“All politics,” as the familiar English saying goes, “is local.” For Chinese political elites, however, locality carries two distinct meanings: the jurisdiction in which political authority is exercised, and the geographic origins of the political elites who exercise it. In contemporary China, the frequent gap between where officials are from and where they serve has long drawn public and scholarly interest. Two main questions are commonly raised: How often do officials’ places of origin overlap with the jurisdictions in which they serve? And how is regional origin distributed across the national leadership?

Observers of Chinese elite politics routinely prioritize Beijing as the primary focus of analysis, searching for clues about leadership changes in the limited information coming from the center. Yet critical insights worthy of attention are not exclusively concentrated in Zhongnanhai. A substantial share of early indicators often initially emerges within the leaderships of China’s 31 provincial-level administrations.

China’s market reforms and economic restrictions have transformed its economy into a more capitalistic state since 1979. What can it do to ensure equality as costs of living rise and income disparity becomes more pronounced?

The 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of China recently concluded, and with Xi Jinping entering his third term with a Politburo Standing Committee of allies, the stage is set for coherent leadership over the next five years.

As China grows stronger, its approach to the world will naturally shift to cope with new conditions and challenges. President Xi Jinping’s report to the 20th Party Congress illuminates China’s diplomatic stance in the new era. He set the direction for China’s foreign policy development in the years ahead.

After the 20th Party Congress, relations with the U.S., Europe and Japan are likely to improve, as China continues to pursue high-quality development and the integration of domestic demand with supply-side structural reforms.

“Upper echelon strategists,” a term coined in some quarters of the Chinese political establishment, support Xi Jinping by playing an increasingly key role in China’s strategic thinking, ideological discourse, and propaganda work. And as some top scholar-officials move to the center stage in propaganda and ideological work during Xi’s third term, one can expect that “upper echelon strategists” like them will gain more influence in the years to come.

Chinese think tanks have far-reaching influence – their scholars serve as researchers and disseminators of state-approved information, and their leaders are also assuming positions of power in the Party. Xi Jinping has relied on think tanks more than his predecessors, and they deserve a closer look.

A significant portion of senior officers of the People’s Liberation Army has been trained in Russia. As the relationship between China and U.S.-led NATO countries continues to deteriorate, an examination of Russian-educated military elites within the Chinese leadership is critically important.

The Russia-Ukraine conflict has predictably become this year’s dominant international story. In the West, China has often been cast alongside Russia as the world’s villain-in-waiting - and this deserves a deep dive into the relationship between two nations seemingly sharing the hot seat on the global stage.