The upcoming Xi-Trump summit could yield progress on trade, AI and other areas, but deeper tensions will remain. Its significance may ultimately lie in three areas: stabilization, substance and symbolism.
A U.S. military honor guard walk with a Chinese flag and U.S. flag after rehearsing for Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit next week with U.S. President Donald Trump at the White House in Washington, D.C., U.S., September 16, 2026. (REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst )
Chinese President Xi Jinping and U
Optimism abounds – though observers would be wise to note that developments in the Middle East, the growing odds that the Republican party would lose both the House (relatively likely) and Senate (less likely), and concerns from both the technocratic apparatuses in Beijing and Washington that the other is unwilling to “play ball” collectively render the seeming “truce” between the two parties an at-best transient and precarious freeze of their underlying conflicts. With talk of more stringent export controls, growing wariness over the state of the AI competition and the surge in Chinese open-weight models, and escalating domestic pressures – especially in DC – in favour of a more trenchant foreign policy stance, all is not well under the surface.
It is against this backdrop that the prospective meeting between the two leaders is due to occur; Xi purportedly shortened his visit to a one-day itinerary on September 24th, with the surfacing of unconfirmed reports suggesting that he would not attend the General Assembly in New York. Some have predicted that Xi would also be bringing a large business delegation – though judging from Beijing’s reticence to be perceived as excessively proximate to private entrepreneurs and capital, those who end up attending are likely to have been briefed on the need to strictly adhere to China’s overarching strategic principles in their negotiations with American counterparts.
Why Do Both Sides Want A Summit Now?
Both sides clearly would prefer to have a summit to not having one, though there is perhaps a slight asymmetry in urgency. As the mid-terms near, the U
On the other side of the Pacific, in the run-up to the 21st Party Congress, Beijing’s foremost priority is to preserve the tepid momentum in economic recovery. Whilst Chinese advanced manufacturing and artificial intelligence sectors have withstood with remarkable endurance the ongoing tumultuousness concerning supply chains, consumer sentiments remain hamstrung by the property sector’s sluggish recovery. Given this, a meeting with Trump is by no means necessary, but for perhaps the renewal of the moratorium on tariffs. In my view, the Chinese leadership does not expect a drastically productive summit and has hence placed less weight in the September meeting than its American leadership.
The fundamental, structural question that both sides’ senior policymakers are likely contemplating is this: to what extent can the apparently amiable relations between Trump and Xi be converted into concrete policy outcomes? There is perhaps only one way to find out – a meeting agenda designed by their advisors, building off and extending to policy discussions their enduring rapport.
Likely Agenda – A Few Predictions
A large variety of topics will likely be brought up between the two leaders – though in the absence of any specific. Trump is known to enjoy striking up conversations in accordance with his own cadence and preferred negotiating styles – in other words, deviating significantly from the lines-to-take on which he is briefed. Xi, on the other hand, may offer musings on issues ranging from the wars in Ukraine and Iran to the broader multi-polarisation of the world order. Yet we should conflate these disparate topics with the domains in which likely breakthroughs will occur.
The likeliest focal areas towards which the conversation may converge – on the second half of the day – comprise what I term the Three Ss: Stabilisation, Substance, and Symbolism.
Stabilisation is the fundamental crux. Both leaders are eager to affirm their long-standing “friendship” during Xi’s first visit to the U.S. since 2023 (San Francisco APEC). Their teams will be looking to formalise the slew of communicative channels from vice-national/senior cabinet secretary through to vice-ministerial/deputy and assistant secretary levels, focusing specifically on trade, commerce, defense, and energy as priority portfolios. All four areas are of significance to the American administration as it enters the second half of Trump’s presidency – securing trade surplus gains, contextually de-linking Chinese and American technologies in strategically sensitive domains, managing Chinese expectations (and ambitions) as the US further redeploys away from Asia, and, of course, identifying practicable solutions to bring down oil prices. For its part, Beijing is happy to keep communication channels open – both in convincing Trump’s inner circle of the value of continued dialogue and engagement, as well as gauging the U.S.’ inclinations and possible strategic shifts – if any – over Taiwan, South China Sea, and AI controls.
Substance would then follow from such stabilisation mechanisms. Xi will commit to continuously maintaining broadly open flows of rare earths and critical raw materials, in exchange for perhaps a more permanent commitment to lower tariffs and improved market access for Chinese firms in non-sensitive domains. Trump may press Xi to offer more purchases of American goods, whilst promising to take a laxer approach in enforcing export controls. The nitty-gritty will be left to the personnel currently spearheading the preliminary preparation for the proposed boards of investment and trade, despite persisting difficulties. Certain speculation has suggested that Trump is keen to lock in a historic – or near historic – “number” for the trade deals reached, which indirectly explains the raft of Chinese corporations present at the meeting. Yet he may find himself exasperated by the resultant trade deficit between the Chinese and American: the reality is, China is less reliant upon the U.S. for commercial aviation aircraft (e.g. Boeing), meat products (e.g. Beef), and agricultural products (e.g. Beans) – the “Three Bs” – than the U.S. is on China, vis-à-vis extremely affordable and domestically popular consumer goods and rare earths. This asymmetry is unlikely to be lost on Trump or Xi.
Finally, symbolic breakthroughs in areas of global governance, especially AI, could well be in the pipeline. Whilst competition continually intensifies on the frontier of AI development, Trump personally shares the Chinese state’s concerns over the perils of runaway AI and AI at the hands of powerful non-state actors. In contrast to the fervently “AI-pilled” nature of some of his industry-captured advisors, Trump is skeptical of the substantial influence amassed by dominant American AI corporations. With the sturdy technocrat Treasury Secretary Bessent and the seasoned politician Vice Premier He Lifeng at the helm of the bilateral AI safety talks, there exists some hope that a tentative agreement on guardrails can be reached – albeit with limited teeth and substance to follow.
Prognosis
Those who have followed my writings would know that I am a firm advocate of the adage “No expectations, no disappointment”. Yet the upcoming summit could well deliver surprising upsides in one way or another. Trump is keen to secure a publicly declarable “win”, whilst Xi would be looking to cash in on the goodwill accumulated over the past year of Sino-American détente, in securing gains on the front of global governance – a symbolic frame that he has embraced as China’s latest soft power push. In which domain, in whose favour, and in what form such breakthroughs arise, on the other hand, remain open questions to be answered.
