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Security

How Will NATO Manage Competing Priorities?

Aug 08, 2024
  • Sun Chenghao

    Fellow, Center for International Security and Strategy of Tsinghua University; Visiting Scholar, Paul Tsai China Center of Yale Law School
  • Jood Ghazwan Sharaf

    Ph.D. candidate of International Relations and Media Director of Tsinghua International Relations Review, Tsinghua University

NATO summit 2024.jpg

NATO’s 75th anniversary, preceding the summit held in Washington D.C. this year, marked the displacement of the Delian League of Greek city-states for the title of the longest-lasting alliance in history. In his speech on July 9, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg outlined NATO’s historical development, its clear purpose of preserving peace and safeguarding freedom and its enduring reputation as the most successful alliance in history.

Having grown from its 12 founding member countries to 32, with Sweden being the newest member and allies reaffirming their commitment to Ukraine’s accession, NATO’s continued expansion seems only a matter of time. Ukraine was a major focus during the summit, with U.S. President Joe Biden announcing plans for a partnership to supply five new strategic defense systems to the country.

Additionally, through the Washington Summit Declaration, NATO members reaffirmed the need for defense spending beyond 2 percent of GDP. Stoltenberg emphasized the shift by describing the 2 percent minimum defense spending as a floor rather than a ceiling for NATO’s deterrence capabilities.

The Washington Summit unveiled a crucial component for the future of NATO — the introduction of the Summit Defense Industry Forum, hosted by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. This forum aims to enhance crucial private-public partnerships to boost defense production and collaboration.

This could be a significant step in safeguarding the security of the alliance’s members. With NATO’s signing of a nearly $700 million contract for member countries to produce Stinger missiles, such partnerships could improve efficiency and strengthen the pillar of deterrence and defense. Nevertheless, caution is warranted to ensure that these commitments and developments do not shift the focus from security to business interests.

Stoltenberg’s statement that NATO’s success rests on “deliberate choices” and “difficult decisions” opens the door to future considerations regarding Europe’s security landscape. This includes potentially tying it to the Indo-Pacific region under the 2022 Strategic Concept and outlining the roles member states might play in shaping the alliance.

Given the upcoming elections in the United States and the resurgent right-wing populism looming over the summit’s proceedings, concerns about a potential victory by Donald Trump have risen to the forefront of considerations for the future of the alliance in Europe. Debates over how to make NATO “Trump-proof” have surged, and growing uncertainty among European allies is prompting them to explore potential arrangements to guarantee their own security should the situation on the Eastern front of the alliance shift.

Further, the growing interest of NATO’s members in the Indo-Pacific has heightened Europe’s sense of insecurity. In light of such developments, and against the backdrop of the Ukraine conflict, NATO will likely face increasing challenges as it tries to balance reassuring its European allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific with the perceived “systemic challenges to Euro-Atlantic security” posed by China as outlined in the Summit Declaration.

This year, Australia’s Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marls, Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, New Zealand’s Prime Minister Christopher Luxon and South Korea’s President Yoon Suk Yeol attended the summit. Strengthening dialogue with NATO’s Asia-Pacific partners to tackle cross-regional challenges was clearly outlined in the declaration. Yet, while linking security in the Indo-Pacific with Europe aims to promote security on an international stage, this approach could spark discourse among European allies about NATO’s priorities and involvement in areas of concern — the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait and North Korea.

Further, an increased NATO presence in the Indo-Pacific to reassure its partners might create antagonistic tensions with other regional actors — particularly China — potentially exacerbating global security challenges.

The feasibility of reassuring NATO’s partners without dragging European allies into tensions in the Indo-Pacific region remains unlikely. Linking Ukraine to the Indo-Pacific, especially the Taiwan question, will more likely increase tensions instead of solving existing ones. This raises questions about China’s role in NATO’s future strategy.

With the inclusion of China in the 2022 Strategic Concept, it seems the Washington summit has taken an even stronger stance against the country, indicating a future trajectory. China has been identified as a “decisive enabler of Russia’s war,” using coercive efforts to divide the NATO alliance and increasing the perceived threat posed by Russia to Euro-Atlantic security. Additionally, the Washington Declaration clearly calls upon China to undertake specific measures to adjust its conduct in international relations to diminish the alleged “systemic challenge” it poses to Euro-Atlantic security.

The implications for both China and the Indo-Pacific could be striking. The linkage of Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security, as well as Stoltenberg’s conflation of China, North Korea and Russia, may prove to be unrealistic and dangerous for international peace and security. The three countries differ vastly in military capabilities, economic situation and integration into the world economy, as well as in broader policy formulation and strategic realities — not to mention myriad domestic differences and the presence of multiple domestic factors that affect each country’s political circumstances and foreign policies. It would not only be a gross over-simplification but also a failed reflection of reality to lump these countries together and link them within the context of the Ukraine conflict.

NATO’s potential shift toward the Asia-Pacific or its increasing focus on the so-called China challenge will likely lead to a dispersion of the military organization’s global priorities. From the U.S. and European perspectives, and because of existing differences, the U.S. strategy to balance Europe with the Indo-Pacific may be unsustainable. NATO’s pivot to the Asia-Pacific would stimulate EU members’ desire for strategic autonomy, potentially leading to a new transatlantic division of labor centered on great power competition. Regionally, NATO’s pivot to the Asia-Pacific will complicate the regional security landscape, resulting in China facing an increasingly severe strategic environment.

Thus it is paramount, at a time of growing uncertainty for the future of international peace and security, to exercise caution to prevent the escalation of tensions in avoidable areas. The international community stands to benefit from an exploration of questions beyond conventional lines of discourse to broaden its perspectives on achieving peace and freedom and actively working to foster stability worldwide.

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