As major powers intensify their efforts to secure critical minerals, a new wave of resource nationalism is sweeping the globe. Resource-rich countries are seeking to capitalize on the rivalries to capture more value from their mineral wealth as global mineral supply chains and value chains are reconfigured.
Amid profound changes in the international order and geopolitical landscape, competition between major powers across multiple fronts has become a defining feature of our times. As the world’s major powers seek to secure and compete for critical minerals, a new wave of resource nationalism is sweeping the globe. From Africa and Latin America to Central and Southeast Asia, many resource-rich countries are joining forces and introducing mineral export restrictions in coordinated waves. Their aim is to capture more value from their natural resources as global mineral supply chains and value chains are reconfigured, driving a structural shift away from the simple export of raw ores towards maximizing value across entire production chains.
The rapid development of advanced technologies—including artificial intelligence, those associated with the energy transition and the computing power industry—has sent demand for critical minerals soaring. It is estimated that global demand for key resources such as copper and lithium, particularly among major powers, will rise by 400 to 600 percent over the next decade.
These shifts in mineral supply and value chains are directly fueling a global wave of export restrictions on critical minerals. In Africa, 12 countries have introduced new regulations on mineral exports in quick succession. Zimbabwe signed a decree banning all forms of tungsten and antimony exports and announced that it will halt exports of lithium concentrates starting next year. Mozambique has introduced a new mining policy imposing a blanket ban on exports of unprocessed rare earths, lithium, tantalum and niobium. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, the world’s largest cobalt producer and second-largest copper producer, has imposed a strict ban on exports of cobalt and copper concentrates.
In Central Asia, Kazakhstan adopted a policy to end exports of unprocessed copper ore, warning that foreign-invested companies that do not undertake smelting and further processing locally risk being forced out of the market.
In Latin America, the Peruvian government has made local processing of mineral resources mandatory for foreign investors. Brazil has announced that exploration for strategically important resources must receive government authorization and remain under government supervision throughout the process, with companies prohibited from selling minerals without approval.
In Southeast Asia, Indonesia has maintained a comprehensive ban on nickel ore exports since 2020, requiring the ore to be processed domestically. In June this year, it further tightened export restrictions on three categories of strategic resources: palm oil, coal and ferroalloys. Vietnam has also introduced a new mineral export policy, strengthening strategic controls over 17 critical minerals, including tungsten, lithium and rare earths.
The current surge of mineral export restrictions is driven by different motivations and objectives than earlier waves of resource nationalism. Some resource-rich countries no longer place as much emphasis on national independence or decolonization. Instead, invoking “resource sovereignty,” they are capitalizing on major powers’ growing interest in and competition for critical minerals essential to high-tech industries, turning their mineral wealth into a geopolitical lever. They are using their favorable bargaining position to demand higher prices and impose a range of conditions, including local plant construction, domestic refining, local employment, technology transfer, capacity building, community contributions and environmental protection, all with the aim of maximizing the benefits derived from their minerals.
Consequently, while this latest wave of resource nationalism continues to employ familiar measures such as nationalization, semi-nationalization, partial nationalization and contract renegotiation, it also exhibits new characteristics, including a wider array of policy instruments, more forceful intervention, broader sectoral coverage and faster implementation.
First, they are tightening mining and export quotas and imposing quantitative ceilings. Indonesia has sharply cut its nickel mining quota from 379 million metric tons in 2025 to between 250 million and 270 million tons this year. To stem the decline in cobalt prices, the Democratic Republic of the Congo imposed an export cap of 96,600 tons of cobalt for this year and next.
Second, they are restricting export channels and introducing digital, network-based management of mineral resources. Under Indonesia’s new mining regulations, for example, exports of strategic resources such as titanium alloys must be handled exclusively through Danantara Indonesia, a government-designated state-owned enterprise. Congo has invested $180 million in establishing a national geological resources database to enable real-time monitoring and management of mineral resources across the country.
Third, they are shortening the time during which foreign mining concerns can operate, while diluting foreign ownership and increasing the share of mining interests held by domestic investors. Ghana has tightened its mining concession rules through new legislation, reducing the maximum term for mining leases granted to foreign investors from 30 years to 20 years. Mali has raised its domestic ownership requirement for mineral resource development projects from 20 to 35 percent.
Fourth, they are raising taxes and fees and imposing mandatory foreign-exchange retention requirements on export earnings. Congo has introduced new taxes on minerals including germanium, rhenium, selenium, tellurium and scandium, applying a valuation coefficient of 55 percent for tax assessment purposes. Ghana raised its gold mining and sustainability tax from 1 percent to 3 percent of corporate profits. Under new regulations in Bolivia, gold exporters must deposit at least 80 percent of their export earnings in domestic financial institutions, a measure intended to strengthen oversight of resource exports through mandatory foreign exchange retention.
Fifth, they are joining forces and coordinating collective action. In response to intensifyied competition by major powers for strategically important resources such as lithium and rare earths, Chile, Argentina, Peru and Bolivia decided to coordinate their efforts and establish a critical minerals alliance. In Africa, under the leadership of the African Union, resource ministers from countries on the continent are working to formulate rules governing the critical minerals industry and to advance coordinated policies to promote domestic processing and added value across the continent.
Sixth, they seek support from the United Nations to secure international legitimacy and moral backing for the transformation of mineral exports. Following concerted efforts, six countries—Zambia, Guinea, Zimbabwe, Madagascar and Nigeria and Indonesia—have been designated by the UN as priority beneficiaries. Through the establishment of mechanisms for mineral resource transformations and assistance, the initiative aims to strengthen domestic capacity in these countries for advanced mineral processing.
Faced with the new global wave of efforts to lock up mineral resources, major powers have not stood idly by. Instead, they have adopted a range of approaches to safeguard the security and stability of their critical mineral supply chains.
The United States, for example, is pursuing a global strategy to secure its access to critical minerals through a combination of coercion, inducements and alliance-building. In Latin America, Washington has pressed newly installed right-wing governments to abandon their left-wing predecessors’ policies of avoiding exclusive arrangements for critical minerals, and has sought to draw more countries into a U.S.-dominated “critical minerals supply chain alliance.”
In Africa, senior U.S. officials have stepped up contacts with and visits to resource-rich countries. They signed memorandums of understanding on critical minerals cooperation with Nigeria and other nations. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation plans to provide $500 million in financing for the Lobito Corridor, a railway project designed to facilitate the transport of critical minerals in Africa.
In Central Asia, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio led a large business delegation to Uzbekistan, seeking to forge “historic cooperation” ties with the five Central Asian countries on critical minerals, including rare earths, tungsten, uranium and copper.
In Southeast Asia, the United States signed a critical minerals cooperation agreement with Malaysia, while several American companies plan to expand rare-earth mining and processing operations in that country. In South Asia, Washington has moved assertively into Pakistan’s mineral development projects.
The European Union, unwilling to be left behind, is drawing on its geographical advantages and historical ties to pursue critical minerals cooperation, particularly with African countries. The European Investment Bank has begun talks with Congo and other countries on advancing such cooperation through public-private partnerships. In Vietnam, the European Union competes with the United States for access to critical minerals and has signed offtake and processing agreements with the country.
Amid this new global wave of resource nationalism, China is undertaking a nationwide mineral exploration drive, using new technologies to discover untapped deposits and reduce its dependence on imports of critical minerals.
At the same time, it is pursuing new forms of cooperation with resource-rich countries, working closely with enterprises to develop a new model of collaboration that encompasses mining, smelting, operations, management and services. By emphasizing capacity building through technology transfers and project-based training, China is seeking to forge critical minerals partnerships and help its partners turn their resource endowments into drivers of economic development.
In short, the development of advanced technologies and emerging industries has sent demand for critical minerals soaring, prompting a new awakening among resource-rich countries. Competition between major powers for these minerals has ushered in a new cycle of resource nationalism, using mineral resources as geopolitical tools. Politicization is becoming more pronounced. As global critical mineral supply and value chains undergo restructuring, resource-rich countries are seizing the opportunity to leverage the competition between major powers to swap access to their natural resources for advanced technologies. In doing so, they aim to build domestic industrial value chains and advance their strategic industrialization goals.
