Recent developments warrant a senior China-U.S. dialogue regarding Afghanistan, beginning with the upcoming meeting between the Chinese and U.S. presidents in Seoul.
Acting Foreign Minister of Afghanistan Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi (3-R) meets with Chinese officials in Kabul, Afghanistan, 20 August 2025.
From the perspectives of Beijing, Washington, and other governments, the international relations of Afghanistan are heating up. Afghan and Pakistani forces have engaged in their deadliest border clashes in years, while Chinese, Russian, and Indian national security managers are cultivating closer ties with the Afghan Taliban. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump’s demand for the Bagram Air Base has spurred resistance in China and other neighboring countries. Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping should discuss these Afghan-related regional security issues at their planned meeting at the upcoming Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Seoul.
Pakistani leaders have experienced a severe case of buyer’s remorse for giving birth to the Afghan Taliban in the 1990s and for supporting the movement for decades before the group reestablished its Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The Pakistani government now accuses the group of assisting the “Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan” (aka the “Pakistani Taliban” or TTP) and other anti-Islamabad terrorist groups. Thanks to the overlapping ethnic and tribal communities that straddle their frontier, the TPP has sustained a large insurgency along the Afghan-Pakistan border for decades. Thousands of Pakistanis, mostly members of the security forces, died last year from such violence. Pakistan’s defense minister has called Afghanistan an “enemy country.”
Islamabad also worries about India’s warming ties with the Afghan Taliban. This month, the group’s “Foreign Minister,” Amir Khan Muttaqi, became the first senior Afghan leader to visit India since the Taliban returned to power. New Delhi subsequently upgraded its representation in Kabul to that of a full embassy. Furthermore, India continues to provide substantial humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, partly to curry favor with Afghans and the larger international community. Another Indian goal is to increase investment in Afghanistan and construct north-south commercial corridors to Central Asia when the regional economic and security environment improves.
Despite diverging values regarding gender, religion, and democracy, Indian officials have concluded that the Taliban regime has strived to prevent attacks from Afghanistan’s territory by al-Qaeda and other transnational terrorist groups against Indian targets. New Delhi is leveraging Afghan-Pakistani hostility to distract and debilitate its arch-adversary, Pakistan.
The Chinese government has cautiously engaged the new Taliban regime. PRC representatives have maintained channels of communication with the Taliban since the 2010s. Furthermore, China became the first country to exchange ambassadors with the Taliban in 2023. For more than a decade, PRC firms have invested in projects to develop Afghanistan’s natural resources. After returning to power, the Afghan Taliban envisaged China as its most important commercial partner. However, Afghanistan’s security problems, inexperienced management, widespread poverty, and international sanctions have stymied Chinese aspirations to expand economic ties with Afghanistan.
Beijing has tried to induce the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani government to resolve their differences, which endanger China’s economic and security interests with both countries. Their tensions have prevented the PRC from using Pakistan as an intermediary to influence the Afghan Taliban’s internal and external policies. PCR officials have had more success in securing Taliban pledges not to support international terrorist groups that might attack targets inside China.
Trump’s demand that the Afghan Taliban allow the Pentagon to reestablish control over the Bagram Air Base near Kabul has now reawakened PRC concerns about U.S. military encirclement encompassing China’s western borders. During his visit to the United Kingdom, Trump told the media that “one of the reasons we want the base is, as you know, it’s an hour away from where China makes its nuclear weapons.” Though the actual flight time between the base and China’s nuclear facilities in Xinjiang is longer, competition with China was clearly on Trump’s mind.
Contributors to China-US Focus have commented on the base’s prime location for monitoring security developments in western China, compelling Beijing and other potential U.S. adversaries to divert resources to securing their Afghan-facing frontiers, complicating Chinese and Russian aspirations to cultivate ties with the Taliban regime, accessing Afghanistan’s critical minerals, and enhancing the U.S. capacity to counter regional terrorist movements. However, these analysts have noted the diplomatic, logistical, and other difficulties the United States would face in trying to regain control of Bagram in the near term.
Though some analysts have advocated that Washington work with anti-Taliban Afghan resistance movements to circumvent these difficulties, the U.S. intelligence community assesses that “The Taliban almost certainly will remain firmly in control of Afghanistan during the next year.” An additional drawback is that focusing on Afghanistan would detract U.S. attention and resources from the more important challenge of managing Sino-U.S. relations in the Indo-Pacific region.
Both Beijing and Washington have found it challenging to influence the Taliban’s behavior through diplomatic enticements, economic inducements, or other policy instruments. Their means of resolving Afghan-Pakistan tensions are also limited. Nevertheless, the security, economic, and humanitarian environment in Afghanistan presents persistent challenges to both countries. The potential for mass migration, widespread famine, and renewed civil strife among armed militants could widen the operational space for regional terrorist groups. Additionally, these conditions could lead some of Afghanistan’s neighbors to promote local proxies or use their national militaries, to the detriment of the Afghan people and others.
China and the United States have cooperated on some Afghan issues in the past. For example, a decade ago, they jointly trained diplomats from the previous Afghan government. They could potentially cooperate on Afghan-related questions in the future. As a first step, they could resolve their differences in the UN Security Council on the mandate of a new UN Special Envoy to the country. They could also help the governments of Afghanistan and their neighbors to manage their transboundary water disputes.
At the upcoming APEC summit and other engagements, Chinese and U.S. officials should elevate their dialogue on these issues even as they address the important questions of export controls, trade and tariffs, and the Ukraine, Iran, and Korea files.
