Outer space belongs to all humanity. No nation should seek to monopolize space resources or dominate humanity’s space future. Only by rejecting hegemony and prioritizing the peaceful utilization of outer space can global space undertakings deliver shared benefits and drive the progress of human civilization.

When President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping meet in Washington this week, AI governance is expected to be at the top of the agenda. The United States and China have been racing to develop increasingly powerful AI systems, and neither has shown much appetite for slowing down. But not even the winner of the AI race will be exempt from the profound risks the technology poses.

The challenges posed by the development of artificial intelligence are no longer hypothetical. They are already a reality. Viewing AI solely through the lens of competition could cause China and the United States to miss opportunities to coordinate and address shared risks.

In the past few weeks, the global AI race has entered a new, existential stage. What makes this fluid status quo particularly perilous is the effort to exploit AI for global supremacy.

By Quan Zhao GENEVA—When Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump meet in Washington this month, AI will be near the top of the agenda

The American-Israeli war against Iran failed to produce the Middle East security order the two parties had hoped for but instead has spurred the emergence of a new security architecture in the Gulf to work around regional distrust of U.S. guarantees.

America’s Gold Eagle framework is fragmenting global technology, accelerating the securitization of AI and pushing the world closer to a new kind of technological cold war—one that threatens to make AI a source of permanent global conflict rather than a shared tool for collective progress.​

Given the overwhelming superiority of the American military, Washington could create the appearance of bringing Iran under control. Regardless how the conflict ultimately unfolds, however, the United States is unlikely ever to return to an era in which the Iran issue was manageable at a limited and predictable cost.

Britain may not become a third AI superpower alongside China and the United States, but it is well positioned to serve as an important bridge across different governance frameworks.

For nearly eight decades, American grand strategy in the Indo-Pacific has rested on a singular assumption: that the United States can project decisive military