Taiwan.”
Despite the complaints and paranoia coming from China’s vehement adversaries in the United States, the two summits in 2026 merely confirm a long-developing global shift of power. In terms of economic, diplomatic, and strategic influence, the United States and the PRC have occupied a higher level than any other great power for years already. The foolish obsession of the U.S. foreign policy and media establishments with Russia and the alleged threat that it poses has unfortunately obscured the extent of China’s emergence for far too many observers.
China, not Russia, is now America’s true peer competitor. Consequently, frequent business-like summits between the leaders of the two leading global powers should be expected and welcomed. However, conservative hawks bitterly resist making any meaningful adjustment to U.S. foreign policy to accommodate China’s rise.
For example, they display a pronounced anti-PRC focus in their calls for a buildup or “modernization” of Washington’s nuclear arsenal. The animosity toward China among influential conservatives in Trump’s own party on this issue is especially worrisome. Sen. Tom Cotton (R-AR) seems even more worried about Beijing’s alleged ambitions with respect to nuclear weapons than he does about Moscow’s moves. Indeed, he states so explicitly: “China’s nuclear stockpile has surpassed 600 operational warheads as of mid-2024, and it remains on track to exceed 1,000 by 2030. This isn’t incremental modernization. This is a fundamental transformation from a minimal deterrent to strategic parity with America and Russia in both quality and quantity.”
The lack of treaty limits on the size of Beijing’s strategic arsenal is a legitimate concern. Any worthwhile replacement for the defunct New Start treaty needs to include China. But Cotton’s real focus has little to do with genuine strategic arms control. His goal is to justify an extensive increase in the U.S. nuclear arsenal under the label of “modernization.”
“To those who fear an arms race,” Cotton responds: “The race has already begun.” Indeed, he contends that China has been running it for more than a decade “while we sat on the sidelines. The question isn’t whether there will be competition in nuclear forces, but whether America will show up to compete.”
Such attitudes raise severe doubts about whether Trump’s conciliatory policy toward Beijing can last even throughout the remainder of his presidency. The prospects for continued détente are even dimmer once Trump leaves office—especially if his successor is a GOP anti-China hawk. Unfortunately, several of the most likely candidates for the Republican presidential nomination in 2028 warrant that label.
