The ROK’s new president, Lee Jae-myung, is attempting to improve relations with Pyongyang. But if Seoul is serious, it will need to take steps that go beyond rhetoric. Conciliatory efforts may not guarantee Pyongyang’s engagement, but they could lower the temperature and create space for negotiation.
South Korea’s president vows to build ‘military trust’ with North Korea.
In recent years, relations on the Korean Peninsula have reached their lowest point since the end of the Cold War. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has continued to expand its nuclear arsenal and conduct missile tests. It has even written its status as a nuclear-armed state into its constitution. It has described its posture with the Republic of Korea to the south as permanent enemy relationship.
Meanwhile, the United States, the ROK and Japan have been continuously strengthening their military cooperation and building deterrence against the north. There has been no contact or dialogue between the opposing sides. Last year, the alliance between Russia and the DPRK was restored.
Under the circumstances, while neither side of the peninsula may intend to provoke a military conflict, there is a serious risk. The potential escalation of a nuclear weapon looms ever larger.
When President Lee Jae-myung assumed office, he pledged to engage in what he called pragmatic diplomacy — a foreign policy that serves the ROK’s national interests. This new policy includes three primary elements:
• While continuing to attach high importance to alliances and partnerships, the ROK will focus more on strengthening its autonomous defense capabilities.
• The ROK will pursue a more balanced relationship with the United States, China and Russia.
• To ease and stabilize relations on the Korean Peninsula by resuming dialogue (including denuclearization talks) and rebuilding mutual trust.
It seems to me that accomplishing the last element of his pledged policy will be the most difficult and most challenging. But the administration has sent some clear signals of goodwill to Pyongyang:
• On June 11, the South Korean Defense Ministry ordered the cessation of loudspeaker broadcasts into North Korea.
• On June 15, President Lee said at the commemoration of the 25th anniversary of the North-South Joint Declaration that both sides should “stop destructive hostile actions” and quickly restore dialogue channels, along with the crisis management system, and usher in a new era of peaceful coexistence and prosperity on the peninsula.
• On July 21, South Korea’s Ministry of Unification proposed to open individual tours to the DPRK.
• On Aug. 4, the South Korean military began dismantling the loudspeaker broadcasting facilities aimed toward North Korea in the border area.
On Aug. 15, President Lee, while attending the 80th anniversary commemoration of Liberation Day, further said that the South Korean government should respect the current system in North Korea and does not seek any form of unification or absorption, nor does it have any intention of engaging in any hostile actions.
South Korea will take the lead in restoring the 9/19 Military Agreement (2018) between the two sides in stages to prevent accidental conflicts. He also said that South Korea is willing to follow the principle of “mutual benefit and prosperity, supplying each other’s needs,” to restore and improve the cooperative foundation for inter-Korean civilian exchanges and to create conditions for common development.
Additionally, it was reported that the Lee administration was considering inviting Kim Jong-un to attend the informal meeting of APEC leaders to be held in South Korea at the end of the year.
The series of conciliatory policy declarations and actions toward North Korea by the Lee Jae-myeong administration stand in sharp contrast to the tough posture taken by the Yoon Suk-yeol administration. However, there has been little positive response from the North Korea so far — and, perhaps more important, no support from Seoul’s allies for this outreach.
Recent events have complicated the situation. In July, the United States, Japan and the ROK conducted a joint air exercise south of Jeju Island, with the participation of a U.S. strategic bomber. Immediately after that, in mid-August, the South Korean and U.S. militaries conducted a routine joint military exercise under the code name “Uijeong Freedom Shield.” Regarding the exercise in July, North Korea was silent, but for the exercise in August it raised a strong protest before the exercise began, claiming that if the exercise “overstepped the boundary” Pyongyang would promptly take strong countermeasures.
There is no doubt that the joint military exercises by South Korea and its allies sent a negative message to the DPRK. They led North Korea to believe that President Lee’s conciliatory gestures were merely temporary, or that even if he did have the desire to improve relations between North and the South he lacked the ability to do so.
Kim Yong-jun, deputy minister of the Central Committee of the Labor Party and the younger sister of the top leader of the DPRK, said a few weeks ago that South Korea’s invitation of Kim Jong-un to the APEC summit was a “daydream,” putting words to the north’s extreme dissatisfaction with the south.
So, I think that if Seoul is serious about improving North-South relations, it will need to take steps that go beyond rhetoric. Measures should include suspending or scaling down large-scale joint exercises, lifting selected sanctions (particularly those affecting humanitarian aid) and pursuing cooperative projects in areas such as disaster relief and public health. These efforts will not guarantee Pyongyang’s engagement, but they could lower the temperature and create space for negotiations.
It’s important that any such efforts be coordinated not only with the United States and Japan but also with China and Russia, whose influence in North Korea remains significant. Without their support, it will be difficult to achieve sustainable progress.
In addition, as is well-known, the DPRK will firmly oppose any dialogue about its denuclearization. My suggestion is that the ROK and its allies should start talks with Pyongyang from a crisis management and military confidence-building perspective. If such a dialogue were to make progress, both sides could take the second step and talk about arms control. A third step would involve diplomatic relations.
Perhaps, one day, if conditions were to ripen, the topic of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula could be on the agenda. At present, we should keep it as an ultimate goal but not a precondition for talks. I think this will be a pragmatic way to resume and develop talks with Pyongyang.
Finally, I have one more hope — that the Lee administration will adhere to its policy and not seek nuclear weapons for South Korea nor seek to share nuclear weapons with the United States or demand the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula. Otherwise, nuclear proliferation and crisis on the Korean Peninsula will only become increasingly acute. Once a domino falls, the ultimate effect could be the collapse of the entire global nuclear non-proliferation mechanism.
