Hai Boping, Guest Researcher, School of International Studies, Peking University
May 13, 2016
Differences over freedom of navigation mainly originate from different interpretations of UNCLOS. As China extends the reaches of its maritime power, the operational capability at sea of the PLA Navy may be constrained due to the question of EEZ jurisdiction, which will invite cooperation with the US at appropriate times. The two countries would benefit from developing a common language on freedom of navigation.
Wu Zhenglong, Senior Research Fellow, China Foundation for Int'l Studies
May 05, 2016
To advance its rebalancing strategy, the U.S. will continue to meddle in the South China Sea issue, using its political, diplomatic, public opinion and even military tools to challenge China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests to build obstacles to China’s development. But it will limit the scale and intensity of such actions to avoid upsetting well-established cooperation between the two countries on critical issues.
Rommel C. Banlaoi, Director, Center for Intelligence and National Security Studies
Mar 17, 2016
Despite some negative social costs, most Philippine presidential candidates welcome American presence in the country because it provides deterrence from China’s assertive actions in the South China Sea. But China is very wary of EDCA and the subsequent increase of U.S. military presence in the Philippines because of Beijing’s long-standing fear of American containment.
Tian Shichen, Founder & President, Global Governance Institution
Mar 17, 2016
The US promise of promoting peace and stability in the South China Sea may sound familiar to regional players as they have heard very same slogans many times in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria. All regional countries have to make concerted efforts to maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea.
Yin Chengde, Research Fellow, China Foundation for International Studies
Mar 07, 2016
For many years, United States military airplanes and ships have conducted close-in surveillance operations on China. Recently, with a more ostentatious move, a U.S. Navy vessel sailed within 12 nautical miles of the Zhongjian Island in China’s Xisha Archipelago in violation of Chinese sovereignty. The U.S. claimed that they will continue the practice in the future.
Stewart Taggart, Founder & Principal, Grenatec
Feb 22, 2016
Could the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) suffer collateral damage from China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea? In coming years, China must invest overseas to relieve growing internal economic imbalances and keep its populace employed to maintain political stability. This presents opportunities for borrowers and risks to China.
Richard Weitz, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute
Nov 13, 2015
Richard Weitz reviews the recent speech of U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter, who describes China’s potential to challenge the U.S.-built international order through its assertive stance in the South China Sea, and finds his approach sensible, given the mixed and fluid strategic relationship between the two countries.
Hu Bo, Director, the South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative
Nov 12, 2015
US naval actions in the South China Sea are about hegemony and power politics, a prevailing pursuit in the world in the 19th century, under the cloak of a 21st century pretense to safeguard freedom of navigation and international justice. The reality is: The US wants to check any expansion of Chinese power in the South China Sea.
Ma Shikun, Senior Journalist, the People’s Daily
Sep 07, 2015
Apart from meeting China’s own defense needs, the activity is also based on a 1987 request from the United Nations. By constructing civilian facilities on the islands and reefs in a transparent way, China is contributing to navigational safety and raising the level of maritime cooperation in the region.
Zhou Bo, Senior Fellow, Center for International Security and Strategy, Tsinghua University
Aug 20, 2015
Beyond search-and-rescue cooperation and crisis management, creating hotlines between China and the 10 ASEAN countries would carry a no less important symbolism: the consensus that the South China Sea issue is not an issue between them as a whole.