Data flows and other high-tech issues come to the fore as officials pursue agreement.

Deterrence will not be enough.

Although Moore’s law about the doubling of computing power every two years means that cyber time moves quickly, human habits, norms, and state practices change more slowly.

Google has quietly opened a third office in China, highlighting its growing hardware and ad businesses in the country even as the US tech company’s signature search engine remains blocked there.

This week, China's homegrown tech giants Tencent, Alibaba and Baidu took the competition to the U.S., showcasing the best of their innovation at the Consumer Electronics Show in Las Vegas.

The key to which country currently takes the lead in the global tussle in AI and other technological forefronts can be boiled down to some fundamentals, while China is pushing the boundaries in this Sputnik Moment, it still lags behind the U.S. in this global tussle.

Cybersecurity has been a complicated and thorny issue in China-US relations ever since the Obama administration. How will China and the US manage cyberspace under Trump Era?

China’s digital economy is a force to be reckoned with. The country now accounts for 42% of global e-commerce, boasts one-third of the world’s most successful tech startups, and conducts 11 times more mobile payments than the United States per year. But there are major challenges ahead.

Since China joined the internet in 1994, China-US cyber relations have gone through three stages. What might the fourth stage look like?

The question for Western diplomats dealing in global Internet governance must be how to effectively engage China so as to maintain peace, security and stability in cyberspace – goals to which China’s cooperation strategy commits explicitly. Will cold-shouldering China empower those voices in Beijing advocating a more hawkish and isolating approach to global internet norms? Meeting China halfway on some of its desiderata, for instance a more high-profile presence at flagship Chinese events, might not only lead to a broader basis for engagement and trust, but also enable support for those voices within the Chinese system whose objectives overlap more with that of outside countries.