An extreme imbalance of power appears likely to emerge in the future. Donald Trump’s personal attitude will be a critical factor influencing the sensitive political dynamics of the island, and doubts about the reliability of U.S. support will continue to grow.
U.S. President Donald Trump and Taiwan's leader Lai Ching-te. (Source photos by Reuters)
Under Trump 2.0 and guided by the “America first” doctrine, the underlying logic of America’s Taiwan policy has become increasingly transactional. It treats Taiwan as a pawn in a geopolitical chess game.
Meanwhile, the island’s Democratic Progressive Party, led by William Lai, clings to the misguided notion of leveraging the United States to serve its political agenda. It has become more blatant in its unscrupulous fawning toward the U.S. and selling out Taiwan. This is self-defeating and has led to six changes in Taiwan authorities’ relations with the U.S.:
I. Existing cooperation mechanisms between the United States and Taiwan face challenges.
Under former U.S. President Joe Biden, America sought to accelerate its strategic competition with China by vigorously expanding economic, trade and technological ties with Taiwan. As an anti-establishment president, Donald Trump adopted a utilitarian attitude toward cooperation mechanisms, which has weakened or even hollowed-out these institutionalized mechanisms. Although the first round of agreements under the Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade has taken effect, it remains uncertain whether and how these agreements will be implemented. The prospects for negotiations are unclear.
II. Taiwan must make major concessions and tradeoffs.
Before and since taking office, Trump has repeatedly accused Taiwan of “stealing” the U.S. chip business and has explicitly demanded that it should buy more American goods. For the DPP, the challenges are twofold. First, Taiwan runs substantial trade surplus with the U.S., and it bears much of the brunt of the Trump administration’s trade war. Second, companies in Taiwan such as TSMC are being heavily pressured by Washington to accelerate or expand their investments in the United States. They have pledged to relocate more advanced manufacturing processes or R&D operations to the U.S.
III. The “Democratic value alliance” narrative no longer holds.
The Biden administration framed great-power competition through a “democracy vs. authoritarianism” narrative, and repeatedly invited DPP leaders to participate in a “democracy summit” — a sort of ideological collusion. By contrast, Trump prioritizes concrete interests over ideology. Although he views the Taiwan card as a crucial tool for containing China, he and his team generally take an interest-oriented approach, focusing on tradeoffs, and treating security commitments more as fungible “goods.” Trump has barely alluded to democratic values or used the notion of a democratic values alliance to underpin the U.S. narrative.
IV. U.S. has reduced military aid to Taiwan while requiring a higher “protection fee.”
The United States is increasing Taiwan’s “protection fee” while reducing arms shipments. Sending weapons to Taiwan had once been a key piece of evidence the DPP authorities used to flaunt their supposed strong military ties with America. Trump has treated the sized of Taiwan’s protection fee as a gauge of relations with the United States. DPP authorities have offered a record-breaking $10 billion to purchase a list of arms, which means that over the next four years, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan will hit new highs both in terms of quantity and variety, and more of the island’s resources will be devoted to paying the protection fee to the U.S.
V. Cooperation between the United States and Taiwan in the international domain is unclear.
Unlike the Biden administration, which was committed to aiding Taiwan to expand its “international space,” Trump 2.0 is less favorable to the DPP’s attempt to galvanize U.S. support in this regard.
First, the U.S. has reduced support to the DPP authorities. Following the streamlining of USAID, the U.S. has backed away from its support of separatists, so it’s hard to say how cooperation might evolve.
Second, the U.S.-Taiwan Global Cooperation and Training Facility has been losing momentum. During Biden’s tenure, the GCTF had become an important platform and channel for Taiwan to expand its international activities. Japan and Australia officially joined the GCTF, and Sweden, the UK and the Czech Republic all hosted GCTF-related events. Since Trump’s return to office, GCTF activities have basically been led and publicized by DPP authorities.
Third, America’s withdrawal from international organizations has also tamped down its support for the Taiwan authorities. Because of the Trump team’s neglect of international organizations, the U.S. has to some extent diluted the effect of its professed support for Taiwan. As soon as Trump took office, he announced America’s withdrawal from the World Health Organization, but counter-intuitively he still acknowledged Taiwan at the WHO executive board meeting. The negative attitude of the United States toward some international organizations in terms of funding resources and personnel arrangements has resulted in the de facto participation Taiwan in some organizations.
VI. The United States is back to “strategic ambiguity” on Taiwan.
Under the Biden administration, pro-Taiwan voices in the United States have increasingly called for the adjustment — or even termination — of the policy of strategic ambiguity. Biden himself repeatedly made verbal slips regarding Taiwan, which drew much scrutiny. President Trump has directly criticized Biden’s “defense of Taiwan” remarks as foolish, emphasizing the need to maintain unpredictability in U.S. policy. Regrettably, the DPP authorities in Taiwan continue to adhere to the strategy of relying on the United States for independence. They cling to the illusory promise of U.S. support.
Guided by “America first,” Trump and his team have intensified their transactional interactions with Taiwan, leading to significant changes in the six key aspects of relations outlined above. These changes foreshadow an extreme imbalance of power between the two sides in the future, particularly in areas such as economics and trade, politics, the military and culture. Although the pro-Taiwan faction in the U.S. has maintained a consistent stance, Trump’s personal attitude will be a critical factor influencing the sensitive political dynamics of the island. Doubts about the reliability of U.S. support will continue to grow within Taiwan society, and the uncertainty surrounding U.S.-Taiwan relations will persist. Consequently, the DPP’s strategy of relying on the U.S. as it seeks independence is likely to face increasingly severe challenges.
