Donald Trump prefers to treat the waters as a bargaining chip, so the United States may reduce high-profile provocations — such as close-in reconnaissance — and instead increase its “gray” tactics and low-intensity military exercises.
(From left) U.S. Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin, Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles, Japanese Defence Minister Minoru Kihara and Philippine Defence Secretary Gilberto Teodoro hold a joint press conference following their talks in Hawaii on May 2, 2025. (Photo: Kyodo)
Six months into Trump 2.0, the U.S. administration’s South China Sea policy has largely continued along the trajectory of Trump 1.0 and the Biden administration. Specifically, Trump has focused on leveraging the South China Sea issue to deepen security cooperation with both regional and non-regional allies. The goal of this strategy is to forge a maritime alliance to contain China, while simultaneously amplifying political and propaganda efforts to shape international perceptions of a China threat. Using confrontation and pressure as his primary tools, Trump’s South China Sea policy seeks additional leverage in the broader strategic competition against China. However, this approach is likely to exacerbate uncertainties.
Trump introduced America’s Indo-Pacific Strategy in his first term, positioning the South China Sea as its core area and describing China’s activities there as a form of a “salami-slicing” style of geostrategic expansion and framing China’s legitimate claims and protection of its rights as a direct challenge to. Trump opted for a strong U.S. pushback.
During his first term, Trump adopted a more assertive stance in the South China Sea. He adjusted policy statements to deny China’s rights and interests in the region, while supporting the claims of countries like Vietnam and the Philippines. He also imposed sanctions on Chinese entities and individuals involved in the construction of artificial islands and reefs in the area. Additionally, he stepped up U.S. “freedom of navigation” operations, upgraded reconnaissance and military exercises and actively rallied both regional and non-regional allies to bolster their military presence.
In late May this year, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth attended the Shangri-La Dialogue and delivered a speech outlining the U.S. security vision for the Indo-Pacific region and its strategy for addressing the alleged China challenge. In his speech, Hegseth characterized China as the “most realistic and potentially imminent security threat” in the region and falsely claimed that China is “harassing its neighbors in the South China Sea” and “challenging sovereignty, freedom of navigation and overflight.” He said that “any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo in the South China Sea and the First Island Chain through the use of force or coercion is unacceptable.”
This latest U.S. stance reflects that, against the backdrop of increasing strategic competition with China, the Trump administration will maintain a tough position on the South China Sea and adopt more substantive military intervention policies.
First, the U.S. is set to significantly increase its support for the Philippines, positioning it as a key military outpost in the Indo-Pacific. In pursuit of the strategic objective of countering China through maritime means, the Trump administration has continued the policy trajectory of the Biden period by deepening the U.S.-Philippines alliance. Washington is actively backing Manila in its efforts to push back against Beijing, reaffirming security commitments while accelerating the modernization and arming of the Philippine military. This includes advancing military deployments in and around the South China Sea.
In the next phase, the U.S. is expected to expedite the deployment of advanced weapons systems in the Philippines, expanding the presence of tactical assets such as the Typhoon midrange missile system and the NMESIS anti-ship missile system. The goal is to establish a “three-tiered firepower network” capable of covering the South China Sea and thereby enhancing the ability to counter China’s anti-access/area-denial capabilities (A2/AD) capabilities within the first island chain.
Additionally, the U.S. military is planning to construct the world’s largest pre-positioned equipment depot near Subic Bay Naval Base in the Philippines. This development could mark the most significant U.S. military logistics initiative in the country since the withdrawal of American forces in 1992.
Second, the United States is strengthening collective and institutionalized engagement in the South China Sea alongside its allies. Since Trump returned to office, he has used the Philippines as a strategic pivot. Frequent military exercises with Manila and other Asia-Pacific allies in the South China Sea have been conducted — operations that further integrate the Indo-Pacific military network on the pretext of addressing regional security concerns. This year’s U.S.-Philippines Balikatan joint military exercises reached historic scale, with participation from Japan and Australia for the first time in the form of special detachments.
As the U.S. continues to institutionalize its minilateral security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific during Trump 2.0, the U.S. is expected to leverage these mechanisms as tools and platforms for future intervention in the South China Sea. In coordination with Japan, Australia, India and others, the U.S. aims to form a “ring of deterrence.” Washington will also enhance the operational capacity of minilateral frameworks such as the QUAD (U.S., Japan, India, Australia) and the SQUAD (U.S., Japan, Philippines, Australia), making them more combat-ready and mission-oriented.
In addition, the U.S. military will accelerate the construction and upgrading of bases in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly in the Philippines. These efforts will be integrated with other strategic nodes, including Japan, Guam and Diego Garcia, to form a “forward intervention chain” that effectively reconstructs the deterrence architecture of the first island chain.
Third, the United States is reinforcing the strategic framework known as “three-sea linkage.” Under Trump 2.0, there will be a stronger effort to bind the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea into a single, contiguous combat zone. This year, the U.S.-Philippines Balikatan military exercises clearly simulated a conflict scenario in the Taiwan Strait, reflecting the growing tendency toward joint U.S.-Philippine intervention in a potential Taiwan contingency.
During the ninth iteration of the U.S.-Philippines Kamandag exercises held on May 26, additional NMESIS anti-ship missile launchers and U.S. Army HIMARS rocket artillery systems were deployed to the Philippines between Luzon Island and Taiwan. Live-fire drills were conducted focused on anti-ship operations. This demonstrates the integrated, cross-theater nature of U.S. preparations with its allies across the three seas — the South China Sea, Taiwan Strait and East China Sea.
In recent months, the Philippines has adopted a more provocative stance on Taiwan-related issues. Going forward, Manila is expected to increase its cooperation with the U.S. military in the Taiwan Strait, particularly in supporting American efforts to establish direct control over the Bashi Channel and the southern approaches to the strait. The objective is to be able to disrupt PLA mobility east of the island in the event of a conflict.
Notably, while the Trump administration maintains a tough stance on China, Trump himself has shown less interest in the South China Sea, preferring to treat it as a bargaining chip to avoid direct confrontation. As a result, the United States may reduce high-profile provocations, such as close-in reconnaissance, and instead increase its involvement through “gray” tactics and low-intensity military exercises. Washington is also likely to push regional allies, particularly the Philippines, to the forefront, encouraging Manila to continue challenging China in areas such as Ren’ai Reef, Xianbin Reef and Huangyan Island.
Despite ongoing tensions, however, both China and the U.S. want to avoid any direct military confrontation, favoring long-term competition through proxy strategies and rule-based rivalry. In light of global and regional instability, most countries in Southeast Asia are cautious about external powers inflaming tensions. They hope to prevent the South China Sea issue from disrupting China-ASEAN relations and broader regional cooperation.
China has opportunities to stabilize the South China Sea and enhance maritime cooperation with neighboring nations. Moving forward, Beijing should adopt a comprehensive approach that combines diplomacy, security cooperation, military preparedness and international messaging. It should work with ASEAN to achieve and maintain lasting peace and stability.
