China and the United States should work to improve their crisis management mechanisms and to promote mutual trust and cooperation. In this way they can contribute to each other’s success, achieve common prosperity and bring benefits to themselves and the world.
(From left) Armenian Defence Minister Suren Papikyan, Cambodian Defence Minister Tea Seiha, Chinese Defence Minister Dong Jun, Vietnam’s Defence Minister General Phan Van Giang, and Azerbaijan's Defence Minister Zakir Hasanov attend Beijing Xiangshan Forum in Beijing, China on Sept 18, 2025.
At the 12th Beijing Xiangshan Forum held in September, the stability of ties between China and the United States — major countries with significant global influence in the cause of peace — was a topic of concern.
Some Chinese scholars pointed out that, though there has been no fundamental change in the core logic of the U.S., which emphasizes competing with China and containing it. Since Trump began his second term in January, Washington has gradually come to terms with China’s strategic resilience while increasing pressure on it, thereby transitioning from a phase of coercion to one of mutual compromise.
However, as such subjects as Taiwan and the South China Sea continue to ferment, exacerbated by insufficient strategic mutual confidence and risk of misjudgment brought by emerging technologies, potential points of conflict have been on the rise. As discussions at the forum indicate, building an effective crisis management regime and avoiding military conflict has become a pressing task in China-U.S. relations.
Historical experience in bilateral crisis management is a source of inspiration. The two sides have demonstrated a complex dynamic that includes collaborating while competing. For instance, at the beginning of the Korean War, owing to the absence of channels for direct communication, the U.S. seriously misjudged China’s determination to preserve its security. Despite repeated Chinese warnings against the crossing of the 38th Parallel by the American military, Washington saw these as bluffs. This resulted in what is now characterized as the U.S. fighting the wrong war at the wrong time in the wrong place.
In 1996, the visit of Taiwan leader Lee Teng-hui to the U.S. triggered a crisis in the Taiwan Strait, with China staging military drills to demonstrate its strong resolve to preserve national sovereignty and territorial integrity. The U.S. dispatched two aircraft carrier strike groups to waters off Taiwan. Although there was no direct conflict, the crisis exposed the risks of poor communication and misjudgment. NATO, led by the United States, bombed the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia in 1999, resulting in serious casualties and damage, which the U.S. initially said was “unintended.” The incident ignited extreme indignation in the Chinese public and ended in a U.S. apology and compensation, further highlighting the necessity of timely, direct dialogue. The mid-air collision of Chinese and U.S. military aircraft over Hainan island in 2001 was resolved through diplomacy, but the process was full of twists and turns, reflecting the lack of corresponding mechanisms for bilateral information exchange and risk management for maritime incidents.
All these crises had lasting negative effects on the China-U.S. relationship and revealed the importance of crisis management. Such management currently faces multiple challenges.
First, lack of strategic mutual confidence amplifies the risk of a crisis. The U.S. has named China as its foremost rival in strategic competition in recent years and constantly uses hostile rhetoric at home and internationally, which constricts the flexibility in decision making it might otherwise have in a crisis.
Cognitive differences over crisis management between China and the U.S. in turn have worsened the trust deficit. The U.S. usually emphasizes post-crisis management as it looks for excuses for its military provocations. While China stresses crisis prevention, asking the U.S. not to engage in provocation in the first place. Coping with a crisis after triggering it is not the best approach for Washington.
The negative influence of U.S. moves before, during and after the forum understandably reduced China’s strategic confidence. Before the forum, during a video call with Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth made the rare statement that the U.S. has no intention to confront China, nor does it seek regime change or suppression. Forum participant Chad L. Sbragia identified this as a “significant change.” Yet the US military was not restrained and immediately made a provocative move in the South China Sea.
Such contradictions between words and deeds can only feed China’s suspicions regarding the sincerity of U.S. policies. Moreover, the forum attracted more than 1,800 representatives from more than 100 countries, regions and international organizations, with more than 40 at or above the ministerial and chief-of-staff levels. Only the U.S. sent lower-ranking representatives. Such an intentional cold shoulder undermines the ability of the two major countries to increase strategic mutual trust.
Second, there are increasing risk points for crises. The Taiwan question is particularly sensitive, as it lies at the core of Chinese interests. To contain China, the U.S. regularly plays the Taiwan card as it seeks to enhance its collusion with the DPP party on the island. It routinely tramples on the “one China” redline. In the South China Sea, the U.S. continues to carry out so-called freedom of navigation operations. Close encounters between Chinese and U.S. naval and air forces have been frequent, which escalates the risk of an unexpected confrontation. Making matters worse, with America’s endorsement, countries such as the Philippines tend to become more radical, leading many analysts to worry they may even create friction great enough to drag the U.S. into a conflict with China .
In addition, AI technology, networks and outer space have become new frontiers in this major country rivalry, further intensifying the possibility of a clash. An accidental cyberattack or a collision of space assets could swiftly escalate into a confrontation between China and the United States.
Despite the various crisis management mechanisms already in place, their efficacy is constantly being put to the test. Bilateral mechanisms include the 1998 Military Maritime Consultative Agreement, the 2014 Memorandum of Understanding on Notification of Major Military Activities Confidence-Building Measures Mechanism the Memorandum of Understanding on the Rules of Behavior for the Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters and the hotline between defense authorities.
Other mechanisms, such as the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea and ASEAN-led dialogue mechanisms also involve China and the United States. But these mechanisms involve mostly tactical and technical levels and are subject to the political atmosphere.
Academics generally believe that effective crisis management includes four factors:
• First, clear signals to prevent ambiguous or contradictory information from leading to misjudgment;
• Second, smooth communication channels to ensure direct dialogue at high levels;
• Third, prevent nationalism from hijacking policy;
• Fourth, third-party players, such as multilateral platforms, including the UN, to provide room for mediation.
To enhance crisis management, China and the United States might want to consider making the following efforts:
First, raise communication efficacy to communicate clear messages. Maritime and aerial domain awareness could be upgraded to reduce misjudgment. A modern hotline system could be set up to avoid dependence on a single channel. Existing hotlines could be expanded to multiple levels, with a guarantee of smooth 24/7 communication.
Second, perfect crisis management mechanisms and rules. A crisis prevention framework could be built, with a crisis management working team. This team would focus on high-risk subjects, draw redlines and downgrade procedures, specify rules of conduct, compile crisis handling brochures and clarify code of conduct and telecommunications protocols.
Third, build strategic mutual confidence. Dialogue related to strategic stability and cooperation could be strengthened to accumulate mutual trust and create a better atmosphere for crisis management. For example, the Xiangshan Forum offers an important platform for China-U.S. security dialogue. The American side should take it seriously.
To sum up, through the Xiangshan Forum the Chinese side explicitly conveyed to the international community its global security outlook. True security derives from equal dialogue and inclusive cooperation, not confrontation and division. The forum itself is a vivid example of this idea. It provides a unique platform for dialogue between parties including those in conflict.
China and the United States should uphold the bottom line of no conflict and no confrontation, and the U.S. side in particular should calibrate its cognitive logic at the strategic level to avoid misunderstanding and misjudgment. So long as China and the U.S. meet each other halfway, tighten the safety valve of crisis management and advance mutual trust and cooperation, they surely can contribute to each other’s success, achieve common prosperity and bring benefits to themselves and the entire world.
