The incoming administration in the United States is expected to intensify export controls on China and strengthen measures to block overseas markets for Chinese technology products. However, Donald Trump’s new team, steered by his pragmatic approach, may ease the pressure in some sectors.

The US was shocked out of its 20th century global isolationism on December 7, 1941 when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. Ever since that era when a dirt-poor, war-torn China was still being derided as the “sick man of Asia”, the US has kept trying to maintain its lock on advanced technological global hegemony, doing whatever it takes to be #1, albeit with declining success.

The debate over the difference between tactics and strategy is as rich as it is enduring. In his seminal 1996 article in the Harvard Business Review, Harvard’s Michael Porter tackled this issue head on. While his focus was business, his arguments can be applied much more broadly – including to today’s Sino-American rivalry.

Chinese chipmakers have remained surprisingly resilient despite U.S. semiconductor export controls. By redirecting focus towards legacy chip production, stockpiling restricted foreign chips, government support, and open-source RISC-V chip design architecture, China’s semiconductor industry may survive Washington’s export control campaign.

Technology is ground zero in the conflict between the United States and China. For the American hegemon, it is about the leading edge of geostrategic power and the means for sustained prosperity. For China, it holds the key to the indigenous innovation required of a rising power. The tech war now underway between the two superpowers could well be the defining struggle of the twenty-first century.

National security and data risk concerns between the U.S. and China are continuously increasing, potentially leading to a ‘Cold War’ between the two countries.

To me, an eternal optimist, the United States and China appear more and more likely to be on a collision course for war. Recent US regulatory actions amount to nothing less than an economic and technological declaration of war against China and its 1.4 billion people.

News headlines described the Biden administration’s latest semiconductor-focused sanctions on China as sheer annihilation, which could ‘decapitate’ the overall semiconductor industry.

The U.S. House speaker made a bad situation worse, and China-U.S. relations are headed to a new low. Changes can be seen on multiple fronts, but perhaps most clearly in the military dynamics between the two countries and in the chip-making regime, which has become an important chess piece in the geopolitical game.

Washington wants to build a “small chip world” for itself that is decoupled from global supply chains. This is pure fantasy. The act can neither help the U.S. achieve a secure supply chain nor rejuvenate its domestic chip manufacturing sector. And it won’t slow China down either.