In the waning days of 2025, the United States unveiled its National Security Strategy (NSS), a document that reads less like a blueprint for global dominance and more like the confessions of a fading hegemon. Penned in the shadow of economic strains, industrial atrophy, and military overstretch, the NSS trumpets “America First” while subtly shifting the burdens of empire onto allies. Far from signaling a retreat from global ambitions, it represents a tactical pivot: maintaining U.S. primacy by outsourcing responsibility and risk to partners, particularly in Asia. This approach, however, sows seeds of doubt among key allies like Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, who are increasingly questioning Washington’s reliability as a defense partner. As raw material constraints expose the limits of U.S. power, these nations have little choice but to hedge their bets, diplomatically and militarily.
At its core, the NSS is a masterclass in affective politics, designed to rally domestic audiences with promises of renewed strength and sovereignty. It decries post-Cold War “globalism” for hollowing out America’s middle class and industrial base, while pledging to restore economic dominance, military lethality, and cultural confidence (NSS, pp. 1-4). Yet beneath the bravado lies a sobering acknowledgment of decline: the U.S. can no longer afford to shoulder endless global burdens alone. The strategy prioritizes core interests like border security and hemispheric stability, invoking a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine (p. 5). But it stops short of isolationism, insisting on preventing adversarial dominance in key regions like the Indo-Pacific (pp. 19-24). This is no abandonment of strategic intent - commitments to the First Island Chain underscore a continued drive to contain China - but a reconfiguration of operational roles, where allies bear more costs and frontline risks.
Delving deeper, the NSS reveals a empire in managed retreat, cloaked as pragmatism. It critiques past elites for overestimating America’s capacity to fund both a vast welfare state and a global military apparatus (p. 1), admitting vulnerabilities in supply chains, intellectual property theft, and energy dependence (pp. 20-21). To counter this, the document demands “fairness” from allies: higher defense spending (at least matching U.S. GDP percentages) and greater contributions to collective defense (p. 10). In Asia, this means urging Japan and South Korea to “increase defense spending, with a focus on the capabilities… necessary to deter adversaries and protect the First Island Chain” (p. 24). The strategy envisions a “favorable conventional military balance” through allied investments in ports, facilities, and capabilities, effectively outsourcing deterrence to regional partners while the U.S. focuses on high-end enablers like AI, quantum computing, and missile defenses (pp. 3, 21-22). This isn’t a change in ends - containing China remains paramount - but in means: allies as shock absorbers for U.S. limitations.
Complementing the NSS is the U.S. Army’s Unified Network Plan 2.0 (AUNP 2.0), a technical roadmap that operationalizes this outsourcing through “grey” warfare. Released in early 2025, the plan shifts from siloed networks to a data-centric, Zero Trust architecture for multidomain operations (MDO) in contested environments (AUNP, pp. 2-3). It centralizes services under ARCYBER, emphasizing interoperability with allies via persistent Mission Partner Environments (MPE) (p. 6). This enables “faster, secure data sharing with partners” in denied, disrupted settings (p. 3), allowing the U.S. to wage persistent, low-intensity conflicts - cyber hunts, AI-driven readiness, and defensive operations - without full commitment (pp. 9-10). By integrating allies into this network, the U.S. offloads the cognitive and material burdens of edge operations, buying time for domestic reindustrialization amid constraints like legacy divestment and hybrid compute limitations (pp. 5-6). It’s a blueprint for “war without war,” where allies handle the grind while America preserves its core strengths.
The RAND Corporation’s 2025 report, “Thinking Through Protracted War with China,” further illuminates this theme, exploring scenarios where U.S. decline manifests in drawn-out conflicts. Sponsored by the Office of Net Assessment, the report outlines nine vignettes - from proxy wars in Southeast Asia to dueling blockades over Taiwan - where material constraints force the U.S. to protract fights, relying on allies to sustain operations (RAND, pp. iv-vii). In “Dueling Blockades” (p. 32), the U.S. imposes oil sanctions on China while airlifting supplies to Taiwan, betting on allied navies to erode Beijing’s readiness over time. “Power Grab in the Indian Ocean” (p. 37) sees the U.S. supporting India against Chinese incursions. The taxonomy of protraction - wars via proxies, on third-party turf, or with limited objectives (p. 47) - highlights U.S. incentives to degrade China indirectly, outsourcing risks to partners. Yet it warns of industrial bottlenecks: stockpiles deplete, surges fail against China’s manufacturing edge, forcing reliance on reusable platforms and allied surge capacity (pp. 50-52). This underscores the NSS’s logic: prolong conflicts to exploit U.S. advantages in tech and alliances, but at the cost of exposing partners to quagmires.
Nowhere is this outsourcing more precarious than in Asia, where Japan, South Korea (ROK), and the Philippines grapple with nuclear shadows from China, Russia, and North Korea. The NSS’s call for First Island Chain fortification - pressing allies for “greater access to their ports” and investments in denial capabilities (p. 24) - affirms containment ambitions, but allies increasingly doubt U.S. credibility. In Japan, the pivot of the region, hedging is evident. Tokyo’s 2025 Defense White Paper prioritizes “independent strike capability,” budgeting for hypersonics and standoff munitions amid energy and food vulnerabilities that make blockade risks existential. Reactions to the NSS have been wary: An ORF analysis notes it “overlooks” North Korea’s nuclear threat and the Philippines’ frontline role, pushing Japan toward self-reliance. Public sentiment echoes this; polls show declining faith in U.S. extended deterrence, with experts warning of latent nuclear options.
South Korea faces similar dilemmas. The NSS urges Seoul to ramp up spending for collective defense, but amid DPRK escalations - backed by Russian tech - polling reveals 71-75% favoring an independent nuclear arsenal, up from 50% five years ago. The NSS’s framing of China as an “economic competitor” rather than existential threat fuels doubts: Why risk Seoul for Taiwan if Washington won’t commit fully?
The Philippines, as a frontline state, embodies the risks. The NSS assigns Manila a “frontline role” in South China Sea deterrence, expanding EDCA basing for U.S. access. Yet a Philippine Senate debate in December 2025 raised alarms over alliance reliability, questioning if U.S. sites make the archipelago a target without reciprocal homeland risks. This may deliver the Philippines some benefits by way of modernization and leverage if it was willing to use it, but risks of becoming a “buffer state” with grey-zone escalation and eroded ASEAN trust are amplified. Manila’s response? Multi-alignment: Deepening U.S. ties while negotiating with Japan, France, and India for arms, and leading trilateral patrols with Vietnam and Indonesia to avoid proxy status.
These allies tread warily, affirming partnerships publicly to avoid Washington’s ire - joint exercises continue, arms purchases flow - but hedge privately. Material constraints amplify doubts: U.S. artillery production lags China’s by orders of magnitude, rare earths remain Beijing-dependent, and shipbuilding tonnage favors the PLAN (RAND, p. 50). Dollars can’t conjure resources; prices spike, deliveries delay, eroding confidence. Diplomatically, contingencies emerge: Japan’s “strategic reciprocity” with China, ROK envoys to Beijing, Philippines’ ASEAN brokerage revival.
The die is cast for hedging, as these nations recognize U.S. power’s limits. Tokyo, Seoul, and Manila must seriously ask: Is America a credible partner when its strategy outsources existential risks? The NSS maintains containment intent but reshuffles the deck, leaving allies to bear the brunt. For Asia’s pivots, survival demands autonomy - not blind faith in a declining empire’s promises.
Meanwhile, China will be under no illusions. An empire’s twilight may well be the most dangerous of moments.
