U.S. President Donald Trump views allies as a security burden while championing the sovereignty of great powers. This has forced the EU to accelerate efforts to consolidate its role in regional security—ostensibly to ease America’s burden but in reality to protect itself.
Ukraine, on the European Union’s southeastern fringe, has in effect become the union’s “hard border” in the wake of Russia’s invasion, making its accession to the EU only a matter of time. Since Donald Trump has been in office in the United States, his repeated secret negotiations with Russia have made the need for the EU to integrate its periphery institutionally all the more urgent.
In April this year, a change of government in Hungary after a general election created an opportunity for the EU to rethink enlargement in a more systematic way. In early October, the European Commission issued a document describing preparations for a wider European Union. It suggests that the EU plans to open up its economy to candidate countries in exchange for their alignment on matters of strategic and economic security. This amounts to a strategic integration of the EU’s neighborhood to consolidate the foundations of the group. Montenegro, Albania, Moldova and Ukraine were been designated as the first candidates for accession. Montenegro, ranked first, is widely expected to join the EU by 2028. Ukraine signed a defense-industrial partnership with the European Commission in July, paving the way for its integration into Europe’s rapidly expanding defense industry.
On the EU’s northwestern flank, the shockwaves generated by Trump have been more immediate. At the end of last year, the “Donroe Doctrine” emerged with the publication of the U.S. National Security Strategy, in which Trump cast the Western Hemisphere as America’s sphere of influence. But the hemisphere, in Trump’s conception, extends beyond the Americas. In September he posted an image on social media showing the U.S. flag draped over Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean, as well as Canada, Greenland (a Danish territory), Iceland and even the overseas territories of France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. From the EU’s perspective, this amounts to the addition of an American threat on its northwestern flank to the Russian threat on its southeastern flank.
The EU has traditionally focused on cultivating relations with its neighbors to the east and south, for which it has established dedicated policies and mechanisms. In light of the new northwestern developments, the European Commission issued a communication on Oct. 20 entitled “Europe’s Northern Neighborhood: A New Strategy for the Arctic.”
The European Arctic Summit was held in mid-September in Rovaniemi, Finland. In a joint statement, Finland, Denmark, Estonia, France, Greece, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania and Sweden declared: “Intensified great power competition, the consequences of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, China’s increased security policy interest, and the accelerating and severe impacts of climate change are reshaping the region’s strategic environment.” Although the United States was not explicitly named, it was in fact the biggest new variable in the equation.
Canada, Greenland and Iceland have also increasingly turned to the EU for support. Against this backdrop, several noteworthy developments have taken place in recent months.
Canada came out first. In mid-September, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, an advocate of a “coalition of middle powers,” visited Europe, bringing Canada-EU relations to a brief high point. In her annual State of the Union address to the European Parliament, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen welcomed Canada as the EU’s first “associate member.” But after Trump called the move a “hostile act” and threatened to impose additional tariffs on the EU, both sides quickly toned down their rhetoric.
Second came Greenland. In early and late September, Denmark and Greenland signed separate documents with the EU and the United States. Greenland’s agreement with the United States was more formal than the joint declaration it signed with the EU, and it included provisions for military cooperation. Under its terms, the United States could establish two new military bases in Greenland and gain access to its territory, territorial waters and seabed. However, the agreement also explicitly affirmed Danish sovereignty, reinforced NATO’s role and upheld international law. It was therefore welcomed by the European side. It stipulated that no non-NATO country could establish bases in Greenland or exploit critical minerals or rare earth minerals without the consent of all three signatories—a provision that could be interpreted as a warning to China and Russia.
Third came Iceland. In a referendum in late August, a majority of Iceland’s voters opposed reopening negotiations regarding EU accession. This was a setback, albeit a limited one, for the EU’s geopolitical ambitions. In early October, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio made Iceland the first stop on his European tour.
A brief word here about the United Kingdom: Like Canada, Greenland and Iceland, Britain lies between the United States and continental Europe. Although it is not part of the “sphere of influence” coveted by Trump, Britain has been unable to establish a special relationship and is being squeezed by China, the United States and Europe amid global trade turmoil. It has therefore been forced to rethink its own place in the world. At the Labour Party conference in late September, Britain’s new Prime Minister Andy Burnham declared that “Brexit has done more harm than good.” The following day, he said that options for moving closer to Europe could include rejoining the single market and the customs union, or even returning to the EU in full. This marked a major shift in Labour’s attitude toward the EU.
All these developments have reignited debate over the EU’s identity. The proposed status of “associate member” for Canada is something new; previously, it had been discussed only in the context of Ukraine’s accession to the EU. Greenland, an autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark, is not itself part of the EU. Now, with the EU at its back, it entrusts its security to the United States and its resources to NATO, seeking to defuse potential disputes through a complex, multilayered status. Although Iceland is not an EU member, its ties with it are in fact closer than those of the UK after Brexit. Iceland is a member of the European Free Trade Association and the European Economic Area, as well as the Schengen Area.
Europe’s elaborate, overlapping and ever-expanding institutional arrangements have now reached a point where they need to be reorganized to unlock their greater potential. Although a European regional order can truly take shape only after the global order has stabilized, the EU will in the meantime seek various ways to counter the shocks caused by international turbulence.
