China’s fast growing economy has been the story of the 21st century. By learning from past catastrophes, Beijing hopes to avoid the costly recessions that have burdened other wealthy nations who exposed their financial sector to risk-laden operations.

President Xi’s speech at the G20 calls to mind the childhood fable of the Three Little Pigs, in which houses of straw and sticks could not stand against a threat. The analogy is apt, as China’s response to COVID-19 has been robust. And it’s clearly worth emulating.

An ideological competition has sprung from pandemic, and the space for the two sides to compromise and collaborate has narrowed rapidly. The two countries appear to be entering a lose-lose war in which the entire international community will suffer.

The world is reeling from the novel coronavirus epidemic. While the epidemic has been effectively contained in China, many other important economies across the world are being hit hard, and humanity has been thrown into crisis mode.

China’s household registration system, known as the hukou system, was employed throughout imperial China and used as a caste system under Mao Zedong. Now that China is attempting to rise into the ranks of rich countries, the legacy of this system is a major obstacle.

China’s 2019 government work report lays out the country’s economic policies to sustain growth and avoid the “middle income trap” that Premier Le Keqiang has warned of. In taking steps next year to realize the “Chinese dream,” three battles will be tough but key: defusing financial risks, effecting targeted poverty alleviation, and achieving pollution control.

Trust in U.S. institutions has plunged while China saw the biggest trust gains among its own citizens, according to the 2018 Edelman Trust Barometer,

If many analysts prove correct in their forecasts, China’s military leadership will undergo the largest-ever turnover of military elite in the history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) at the 19th Party Congress this October.

Xi Jinping’s administration has emphasized the promotion of leaders who have worked in China’s poorest and most remote provinces, or “hardship” regions. But not all emerging heavyweights with experience in hardship regions are Xi Jinping’s protégés. In fact, some have strong personal ties to Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) and Li Keqiang (李克强).

The new system evolving in the anti-corruption campaign will not only integrate the existing supervisory bodies and their functions, but extend the scope of the oversight of the CPC’s discipline watchdog from Party members to all public officials. Pilot programs in three very different regions will provide examples for future reforms.