The Philippines is strengthening defense ties with the United States at a time of escalating US-China rivalry. Manila aims to mitigate power asymmetry, while China’s response to its maritime neighbor reflects a deep distrust of alliances and wary of invaders which came by sea.
Reflecting on the security concerns of parties to a dispute is a good starting point in understanding their actions or strategies in a flashpoint. Boiling tensions and dangerous incidents in hotspots like the South China Sea (SCS) are symptoms, not root causes. For both the Philippines and China, the sea has been a source of vulnerability, leading both to invest in upgrading their maritime capacity. However, the two neighbors hold different conceptions of security, likely owing to history and power asymmetry.
Sea as a source of risk
While the sea has been a passageway for commerce and people-to-people ties for centuries, it has also been a source of risk for the two Asian neighbors. Early Philippine polities like the Sultanate of Sulu have a strong seafaring tradition, with Sulu East King Paduka Pahala sailing across the South China Sea to visit the Ming Dynasty Yongle Emperor Zhu Di in 1417. Admiral Zheng He’s voyages (1405-1433) from Southeast Asia all the way to East Africa preceded Christopher Columbus’ “discovery” of the New World by almost a century and mark the zenith of Chinese shipbuilding and maritime expedition. These undertakings advanced exploration, commerce, and contacts with other kingdoms.
With China having a long coast and the Philippines being an archipelago, the sea exposed them to risks from foreign invaders who covet their market, resources, or strategic location. Whether for evangelizing or "civilianizing" missions, the pursuit of economic gain or war aims, external forces came by sea to fulfill their desires. In the case of the Philippines, the 1521 Battle of Mactan was one of the earliest clashes between indigenous Asians and European conquerors. Succeeding colonizers - the United States and Japan – also came by sea.
In China's case, Japan, Russia, and Western powers colonized and carved out spheres of influence and forced the weak Qing Dynasty to cede territories and enter into unequal treaties. Russia occupied Outer Manchuria (now the Russian Far East), and Japan obtained Taiwan and the Liaodong peninsula (now southern Liaoning). Japan would later take over Manchuria and attack much of eastern China. Shandong came under the influence of Germany. Hong Kong went to Britain, and Macau to Portugal. European powers, Japan, and the United States got concessions in Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangdong, and other areas, most of which were coastal, including key ports. This tragedy became part of China's "Century of Humiliation."
The Philippines' transition from internal security to external defense recognizes the need to secure the country's vast maritime domain, including the bounty derived from it. The country adopted a Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept aimed at having the wherewithal to protect the country's maritime zones, up to its 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and the airspace above it. The country is investing in modernizing its navy, air force, and coast guard, changing the longstanding privileged position enjoyed by the land-based army. Similarly, China's maritime underbelly led it to develop a strong navy and coast guard, which are now the world's biggest by fleet size. Furthermore, China has emerged as the world's largest trading and energy-importing nation, making a blue-water navy critical to securing sea lanes for its goods and fuel.
Resources or security?
For the Philippines, the West Philippine Sea is crucial for its energy security, as most of the country's oil and gas deposits are located offshore, west of Palawan. The country's biggest natural gas field, Malampaya, is located in this area. Manila is doing additional drilling to extend the productive life of the field that supplies about 20% of the energy requirement of Luzon, the country's largest and most populous island. The sea is also an important source of livelihood for Filipino fishers and contributes 7.2% of the country's fisheries production and 10.8% of food fish production. Hence, Chinese attempts to disrupt Manila's peaceful economic activities, including patrols and provision of supplies to fishers operating in these rich fishing grounds, invite vocal protests.
In China's case, the South China Sea is more of a security matter. Much of the country's massive oil and gas fields are located onshore, particularly in its central and northwestern regions. The explosion of aquaculture also reduced its reliance on wild capture fisheries. China is the world's largest aquaculture producer, and this sector accounts for 80% of the country's total fisheries production in 2022, and the trend is increasing. In the case of the Philippines, aquaculture's share is only at 53.1%, although the sector is also growing. Overfishing (classic case of tragedy of the commons), pollution, and climate change are encouraging the shift away from dwindling sea catch to a more steady harvest from aquaculture farms. Hence, competition for capture fisheries will be less of a driver for conflict in the contested sea going forward. However, offshore sea farming in overlapping maritime zones can create friction.
That resource motives are less of a factor for Beijing in the flashpoint made it amenable to joint development. However, this concept has become problematic for Manila due to legal and political constraints. In 2023, the country's Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional a joint exploration undertaking between the national oil companies of the Philippines, China, and Vietnam in 2005. Instead of resources, China is likely more concerned about its maritime exposure. U.S. freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) that test its excessive claims, air and sea reconnaissance (e.g., 2001 Hainan Island incident), a rival's control over critical chokepoints like the Malacca Strait, and submarines carrying conventional or nuclear warheads lurking in the depths of the disputed sea present serious challenges.
Collective versus indivisible security
With a weaker military, traditionally preoccupied with counterinsurgency, the Philippines values the importance of alliances and security partnerships. The 1951 Philippines-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) and the presence of U.S. military bases until 1991 were vital to Manila's external defense since the early years of postwar independence. The country is a key piece in the so-called First Island Chain, a network of U.S. allies that runs from Japan to South Korea to the Philippines. The MDT was reinforced by the 1999 Visiting Force Agreement (VFA) and the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). It entered into a similar VFA with Australia in 2012 and signed a similar deal with New Zealand last April. The country is in talks with Canada and France for a similar arrangement. A Reciprocal Access Agreement with Japan came into effect this September.
Aside from deepening defense ties with the U.S., Manila is also receptive to U.S.-led security multilaterals like the so-called SQUAD (U.S., Japan, Australia, Philippines) and the Philippines-Japan-U.S. trilateral. The country is growing its security partners to include European countries from France, the United Kingdom, and Germany to Sweden, Lithuania, and even Ukraine. Given its asymmetry vis-à-vis China, Manila feels it is important to enlist more able allies and partners invested in its security and supportive of its legal and diplomatic position in the SCS hotspot.
China, on the other hand, is critical of alliances and security blocs, seeing them as targeting a third party. This is rooted in history. An Eight-Nation Alliance composed of Austria-Hungary, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, and the U.S. invaded northern China in 1900 to suppress the Boxer Rebellion. While the original mission was to relieve the siege of foreign legations and protect aliens and their interests in China, the multinational force also got involved in looting, pillaging, and brutalizing civilians. Fast forward to the end of the Chinese Civil War, and the network of U.S. forward bases in the First Island Chain was regarded as part of America's containment policy. Such bases were sustained well after the Cold War. Beijing is opposed to the formation of an Asian NATO. Instead of Western-style collective security, China promotes indivisible security in regional organizations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which recently met in Tianjin. Beijing is also critical of other less formal security minilaterals like QUAD and AUKUS, seeing them as directed against her.
Beijing has long been wary of great powers and their interests, from Moscow to Washington. Despite being in the same ideological camp, China did not want to be a Soviet satellite like Eastern European countries, indigenizing communism to suit its peculiar conditions. The Sino-Soviet split led to a major schism in the international communist community. The two sides engaged in border hostilities in 1969 and almost came to a full-blown war. China's openness to a rapprochement with the U.S. was motivated by this desire to counter Moscow.
NATO enlargement, despite the dissolution of the U.S.USSR, and U.S. hub-and-spoke alliances in Asia-Pacific, has a profound influence on the Chinese security calculus. It reinforced the notion of U.S. intent to suppress and bottle China in its near seas, as well as threaten its energy and trade security through control of critical bottlenecks like the Malacca Strait. This pressure in the east is one impetus behind the Belt and Road Initiative, which generally follows a westward direction through land and maritime corridors. Roads, railways, ports, and pipelines to Central and South Asia, Eurasia, and Southeast Asia can help China bypass a possible U.S. maritime blockade.
From this angle, China views the deepening of the Philippines-U.S. alliance with concern. Given its neighbor's strategic location, expanded U.S. military access can bear on two flashpoints – the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. Expanded U.S. military presence, drills, and missile deployment in northern Luzon and Batanes were seen through the lens of Taiwan contingency and not the SCS. The installation of Typhon's mid-range capability, which can hit targets in Mainland China, drew a sharp reaction. China replied by launching an intercontinental ballistic missile across the Pacific, its first test in 44 years. The proximity of the debris fallout from its Long March 12 rocket launch to the shores of Palawan last August can also be seen as another show of force. Recent events in Scarborough and Second Thomas Shoals indicate that Beijing is intensifying pressure against Manila in the west and now in the north as well (i.e., China Coast Guard patrols off Batanes) to deter it from linking arms with Washington and Taipei.
For the Philippines, defense treaties and agreements can help modernize its military and enhance interoperability with allies and partners to respond to regional contingencies. This growing web of security partnerships also mitigates the power asymmetry with China, SCS’ biggest claimant. Manila will not have to face an existential challenge alone. However, for China, the intervention of external parties, especially rivals that are non-claimants in the intractable maritime row, only complicates the situation. Providing access and stepping up joint military exercises and sails with foreign navies also rekindles China's contempt for outside powers and their agendas. Beijing is also wary of possible Philippine involvement in a cross-Strait conflict and Manila's alignment with Washington to frustrate its national reunification.
*This piece is based on the author's remarks delivered during the Symposium on "Philippines-China Relations at 50: Questions, Answers and Ways Forward" organized by the Ateneo de Manila University Dr. Rosita G. Leong School of Social Sciences Chinese Studies Program, Ricardo Leong Center for Chinese Studies, Ricardo Leong Institute for Global and Area Studies, and Department of Development Studies held on September 10.
