At the recent Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth pressed America’s Asian allies to spend 3.5% of their GDP on defense, fueling anxiety across the region and beyond. His brow-beating call to arms may well bring about a regional defense build-up on a scale unseen since the Cold War’s end.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is rapidly becoming an indispensable part of the military relationship between China and the United States, with both countries viewing it as a key factor in shaping the future balance of military power.

In recent years, Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) has re‑emerged as a central theme in artificial intelligence research and technology policy debates. In contrast to “narrow artificial intelligence” tailored for specific tasks or application scenarios, AGI is conventionally conceptualized as a general‑purpose intelligent system capable of cross‑domain learning, reasoning and adaptation. Its potential impacts are regarded as extending far beyond individual industries or technological spheres, and will profoundly reshape economic structures, social governance, and even international power configuration. For these reasons, AGI is no longer merely an engineering or academic problem, but has gradually evolved into a political‑economic issue of paramount strategic importance.

After years of observing U.S.-China dialogues on artificial intelligence, one pattern is hard to miss. The agenda has actually expanded over the past two years. From military AI to frontier model risks, from biosecurity to cybersecurity, the topics under discussion are not few. Disinformation, however, has barely entered the conversation, let alone become a subject of cooperation. In existing international discussions, it usually surfaces as accusation. I want to ask whether it can move from being a topic of accusation to being a problem the two countries handle together.

The recent Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore offered a window into the evolving realities of power in the Indo-Pacific. U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth’s address struck a notably more measured tone than his previous interventions. Gone were the sharper edges of 2025 rhetoric. In their place emerged a focus on securing a “favourable but durable balance of power,” preventing any single hegemon — implicitly China — from dominating the region. Allies were urged to shoulder greater burdens, with familiar calls for increased defence spending. Conspicuously absent was any direct reference to Taiwan.

The startling breakthrough moment in artificial intelligence and the commensurate concentration of power into the hands of a few tech giants may lead to an intensification of geopolitical competition. China is positioned to play a major constructive role for the well-being of humanity.

When it comes to the principle of multi-alignment – that is, the formation of non-binding yet effectual ties with a number of exogenous actors, including but not limited to great powers or regional blocs – ASEAN, the eleven-member bloc in Southeast Asia, is most definitely an astute exemplar.

The scale of U.S. military exercises continued to expand, mainly focusing on improving the combat capabilities of allies and partner countries and emphasizing strengthening military preparations and strategic deterrence for major power competition.

Israel is using its wealth—accumulated through technology—to prop up a new vision of territory. But there’s a price to pay. Ultimately, land obsession is harder to remove than politicians expect. It resides not on maps, but in the deepest fissures of national memory.

The region’s future will be shaped less by formal claims of presence than by the practical capacity to operate and govern in a difficult environment. It is moving into a more operational phase in which capability will become the currency of influence.