At the heart of the matter is a growing gap between Europe’s ability to control its own security and the pace of external change. The Ukraine crisis has reshaped Europe’s assumptions about war and peace. Its future comfort will depend on its ability to prevent crises even as it prepares to confront them.

Europe has not turned away from NATO; rather, it is using NATO as a foundation on which to weave an increasingly dense network of “minilateral” security arrangements. This network is both a product of the war in Ukraine and the reallocation of transatlantic responsibilities, and a continuation of Europe's longstanding tradition of security cooperation.

The United States needs to demonstrate solidarity with Japan as it faces concurrent challenges from China, Russia, and North Korea.

Revising Japan’s three non-nuclear principles would require far more than a simple adjustment to national security policy. It would concern Japan’s ultimate choice of national identity and could profoundly shape the future direction of the security architecture in Northeast Asia.

Over the past year, the war between Russia and Ukraine has evolved, extending into economic and social spheres and prompting a shift in the brokering of peace. This, in turn, has allowed strategic pressure to spill across theaters.

What the U.S. president needs is not another, more intense round of airstrikes but a cease-fire formula that every side can sell at home.

The focus of the Russia-Ukraine war is shifting from front-line engagements to deep-strike operations, while the central arena of competition is increasingly defined by each side’s capacity to sustain the war effort. In this evolving landscape, drones have emerged as a pivotal force.

The U.S.-Iran memorandum of understanding is only a political commitment and carries no legally binding force. What truly matters is whether the two sides can conclude a formal peace agreement within the 60-day negotiating period. Three formidable hurdles stand in the way.

Israel is using its wealth—accumulated through technology—to prop up a new vision of territory. But there’s a price to pay. Ultimately, land obsession is harder to remove than politicians expect. It resides not on maps, but in the deepest fissures of national memory.

Repeated U.S. military interventions and alignment with Israeli strategic priorities have eroded American credibility in the Middle East and weakened global confidence in U.S. leadership. The United States can restore its strategic influence only through diplomatic consistency, restraint, and a more independent regional policy.