Following the successful summit earlier in July, many observers excitedly noted the increased possibilities of cooperation between the EU and China. But does the EU have the strategic vision and commitment necessary to truly take advantage of its new relationship with China?

While the transatlantic partnership remains a priority for Europe, this should not make the EU strategically biased against China. It should urge Europe to become a more autonomous strategic actor and to negotiate its global interests from a principled position of consolidated strength.

Sometimes love just ain’t enough.

The relations between China and the European Union (EU) are crucial in the era of Donald Trump, when the U.S. administration is set to pursue America's interest first and distancing itself from global economic leadership, said European experts.

French President Emmanuel Macron is trying to advance a new kind of "offensive multilateralism." But unless the European Union as a whole embraces the cause, Europe risks becoming a casualty of China’s efforts to bend the multilateral system to its own will or, worse, Trump’s efforts to dismantle it altogether.

In the near-term, the trigger for increased China-U.S. tensions might be foreign policy-related, for example, a hardening of positions on North Korea or a maritime incident. Or it could come from the U.S. taking more punitive economic measures.

The new rapprochement between Brussels and Beijing involves converging economic interests between Europe and China – and diverging strategic interests between Europe and America. While the shift was conceptualized as a reaction to a policy vacuum created by Trump, in reality, the ties between Brussels and Beijing have grown steadily since the 1990s, even when U.S.-Chinese ties have fallen under pressure.

When the United Kingdom, France, Germany and other U.S. allies decided to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2015 amidst clear opposition from Washington, some questioned whether it meant the transatlantic relationship was weakening in the face of a rising China. In terms of risk, rebalancing, and reward, however, the AIIB was not a situation that pitted Europe’s relationship with the U.S. against its relationship with China. Such a case may offer insight when considering the Paris Agreement and Europe’s actions if faced with choices between Washington and Beijing.

While the new French leader will focus an enormous amount of resources on domestic reform, he will also try to accomplish something big in foreign affairs. As a pro-EU president of France, Macron will make the restart of the Franco-German engine his primary task.

However histrionic the demagogic oratory of President Trump has been, his strategy to revitalize American manufacturing will be better served by exporting more to China, not decreasing Chinese imports. China’s gigantic market has thus become the golden apple of discord in an accelerating geo-economic competition between the United States and Germany, which already enjoys significant production networks within the Middle Kingdom. Yet unlike the days of the Boxer Revolution and the alliance of eight Western nations, China can this time choose her major commercial partners.