When Presidents Xi Jinping and Donald Trump meet in Beijing on May 14-15, both are looking to stabilize the volatile and fraught U.S.-China relationship. Significant and diverse differences between the two sides will endure long beyond the summit meeting, but overall stabilization and progress on ten specific policy areas is achievable.
Stabilization. This is the buzzword increasingly heard around Washington DC these days in the run-up to President Trump’s May 14-15 trip to Beijing and superpower summit with China’s leader Xi Jinping. Stabilization of bilateral relations is thought to be both the intended goal of the president and his administration, as well as the predicted outcome of the state visit.
Given how rocky and fluctuant the U.S.-China relationship has been for the past decade since Trump’s first term, some real (and not ephemeral) stabilization would be welcomed from many quarters—not the least of which are third countries in many parts of the world (Asia, Europe, Middle East, and Latin America) which are caught in the middle of U.S.-China geostrategic rivalry and have been feeling increased pressure to “choose” between Beijing and Washington (Trump’s antagonistic policies have pushed many of these countries increasingly towards Beijing in recent months).
However, stabilization should not be confused with either a new “Grand Bargain” or a real “Reset” of relations. The underlying structural “contradictions” (as the Chinese like to say) are so pervasive and deep that there is no escaping the relationship of “comprehensive competition.” Yet there are many reasons why the two sides should do their best to “manage the competition” and establish a framework of “competitive coexistence.” This will involve a lot of selective bargaining on various specific issues—rather than negotiating a comprehensive “package deal” as President Trump sometimes seeks.
President Trump clearly seeks a successful and well-publicized state visit and he has been carefully laying the groundwork for many months by taking a number of politically sensitive policy actions that would please the Chinese side: withholding two arms packages for Taiwan totaling $14 billion; authorizing the sale of Nvidia’s advanced H200 microchips to China; holding to the “tariff truce” he reached with President Xi in South Korea last October; loosening some restrictions on Chinese investments in the United States; seeking to restrain Japanese Prime Minister Takaishi’s language concerning China and Taiwan; not criticizing China’s longstanding support for Iran; forbidding his cabinet members from public comments or criticisms of China while repeatedly praising his “excellent relationship” with his “good friend” President Xi. And, of course, Trump has made no comments concerning human rights in China—as he is the first American president not to care or speak about the Chinese government’s domestic behavior and authoritarian political system.
What to Watch for at the Summit?
There are ten things to anticipate and watch for from the Trump-Xi meetings.
First, expect a regal spectacle of pageantry and pomp put on by the Chinese government for Trump. In 2017 Xi gave Trump a “state visit plus” with dinner in the Forbidden City—expect it to be even more elaborate this time. The ceremonies will likely go well beyond the standard review of the military Honor Guard and Great Hall of the People meetings—it could include a military parade and/or a carefully choreographed mass rally by thousands in Tiananmen Square with Xi and Trump presiding from atop Tiananmen Gate. Playing to Trump’s ego is certain, and the Chinese are long practiced in the rituals of receiving dignitaries from afar.
Second, at least for the Chinese side, Taiwan will top the agenda and is certain to be discussed. Xi will be looking for marginal gains, particularly in altering the standard language used by the United States Government across multiple presidencies. Xi would be delighted if Trump would say that he “opposes” rather than “does not support” Taiwan independence; accepts the “One China Principle” instead of the “One China Policy”; and supports “peaceful reunification” of the island with the mainland. Trump may not even know, or care about, the carefully worded catechism of America’s longstanding policies concerning Taiwan—anchored in the three joint communiques, the Taiwan Relations Act, and the Six Assurances—and he could accidentally or intentionally fundamentally alter this framework that has endured since 1982.
So, don’t be surprised if Trump uses language (or falls into a linguistic trap) concerning Taiwan policy. But Trump may be tempted to go further and discuss some kind of “Grand Bargain” with Xi concerning Taiwan. There is reason to believe that Trump sees Taiwan as a huge impediment to the kind of relationship (anchored on vast bilateral commerce and geostrategic spheres of influence) he seeks with China—in the same way that he sees Ukraine as an impediment to the commercial and geostrategic relationship he seeks with Vladimir Putin and Russia. For Trump, Taiwan and Ukraine are encumbrances to the kind of recast relationships he seeks with the other two major powers in the world. Trump could end up throwing Taiwan under the bus, and there is sincere concern about this in Taipei.
Third, anticipate a Chinese pledge of gigantic investment into the United States. The amount could possibly surpass the extraordinary $550 billion investment pledge that Japan made in July 2025 (because China would never allow itself to be second to Japan). Such a dramatic pledge would obviously delight President Trump—who seeks such pledges from various countries—but it would present a real test for the U.S. government bureaucracy and individual states, which have sought to limit Chinese investments in several sectors (a source of considerable frustration for Chinese firms).
Fourth, expect a Chinese pledge for very large purchases of American soybeans and other agricultural products (wheat, sorghum, pork, beef) and biotech, Boeing aircraft, natural gas and perhaps some oil. For its part, the U.S. side will look for pledges to open up investment opportunities in China and general improvements of the poor operating climate for American businesses in the country.
Fifth, the U.S. delegation will seek an indefinite extension of the moratorium on implementing China’s new export control regime governing “rare earth” minerals and magnets. Xi told Trump he would freeze this when they met in South Korea six months ago. These minerals—over which China has a virtual global monopoly—are vital to the manufacture of everything from laptop computers to fighter jets.
A sixth area to watch is in military-to-military relations, where there may (hopefully) be some forward movement in crisis communication mechanisms. The U.S. side would like to start a dialogue on nuclear weapons “strategic stability,” but the Chinese side is likely uninterested in that.
A seventh issue concerns Iran, where Trump may ask Xi’s help in convincing the regime in Tehran to abandon its uranium enrichment and nascent nuclear weapons program, and to permanently open the Strait of Hormuz. China certainly has considerable influence over the Iranian regime, but it is doubtful that Beijing would exercise its leverage.
Eighth, hopefully the two sides could agree to relaxing their respective strictures on people-to-people exchanges, which have dramatically atrophied since the COVID-19 pandemic as both sides have “securitized” educational and professional exchanges. At present, there are only about 1200 American students studying in China (270,000 Chinese in the U.S. universities this academic year), and this needs to be dramatically increased. Opportunities for American scholars to conduct research in China has been similarly sharply curtailed by the Xi government, while the U.S. Government has also placed various unnecessary restrictions on visas for Chinese students and researchers.
Ninth, anticipate further incremental steps on fentanyl, building on previous agreements in October 2025, whereby China takes steps to stem the export of chemical precursors to Mexico used to manufacture the drug.
Tenth, the two sides may initiate a dialogue on Artificial Intelligence (AI), which is urgently needed. AI is, however, only one key element in the broader fierce competition in high technology innovation between the two countries, and a framework for rationalizing respective export controls should be explored.
These ten specific areas are all to be watched and anticipated. But the real significance of the summit is that both sides are going into it with a mutual desire to stabilize bilateral relations. If that can be achieved, and a framework for managing the competitive relationship can be established, it will have been a successful summit.
