Second round of Trump-Putin engagement incorporates elements of strategic deterrence but has failed to resolve the conflict. That’s because the war reflects a deeper struggle over institutions, grand strategy and competing value systems.
U.S. President Donald Trump is recently signaling a dramatic shift on his Ukraine-Russia policy, hinting at walking back his self-imposed 50-day ultimatum for Vladimir Putin to accept a peace deal.
Upon his presidential inauguration early this year, Donald Trump departed from conventional U.S. policy by seeking to mediate the Russia-Ukraine conflict through direct engagement with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The two leaders held six phone conversations aimed at achieving a negotiated settlement.
Contrary to expectations, however, the conflict escalated. By July, Trump was publicly accusing Putin of “acting in bad faith” as he reinstated military assistance to Ukraine — a decisive shift in strategic posture. The reversal marked the start of a second round of the U.S.-Russia confrontation, further complicating the conflict and introducing new strategic uncertainties.
Lessons from history
To understand Russia’s wartime resilience, it is essential to consider historical precedents. During the Soviet era, internal instability and economic constraints that were evident in conflicts with Poland, Finland and Afghanistan ultimately compelled Moscow to pursue cease-fires.
In the post-Soviet period, similar socioeconomic pressures influenced Russian recalibrations during the Russo-Georgian war and the Crimea crisis. Currently, as the Russia-Ukraine war enters its fourth year, the Russian Federation has drawn upon Soviet-era lessons to restructure its wartime economy through a model akin to military Keynesianism. This approach emphasizes heightened arms production, intensified social control and more muscular domestic governance. The wartime measures have significantly enhanced Russia’s capacity for endurance.
As reported by The Wall Street Journal in June, Russia has notably increased its production of navigable “loitering” munitions and Kinzhal hypersonic missiles. On July 8 alone, Russian forces launched a record 728 drones and decoy missiles, with monthly drone output projected to exceed 1,000 units by autumn. This comprehensive mobilization of economic and social resources has fortified Russia’s domestic resilience and reinforced Putin’s negotiating stance, making him increasingly resistant to Trump’s cease-fire proposals.
The peace dilemma
Although Trump demonstrated a clear willingness to pursue a negotiated peace through transactional diplomacy, the obstacles to resolution lie beyond his personal influence. Putin’s conditions for a cease-fire — which include a halt to NATO expansion, securing territorial concessions from Ukraine, lifting Western sanctions and protecting the rights of Russian minorities abroad — stand in direct opposition to NATO’s established red lines and challenge the foundational principles of the Western security architecture.
At a deeper level, the enduring Western perception of Russia as a strategic threat constitutes a structural impediment to peace. This “structural fear,” which is embedded in a long historical arc from czarist expansionism to Cold War antagonism, has shaped Western attitudes toward Russia. Winston Churchill’s Iron Curtain theory, George Kennan’s Long Telegram and Eastern Europe’s historical traumas have entrenched a security mindset that cannot be overturned easily by ad hoc diplomacy. Even if Trump is personally inclined to engage with Putin, institutional constraints within the United States, such as bipartisan support for Ukraine and consensus on maintaining sanctions against Russia, severely limit his capacity to effect a diplomatic breakthrough.
Who wins?
The question of who “wins” in war is inherently complex and often contingent upon differing moral, strategic and national-interest criteria. For nation-states, “victory” is rarely defined by a single metric.
From an external vantage point, the United States appears to be the principal beneficiary of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. First, the war has reshaped Europe’s security dynamics, as European nations have significantly increased defense spending and deepened their reliance on NATO. Second, Russia’s relative weakening has enabled Washington to forge a more cohesive transatlantic coalition, which also serves to constrain China and aligns with broader U.S. strategic objectives. Third, the conflict has generated substantial economic advantages: U.S. arms and energy exports have soared, and the U.S. dollar’s role as a global safe-haven currency has been reaffirmed.
From Russia’s perspective, the prevailing international order marginalizes its strategic interests. Despite the high costs of war, Moscow has achieved several key objectives, including the establishment of a buffer zone to impede NATO expansion, the promotion of multipolarity through anti-Western narratives in the Global South and the consolidation of control over strategically and economically vital regions to bolster national resilience. For Putin, this represents a costly yet inevitable confrontation.
Ukraine, despite its remarkable military and diplomatic efforts and the admiration it has garnered worldwide, continues to suffer devastating losses. By July this year, the war had caused over $500 billion in damage to the country. The potential use of frozen Russian assets for reconstruction carries significant risks, including the possibility of fueling future conflicts.
Further, Ukraine’s reconstruction efforts will require funding on an unprecedented scale. According to World Bank estimates, Ukraine’s total reconstruction costs had reached $524 billion as of December, with ongoing monthly damage of $3 billion to $5 billion if hostilities continue at current levels. Plus, Ukraine’s long-term prospects are inextricably tied to sustained Western support but divided opinion in the West on territorial concessions and the scope of aid cast considerable doubt on the feasibility of a decisive Ukrainian victory.
War as politics
Trump once imagined that his supposed art of the deal could broker peace in Ukraine. But reality has made clear that war is not a deal to be made; it is the extension of politics by other means. The illusion of a negotiated victory is giving way to the imperatives of deterrence and strategic pressure. The United States and its allies are systematically targeting the foundations of Russia’s wartime resilience. Nevertheless, Russia — having overcome initial disarray and transitioned fully to a wartime regime — is signaling that its strategic rivalry with the United States is far from over.
The second round of Trump-Putin engagement incorporates elements of strategic deterrence, but it has failed to bring the conflict closer to resolution. Beyond the battlefield, the war reflects a deeper struggle over institutions, grand strategy and competing value systems. It foreshadows an increasingly unstable international order.
