PRC policy makers have found themselves cross-pressured: They would prefer that Pyongyang refrain from provocative actions like nuclear weapons testing, yet are unwilling to impose the substantial pressure on the DPRK desired by the United State for fear that its regime would collapse and China would suffer economic and security costs.

Sino-U.S. relations in cyberspace in 2016 will be defined by three key policies: attribution, sanctions, and norms. Franz-Stefan Gady discusses what each policy could look like, and also the reviews the cyber diplomacy between the two countries in 2015.

China-US cooperation is the critical factor for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Regaining and maintaining security in the area is the common interest and common responsibility of both nations, and that is the basis of President Xi Jinping’s fresh approach.

China’s position on Internet governance is that the Internet is a mere reflection of physical space, and therefore should be subject to similar norms of non-external interference. After the Wuzhen Conference, the question on how to engage with China in the realm of cyberspace remains largely unanswered.

The lesson of the DPRK’s latest nuclear test is that talking to North Korea offers a better hope of success than ignoring it. But then, that’s what Beijing has been telling the U.S. for a long time.

As the latest episode in regional conflict has unfolded, China has acted quickly on the diplomatic front, working with the United States and other major powers to reduce tension and resolve the Saudi-Iranian standoff through dialogue.

George Koo describes how a treaty between the U.S. and North Korea was within grasp until George W. Bush’s administration halted the proceedings. Since then, dealing with Pyongyang has become a blame game between the U.S. and China.

Washington should propose a “grand bargain” to Pyongyang by formally ending the state of war on the Korean Peninsula, lifting of all except narrowly defined military sanctions against the North, and U.S. diplomatic recognition of the North Korean regime. In exchange, Pyongyang would agree to place its nuclear program under international safeguards and extend diplomatic recognition to South Korea.

The recent U.S. arms sales decision regarding Taiwan led to a more moderate Chinese government reaction than seen in many previous transactions. The U.S. arms transfers to Taiwan serve multiple purposes and are likely to continue whoever is the leader of the next government in Taipei and in Washington.

“Strategic Patience” has not served the US well as a policy, nor has a collection of unilaterally pursued sanctions, diplomatic pressure, isolation and military deterrence. Even late in a president’s second term, there is an opportunity to shift gears and seek a new approach.